Lord Simonds, J.@mdashThis appeal which is brought from a judgment and Order of the Supreme Court of New Delhi Wales raises a question of
difficulty and importance as to the meaning and effect of certain provisions of the N. S. W. Workers'' Compensation Act, 1926-27, which will be
called ""the Act.
2. The Respondent is the administratrix of the estate of Minnie Gertrude Milligan who was an applicant for compensation under the Act in respect
of the death on the 29th May, 1947, of her husband, John Samuel Milligan, a worker employed by the Appellants.
3. The relevant provisions of the Act which must be stated are as follows: -
Section 6(1). In this Act, unless the context of subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires.
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''Injury'' means persona injury arising out of or in the course of employment and includes a disease which is contracted by the worker in the course
of his employment whether at or away from his place of employment and to which the employment was a contributing factor but does not save in
the case of a worker employed in or about a mine to which the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1912-41, applies include a disease caused by sicila
dust.
Section 7(1)(a). A worker who has received an injury whether at or away from his place of employment and in the case of the death of the worker
his dependeants shall receive compensation from his employer in accordance with this Act
(b) Where a worker has received injury without his own default or wilful act on any of the daily or other periodic journeys referred to in paragraph
(c) of this sub-section, and the injury be not received: -
(i) during or after any substantial interruption of, or substantial deviation from, any such journey, made for a reason unconnected with the worker''s
employment, or unconnected with his attendance at the trade, technical or other school, as the case may be; or
(ii) during or after any other break in any such journey, which the Commission, having regard to all the circumstances, deems not to have been
reasonably incidental to any such journey;
the worker (and in the case of the death of the worker, his dependants), shall receive compensation from the employer in accordance with this Act.
appeal The daily or other periodic journeys referred to in paragraph (b) of this sub-section shall be -
(i) between the worker''s place of abode and place of employment, and
(ii) between the worker''s place of abode, or place of employment, and any trade, technical, or other training school, which he is required by the
terms of his employment, or is expected by his employer, to attend.
(d) The provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of this sub-section shall not apply to or in respect of an injury received after the expiration of six
months after the termination of the war, which commenced on the third of September, one thousand, nine hundred and thirty-nine.
(4) Where the injury is a disease which is of such a nature as to be contracted by a gradual process compensation shall be payable by the
employer in whose employment the worker is or who last employed the worker.
(5) For the purposes of sub-section four of this section and of sections forty-four and fifty-three of this Act the injury shall be deemed to have
happened at the time of the worker''s incapacity.
4. Certain other provisions are relevant to a plea to jurisdiction raised by the Respondent but a reference to them can be conveniently deferred to a
later stage in this opinion.
5. The material facts, upon which an award of 800 pounds was made in favour of the applicant, are thus stated by the Chairman of the Workers''
Compensation Commission of New South Wales u/s 37 (4) of the Act:
(1) The deceased was employed by the Appellant Slazengers (Australia) Property Appeal. and the Respondent Minnie Gertrude Milligan was
totally dependent on the deceased''s earnings at the time of his death.
(2) On the twenty-ninth day of May, one thousand, nine-hundred and forty-seven the deceased was journeying by tram on his daily journey
between his place of abode at 23 Townes Gardens Pagewood and his place of employment with the Appellant at Alexandria when he suffered a
coronary occlusion from which he died at his place of abode on the same day.
(3) The physical effort of the deceased arising out of the journey did not play any part in the happening of the occlusion.
(4) For some months prior to his death the deceased had been receiving medical treatment for hypertension and myocardial degeneration. It was
common ground that the hypertension, myocardial degeneration and coronary occlusion were not contracted by the deceased in the course of his
employment with the Appellant nor was the employment a contributing factor thereto; neither was an injury which arose out of or in the course of
deceased''s employment.
(5) The coronary occlusion was solely due to autogenous causes and had no causal connection whatsoever with the journey.
6. Upon these facts the question of law referred at the request of the Appellant for the decision of the Supreme Court was as follows: -
On the Commission''s findings of fact did the Commission err in law in holding that the deceased John Samuel Milligan ''received injury'' within the
meaning of Section 7(1)(b) of the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1926-47?
7. This question was answered by the Supreme Court (Jordan, C.J. and Davidson and Street, JJ.) in the negative. The learned Chief Justice was of
the opinion, in which the other members of the Court concurred, that the case was completely covered by the reasons given by that Court in the
earlier case of Pearl v. Hume Steel Appeal., 47 S.R.N.S.W. 384; on appeal, 75 C.L.R. 242 which had been approved by the High Court of
Australia on Appeal (75 C.L.R. 242).
8. The facts in Pearl''s case in most respects bore a remarkable resemblance to those of the case under appeal, the points of difference being first,
that in Pearl''s case the actual cause of the coronary occlusion was detected, viz., the fact that a small piece of the lining of the artery had been
loosened and had blocked the artery, and, secondly, that this physiological change had taken place as the result of a physical effort made during
the journey, viz., that of pedalling a bicycle uphill. These points of difference, which at least established a causal connection between the injury and
the journey, were regarded as material by some at least of the learned Judges of the High Court who took part in the decision of Pearl''s case. But
it will in any case be necessary to examine the reasoning which led to that decision. Before doing so their Lordships must once more turn to the Act
itself.
9. The Act, as is commonly conceded, makes a substantial departure from former legislation in this field, and in particular deals not, as had
previous Acts, with ""injury by accident"" but with ""injury"" simpliciter, a change which made it necessary to define what had previously been
undefined. The difficulty of such definition is shown in the several alterations which were made in Amending Act between 1926 and 1947, and is
perhaps further illustrated by the fact that in the end of definition still contains the word which is itself to be defined. But this at least is clear that in
the Act the word ""injury"" (unless the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires) must bear a very artificial meaning in that it is to
include a disease which satisfies certain conditions and must, therefore, according to ordinary rules of construction exclude any other disease. It is
not disputed that it is this artificial meaning which the word ""injury"" bears in Section 7 (1) (a) of the Act. The question is what it means in the
immediately following sub-paragraph, Section 7 (1) (b). In Pearl''s case the learned Chief Justice (Latham, C.J.) thus expresses his view : ""This
definition is inapplicable to Section 7 (1)(b). If ''injury'' in Section 7 (1) (b) were given the meaning which is ascribed to the word in Section 6, then
the periodic journey provisions in Section 7 (1) (b) would apply only in cases where there was an injury within the meaning of Section 6, that is,
where the injury arose out of or in the course of the employment, etc., or was a disease of the kind mentioned in the definition. If these conditions
were satisfied, then the worker would be entitled to compensation u/s 7 (1) (a) of the Act and it would never be necessary for any worker to have
recourse to Section 7 (1)(b) which would have no possible field of operation. Accordingly, the context and the subject-matter of Section 7 (1)(b)
exclude the application of the definition of injury to the word where it appears that section."" The definition being thus excluded from Section 7 (1)
(b), the question would follow what the expression ""receive injury"" means in its new context which may for this purpose be treated as the receipt of
injury by a worker on his daily journey between his place of abode and place of employment. The Appellant, upon the assumption that the
statutory definition is excluded, says boldly that all disease falls outside the expression; the Respondent on the other hand contends that it is appoint
to cover any physiological change which happens during the journey, adopting the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice in Pearl''s case when he
says, ""It appears to me to be difficult to draw any satisfactory distinction between the breaking of a limb and the breaking of an artery or the lining
of an artery. One is as much an injury to the body, that is, something which involves a harmful effect on the body, as the other. Each is a
disturbance of the normal physiological state which may produce physical incapacity and sufferings or death. Accordingly, in my opinion the
detachment of a piece of lining of the artery in the present case should be held to be an injury. The death of the worker resulted from that injury."" It
is to be observed that the learned Chief Justice repudiated the idea that any causal connection between the injury and the journey was necessary.
In this view a temporal relation was sufficient, namely, that the injury happened while the worker was on the journey. It is not clear that all the
members of the High Court took the same view on this point.
10. This decision leads to the remarkable consequences upon which the learned Chief Justice himself observes. A worker who, having reached his
place of employment, dies of a coronary occlusion, being the result of a disease to which the employment was not contributing factor, is not entitled
to compensation : see Kellaway v. Broken Hill South Appeal., 1944 S.R. (N.S.W.) 210, a case clearly decided correctly, though some of the
reasoning may be open to criticism. On the other hand the same worker, if he dies of the same disease., in the course of his journey to or from his
place of employment, is entitled to compensation.
11. The fact that a particular interpretation of an Act may lead to strange consequences does not make it an impossible interpretation. But it should
not be adopted if a more reasonable one can be found. It appears to their Lordships that without doing violence to its language a satisfactory
construction of the section may be found. The clue to it, as they think, is to be found in an observation of Appeal. Justice Dixon in Pearl''s case. ""In
a general way,"" said that learned Judge, ""the intention doubtless was to extend the course of the employment to the journeys of the workman
between his home and his work. Injury received in the course of his journey is to stand in the same position as injury in the course of his
employment."" It appears to their Lordships that the implication of this intention is irresistible. The improbability of the word ""injury"" bearing a
different meaning in successive paragraphs of the same sub-section is so great that any legitimate interpretation which avoids this result would
appear preferable. It must be conceded that the opening words of Section 6 admit the possibility of the defined meaning being excluded, but this is
a general provision covering all the definitions. As a matter of construction it covers the definition of ""injury"" but the improbability is great that the
draftsman should have left the most important word in the whole Act to the hazard of the statutory definition being excluded and some other
meaning of meanings, to which no clue is given, being substituted. Moreover, to accord a different and a higher measure of protection to a worker
who receives injury during his journey from that accorded to one who receives it in his place of employment is clearly illogical and out of harmony
with the whole scheme of workmen''s compensation as developed in the relevant legislation. On the other hand to treat an injury received by a
workman in the course of a journey of the limited character covered by Section 7 (1) (b) as if it were an injury received by him in the course of his
employment, or (to put it somewhat differently) to treat the worker as being in the course of his employment, while he is in the course of certain
journeys, and to give the same measure of protection if he receives the same kind of injury, is a provision both rational and consistent with the
general scheme of the Act. It is, in their Lordships'' opinion, legitimate so to construe the sub-section. This involves, no doubt, that after the words
the worker"" where they occur immediately after sub-clause (ii), some such words as ""shall be deemed to have received such injury in the course
of his employment and he"" are by implication to be read into the sub-section. The result of this construction is to displace the reasoning upon which
the decision in Pearl''s case was largely founded. The word ""injury"" will retain its statutory meaning but the sub-section (1) (b) of Section 7 will
afford a valuable measure of relief in cases not covered by sub-section (1) (a). If the injury received by the worker during his journey is some
injury other than a disease, e.g., a broken limb resulting from a collision, it will be an injury received in the course of his employment and he will be
entitled to compensation : if the injury is a disease ""received"" (a difficult word in this connection to give effect to) during the journey and if it is a
disease to which the employment, including the journey, was a contributing factor, then equally he will be entitled to compensation. Their Lordships
are conscious that in thus interpreting the relevant sub-section they do not fully adopt the arguments of either the Appellant or the Respondent, but
it appears to them that thus alone can a reasonable and consistent meaning be given to it in its context.
12. As has already been mentioned, the Respondent took a preliminary objection to jurisdiction, submitting that in Sections 36 and 37 of the Act
the legislature was clearly providing that the Commission established under the Act should not be subject to control by way of appeal or otherwise
by any Court or by His Majesty in Council save only for the control exercised by way of case stated, and that on case stated the decision of the
Supreme Court was final and conclusive and was not subject to review by His Majesty in Council. This objection was not taken when application
was made to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal to His Magesty in Council, nor, so far as can be ascertained, was it taken upon the appeal in
Pearl''s case from the Supreme Court of New South Wales to the High Court of Australia. The plea is, in their Lordships'' opinion, without validity.
It is true that it is provided by Section 36 that the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction and that its action or decision shall be final and
further that its decisions shall be upon the real merits and justice of the case and that it shall not be bound to follow strict legal precedent. But
whatever might ensue from these provisions and from those of the first three sub-sections of Section 37, the fourth sub-section of that section
provides that, when any question of law arises in any proceeding before the Commission, not only may the Commission of its own motion but it
must, if any party as therein prescribed requests, state a case for the decision of the Supreme Court thereon. This procedure is commonly and
properly described as an appeal by way of case stated and is in all respects, formal and substantial, an appeal in legal proceeding to an Appellate
Court of Law. It is further provided by sub-section (7) of Section 37 that the decision of the Supreme Court shall be binding upon the Commission
and upon all the parties to the proceedings. The circumstances in which the decisions of Courts of Law in His Majesty''s Dominions and Colonies
are not subject to review by His Majesty in Council have recently been again considered in De Silva v. The Attorney-General of Ceylon, (1949)
W.N. 248; 53 APPEAL 825 (1949). Their Lordships think it unnecessary to say more than that in the present case no plausible argument was
advanced in favour of the view that under the Workers'' Compensation Act the Supreme Court is established as a tribunal from whose decisions
upon a case stated by the Commission no appeal lies to His Majesty in Council.
13. In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and the question stated for the decision of the
Supreme Court should be answered in the affirmative. The Respondent must pay the costs of the Appellant in the Supreme Court and of this
appeal.