Sathiadev, J.@mdashThis application is preferred by the petitioner in W.P. No. 8843 of 1982. The writ petition was filed impleading not only
respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein, but also one SM. Swetharanyam as a respondent, who is the husband of the third respondent in this application.
2. The writ petition was filed to quash a notice issued by the first respondent dated October 18, 1982, and to restrain him from taking any steps
thereof, pending decision of rights of parties in the partition suit O.S. No. 50 of 1982, Sub-Court, Devakottai.
3. The impugned notice was issued directing petitioner to furnish particulars in connection with the jewellery mentioned therein, and (i) to furnish a
list of jewellery given for wealth-tax assessment; (ii) the reasons for the difference between the two; (iii) details for fresh acquisition and evidence
for the same; and (iv) to identify the jewels given for wealth-tax purposes at the time of inspection on September 3, 1982 at Devakottai. The
caption for the communication states ""Action u/s 132 - M.R.M.SP. House, Devakottai."" This communication having been issued based on an
earlier communication dated October 15, 1982 calling upon the petitioner to attend the office on October 28, 1982 with the required particulars,
the petitioner has preferred the writ petition claiming that any decision in the partition suit already instituted would be a judgment in rem and would
prevail over any presumption that could be envisaged u/s 132(4A) of the Income Tax Act, and that the said section is ultra vires.
4. He has stated as follows in the affidavit :
The properties involved in the proceedings belong to one Subramania Chettiar, who died in 1937 leaving behind two sons Venkatachala Chettiar
and Swaminatha Chettiar. Petitioner, V. Subramaniam and V. Lakshmanan, and third respondent were born to Venkatachalam Chettiar, and
Swaminathan Chettiar, adopted third respondent, and the family continued to be joint. Extensive properties are scattered all over Tamil Nadu and
also in Malaysia, and the second respondent, Swaminathan Chettiar, taking advantage of the old age of his elder brother, Venkatachalam Chettiar,
is in complete control of the affairs of the family. On coming to know that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are secreting movables apart from creating
documents against the interests of the petitioner and his father and brothers, a partition suit was filed in this court on December 28, 1981 and an
order was obtained in Applications Nos. 4440 to 4442 of 1981 for appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner to take an inventory of the
properties in M.RM.SP. House, Sivan Koil North Street, Devakottai. In spite of it, on December 30, 1981, third respondent in writ petition had
given a memo to the Advocate-Commissioner that he will not give the keys for taking an inventory. On March 5, 1982, this court passed an order
enabling the Advocate-Commissioner to break open the lock and take an inventory, if co-operation is not extended by the concerned defendants.
In the said suit, the first respondent took out Application No. 1133 of 1982 stating that he had information that there are certain unaccounted
properties which had escaped attention and that he may be permitted to make a search and seizure u/s 132(1) of the Income Tax Act and secured
an ex parte order on March 24, 1982. Between April 5, 1982 and April 9, 1982 search was conducted and inventory taken by the Department.
Petitioner suspects that it was a make-believe affair, in which on the request of the third respondent in the writ petition, the Department was duped
in staging a so called search, in which very valuable jewels belonging to the family and several other assets were not properly accounted for. They
are detailed in para 5 of the affidavit. Hence, the main point which arises in the writ petition is, whether ""pending civil litigation between
coparceners, the presumption envisaged u/s 132(4A) can prevail over evidence, and decide ownership of properties, which is subject to litigation
?"" It is with these averments he had preferred the writ petition. Pending disposal of the writ petition, interim stay was granted on November 29,
1982, only till October 15, 1982.
5. In the counter-affidavit, the first respondent stated that to his knowledge, there had been no partition as required u/s 171 of the Income Tax Act,
and knowing that the premises have been sealed under orders of this court, Application No. 1133 of 1982 was filed seeking appropriate directions
to enable the Department to proceed further in the matter, on the proceedings started u/s 132 of the Income Tax Act. Only after securing an order
dated March 24, 1982, the search was conducted, and later on, a further order was passed on June 25, 1982 permitting the Department to keep
the keys of the sealed portion of the premises and the entrance in its custody till proceedings were completed u/s 132. The Advocate-
Commissioner was directed to finish taking inventory of the articles not listed. The proceedings pending in the High Court were directed to be
transferred to the Sub-Court, Devakottai, to be dealt with by that court. An inventory having been taken in the presence of the Advocate-
Commissioner and the parties, the deponent of the affidavit is in no manner interested in any of the parties to the suit. As for the vires of section
132(4A), it is only a rule of presumption for facilitating investigation and assessment; and as for the impugned notice, it is only a formal letter calling
for further information, and no conclusion having been reached hitherto, nor the civil suit having been disposed of, the petitioner cannot take any
exception to a further step being taken in the course of enquiry or in issuing the impugned notice, which cannot be treated as an order which is
injected with any illegality, and, therefore, the writ petition requires to be dismissed.
6. Pending disposal of such a writ petition in which the first respondent having spelt out under what powers action has been initiated under the
Income Tax Act and clarified about the nature of the communication sent which is impugned therein, this contempt application is preferred claiming
as to how the first respondent had disobeyed the order of this court dated December 23, 1982 in W.M.P. No. 15612 of 1982, and hence, the
respondents are liable to be punished.
7. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it is stated as follows :
In the suit already instituted, specific allegations have been made that defendants Nos. 1 to 4 therein have secreted and are trying to secret large
extent of valuable jewels and other income, and, therefore, appointment of a Commissioner was sought for, and that the petitioner had obtianed an
order dated December 29, 1981 to take inventory in the family house at Devakottai. On October 30, 1981, the Commissioner had sent a report
stating that the third respondent in the writ petition was not making available the keys of the premises. In the meanwhile, the first respondent had
filed A. No. 1133 of 1982, and an order was passed by this court on March 24, 1982, directing the Commissioner to hand over the keys of the
premises to the Assistant Director of Inspection, so that he may execute the warrant issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax u/s 132. After
referring to certain claims made, viz., that the contesting defendants were behind the stage-managed search, it is stated that the search already
conducted was illegal, and intended only to benefit two persons, who are ranked as second and third respondents in the writ petition. Hence,
pending the said proceeding, in W.M.P. No. 15612 of 1982, this court having ordered that the first respondent has to move the sub-court,
Devakottai, for further directions, and in the event of himself not seeking for any direction, it will be open to the contesting parties to seek for
appropriate direction with notice to the first respondent; on March 19, 1984, he had filed an application before the sub-court for appointment of a
receiver and for directions for depositing the keys in the custody of the first respondent into court. At a time when the order of the sub-court was
expected, on April 4, 1984, he received a trunk call from Devakottai informing him that on an alleged application given by the third respondent
herein, the first respondent together with two officers have gone to the family house and opened it at 2 p.m. Immediately, he sent a telegram to the
sub-court that he apprehends that in total disregard of the order of this court, action was being taken by the first respondent. Thereafter, he came
to know that by opening the sealed premises, jewels and cash worth not less than Rs. 10 to Rs. 20 lakhs have been removed after the rooms were
opened by respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In the absence of any fresh proceeding u/s 132, the first respondent had acted without authority, and having
been already directed by this court to seek directions from the sub-court for anything further to be done; the first respondent on his own having
opened the seals of the rooms in the premises had committed gross contempt of orders of court. The search having been conducted between April
5, 1982, and April 9, 1982, the retention of the records for more than 180 days was illegal; and when the power u/s 132 cannot continue beyond
180 days from the date of search, he had no authority under the said Act in entering the premises without the prior permission of the court.
8. First respondent would state that he is not interested in internecine quarrels between the members of the family and that on March 27, 1984, the
third respondent herein, being the wife of the third respondent in the writ petition, asked for the release of her passport kept in the house and which
was under prohibitory order, as she required it to join her husband in Malaysia. Then he would state in para 6 :
In view of the directions in W.M.P. No. 15612 of 1982, in W.M.P. No. 13221 of 1982, in W.P. No. 8843 of 1982, I sought the opinion of the
Department''s Advocate at Devakottai, Sri RM. Veerappan, as to whether the request of Smt. Alagammai, the third respondent herein, could be
complied with. Mr. R. M. Veerappan, Advocate, Devakottai, opined that the release and return of the passport to the third respondent herein,
would not ion any way be in violation of the order of the High Court in W.M.P. No. 15612 of 1982.....
9. Hence, on the the suggestion made by him, after securing an undertaking from her that she would produce it whenever required by the
Department, it was released by opening the premises on April 4, 1984. The seal placed on room No. 27 was intact, and it was opened with key
No. 6 in the immediate presence of the Head Clerk of State Bank of India and Shroff of Indian Bank of Devakottai. Passport bearing No. K.
044904 required by her was found in a brown leather wallet kept in the cupboard of black rosewood bureau. It was handed over to the second
respondent herein with a request to hand it over to his daughter-in-law, who was then at Madras. The room was locked at 4 p.m. On April 5,
1984, an acknowledgement was obtained from the third respondent receipt of the passport. Hence, when action had been taken after obtaining the
opinion of the advocate, it cannot be held that he had committed contempt of court. The direction of this court was only with reference to handing
over the keys and seized goods, but as far as the passport is concerned, it was not one of the seized goods, and hence, on humanitarian grounds,
the passport was taken out in the presence of independent and respectable witness. Then he deals with other averments made regarding various
aspects of allegations against the Department which are not relevant for this application. Except room No. 27, no other room was ever opened,
and no asset belonging to the family had been removed. During the search conducted in April, 1982, the Advocate-Commissioner, the petitioner,
his brother and his advocate were all present. Whatever was found head been inventorised and forms part of the record. A copy of each of the
inventories and panchanama had been given to the commissioner. Further, he would state :
.... I submit that whatever was found and inventorised at that time is there even now, and there is no question of any unauthorised removal of any
jewels and cash as deliberately, maliciously and falsely alleged by the petitioner .....
10. Takings out the passport from the sealed room is a continuation of search already made, and therefore, there was no need to obtain a fresh
warrant from any higher authorities u/s 132. The passport was not a seizable item, and it will not and cannot be the subject matter of a partition
suit, and it is personal document of the third respondent herein, and it having been handed over, only after obtaining the opinion of the advocate,
the defamatory statement made by the petitioner are unwarranted. The stage for handing over the keys had not reached, as the search itself is not
complete, because of the spate of court proceedings instituted by the petitioner and others. Permission from the Commissioner had been already
obtained u/s 132(8) for retention of the seized books. The allegation that valuable jewels and cash of not less than Rs. 10 to 20 lakhs had been
removed is untrue and motives had been unnecessarily attributed without any basis. If an inventory is taken now, it would reveal that no article has
been removed by the by the Income Tax authorities after the search operations. Hence, he had not committed any contempt of orders of this court.
11. He also filed W.M.P. No. 16326 of 1984, for appointment of an Advocate-Commissioner to take an inventory of all the articles that are in the
nine rooms of M.R.M.SP. House, against which prohibitory orders u/s 132(3) of the Income Tax Act had been passed. This was evidently filed to
get over the allegations made that Rs. 10 to 20 lakhs worth of jewellery and other valuables have been removed, by entering the premises illegally
on April 4, 1984. Hence, on March 1, 1985, an Advocate-Commissioner was appointed to take an inventory, and he has submitted his report and
certain objections have also been filed.
12. This contempt application having been filed pertaining to an order passed in W.M.P. No. 15612 of 1982, it is necessary to first find out the
nature of relief asked for therein. This W.M.P. was filed by writ petitioner asking for extension of stay granted on October 29, 1982. This petition
was filed on December 16, 1982, by making reference to an order passed on November 8, 1982, in W.M.P. No. 13221 of 1982, which was
petition filed for stay of further action being taken pursuant to the impugned order. On the writ petition being taken pursuant to the impugned order.
On the writ petition being admitted on October 29, 1982, interim stay was granted only up to November 15, 1982. It was again extended on
December 8, 1982, till January 8, 1983. The intention of the court in limiting the order of stay was to prevent undue advantage being taken by a
mere order of interim stay being passed; and thereafter, the petition would never come up for heating. It is on such an order passed that the first
respondent had filed the counter. Thereafter, the petitions have appeared in another list. In the counter, a claim having been made that the petitioner
was asked to be present in his office for inspection on October 30, 1982, it is contended by the petitioners that on that day, even though he himself
and his brother had gone, the first respondent having gone out, and no inspection of records having been granted, and as the Christmas vacation of
this court had been extended beyond the usual duration, he had asked for extension of the order of stay. In those circumstances, the order dated
December 23, 1982, came to be passed, taking not of the stand taken by learned counsel for the first respondent that the impugned notice was not
issued under section, 132(4A), and it was purpose of receiving information, and that parties could make inspection and submit their
representations, so that there need not be any further delay in handing over the seized articles.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there cannot be a presumption drawn at this stage that the family was a Hindu undivided
family. Then, on the submissions made by the respective counsel, this court felt that further action under the provisions of the Act was require to be
taken, and therefore, the petitioner and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 could have inspection of the seized articles on any of the days beginning from
January 5, 1983, and ending with January 14, 1983. Even any other member of the family interested was also permitted to avail of the facility of
inspection. Then in the last paragraph, it was ordered as follows :
On the aspect of handing over of the seized good and the key of the premises, u/s 132 of the Act, it is for the first respondent to move the Sub-
Court, Devakottai, in O.S. No. 50 of 1982, and according to orders obtained, proceed further with the matter. In the event of the first respondent
not seeking for directions, then as above stated, it is open to any of the parties to the suit to seek for suitable directions, with notice to all parties in
the suit, and in particular, the first respondent.
The order of stay granted in W.M.P. No. 13221 of 1982 would enure to the petitioner only till January 15, 1983, and no further. To this effect,
this petition ordered.
14. It is by relying upon this portion of the order that the petitioner claims that the respondents have committed contempt of orders of this court.
15. In the counter-affidavit, the first respondent admits that on April 4, 1984, he opened room No. 27, with key No. 6, in the presence of two
withnesses and took out the passport of the third respondent herein and handed it over to her father-in-law on humanitarian grounds. On March
27, 1984, she having requested for the release of the passport, he took the opinion of the Department''s advocate at Devakottai, who opined that
taking out of the passport would not be a violation of the order of this court and hence could be released to her.
16. This stand taken by him clearly shows that he was fully conscious that he was confronted with an order of this court and that he cannot open
the rooms. Hence he had take the opinion from the Department''s advocate at Devakottai. Nothing precluded him from approaching the
Department''s advocate at Madras, who had appeared in the matter, and having his office only 1/2 a kilometre from standing counsel''s office. All
along, he had been approaching only the counsel at Madras in the conduct of these proceedings and taking guidance from time to time. Taking a
legal opinion would not help ab authority to claim that he had not countersigned an order of the court. In spite of being fully aware that there are
litigations between the parties, and claims and counter-claims are put forth against each other involving several lakhs of rupees; and himself having
moved this court after the institution of the suit for permission to take action u/s 132, and conducted search only under orders of this court granted
on March 24, 1982, and also asked this court as early as October 6, 1982, for permission to taken u/s 132(5) of the Act had been started; he
was thus holding the key under order of court. His exercising power u/s 132 was not independent of the direction of this court, because it was he
who filed Application No. 1133 of 1982 for permission to execute the warrant issued by the Commissioner, and only after securing orders of this
court, action could be taken under the Act. These circumstances form the background for what had been done by him.
17. Learned counsel appearing on his behalf would state that he had done it with good intention; and having obtained orders of the Commissioner
the time limit u/s 132 cannot be applied; and in any event, except for the passport which is not a seized item, no other inventorised valuable having
since been found to be missing, the petitioner with a view to protract the proceedings and with ulterior motives, has filed this contempt application,
knowing quite well that the order of stay was no longer available to him. It is a device adopted to secure what he could not get in the stay petition,
and thereby prevent the authorities from pursuing action based on the impugned communication
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner in dealing with the point relating to interference in the process of court, its disobedience, and as to how far
legal opinion obtained would not help a contemner, refer to the following decisions :
Dibakar Satpathy Vs. Hon''ble The Chief Justice and Judges of The High Court of Orissa., is a case wherein a circular of was issued by the Legal
Remembrancer to the District Magistrates referring to an alleged confusion created by the High Court in a particular case. Legal Remebrancer
gave an opinion taking into account the decision of the Orissa High Court, which according to the High Court, was something ambiguous and did
not deal with all questions, consequential and ancillary. In spite of it, the Under Secretary to Government having issued a direction to District
Magistrates to ignore the decision of the High court, even though that was binding on them had committed flagrant interference with the
administration of justice, and hence held that it would be a clear contempt of the court. Hence, as pointed out therein, a legal opinion whatever be
its nature could not be a defence since the authority invested with power has to take a correct decision.
19. In Kruthiventi Kutumba Rao Vs. Muthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others, , a Division Bench held that parties to the suit and who have notice of
the same will be liable for contempt or disobedience or for obstructing execution, whether the order is valid or irregular. Unless it is vacated, it has
got to be obeyed.
20. The High Court Vs. S.K. Mathur, Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, deals with a case wherein an Income Tax Officer being
confronted with directives of the superior officer and an order of court, was held to have committed contempt of court for not having obeyed the
stay order passed by the court, which she was aware of. As for the Commissioner, He was held guilty of having committed contempt in persuading
his subordinate to pass as order u/s 132(5) and according approval to it, in spite of being conscious of the order of the court.
21. In A. T. K. Sahakari Sanstha, Nagpur v. State Of Maharashtra [1877] Cri. L.J.1809 it was held :
...... A mistaken advice given by a counsel coupled with the conduct of the contemner might, in the circumstances of a particular case, give rise to
sufficient cause for acting in particular way, bona fide and in good faith, though there is certainly no general doctrine which saves a party from the
consequences of wrong advice...Nobody can be permitted to disobey the order of the court by putting forward someexcuse, including an excuse
based on wrong legal advice...
22. These decisions go to show that when an authority is aware of the nature of the order passed, taking a legal opinion would not save him, if
what had been done is disobedience of the order of the court. If only the standing counsel at Madras whom he had been contacting had been
asked about the request made for opening the sealed room, it would have enabled the Department to move this court by one more application.
After all, in this writ petition, several applications have been filed, and there could have been no difficulty in obtaining orders of this court. The
standing counsel would have told him that he cannot open the seals room and hand over any article, whether seized or not seized, without prior
orders of court. The intention in passing the order was that when parties are in and around Devakottai, it would be in their interest to secure orders
of that court, for whatever they may need. It was not confined only to the handing over of the seized goods and the keys of the premises. All the
parties before this court had understood as to why they have thought it fits to move the sub-court, for suitable directions, as and when required. If
parties required any direction, it was obligatory on their part to compulsorily serve the first respondent, so that no coleuses order could be
obtained to defeat the interests of the Department. It was only after obtaining permission of this court on March 24, 1982, that he took action u/s
132, and on the order of the court, 2 keys were handed over by him, and later he filed an application on October 6, 1982, for retention of the
other keys. His headquarters was only at Madras. There was no need to approach a lawyer at Devakottai and thereby avoid informing the
standing counsel at Madras of what he was doing which did not form part of a section 132 action at all. The department was not interested in
getting at the passport on April 4, 1984, u/s 132. The counsel who gave the opinion had written on April 6, 1984, that he does not have either a
bare Act or with commentary, a book on Income Tax Act. On this, comment is made by counsel for the petitioner by stating that it is self-evident
that he has given the opinion to help defendants in the suit. The opinion of the counsel is a wrong one, and hence it cannot ne a shield for the first
respondent. There is, therefore substances in the plea that the first respodent has knowingly acted in convert with respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the
writ petition, in opening it on April 4, 1984.
23. Hence, by opening without prior permission of this court or sub-court, by heading over a document which was in the sealed room, the first
respondent had committed disobedience of the order of this court.
24. Even though this would suffice to dispose of this application, yet as Mr. Ranganathan had dealt with other points, for completion of records,
they are referred to. The first contention is that the opening on April 4, 1984, was not confined only to room No. 27 but other rooms have also
been opened, and valuables worth Rs. 20,00,000 in the form of jewellery, silverware and other valuables, etc., have been removed; and that it had
been done by the first respondent to help and aid the third respondent in the writ petition. It was when such an allegation was made that it resulted
in an Advocate-Commissioner being appointed at the instance of the Department which wanted to show that no valuable which had been
inventorised earlier, is now missing. Even in taking inventory, there had been protracted proceedings, and ultimately, the Commissioner had
submitted his report. In short, he had stated in court that whatever inventory lists had been handed over by the Income Tax Department, in taking
re-inventory he had found all of those items listed in such of those lists handed over by Department to him. He would state that he had not been
handed over all the inventory lists, but only truncated lists. In the counter-affidavit file by the first respondent in W.M.P. Nos. 6326 and 19071 of
1984, he had stated as follows :
...In view of the litigation, the Department was not able to complete the search and hence the unaccounted jewellery, valuables and silverwares
have not yet been actually seized. At the time of seizure of all the unaccounted jewellery, valuables and silver articles, again a fresh inventory will be
made of them. As far as the other documents found during the search, they were merely inventorised, but not seized, since they were not relevant
for the purposes of the Income Tax or Wealth-tax Acts. Such documents were left behind in the premises of M.RM.SP. House, which was under
the custody of the Advocate-Commissioner, as per the orders of court... After the search, prohibitory order was issued with respect to 8 rooms
and the main door. At the request of the Advocate-Commissioner, a prohibitory order with respect to the main door was lifted, and the two
Godrej keys to the Godrej locks, which were used for closing the main door with the chain fastened to it by the Advocate-Commissioner for
purposes of identification, were handed over to the Advocate-Commissioner on July 3, 1982. ......
A perusal of the report of the Advocate-Commissioner would clearly indicate that not a single item of valuables kept under prohibitory order was
found missing at the time of inventory taken by the Advocate-Commissioner........
As far as the documents that were inventorised but not seized, and left in the premises itself, the Department cannot be held to be liable or
responsible, if any such document is found to be missing, since after the search, the premises itself was under the custody of the Advocate-
Commissioner and not with the Income Tax Department.....
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner would still contend that, on an analysis of the report of the Advocate-Commissioner, it could be seen that
very many valuable items had not been initially inventorised for obvious reasons, and some of them which should be there are not traceable at all.
Instead of referring to each one of the items, only a few important items referred to by him are considered herein.
26. He refers to absence of nearly 150 F.D. Rs. and that their outer covers alone were found in one of the rooms. First respondent would state
that all the F.D.R.S. have been inventorised in the original search made on April 7, 1982, as per annexure A to panchanama; and they could be
easily verified at any time through banks. About a broken qural malai, it is admitted by the first respondent that it was found only in the present
inventory and taken note of. Similar comment is made regarding a gold watch weighing 6 grams found in the present inventory, and therefore, the
first respondent would state that it will be taken note of, since search is not complete. Another comment regarding total weight of gold is that it is
not mentioned in 1982 list; but as the Advocate-Commissioner had certified that whatever had been inventorised earlier by the Department are not
missing; excess gold, etc., now found will certainly be taken note of at the time of assessment. Therefore, the inventory made in 1985 had resulted
in more valuables being identified. Hence, there is no question of any inventorised article missing. Yet what is contended is that these have been
planted in the room of Mrs. Ranganathan. It has to be taken out from other rooms, and, therefore, the first respondent had aided third respondent
in his avariciousness to unjustly enrich himself. This is an aspect to be decided in the suit. The contesting parties would have ample opportunity to
prove the correctness of such claims. In a petition of this nature, more than by appointing an Advocate-Commissioner to find out as to whether any
valuables already inventorised are now missing or not, it will not be proper to go into these aspects, which are left out to be considered in the suit.
27. The other contention is that the first respondent cannot exercise his powers indefinitely u/s 132. Even though Mr. Ranganathan was told that
this is not an aspect which could be gone into in this application, he had placed before us the following decisions.
28. In The Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation), New Delhi and Another Vs. Pooran Mal and Sons and Another, , it was held that
the period of limitation is one intended for the benefit of the person whose property had been seized, and it is open to him to waive it, and ""that the
period of 90 days which is mentioned in section 132(5) is an immutable one"", and if so held it ""would cause more injury to the citizen than to
Revenue.
29. In dealing with the scope of section 132(3) and in upholding its validity, it was held by a Division Bench of this court in I. Devarajan and
Others Vs. Tamil Nadu Farmers Service Co-operative Federation and Others, , that, if in any case any person whose assets are subject to
attachment, satisfies the court that, under sub-section (3) the power had been utilised to continue the attachment indefinitely, then the affected party
can move the court. It was further held that the time limit under sub-section (5) cannot be imported into sub-section (3).
30. In Pooran Mal Vs. The Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi and Others, , while upholding the validity of section 132(1) and (5),
it was held that even though a search and seizure may be in contravention of it, still the materials obtained thereby are liable to be used by the
Department.
31. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others Vs. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver and Others, , deals with issue of a defective search warrant
under the Sales Tax Act, and it has no relevance to the facts of this case.
32. He also finally refers to the recent directives issued regarding searches and seizures, laying considerable emphasis on the time-limit of 120 days
from the date of seizure for estimating the undisclosed income and quantifying the amount of tax on income so estimated along with interest and
penalty, being accomplished by making summary assessment by the Income Tax Officers.
33. The first respondent has produced during the course of one of the hearings, the approval obtained from the Commissioner to extend the time;
and due to protraction of proceedings, the search still continues, and hence the reliance placed on these decisions could be of no avail to the
petitioner in making the claim that he has become ""functus officio"".
34. As for the second respondent, he was a party to the earlier order, and he knew quite well about the restriction put on taking out any of the
articles or goods from the sealed rooms. It was he who was in physical occupation of the other portions of the house. He was aware that his
daughter-in-law had wanted the passport to be taken out, and he received it from the first respondent on her behalf. Hence, he had also committed
disobedience of the order of the court. Nothing prevented him from moving the court below or this court, wherein he has been impleaded as a
party to the proceedings. The court below would have told him to move this court, being aware of the nature of the orders passed hitherto in the
writ petition. Hence, he has also committed contempt of court.
35. Though Mr. Ranganathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, would state that, as held in The High Court Vs. S.K. Mathur, Commissioner of
Income Tax and Others, , a punishment of detention in civil prison should be imposed because huge amounts had been taken out; and as held in
Deputy Director of Inspection (Intelligence) and Others Vs. Vinod Kumar Didwania and Another, , value of goods lost must be recovered; on the
finding now rendered, and leaving it for the parties to agitate in the suit, regarding alleged removal of valuables, this is a case which calls for a
similar approach to be made, as done by the said court, as against the Income Tax Officer. Hence, interests of justice would be met by
administering a stern warning to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein that any lapse of the like nature on their part in future would be severely dealt
with.
36. As for the third respondent herein, she was not a party to the writ petition, and evidently it is the third respondent in the writ petition, her
husband, who had been instrumental in making the application, but he had not been impleaded as a respondent herein, and, therefore, there is no
need to hold that she was aware of the nature of the order but still secured the passport. Hence, she is exonerated.
37. It is because of the first respondent opening the premises that he had brought about the present situation leading to serious claims of loss to
estate being made, which now leads on to a long drawn litigation between the family members. Lot of court''s time had been taken and parties have
spend considerable sums due to his improper acts. Hence, the remuneration of the Advocate-Commissioner is fixed at Rs. 1,500. This sum and
other expenses incurred by him to be shared equally by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Regarding handing over of keys he has to await orders in other
applications filed by contesting parties in the writ petition.
38. Hence, this application is ordered with costs as against respondents Nos. 1 and 2, but dismissed as against the third respondent.
