Sandeep Sharma,J.
1.By way of present Regular Second Appeal, challenge has been laid to judgment and decree dated 7.10.2010, passed by learned District Judge,
Kangra at Dharamshala, in Civil Appeal(RBT) No.150-B/XIII-2010/2006, reversing the judgment and decree dated 14.06.2006 passed by learned
Civil Judge(Senior Division), Baijnath, District Kangra in Civil Suit No.59/2003, whereby suit having been filed by the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘plaintiff’) for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative decree for possession was decreed.
2. Succinctly facts, as emerged from the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties, are that the plaintiff filed a suit against the appellants-
defendants (hereinafter referred to as the ‘defendants’), seeking therein decree for permanent prohibitory injunction and in the alternative
decree for possession qua the suit land as described in the plaint as well as in the impugned judgment. It has been averred in the plaint that the plaintiff
is recorded as owner in possession of the suit land and the defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit land and, as such, they being stranger
have no concern with the suit land. It has further been averred that the defendants, who are clever and shrewd persons, are trying to take forcible
possession of the suit land with a view to change the nature of the suit land. It has further been averred by the plaintiff that defendant No.1 had earlier
filed a suit for specific performance against him to take the suit land on the basis of an invalid agreement, but same was dismissed and now
defendants, with a view to take forcible possession, are interfering in the possession of the plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged that the defendants are
threatening to cut bamboo and other trees from the suit land and continuously interfering in the absence of the plaintiff and proclaiming to take forcible
possession of the suit land. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to decree for permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining
the defendants from interfering in any manner, or taking forcible possession, or constructing any structure, cutting the trees or changing the nature of
the suit land. It is further prayed that in case, defendants succeed in taking forcible possession during the pendency of this suit, then decree for
possession of the suit land may also be awarded in his favour.
3. Defendants, by way of written statement, refuted the aforesaid claim of the plaintiff by taking preliminary objections qua the maintainability, cause
of action, locus standi, estoppel and claimed that the plaintiff is not at all in possession of the suit land and that the suit, having been filed by him, is
barred by Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘CPC’). Defendants further averred that the plaintiff entered
into an agreement to sell the suit land to defendant No.1 on 2.6.1989 and on the same day the plaintiff put defendant No.1 into possession of the suit
land and since then he is in possession of the suit land on the spot and plaintiff is having knowledge of the same. Defendants further claimed that
defendant No.1 is in possession of the suit land from the date of agreement and said possession is open, hostile, uninterrupted and within the
knowledge of the plaintiff and he has become owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession and, as such, plaintiff has no right,
title or interest over the suit land. Defendants further averred that defendant No.1 had filed a suit for specific performance and the same was
dismissed but he is in possession of the suit land on the basis of agreement dated 2.6.1989 and till date plaintiff has not taken possession back from
him, therefore, he is liable to be declared owner in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession. It is further averred that the plaintiff had
filed an application under Order 21 Rule 11 CPC for getting the possession of the suit land from defendant No.1, which was dismissed on 11.6.2003
during the pendency of the suit which itself suggests that the defendant is in possession of the suit land, but the plaintiff has purposely concealed this
fact from the Court to get the relief as prayed for in the plaint. Lastly, defendants averred that the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct
from filing this suit without any locus standi and the present suit has been filed merely to harass the defendants.
4. Despite opportunity, plaintiff failed to file replication and, as such, right to file the same came to be closed vide order dated 4.11.2004.
5. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:-
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP.
1-A. Whether the plaintiff in the alternative is also entitled for the relief of possession in case defendants succeed in taking forcible possession during
the pendency of the suit or found in unauthorized possession of the suit land, as alleged ? OPP.
2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.
3. Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of acton? OPD.
4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to sue? OPD.
5. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his act and conduct? OPD.
6. Whether the defendant is in possession of the suit land on the basis of agreement dated 2.6.1989 and now his possession is ripened into ownership
by way of adverse possession, as alleged? OPD.
7. Relief.â€
6. Learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence led on record by respective parties, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied
with the judgment and decree dated 14.6.2006 passed by learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Baijnath, District Kangra, plaintiff preferred an appeal
in the Court of learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, who, partly allowed the appeal having been preferred by the plaintiff and decreed her
suit for possession of the land comprised in Khata No.114 min, Khatauni No.319 min, Khasra No.772/175 and 185, measuring 0-28-42 Hectares as
per Jamabandi for the year 1998-99 situate in Mohal Panjayala Buhla Mouza Sansaal Tehsil Baijnath District Kangra. However, learned District
Judge did not disturb the findings returned by the learned trial Court below with regard to prayer having been made by the plaintiff for permanent
injunction. In the aforesaid background, appellants-defendants have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set aside the
impugned judgment and decree dated 7.10.2010 passed by learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala.
7. This Court vide order dated 18.7.2011 admitted the present appeal on the following substantial question of law:-
“(1) After the dismissal of counter claim of the respondent by the learned trial Court in Civil Suit No.239/99, dated 21.6.2000, whether respondent-
plaintiff is entitled to decree of possession in the present suit.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case.
9. Mr.Romesh Verma, learned counsel representing the appellants-defendants, vehemently argued that impugned judgment passed by learned District
Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law as the same is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence as well as law and, as such, same deserves to
be quashed and set aside. Mr.Verma further contended that bare perusal of judgment dated 14.6.2006 passed by learned trial Court clearly suggests
that the same is based upon proper appreciation of evidence and law and, as such, there is/was no scope left for learned District Judge to reverse the
findings returned by the Court below. While inviting the attention of this Court to Ex.P-2 i.e. copy of judgment dated 25.9.2000 passed by learned Sub
Judge Ist Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P in Civil Suit No.239/99/97, titled: Jagdish Chand vs. Hari Singh, Mr.Verma strenuously argued that on
the basis of pleadings adduced on record in that suit a specific issue i.e. issue No.9, “Whether defendant is entitled for the decree of possession?
OPDâ€, was framed and learned trial Court, having perused material on record, returned the findings that since defendant (Plaintiff in present suit)
has admitted that he is in possession of the suit land, therefore, he cannot claim decree of possession against the plaintiff in the counter claim.
10. Mr.Verma further contended that the plaintiff had filed counter claim specifically praying therein decree of permanent prohibitory injunction as
well as for possession, but plaintiff was not held entitled to possession in that suit, but at no point of time challenge was ever laid to finding returned by
the trial Court in the counter claim having been filed by the plaintiff and, as such, the same has attained finality. While placing reliance upon judgments
rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajni Rani and Another vs. Khairatilal and Others, (2015)2 SCC 682 and Aloys Wobben and Another vs.
Yogesh Mehra and Others, (2014)15 SCC 360, Mr.Romesh Verma contended that subsequent suit i.e. present suit, having been filed by the plaintiff
on the same and similar cause of action, has been rightly dismissed by the Court below. He further argued that counter claim in a suit is in the nature
of cross suit and if counter claim is dismissed on being adjudicated on merits, it forecloses the right of the defendants. He further stated that in case
the counter claim was dismissed by expressing an opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief of possession and formal order made in this regard
amounts to decree which is/was required to be assailed by the plaintiff by way of independent appeal, affixing separate court fee. Mr.Verma, while
referring to the plaint having been filed by the plaintiff, vehemently argued that no decree for possession could be granted by learned first appellate
Court in view of averments contained in the plaint, wherein plaintiff has specifically claimed himself to be owner in possession.
11. Mr.Virender Rathore, learned counsel representing the respondent-plaintiff, supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned
District Judge and admitted that there is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree and as such the same deserves to be upheld.
Mr.Rathore, while fairly acknowledging the fact that no appeal was filed against the rejection of counter claim having been filed by the plaintiff in
earlier suit i.e. Ex.P-2, contended that on the strength of findings returned in the earlier counter claim having been filed by the plaintiff, plaintiff cannot
be precluded from filing fresh suit for possession; especially when defendants forcibly took the possession of the suit land during the pendency of the
suit. While inviting the attention of this Court to the written statement having been filed by the defendants, Mr.Rathore strenuously argued that factum
with regard to forcible possession taken by defendants stands duly admitted in the written statement and, as such, there is no force in the arguments of
the learned counsel representing the defendants that no decree for possession could be granted in favour of plaintiff on the strength of pleadings made
in the plaint.
12. Having gone through the pleadings and evidence adduced on record, this Court finds that plaintiff while praying for decree of possession has
specifically averred in the plaint that he is owner in possession of the suit land. Plaintiff has further averred that the defendants being stranger has no
right, title or interest in the suit property and, as such, he be restrained from taking forcible possession of the suit land. There is no averment much less
specific with regard to possession, if any, of defendants over the suit land and, as such, this Court is persuaded to agree with the contention of
Mr.Romesh Verma, learned counsel representing the defendants, that in the absence of specific pleadings with regard to possession, if any, of
defendants over the suit land, first appellate Court below ought not to have granted decree of possession in favour of plaintiff.
13. No doubt, defendant No.1, while refuting the averments contained in the plaint, has claimed himself to be in possession of the suit land, but
needless to say plaintiff is/was required to stand on his own legs to make him entitled for decree of possession, which can/could only be granted in
case plaintiff is/was able to show that he has been dispossessed. At the cost of repetition, it may be observed that it nowhere emerge from the
averments contained in the plaint that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land and he was forcibly dispossessed from the suit land during the
pendency of the suit. Defendant No.1 has averred that he was put into possession of the suit land in terms of the agreement dated 2.6.1989 Ex.DW-
2/A, which came to be set aside in earlier suit Ex.P-2 i.e. Civil Suit No.239/99/97, having been filed by the appellant-defendant Jagdish Chand, who, on
the strength of aforesaid agreement Ex.DW-2/A, prayed for decree of specific performance of contract and permanent prohibitory injunction. Though
aforesaid suit having been filed by the appellant-defendant Jagdish Chand was partly decreed for recovery of Rs.15,000/- from the defendant with
simple interest @ 6% per annum w.e.f. 2.6.1989 till the final payment of the amount, but he was not held entitled for decree of permanent prohibitory
injunction.
14. Careful perusal of Ex.P-2 clearly suggests that in the previous suit having been filed by the plaintiff (appellant-defendant herein) for specific
performance of contract and for permanent prohibitory injunction, defendant (respondent-plaintiff herein) also filed counter claim, wherein defendant
claimed decree of possession on the basis of title against the plaintiff. In the suit, referred hereinabove, a specific issue i.e. issue No.9 “Whether
defendant is entitled for the decree of possession? OPD, came to be framed. However, fact remains that learned Civil Court, while passing judgment
dated 25.9.2000 (Ex.P-2), held the defendant (respondent-plaintiff herein) not entitled for decree of possession. While returning findings qua issue
No.9, learned trial Court specifically held that defendant (respondent-plaintiff herein) has admitted this fact that he was in possession of the suit land
and, as such, he cannot claim decree of possession against the plaintiff in counter claim. It would be profitable to take note of para-13 of judgment
Ex.P-2, wherein specific finding, with regard to counter claim having been filed by the plaintiff, seeking therein decree of possession, has been
returned. Para-13 of the judgment reads thus:-
“13. It is the case of the plaintiff that the possession of the suit land was delivered to him by the defendant on 2.6.1989 at the time of execution of
agreement, but as per the defendant, the plaintiff has forcibly taken the possession of the suit land after 17.1.97. Witnesses have been produced by
both the parties in the witness box to prove the possession. But the plaintiff has produced the copy of plaint Ex.PX of the Civil Suit No.70/2000 which
is pending before this court qua the suit property in which it has been admitted by the present defendant that he is in possession of the suit land i.e.
Khasra No.772/275 and 185. It shows that the defendant is admitting this fact that he is in possession of the suit land. Therefore, he cannot claim the
decree of possession against the plaintiff in counter claim. The plaintiff is not entitled to decree of permanent prohibitory injunction as the agreement
itself is void and the plaintiff cannot claim the right over the suit land on the basis of agreement Ex.PW- 3/A. The suit is maintainable to the extent of
alternative prayer of recovery of the amount of Rs.15,000/-. The plaintiff has locus standi to file the present suit.†15. It is quite apparent from the
aforesaid findings returned by the learned Civil Court that in earlier suit having been filed by the appellant-defendant that respondent-plaintiff with a
view to prove his possession over the suit land had produced the copy of plaint Ex.PX filed in Civil Suit No.70/2000, wherein appellant-defendant had
admitted him (plaintiff) to be in possession of the suit land i.e. Khasra No.772/275 and 185 and, as such, Court below, taking note of aforesaid
admission having been made by the appellant-defendant in that suit, arrived at the conclusion that since defendant had admitted possession of plaintiff
in the suit, therefore, he cannot claim decree of possession against the plaintiff in the counter claim. It is not in dispute that the present appellant-
defendant, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree Ex.P2, preferred an appeal in the Court of learned District Judge,
Kangra i.e. mark ‘A’, but, the same was dismissed. However, fact remains that plaintiff never laid any challenge to the judgment, whereby his
counter claim for decree of possession was rejected and, as such, it attained finality. Plaintiff being aggrieved and dissatisfied with rejection of his
counter claim, whereby he had prayed for decree of possession against the plaintiff, ought to have filed an appeal in the competent Court of law
against the rejection of his counter claim, but, he chose to remain silent, as is evident from the record.
16. By now it is well settled that a counter claim preferred by the defendant in a suit is in the nature of cross suit. As per Order 8 Rule 6-A(2) CPC,
the Court is required to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original claim as also in the counter claim. When a counter claim filed
by the defendant is dismissed being adjudicated on merits it forecloses the rights of the defendant.
17. It is also well settled that when there is a conclusive determination of rights of parties upon the adjudication, the said decision in certain
circumstances can have the status of a decree. A Court may or may not draw a formal decree, but if by virtue of the order of the Court, rights are
finally adjudicated, irrefutably it would assume the status of a decree and the same is required to be laid challenge by way of filing a separate appeal
after affixing prescribed Court fee. In this regard reliance is placed upon Rajni Rani and Another vs. Khairati Lal and Others, (2015)2 SCC 682,
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-
9. To appreciate the controversy in proper perspective it is imperative to appreciate the scheme relating to the counter-claim that has been introduced
by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977.
9.1 Order 8, Rule 6A deals with counter-claim by the defendant. Rule 6A(2) stipulates thus:-
“6-A.(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit,
both on the original claim and on the counterclaim.â€
9.2 Rule 6-A(3) enables the plaintiff to file a written statement. The said provision reads as follows:-
“6-A.(3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in answer to the counterclaim of the defendant within such period as may be
fixed by the Court.â€
9.3. Rule 6-A(4) of the said Rule postulates that: “6-A(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by rules applicable to a plaint.
9.4 Rule 6-B provides how the counter-claim is to be stated and Rule 6C deals with exclusion of counter-claim.
9.5 Rules 6-D deals with the situation when the suit is discontinued. It is as follows:-
“6-D. Effect of discontinuance of suit. â€" If in any case in which the defendant sets up a counter-claim, the suit of the plaintiff is stayed,
discontinued or dismissed, the counter-claim may nevertheless be proceeded with.â€
9.6. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions it is quite limpid that a counter-claim preferred by the defendant in a suit is in the nature of a cross-
suit and by a statutory command even if the suit is dismissed, counter-claim shall remain alive for adjudication. For making a counter- claim
entertainable by the court, the defendant is required to pay the requisite court fee on the valuation of the counter -claim. The plaintiff is obliged to file a
written statement and in case there is default the court can pronounce the Judgment against the plaintiff in relation to the counter-claim put forth by
the defendant as it has an independent status. The purpose of the scheme relating to counter-claim is to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings. When a
counter-claim is dismissed on being adjudicated on merits it forecloses the rights of the defendant. As per Rule 6A(2) the court is required to
pronounce a final judgment in the same suit both on the original claim and also on the counter-claim. The seminal purpose is to avoid piece-meal
adjudication. The plaintiff can file an application for exclusion of a counter-claim and can do so at any time before issues are settled in relation to the
counter-claim. We are not concerned with such a situation.
10. In the instant case, the counter-claim has been dismissed finally by expressing an opinion that it is barred by principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of the
CPC. The question is what status is to be given to such an expression of opinion. In this context we may refer with profit the definition of the term
decree as contained in section 2(2) of CPC:-
“2.(2) “decree†means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards  the  Court  expressing  it, conclusively
determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be
deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within [1][ * * *] Section 144, but  shall notinclude â€
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be
completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;â€
11. In R. Rathinavel Chettiar v. V. Sivaraman, (1999)4 SCC 89, dealing with the basic components of a decree, it has been held thus: (SCC pp.93-94,
paras 10-11)
“10. Thus a “decree†has to have the following essential elements, namely:
(i) There must have been an adjudication in a suit.
(ii) The adjudication must have determined the rights of the parties in respect of, or any of the matters in controversy.
(iii) Such determination must be a conclusive determination resulting in a formal expression of the adjudication.
11. Once the matter in controversy has received judicial determination, the suit results in a decree either in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the
defendant.â€
12. From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is manifest that when there is a conclusive determination of rights of parties upon adjudication, the said
decision in certain circumstances can have the status of a decree. In the instant case, as has been narrated earlier, the counter-claim has been
adjudicated and decided on merits holding that it is barred by principle of Order 2, Rule 2 of C.P.C. The claim of the defendants has been negatived.
In Jag Mohan Chawla v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang, (1996)4 SCC 699 dealing with the concept of counterclaim, the Court has opined thus: (SCC
p.703, para 5)
“5.... is treated as a cross-suit with all the indicia of pleadings as a plaint including the duty to aver his cause of action and also payment of the
requisite court fee thereon. Instead of relegating the defendant to an independent suit, to avert multiplicity of the proceeding and needless protection
(sic protraction), the legislature intended to try both the suit and the counter-claim in the same suit as suit and cross-suit and have them disposed of in
the same trial. In other words, a defendant can claim any right by way of a counter-claim in respect of any cause of action that has accrued to him
even though it is independent of the cause of action averred by the plaintiff and have the same cause of action adjudicated without relegating the
defendant to file a separate suit.â€
13. Keeping in mind the conceptual meaning given to the counter-claim and the definitive character assigned to it, there can be no shadow of doubt
that when the counter-claim filed by the defendants is adjudicated and dismissed, finality is attached to it as far as the controversy in respect of the
claim put forth by the defendants is concerned. Nothing in that regard survives as far as the said defendants are concerned. If the definition of a
decree is appropriately understood it conveys that there has to be a formal expression of an adjudication as far as that Court is concerned. The
determination should conclusively put to rest the rights of the parties in that sphere. When an opinion is expressed holding that the counter-claim is
barred by principles of Order 2, Rule 2 C.P.C., it indubitably adjudicates the controversy as regards the substantive right of the defendants who had
lodged the counter-claim. It cannot be regarded as an ancillary or incidental finding recorded in the suit.
14. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in Ram Chand Spg. & Wvg. Mills v. Bijli Cotton Mills (P) Ltd., AIR 1967
SC 1344 wherein their Lordships was dealing with what constituted a final order to be a decree. The thrust of the controversy therein was that
whether an order passed by the executing court setting aside an auction sale as a nullity is an appealable order or not.
15. The Court referred to the decisions in Jethanand and Sons v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 794 and Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR
1933 PC 58 and proceeded to state as follows: (Ram Chand Spg. & Wvg. Case, AIR 0.1347, para 13)
“13.  In deciding the question whether the order is a final order determining the rights of parties and, therefore, falling within the definition of a
decree in Section 2(2), it would often become necessary to view it from the point of view of both the parties in the present case â€" the judgment-
debtor and the auction-purchaser.  So  far  as  the judgment-debtor is concerned the order obviously does not finally decide his rights since a
fresh sale is ordered. The position  however,  of  the  auction-purchaser is different. When an auction-purchaser is declared to be the highest
bidder and the auction is declared to have been concluded certain rights accrue to him and he becomes entitled to conveyance of the property through
the court on his paying the balance unless the sale is not confirmed by the court. Where an application is made to set aside the auction sale as a nullity,
if the court sets it aside either by an order on such an application or suo motu the only question arising in such a case as between him and the
judgment- debtor is whether the auction was a nullity by reason of any violation of Order 21, Rule 84 or other similar mandatory provisions. If the
court sets aside the auction sale there is an end of the matter and no further question remains to be decided so far as he and the judgment-debtor are
concerned. Even though a resale in such a case is ordered such an order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order as the entire matter is finally
disposed of. It is thus manifest that the order setting aside the auction sale amounts to a final decision relating to the rights of the parties in dispute in
that particular civil proceeding, such a proceeding being one in which the rights and liabilities of the parties arising from the auction sale are in dispute
and wherein they are finally determined by the court passing the order setting it aside. The parties in such a case are only the judgment-debtor and the
auction- purchaser, the only issue between them for determination being whether the auction sale is liable to be set aside. There is an end of that
matter when the court passes the order and that order is final as it finally, determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, viz., the judgment-debtor
and the auction- purchaser in regard to that sale, as after that order nothing remains to be determined as between them.†After so stating, the Court
ruled that the order in question was a final order determining the rights of the parties and, herefore, fell within the definition of a decree under Section
2(2) read with Section 47 and was an appealable order.
16. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions to highlight that there may be situations where an order can get the status of a decree. A Court may
draw up a formal decree or may not, but if by virtue of the order of the Court, the rights have finally been adjudicated, irrefutably it would assume the
status of a decree. As is evincible, in the case at hand, the counter-claim which is in the nature of a cross-suit has been dismissed. Nothing else
survives for the defendants who had filed the counter-claim. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the order passed by the learned trial
Judge has the status of a decree and the challenge to the same has to be made before the appropriate forum where appeal could lay by paying the
requisite fee. It could not have been unsettled by the High Court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Ergo, the
order passed by the High Court is indefensible.â€
18. Reliance is also placed on Alloys Wobben and Another vs. Yogesh Mehra and Others, 2014(15) SCC 360.
19. Now, question which needs to be decided by this Court is, “Whether after dismissal of counter claim of the respondent by the learned trial
Court in Civil Suit 239/99/97 dated 21.6.2000, respondent- plaintiff is entitled to decree of possession in the present suit?
20. It is quiet evident from the aforesaid exposition of law rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajni Rani’s case supra that when there is
conclusive determination of rights of the parties upon the adjudication, such decision can have the status of a decree. If there is formal expression of
an adjudication and determination qua the rights of the parties order gets the status of a decree. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment that the
Court may or may not draw a formal decree, but, if by virtue of this order rights are finally decided, it would assume the status of decree and same is
required to be laid challenge by way of appeal by paying the requisite court fee.
21. Having carefully perused Ex.P2, judgment dated 25.9.2000, passed in earlier suit, this Court is persuaded to agree with the contention of
Mr.Romesh Verma, learned counsel representing the appellant-defendant, that since in earlier suit claim of the plaintiff for possession of suit land was
finally adjudicated, no fresh suit for possession qua the suit land, which was subject matter of earlier suit, could be filed by the respondent-plaintiff;
especially when findings returned in the counter claim filed by him in the earlier suit has attained finality. Apart from above, as has been noticed
hereinabove, plaintiff-respondent in his plaint has specifically claimed himself to be in possession of the suit property and, as such, no decree for
possession could be granted in his favour by learned Additional District Judge in the appeal having been preferred by him. No doubt, there is averment
in the written statement having been filed by the defendants that they are in possession of the suit land, but plaintiff, who had filed suit for possession,
was required to lead positive evidence to the effect that he has been dispossessed forcibly. But, in the instant case plaintiff in his plaint has claimed
himself to be in possession and prayer has been made to restrain the defendants from interfering in his peaceful possession and, as such, no benefit
can be allowed to be drawn by him from the averment with regard to possession made by the defendant in the written statement. Leaving everything
aside, plaintiff is estopped from filing suit for possession qua the suit land in terms of Section 11 of CPC i.e. principle of res judicata, in view of
judgment Ex.P2.
22. True, it is, that Court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Similarly, it
is well settled that when first appellate Court reverses findings of trial Court, it is expected to record findings in clear terms specifically stating therein,
in what manner reasoning of trial Court is erroneous.
23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh vs. S.P. Srivastava, (2017)2 SCC 415, has held that when appellate Court agrees with
the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial Court; expression of general
agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that when the first appellate Court
reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasoning of the trial court are erroneous. The
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not
be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after
adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on
evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial
court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms
explaining how the reasonings of the trial court are erroneous.â€
24. This Court sees substantial force in the arguments of Mr.Romesh Verma, learned counsel representing the appellant-defendant that learned first
appellate Court, while disagreeing with the judgment passed by the Court below, has not dealt with each and every issue involved in the case and has
not assigned any reason to differ with the findings returned by the trial Court.
25. In view of aforesaid discussion, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that respondent-plaintiff is not entitled to decree of possession in the
present suit after dismissal of the counter claim having been filed by him for possession in Civil Suit No.239/99/97, decided vide judgment dated
25.9.2000, which has attained finality. Substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
26. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court sees valid reason to interfere in the judgment passed by first appellate
Court, which is apparently not based upon proper appreciation of evidence as well as law. Accordingly judgment passed by learned first appellate
Court is set aside and that of the learned trial Court is restored. This appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any,
stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.
