Sushil Kukreja, J
1. T he accused persons (petitioners herein), after compromising the matter with the prosecutrix/respondent No. 2 and complainant/respondent No. 3, have come up before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., by invoking inherent powers of this Court, seeking quashing of FIR No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (for short “POCSO”) registered at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P..
2. The present FIR was lodged by the mother of the prosecutrix (complainant) and today the prosecutrix/ respondent No. 2 (name withheld), complainant/respondent No. 3 and the petitioner No. 1-accused are present in person and the statements of respondents No. 2 and 3 and petitioner No. 1 have been separately recorded and placed on the file.
3. In her statement, prosecutrix/respondent No. 2 stated that on the basis of the complaint of her mother, FIR No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, was registered gainst the petitioners-accused persons at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.. She has further stated that the aforesaid FIR was lodged due to some misunderstanding and now the parties have entered into a compromise, vide compromise deed, Annexure P-2, as she had solemnized marriage with petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary on 18.10.2023, as per her own free will/consent and without any external pressure and they are residing happily as husband and wife under the same roof. She has also stated that she has no objection in case the aforesaid FIR and the consequent proceedings, arising out of the said FIR, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape & POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed and set aside.
4. Similarly, the complainant/respondent No. 3 stated that on the basis of her complaint, FIR No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act was registered agaisnt the petitioners-accused persons at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.. She has further stated that the aforesaid FIR was lodged due to some misunderstanding and now the parties have entered into a compromise, vide compromise deed, Annexure P-2, as her daughter (prosecutrix) had solemnized marriage with the petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary on 18.10.2023 and they are residing happily, as husband and wife under the same roof. She has also stated that she has no objection in case the aforesaid FIR and the consequent proceedings, arising out of the said FIR, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape & POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed and set-aside.
5. The petitioner No. 1-Vishal Chaudhary stated that FIR No. 113 of 2022, daed 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, was registered against him and petitioners No. 2 and 3 at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P.. He has further stated that the aforesaid FIR was lodged due to some misunderstanding and now the parties have entered into a compromise, vide compromise deed, Annexure P-2, as he has solemnized marriage with respondent No. 1 (prosecutrix) on 18.10.2023, as per his own free will/consent and without any external pressure and they are residing happily as husband and wife under the same roof. He has also stated that the aforesaid FIR and the consequent proceedings, arising out of the said FIR, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Curt (Rape & POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, may be quahsed and set-aside.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No. 1/State, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 and also gone through the material available on record.
7. In Madan Mohan Abbot vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized and advised that in the matter of compromise in criminal proceedings, keeping in view the nature of the case, to save the time of the Court for utilizing to decide more effective and meaningful litigation, a common sense approach, based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of law, should be applied.
8. In case Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 and also in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has summed up and laid down principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with criminal proceedings.
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbhathbhai Bhimsinghbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641, summarizing the broad principles regarding inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has recognized that these powers are not inhibited by provisions of Section 320, Cr.P.C. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions:-
“(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
10. Although, as per the directions of the Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir’s case supra, the FIR should not be quashed in case of rape as it is a heinous offence, but when complainant-prosecutrix herself takes the initiative and states that now she is married with the petitioner-accused and living happily with him under one roof, in my considered opinion, in such cases, there will be no purpose in continuing with the trial as ultimately, in case of continuation of trial, the result will be of acquittal in favour of the accused persons.
11. In Kapil Gupta vs State of NCT of Delhi and another, (Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 decided on 10. 08.2022), the Supreme Court while considering an appeal against an order of High Court of Delhi rejecting a quashing petition for proceedings under Section 376 IPC, has held that though court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them, which may improve their mutual relationship. The relevant portion of the judgment (supra) reads as under:
“12. No doubt that the learned ASG is right in relying on various judgments of this Court which reiterate the legal position that in heinous and serious offences like murder or rape, the Court should not quash the proceedings. It will be relevant to refer to paragraph 29.5 to 29.6 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Narender Singh versus State of Punjab, which read thus:
"29.5 While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6 Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak.
In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.”
12. This Court is aware that offences like rape cannot be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. if a compromise has been reached, but, at the same time, this Court cannot ignore and overlook the future of the prosecutrix. In the facts of the case, since the petitioner No. 1-accused has married the prosecutrix (respondent No. 2) and they are living happily and peacefully under one roof, continuation of the proceedings would cause immense harm to them, as the same may adversely affect their marital life. Moreover, in view of the compromise, the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them. Therefore, I am of the considered view that no fruitful purpose will be served to continue the proceedings against the petitioners-accused persons, as continuation of the proceedings will be an exercise in futility. The justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored in order to maintain harmonious relations/atmosphere between them.
13. Hence, considering the facts and the circumstances of the case in entirety, I am of the opinion that the present petition deserves to be allowed for securing the ends of justice and, therefore, the same is allowed. Accordingly, FIR No. 113 of 2022, dated 19.08.2022, under Sections 363, 366A, 376, 506, 201 and 34 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, registered against the petitioners-accused persons, at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P., and the consequent proceedings, arising out of the said FIR, pending before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Rape & POCSO), Kangra at Dharamshala, are quashed and set-aside.
14. Petition stands disposed of in above terms, so also the pending application(s), if any.
