Rakesh Kainthla, J
1. The petitioners have filed the present petition for seeking quashing of FIR No. 26 of 2019 dated 13.11.2019 registered at Women Police Station Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. and the consequent proceedings in Criminal Case No. 2186 of 2020 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504 & 506 read with section 34 of IPC pending before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur, H.P.
2. It has been asserted that respondent no. 2 (the informant) lodged an FIR No. 26/2019 against the petitioners with Women Police Station, Bilaspur. The FIR is a clear abuse of process to harass the petitioners. The marriage between petitioner no. 1 and the informant was solemnized on 05.10.2017 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. The relationship between the parties was smooth for a few months. The informant started humiliating the petitioners and their relatives on the slightest pretext. The informant went to her parental home on 18.04.2018 with her uncle. The petitioner no. 1 repeatedly called the informant and enquired about her well-being. The informant avoided the calls made by petitioner no. 1. Whenever she picked up the call, she expressed her inability to join the company of the petitioner. Petitioner No. 1 filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Amritsar. The informant made a false complaint to S.P., Bilaspur accusing the petitioner no.1 & 2 of demanding dowry. She also stated that she was turned out of her matrimonial home on 18.04.2018. A compromise was effected between the parties on 23.07.2019. The Petitioner No. 1 and the informant shifted to the ancestral home of the petitioner and they resided separately from the petitioner’s family. The informant was not comfortable in the ancestral home and they shifted to the first floor of the house of the uncle of petitioner no .1 as per the convenience of the informant. The informant withdrew the false complaint made by her against the petitioners no. 1 and 2. Petitioner No. 1 also withdrew the petition filed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act pending before learned Principal Family Court at Amritsar. The informant again left the company of the petitioner in August. The petitioners tried to settle the matter. The mother of the informant made a complaint to the Police Commissioner, Amritsar. Subsequently, the informant and her mother requested the Police not to take any action against the petitioners on the complaint filed by them. Petitioner No. 1 again filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for Restitution of Conjugal Rights. The informant filed a complaint against the petitioner on 23.09.2019 under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in the Court of learned CJM, Bilaspur. She also filed a false FIR to coerce the petitioner. The informant herself left her matrimonial home. No person ever harassed her. The allegations levelled in the FIR are false and they are not supported by any affidavit. Petitioner No. 1 and the informant resided separately and it was not possible for petitioners No. 3 and 4 to harass the informant. The informant and her mother made repeated complaints against the petitioners, some of which were withdrawn. The FIR is an abuse of the process of law; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
3. The petition is opposed by respondent no. 1 by filing a reply asserting that the FIR was registered on the complaint of the informant. The Police conducted the investigation and presented a challan against the petitioner before the Court, which is pending adjudication. Petitioners No. 1 and 2 harassed the informant for small things and taunted her for bringing insufficient dowry. Petitioner No. 1 gave beatings to the informant. Her mother and the family members made enquiries from the petitioners and they (petitioners) assured the informant and her mother that petitioner no. 1 would not do anything. However, petitioner no. 1 started assaulting the informant again. When the complaint was made to the other petitioners, they blamed the informant and asked her relatives to take her away. A complaint was made to S.P. Bilaspur, which was compromised on 16.07.2019. A subsequent complaint was made by the mother of the informant to the Police Commissioner, Amritsar. A prima facie case is made out against the petitioners. The allegations levelled against the petitioners were found to be correct after the investigation. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
4. Nobody appeared on behalf of the informant despite service.
5. I have heard Mr. Dhiraj Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no. 1/State.
6. Mr. Dhiraj Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a prima facie case against the petitioners. The informant left her matrimonial home without any reason and the FIR is an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
7. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent no. 1/State submitted that the FIR discloses the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323 & 506 read with Section 34 of IPC. The Police have submitted a charge sheet against the petitioner and the matter is pending before the Court of learned CJM, Bilaspur. There is no merit in the petition; hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8. I have given considerable thought to the rival submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:-
“17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court whereupon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)
“27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist.
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27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.”
10. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:-
“26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed:
“10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”.
11. One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.”
12. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings.
13. The FIR (Annexure P-1) reads that the informant was married to Pardeep Kumar as per Hindu Rites and Customs. The husband of the informant, his parents and the relatives started harassing the petitioner on trivial matters. They started taunting the informant that she had brought insufficient dowry. Her husband started beating her. The mother of the informant and her relatives talked to the petitioners who assured her not to do so in future but did not honour their promise. Despite the assurance, the informant was beaten. When the complaint was again made, the informant was blamed and her relatives were asked to take her away. She made a complaint, which was compromised; however, the petitioners again started harassing the informant. She also made a complaint to the Police Commissioner, Amritsar. Her parents-in-law are threatening her. Her dowry articles were in her matrimonial home.
14. These allegations clearly show that the petitioners had harassed the informant for bringing insufficient dowry. She was beaten. The compromise was effected between the parties but it was not honoured. The veracity of the allegations is to be seen during the trial. This Court is only concerned with the allegations made in the FIR to determine whether sufficient case is made out for proceeding further or not. The allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of the cognizable offence and the same cannot be quashed.
15. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.
16. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the application and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
