S. Balasubramani and Others Vs The State of Tamil Nadu and The TANGEDCO

Madras High Court 7 Feb 2012 Writ Petition No. 2808 of 2012 and M.P. No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 02 MAD CK 0137
Bench: Single Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

Writ Petition No. 2808 of 2012 and M.P. No. 1 of 2012

Hon'ble Bench

K. Chandru, J

Advocates

R. Gandhi, SC for Mr. R.G. Narendhiran, for the Appellant;

Final Decision

Dismissed

Acts Referred
  • Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Order 2 Rule 2
  • Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226
  • Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 - Section 79

Judgement Text

Translate:

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

Honourable Mr. Justice K. Chandru

1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioners seeking a writ of declaration declaring that the Diploma awarded to the petitioners under Distance

Education System approved by Distance Education Council of Indira Gandhi National Open University is valid and equal and to be treated on par

with the Diploma awarded through Open University System and also to consider and appoint the petitioners to the post of Technical Assistants by

internal selection in the respondent Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. in the light of the Board proceedings in FB No.5

(Administrative Branch) dated 08.04.2011.

2. It must be noted that similar contentions were raised by a set of petitioners in N. Viswanathan and Others Vs. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and

Others, . In that batch of writ petitions, this court held that it is always left to the Board to adopt whatever Government Orders and that insofar as

the Electricity Board was concerned, it has got its own right to approve the qualification. In paragraphs 34 and 35, it was observed as follows:

34. The rules framed by the State Government in respect of the Tamil Nadu Technical Education Subordinate Services, wherein the term

diploma"" has been defined as diploma awarded by the State Board Technical Education and Training, Tamil Nadu. The other diplomas unless it is

approved by the TNEB, it cannot be contended that even such diplomas will have to be necessarily recognized by them. It is open to the

Electricity Board by virtue of its statutory power vested u/s 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 to make service regulations and having made

such service regulations, it is also open to them to interpret such regulations consistent with the purpose and object of the Act under which the

Board is functioning.

35. By rejecting the diploma awarded by the fifth respondent under the open university system as not equivalent to diploma required for the post of

Technical Assistant, the Board had not violated any constitutional principle. It is well within its jurisdiction to make such interpretation.

3. The contentions raised by the petitioners are more or less similar to the contentions raised in the earlier batch of writ petitions. Reliance placed

upon the Full Board proceedings No.5, (Administrative Branch) dated 08.04.2011 is misconceived as the said Board proceedings was issued with

reference to having minimum educational qualification and persons who are having various degrees through Open University System without going

to the school final examinations. In that context, they have adopted the State Government''s order in G.O.Ms.No.107, P&AR Department, dated

18.8.2009 and G.O.Ms.No.116, P&AR Department, dated 18.8.2010. That does not take away the earlier board proceedings not accepting the

diploma issued by certain deemed universities as an equal qualification prescribed under the Board regulations.

4. It must also be noted that in the affidavit filed in this writ petition sworn to by S. Balasubramani, the first petitioner, he had not stated anywhere

that some of the petitioners whose names are described below were parties to the earlier judgment in N. Viswanathan and Others Vs. Tamil Nadu

Electricity Board and Others, . The names of such persons and the writ petitions filed by them are as follows:

Sl. No. W.P. Number Petitioner''s name and old address

1. W.P. No. 6451 of 2009 T. Ramanathan,

2. W.P. No. 6438 of 2009 S. Periyasamy, No.34/117 A, 60, Sasthree

Nagar, Salem Camp Post, Mettur Dam

3. WP. No. 6441 of 2009 A. Raveendran

4. W.P. No. 6447 of 2009 M.R. Sekar

5. W.P. No. 6450 of 2009 S. Saravanan

6. W.P. No. 6455 of 2009 R. Settu, No. P. 14/8, Thermal Quarters, A-2

Area, Mettur Dam-636 401

7. W.P. No. 6440 of 2009 K. Arputhasamy, No. 8, Type I , Block 1, EB

Campus, Barrage 4, Urachikottai, Salem.

5. If the petitioners have filed similar writ petitions and they were negatived, nothing prevented them from disclosing the same even though they

have produced the copy of the earlier order passed in N. Viswanathan''s case (cited supra). That does not absolve them from disclosing that some

of the petitioners in those batch cases are also parties to the present writ petition. The writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of

suppression of such fact. In such cases, they ought to have taken the matter on appeal and allowed the matter to become final. If any other points

which are open to them to be raised, they ought to have raised it in the earlier writ petitions.

6. In such circumstances, the earlier order will operate against the petitioners in terms of the underlying principles of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. That

provision of CPC will also apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this context, the Supreme Court vide its

judgment in Executive Engineer ZP Engg. Divn. and Another Vs. Digambara Rao etc. etc., held as follows:

15 ...The respondents, therefore, while filing the writ petition were bound to lay their whole claim having regard to the provisions contained in

Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC or the principles analogous thereto. The very basis upon which the writ petitions were based was found to be

incorrect. It was, thus, obligatory on the part of the respondents herein to question their orders of termination upon placing correct facts before the

High Court. They did not choose to do so. They did not pray for and obtain any leave of the Court to raise the contention about the legality or

otherwise of the orders of termination before an appropriate forum. Furthermore, their plea to the effect that they were entitled to continue in

service was specifically rejected. In that view of the matter, the proceedings initiated before the Labour Court questioning the orders of termination

passed against them by the appellants praying for their reinstatement with full back wages, in our opinion, were wholly misconceived. Such a plea

was barred under the principles of res judicata. It is now well settled that the general principle of res judicata applies to an industrial adjudication.

16. In P. Kulothungan this Court held: (SCC p.72. 11)

11. The principle of res judicata operates on the court. It is the courts which are prohibited from tying the issue which was directly and substantially

in issue in the earlier proceedings between the same parties, provided the court trying the subsequent proceeding is satisfied that the earlier court

was competent to dispose of the earlier proceedings and that the matter had been heard and finally decided by such court. Here the parties to the

writ petition filed by the respondent in the Madras High Court and the industrial dispute were the same. The cause of action in both was the refusal

of the appellant to allow the respondent to rejoin service. The Madras High Court was competent to decide the issue which it did with a reasoned

order on merits and after a contested hearing. This was not a case where the earlier proceedings had been disposed of on any technical ground as

was the case in Workmen v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal. The ''lesser relief'' of reinstatement which

was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High

Court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final.

Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to reagitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour

Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and redecide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High

Court in the writ proceedings.

7. The petitioners have not disclosed about filing of such writ petitions earlier. If any person comes to court without clean hands or attempted to

abuse the process of law, the courts can refuse to grant the relief. In this context it is necessary to refer to a recent decision of the Supreme Court

in Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, . In Paragraphs 163 to 167, it was held as follows:

163. Whenever the court comes to the conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the Court would be justified in refusing to proceed

further with the matter. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by

deceiving it. However, the concealed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed, it would have an effect on the merit

of the case/order. The legal maxim jus ex injuria non oritur means that a right cannot arise out of a wrongdoing, and it becomes applicable in a case

like this. (Vide The Ramjas Foundation and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, Noorduddin Vs. Dr K.L. Anand, Ramniklal N. Bhutta and

another Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, , Sabia Khan and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs.

State of Bihar and Others, and Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Shantiranjan Sarkar,

164. It is a settled proposition of law that a false statement made in the court or in the pleadings, intentionally to mislead the court and obtain a

favourable order, amounts to criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration of justice. It adversely affects the interest of the public in

the administration of justice. Every party is under a legal obligation to make truthful statements before the court, for the reason that causing an

obstruction in the due course of justice ""undermines and obstructs the very flow of the unsoiled stream of justice, which has to be kept clear and

pure, and no one can be permitted to take liberties with it by soiling its purity"".(Vide Naraindas Vs. The Government of Madhya Pradesh and

Others, Advocate-general, State of Bihar Vs. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and Another, and Afzal and another Vs. State of Haryana and

others, .

165. In K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others, this Court held that:(SCC p.492, para 34)

34...Prerogagtive writs.....are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court

must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If

there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the

threshold without considering the merits of the claim

(Emphasis added)

166. While deciding the said case this Court relied upon the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners ((1917) 1 KB 486

(CA), wherein it had been observed as under (KB p.514)

...when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an exparte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts -(it

says) facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and

the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have

not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.

(Emphasis added)

36...If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that

ground alone....The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving

it.

(Emphasis supplied)

167. In such a case the person who suppresses the material facts from the court is guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi i.e. Suppression or

failure to disclose what a party is bound to disclose, which may amount to fraud.\

8. The issues raised in this writ petition are squarely answered in the earlier batch of writ petitions. Notwithstanding the same, the petitioners relied

upon some Board proceedings which did not directly apply to the case of the petitioners. Hence, the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs.

Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.

From The Blog
Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Madras High Court to Hear School’s Plea Against State Objection to RSS Camp on Campus
Read More
Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Feb
07
2026

Court News

Delhi High Court Quashes Ban on Medical Students’ Inter-College Migration, Calls Rule Arbitrary
Read More