Wallis, J.@mdashIn this case the Advocate-General has instituted a suit u/s 539 of the Code of 1882 on the original side of this Court for the
appointment of trustees and the settlement of a scheme for the management of the Rameswaram Temple in Madura District.
2. At the first hearing, the case was adjourned to Chambers for the settlement of a scheme, but subsequently, objection was taken by the
defendant, the present manager, that his Vakils had no authority to consent to the terms of the reference and also that the Court had no jurisdiction
to try the suit. I decided to deal first with the question of jurisdiction, and it has now been fully argued before me by the Advocate General and Mr.
S. Srinivasa Iyengar. Two contentions have been raised, that Section 539 does not confer upon the High Court in its original jurisdiction power to
entertain suits about charities in the mofussil, and that the Indian Legislature had no power to confer such jurisdiction on the High Court, contrary to
the limitation imposed, by the Letters Patent on the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. It will be convenient to dispose of the latter
contention first. As printed out in the Queen v. Burch 5 I.A. 178 u/s 22 of the Indian Councils Act 1861, the Indian Legislature can make law ""for
all Courts of Justice whatever"" but cannot ""repeal or in any way affect"" the provision of the Indian High Courts Act of the same year. It is pursuant
to Section 9 of that Act that the Letters Patent of this and the other High Courts were issued; and the only question, in my opinion, is, Section 539
as construed by the plaintiff opposed to the provisions of Section 9 of the High Courts Act? The provisions of the section are as follows:
Each of the High Courts to be established under this Act shall have and exercise all such civil, criminal, admiralty and vice-admiralty, testamentary,
intestate, and matrimonial jurisdiction, original and appellate and all such powers and authority for and in relation to the administration of justice in
the Presidency for which it is established as His Majesty may by such Letters Patent as aforesaid grant and direct, subject, however, to such
directions and limitations as to the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Presidency towns as may be prescribed thereby
and save as by such Letters Patent may be otherwise directed and subject and without prejudice to the legislative powers in relation to the matters
aforesaid of the Governor-General of India in Council, the High Court to be established in each Presidency shall have and exercise all jurisdiction
and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts in the same Presidency abolished under this Act at the time
of the abolition of such last mentioned Courts.
3. The frame of the section which confers a special power to limit the ordinary original Civil jurisdiction of the High Courts by Letters Patent may
be accounted for by the fact that it was intended, as mentioned in para. 16 of the Secretary of State''s despal(sic) accompanying the Letters
Patent, to with(sic) hold from the new High Courts the jurisdiction which the Supreme Courts had exereises ""on the grounds of constructive
inhabitancy or otherwise over persons and property beyond the limits of the Presidency Town but within the limits of the Presidency."" This object
is effected by Clause 11 of our Letters Patent which confines the original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court to such limits as may be declared and
prescribed by any law made by the Governor in Council and until then in effect to the City of Madras. The power of altering the local limits of the
Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction is reserved expressly by the Letters Patent to the Local and not to the Indian Legislature but Clause 11 and all
the other clauses of the Letters Patent are by Clause 44 declared to be subject to the Legislative power of the Indian Legislature, so that it cannot
be said that it would be inconsistent with the Letters Patent in their present form for the Indian Legislature to confer upon the High Court original
jurisdiction in a particular class of suits arising outside the limits of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction as the Letters Patent contemplate that all
the provisions therein contained should be subject to alteration by the Indian Legislature. This conclusion appears to me to dispose of the objection
that such a provision would be opposed to Section 9 of the High Courts Act, because it has been held by their Lordships of the Judicial
Committee in Queen v. Burch 5 I.A. 178 that ""on the true construction of the Indian Councils Act. 1861 and of the High Courts Act, 1861, unless
there should be anything to the contrary in the Letters Patent under which the High Court is established, the exercise of jurisdiction in any part of
His Majesty''s Indian territories by the High Court was meant to be subject to and not exclusive of the general legislative power of the Governor
General in Council as to all Courts of Justice whatever,"" page 190. And later on their Lordships, after quoting the terms of 9th section which is
now in question, observe: ""The authority of the Indian Legislature over the Jurisdiction of the High Courts (so far at all events as the exercise of
authority might be consistent with His Majesty''s Letters Patent) is here distinctly recognised."" This case appears to me to conclude the question
and I do not think it necessary to refer to the Indian cases which have been cited. The next question is assuming that the Indian Legislature has
power to give the High Courts original jurisdictions in suits as to charities arising outside the Presidency Towns, has it done so by Section 539.
There are passages in the judgments in Achaya v. Rathanavelu 9 M. 253 and Rangaswami Naick v. Varadappa Naick 17 M. 462, which show
that the learned Judges who decided those cases read the section as conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the High Court, bat the point did not
arise for decision; there was no discussion about it and the arguments urged before me to-day were not considered and these observations were
only obiter dicta which are not binding on me. On the other hand there are remarks in one of the judgments in Ghazaffar Hussain v. Zarwar
Hussain 28 A. 112 : 2 A.L.J. 591 : 208 A.W.N. (1905), which suggest that the learned Judges read the section the other way. I have not been
referred to any case in which the alleged concurrent jurisdiction of the High Court has been invoked and the point appears to come up for decision
for the first time. Now the ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction of this Court is regulated by the Letters Patent as the Civil Jurisdiction of other Courts
is regulated by the Civil Courts Acts read with the CPC and the Indian Legislature has been slow to interfere with the High Courts Original
Jurisdiction as settled by the Letters Patents. Thus of the provisions in the old Code regulating jurisdiction, Sections 16, 17, and 19 are made
inapplicable to the High Court while Section 18 reproduces part of Clause 2 of the Letters Patent. So too when desirous of relieving the High
Court of suits of small value, the Legislature has effected its purpose not by taking away its jurisdiction in suits valued at upwards of 100 but by
penalising parties resorting to the jurisdiction as to costs. See the provision of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act and of the Madras Civil
Courts Act. Again as already mentioned Clause 11 of the Letters Patent of the three Presidency High Courts expressly provides that the ordinary
Original Civil Jurisdiction shall not extend beyond the prescribed local limits of such jurisdiction, while the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High
Court do not confer on it any Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction at all. Further the question is not one merely of jurisdiction but also of private
right, because the prohibition in Clause 11 protects defendants in the mofussil from being brought here to answer suits except in the circumstances
laid down in Clause 12 and it was the express policy of Parliament to restrain the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of the High Court within the limits
to be prescribed by the Letters Patent. In these circumstances and assuming that the Indian Legislature has power to override these provisions, I
think that in construing its enactments it is necessary to find clear and unambiguous words in order to extend the original jurisdiction of the High
Court to a particular class of suits arising in the mofussil. According to well established principles, such words are necessary to take away private
rights or to extend or curtail the jurisdiction of Courts in the position, of the High Court. See Craies'' Statute Law, 4th Edition, Page 109, and the
authorities there cited. Having regard to the considerations already mentioned, I think the presumption to extend the Original Civil Jurisdiction of
the High Courts is at least as strong as the presumption which arises in England against any intention to extend the jurisdiction of the superior
Courts as to which see Craies, Pages 116 and 117. Applying these principles to the construction of Section 539, we find that it empowers the
Advocate-General &c, to ""institute a suit in the High Court or the District Court within the Local limits of whose Civil jurisdiction the whole or any
part of the subject-matter of the Trust is situate"" and the question is, do these words show a clear intention to extend the Ordinary Original Civil
Jurisdiction of the High Court? In order that they may have that effect, it is necessary to read the words ""within the local limits of whose Civil
jurisdiction"" as including the local limits of the Court''s Appellate Civil jurisdiction whereas the section is providing for resort not to Appellate but
Original Jurisdiction. The Advocate-General, however, argues that the frame is of the Code were familiar with the expression Ordinary Original
Civil Jurisdiction and have used it in other sections and would have used it here if they had been referring to the local limits of its original
jurisdiction. The expression would, however, be inapplicable as the words Civil Jurisdiction refer to the District Court which has no extraordinary
Original Civil Jurisdiction to oppose to ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. It would, of course, have been plainer if the words had been Civil
Original Jurisdiction but as already observed the whole section is dealing with Original Jurisdiction; and on the other hand if the limits of the
appellate jurisdiction had been intended nothing would have been easier than to say so expressly. The Advocate-General also argues that if the
limits of original jurisdiction are intended, the mention of the High Court is superfluous because having regard to the definition District Court ""would
include the High Court on the exercise of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction."" The definition in Section 2, however, only applies ""unless there be
something repugnant in the subject or context,"" and in cases like the present one an interpretation clause must be applied with caution Rex v.
Combridgeshire (1841) 7 A. & E. 491. Having regard to the fact that the section was intended to meet a difficulty which had been experienced in
the Mofussil and as in ordinary parlance District Court does not include High Court, the High Court may, I think, have been expressly mentioned
to make it clear that the section was intended to apply to the Presidency towns as well as the Mofussil. On the whole I have come to the
conclusion that the section does not in a sufficiently clear and unambiguous manner manifest the intention of the Indian Legislature to override the
limitation imposed by the Letters Patent under the authority of Parliament on the exercise of Original Jurisdiction by the High Court in the
Presidency towns. I may add that there is no obvious reason why in 1877 the Legislature should have been desirous of extending the Original
Jurisdiction of the High Courts as regards this particular class of suits and the fact that in the present Code any such extension of the High Court''s
Original Jurisdiction is excluded in the clearest language certainly does not help the plaintiff. Lastly I may observe that on the interpretation
contended for there would be considerable difficulty as to the extent of the power to sue conferred upon the Collector in the last para, of the
section whereas on the other construction it presents no difficulty. For these reasons I am of opinion that the High Court has no jurisdiction. There
is no allegation in the plaint bringing the suit within the jurisdiction and the suit must be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
