Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J
1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been preferred claiming the following reliefs:-
“It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal may kindly be accepted and the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant may kindly be set aside
and he may be acquittedâ€
2. This Criminal Appeal has been preferred against the judgment, dated 28.05.1990, passed by the Special Judge (Anti-Corruption Cases), Udaipur in
Original Case No. 11/85 titled State Vs. Chhagan Lal whereby Chaggan Lal was convicted for the offences under Section 5 (1) (d) and (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 161 I.P.C., and awarded him a sentence of 1 year R.I. along with Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of
which he was to further undergo 1 month S.I. for each of the offences.
3. Brief facts of the case as laid before this Court by the learned counsel for the appellants are that an F.I.R., at Ex. P/6, was lodged by the
complainant P.W.4 Shankerlal, to P.W.9 S.P. Khadgawat, A.S.P., A.C.D. Udaipur on 12.03.1985 stating therein that while Chaggan Lal was engaged
as a handling and transportation agent cum contractor with the Rajasthan Staet Warehousing Corporation Centre, Udaipur, he had submitted bills on
01.03.1985 worth Rs. 30,000/- before Chaggan Lal who was delaying the verification process and despatch of the said bills, and was demanding a
sum of Rs. 2000/- as illegal gratification for the said purpose. Subsequently, a trap was laid on 12.03.1985 at about 03:00 p.m. while the appelant was
in his office with his Managing Director, P.W. 14- Tara Prakash Joshi. And that, a recovery of Rs. 2000/- was made from Chaggan Lal which is
alleged to have been paid outside the office by the complainant, P.W. 4.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that it has been the plea of the late Chaggan Lal from the very beginning that he advanced various
amounts towards loans to the complainant of Rs. 10,000/- from time to time, and that the Rs. 2000/- so recovered from him was made by the
complainant towards a repayment of the same. And that, the same was not disclosed by the complainant when he was interrogated under Section 161
Cr.P.C. but subsequently , the same was admitted by him.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that P.W.14 was a signatory to the recovery memo, being the head of the department in which
Chaggan Lal was working in, accorded the sanction for the prosecution of the appellant, vide Ex.P/20.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants also submits that as per Ex.P/21 covering letter, was placed before P.W. 14, for the purpose of acquiring
prosecution sanction, but that neither was the investigation file, the statement of the complainant, at Ex.D/4 nor the documents of statements of Shri
Raj Kumar, Shri Rajendra Prasad and Shri Pratap Singh under Section 161 Cr.P.C., at Ex.P/7, Ex.P.9 and Ex.P/11 were not produced before him.
And that, therefore, the authority which granted the prosecution sanction make an application of mind, and therefore, is infirm.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that Chaggan Lal, when apprehended, had offered the explanation for acceptance of the amount
of Rs. 2000/- on the spot, being towards repayment of the loan advanced by him to the complainant.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants also submits that the learned Court below has gravely erred in holding that there was a delay in the dispatch of
bills, and that nine of the ten bills had been duly verified and were ready for dispatch, and that the tenth bill in fact lacked verification and therefore
could not be dispatched. And that, the forwarding letter was also ready and signed, and enclosed in the envelope as well. Moreover there were
intervening holidays on 03.03.1985, 06.03.1985 to 10.03.1985, further delaying the same.
9. Learned Public Prosecutor opposes the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and submits that the learned Court below has rightly passed
the impugned order of conviction after looking into the overall facts and circumstances of the case, and the evidences placed on record before it.
10. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that from a bare perusal of the record, and looking to the testimony of multiple witnesses, the factum of
demand of illegal gratification and recovery of the same from the accused, as detailed hereinabove have been proven against him.
11. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits, that the motive for the demand of illegal gratification is said to be established, since the accused herein
sought the bribe from the complainant for the purpose of submission of the pending bill of the complainant withheld by the accused-appellant.
12. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the explanation provided by the accused, that the money was received towards a repayment of loan,
was not substantiated with evidence and rightly disbelieved by the learned Court below. And that, the accused was unable to successfully rebut the
presumption against
13. At the outset, this Court thinks it necessary and fit to keep into consideration the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with
regard to the gravity and seriousness of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the catastrophic effect that such offences, if left
unchecked, have on a democratic society, in State of M.P. & Ors. Vs. Ram Singh (2000) 5 SCC 88.
Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
“Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time is sure to malignancies the polity of country
leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle.
Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as Royal thievery. The socio-political system
exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social
order, being not only anti people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless
nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence shaking of the socio-economic political system in an otherwise healthy,
wealthy, effective and vibrating society.â€
14. Before delving into the case at hand, the relevant Sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as it stood then) applicable in the present
case, are reproduced below for the sake of brevity:-
“7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official Act
 Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for
himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to
do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for
rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of
section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than
1[three years] but which may extend to 2[seven years] and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.â€
(a) ""Expecting to be a public servant."" If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that
he is about to be in office, and that he will when serve them, be may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this
section.
(b) ""Gratification."" The word “gratification"" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.
(c) ""Legal remuneration."" The words ""legal remuneration"" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand,
but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.
(d) ""A motive or reward for doing."" A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not
in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that
person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public
servant has committed an offence under this sectionâ€
13. Criminal, misconduct by a public servant
(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, â€
(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person for
himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as active or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing
without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or
to be likely to be concerned in any proceedings or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the
official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or
related to the person so concerned; or
(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his
control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or
(d) if he,â€
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public, interest;
or
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the
public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.
Explanation.â€"For the purposes of this section, ""known sources of income"" means income received from any lawful source and such
receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant.
(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than
1[four years] but which may extend to 2[ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.
20. Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration
(1) Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) or sub-section (1) of section 13 it
is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other
person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be,
as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows
to be inadequate.
(2) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 12 or under clause (b) of section 14, it is proved that any gratification (other
than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person, it shall
be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give that gratification or that valuable thing, as
the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a
consideration which he knows to be inadequate.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), the court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of
the said sub-sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trivial that no interference of corruption may fairly be
drawn.
15. This Court observes that, for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 sub-section (1) (d) read with Section 13 sub-section (2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 to be made out against the accused, it is necessary that; the twin ingredients of a demand of illegal gratification / bribe of
remuneration; or any valuable thing, either without consideration or a consideration which is known to be inadequate by the accused; or for a
pecuniary advantage, for himself or another, made by the accused or by another on his behalf, coupled with a recovery of the said illegal gratification
from the accused, or from someone who has accepted the same on his behalf; or if he has dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise
converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant, must be proven by the prosecution as per the facts and
circumstances of each case.
15.1 It is a settled position of law that any allegation under the aforementioned sections against an accused, if sans a demand for any kind of illegal
gratification, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Demand’) or a recovery of the same (hereinafter referred to as ‘Recovery’), as discussed
above, would result in a failure of the prosecution to prove its case, beyond all reasonable doubt.
16. However, in case a Demand and a Recovery have been proven before the competent Court by placing the evidence on record, which may
include, but not be limited to; audio and/or video recording of trap proceedings, transcript of telephonic conversation between complainant and
accused, chemical testing of the currency notes and the clothes / person of the accused, or his conduit, by phenolphthalein powder or anthracene
powder, testimonies of complainant and/or investigating officer/shadow witness and/or trap/panch witness and/or other witnesses, and whether any of
the witnesses have turned hostile, the accused may rebut the same, to the satisfaction of the competent Court and averting to the facts of the case, by
providing a justification / explanation to such demand.
17. This Court further observes, as is clear from the legislative intention crystallised in the provision of law under Section 20 of the Act of 1988, that in
case a demand for illegal gratification has been proved, then ‘it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved’ i.e. it is rebuttable at the
instance of the accused if he is able to justify / explain the purpose for the said demand so made, and substantiate the same with cogent and clear
evidence, to the satisfaction of the concerned Court.
18. The same has been reinforced, time and again, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as is evident from the judgment rendered in B. Noha Vs. State of
Kerala and Ors. (2006) 12 SCC 277, wherein, while referencing the ratio decidendi laid down in the earlier decision of State of A.P. v. Kommaraju
Gopala Krishna Murthy (2000) 9 SCC 752 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed the following:-
 “…that when amount is found to have been passed to the public servant the burden is on public servant to establish that it was not by
way of illegal gratification.â€
18.1 Therefore, when it appears that an amount, which may appear to be a Demand made by an accused, has been passed to the accused, then a
presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988 is made against the accused, and the burden of proof of rebutting the same then lies on the shoulders
of the accused.
18.2 Furthermore, in Guruviah & Ors. Vs. The State (2019) 8 SCC 396 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court referenced the ratio decidendi laid down
earlier in T. Shankar Prasad v. State of A.P. (2004) 3 SCC 753 and also took into consideration, that although a justification / explanation was given
by the accused, it was not offered immediately after the recovery of money but at a belated stage, which called into question the authenticity of the
same.
Relevant portion of T. Shankar (supra) is reproduced below:-
“The involvement of both of the them a well-planned and cleverly managed device to systematically collect money stood sufficiently
established on the evidence let in by the prosecution. Further, A-2 did not offer his explanation immediately after the recovery of money. A
similar plea of receiving money as advance tax was rejected and affirmed by this Court in A. Abdul Kaffar v. State of Kerala.â€
19. This Court is also conscious of the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court:-
19.1 State of Gujarat Vs. Bhalchandra Laxmishankar Dave (2021) 2 SCC 735 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with a case
wherein the High Court had set aside the order of conviction passed by the Court below and acquitted the accused therein, made the following
observations:-
“We have gone through the detailed judgment and order of conviction passed by the Learned Trial Court and also the evidence on
record laid down by the prosecution as well as the defence. We have perused the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
High Court to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the principles while exercising in the criminal appeal against the
judgment and order of conviction. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner in which High Court ought to have
while dealing with the appeal against the order of conviction. On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
High Court, we find that, as such, there is no re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record in detail while acquitting the Respondent -
Accused. The High Court has only made general observations on the depositions of the witnesses examined.
The High Court ought to have appreciated that it was dealing with the first appeal against the order of conviction passed by the Learned
trial Court. Being First Appellate Court, the High Court was required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record and also the reasoning
given by the Learned trial Court while convicting the Accused. Being the First Appellate Court the High Court ought to have reappreciated
the entire evidence on record without any limitation, which might be there while dealing with an appeal against the order of acquittal
passed by the Learned Trial Court.
Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court acquitting the Respondent - Accused
without adverting to the reasons given by the Learned trial Court while convicting the Accused and without reappreciating the entire
evidence on record in detail cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.â€
19.2 State of U.P. Vs. Ram Asrey 1990 Supp (1) SCC 12 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:-
 “The appellate Court has given the following reasons for allowing the appeal of the respondent, they being:
1) There is no corroboration of the testimony of the complainant, Ambar Prasad regarding the demand of bribe by the respondent on
27.10.79.
2) The evidence adduced by the prosecution that even on 5.11.79, the respondent demanded the bribe from Ambar Prasad in the presence
of other persons without taking any precaution is not convincing.
3) There is no acceptable reason as to why Ambar Prasad who had promised to give the bribe money on 8.11.79 came even on 5.11.79 with
the vigilance party.
4) Though Ambar Prasad agreed to pay Rs. 15/-, he paid only Rs. 10/-.
5) The application said to have been presented by Ambar Prasad is not found.
6) No evidence whatsoever was produced to show that Ambar Prasad required a backward class certificate for getting the scholarship in
the month of November.
The sum and substance of the above reasonings go to show that there is no acceptable and clinging evidence proving that there was a
demand of bribe and that the respondent accepted the amount in question as a motive or reward for doing an official act or showing a
favour to Ambar Prasad in expertise of his official function.
On going through the impugned judgment of the High Court, we are of the view that the facts and circumstances of this case do not warrant
interference.
In the result, the appeal is dismissedâ€
19.3 Ayyasami Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1992) 1 SCC 304 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court made the following observations:-
“The High Court found that the witnesses who were associated in the conduct of the raid for recovery of tainted money from the
appellant could not be termed as independent who could be associated with such raids. The High Court further expressed doubt about
veracity of the witness who claimed that money was actually handed over in his presence. The High Court, however, drew an adverse
inference against the appellant from the circumstance that the, bill which was delayed for unreasonable period had suddenly been passed
by the appellant On an overall assessment the High Court entertained some suspicion about the credibility of the prosecution witnesses but
at the same time did not find the suspicion to be strong enough to raise doubt about the guilt of the appellant. We agree with the learned
Counsel for the appellant that in the face of the finding that the witnesses who formed part of the raiding party were not independent and
the evidence regarding handing over money to the appellant being unbelievable, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. The
guilt of the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and as such the benefit must go to him.â€
19.4 Meena Vs. The State of Maharashtra (2000) 5 SCC 21 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court made the following observations:-
“Law has always favoured the presence and importance of a shadow witness in the trap party, not only to facilitate such witness to see
but also overhear what happens and how it happens also.
The other person, who was present at the place of occurrence though cited initially as witness, was not examined by the prosecution but
later was got examined as DW-1 and evidence of this person completely belies the prosecution story. The corroboration essential in a case
like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence and acceptance of bribe is very much wanting in this case. Even
the other panch witness, PW-5, categorically admitted that even as the Inspector of Police, PW-6, arrived, the appellant gave the same
version that PW-1 tried to force into her hands the currency note which she turned down by pushing it away, and his evidence also does not
lend credibility to the case of the prosecution.
It is an obligation of judicial conscience to correct errors, where the same are manifest. The judgments of the courts below suffer from
serious infirmities and manifest errors on account of unwarranted inferences liberally drawn by the courts below against the appellant,
overlooking the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence of an accused till the charge leveled and his guilt is established beyond
all reasonable doubt. The courts below have failed to consider the adverse impact on the prosecution case from the evidence of PW-2 and
the withholding of the lady constable and Jagdish Bokade, two material witnesses.
The materials on record in this case are not sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The
conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside and the fine, if any, paid shall be refunded to the appellant.â€
19.5 Seema Silk and Sarees and Ors. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement and Ors. (2008) 5 SCC 580 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard
to presumption made against the accused, made the following observations:-
“The presumption raised against the trader is a rebuttable one. Reverse burden as also statutory presumptions can be raised in seevral
statutes as, for example, the Negotiable Instrumetns Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, TADA, etc. Presumption is raised only when certain
foundational facts are established by the prosecution. The accused in such an event would be entitled to show that he has not violated the
provisions of the Act.â€
20. This Court also takes into consideration the following passed by the Hon’ble Coordinate Benches of this Court in;
20.1 Hari Rudra Bhavan Vs. The State of Rajasthan R.L.W. 1982 Raj 676 decided on 12.03.1982 wherein a Coordinate Bench of this Court, after
analyzing the testimonies of witnesses, observed as under:-
“The prosecution could not succeed in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded or accepted illegal gratification
from Mangat Singh for payment of interest on his Jagir bonds. In the absence of any trust-worthy evidence from the side of the prosecution
relating to demand and acceptance of bribe I am unable to up-hold the convictions and sentences of the appellant under Sec. 161, I.P.C.
and Sec. 5(2) read with Sec. 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.â€
20.2 Ulfat Rai Arya Vs. State of Rajasthan 2007 CriLJ 1846 decided by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 07.12.2006, wherein the following
observations were made:-
“A plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that when the accused accepted the gratification, the presumption immediately
comes into play that he accepted it as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 161, IPC. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of T.
Shankar Prasad's case, (2004 Cri LJ 884) (supra) held that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or
reward for doing or for bearing to do any official act etc. if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only
condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 4 of the Act is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has
accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. In M. Narsinga Rao's case (supra) it was held that where the receipt of gratification was
proved, the Court was under a legal obligation to presume that such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing the public duty.
In Gulam Mahmood A. Malek's case 1980CriLJ1096 (supra) it was held that while appreciating the evidence the background of the case
should not be lost sight of it was also laid down that past conduct of the complainant should not be ignored. In Suraj Mai's case (supra) it
has been observed that in a case of bribery, mere recovery of money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient
to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. In Kesaram's case (supra) it has been held that when
accused at the earliest disclosed the fact of receiving Rs. 100/- against the money due in the brother of the complainant and the defence
version has been supported by the prosecution witnesses, the appellant has succeeded in probising the defence. In Duraisami's case
(supra), it was held that when the explanation given by the accused is found to be true and genuine then case set up by the defence has to
be accepted.â€
21. At the cost of repetition, this Court deems it proper to summarise the observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned
precedent laws in the following manner:-
21.1 For offences under the Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act of 1988, it is fundamental that a Demand and Recovery of
the same is proven against the accused.
21.2 The presumption under Section 20 of the Act of 1988, operates against the accused, and places the burden of proof upon the accused, unless he
rebuts the same to the satisfaction of the competent Court, and whether the rebuttal was made at the appropriate stage.
21.3 Owing to the fact that in old cases, wherein the technology of audio / voice recording, transcripts of conversations etc. proving the existence of
Demand rests solely in the realm of witness testimony and other material evidences placed on record before the concerned Court.
21.4 And that, an appellate Court may interfere with an order of conviction, under the Act of 1988, only after a re-appreciation of of the entire
evidence on record and thereafter, if the appellate Court finds the reasons as laid out by the Court below, in convicting the accused, under the Act of
1988, to be bad or unsustainable in the eye of law, then it may interfere and accordingly, reverse the conviction into an acquittal.
22. Now adverting to the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court makes the following observations:-
22.1 The factum of recovery of the money from the accused has been proven, by the chemical tests and cross verification of the currency so
recovered from him, and is an admitted position of the accused-appellant himself, who stated that the said money was accepted by him as a
repayment of the loan money which owed to him by the complainant.
22.2 What therefore needs to seen and dissected is the reasoning employed by the learned Court below in arriving at the finding that the factum of
demand of illegal gratification was made by the accused-appellant and whether the same withstands judicial scrutiny, when compared with the
evidence available on the record.
22.3 The stand taken by the appellant is that the money recovered from his person, was towards the repayment of a loan advanced by him to the
complainant. However, the explanation offered by him was unsuccessful in rebutting the presumption made against him under Section 20 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, owing to the fact that the complainant was able to substantiate with credible evidence that although he did use to
take loans from the appellant, the amount taken on loan by him was of Rs. 5000/-, RS. 2000/- taken in the year 1980 and Rs.3000/- in the year 1981
which he repaid by way of cheque for RS. 5000/- in the year 1984, which was given to the brother of the accused-appellant, one Mr. Rajendra, and
the counter-foil of the said cheque was placed on the record. The contention of the appellant that the total amount of loan advanced was Rs. 10,000/-
and that the remainder of Rs. 5000/- was accepted by way of cash, was rightly disbelieved by the Court below given that there was no evidence to
substantiate the same. Furthermore, the accused did not appear before the learned Court below to substantiate the same through testimony.
22.4 Further, it was the contention of the appellant that he was false implicated in the case, but there is nothing on the record to suggest the same, nor
was any reason attributed to the same.
22.5 Therefore, the explanation provided by the accused-appellant was rightly disbelieved by the learned Court below. Moreover, the other defence
taken by the accused-appellant that the last bill was kept pending with him on count of certain holidays and pending verification of the said bill, was
rightly held lacking credibility as the same should have been then deposited to the custody of the dispatch clerk. The fact that the said bill was withheld
in the custody of the appellant further weakens the stand so taken by him.
23. This Court therefore finds that the learned Court below has categorically dealt with the evidences placed on record, and after a thorough scrutiny
and appreciation of the same, found that presumption, under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption, against the appellant stands, and that he was
unable to rebut the same. And the factum of recovery stood proved against him, and therefore rightly found him guilty for the offences under the
Sections Section 7, 13 (1) (d) and 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
24. This Court, in light of the above made observations and the aforementioned precedent laws laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, finds that
the judgment of conviction, dated 28.05.1990, passed by the learned Court below deserves to be upheld.
25. This Court, therefore, finds that the impugned judgment dated 28.05.1990 passed by the learned Court below, does not suffer from any legal
infirmity, and therefore, the same is upheld and affirmed.
26. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. Since the accused herein (represented in this case by his LRs) has passed away, there is no need to make any
observations regarding his sentence. Accordingly, all pending applications, if any, are disposed of.
