Sadagopa Ramanuja Jeer the present Madathipathi and Adheenakartha of Srivalliputhur Manavala Mahamuni Mutt Vs Sri Koil Kandadai Vathula Annan Sri Rengachari Swamigal through Sri V. S. Rangaswami Iyengar, Advocate

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

S. Natarajan, J.@mdashThe third respondent in the Court below is the appellant. Srivilliputhur Manavala Mahamuni Mutt is a religious institution controlled and supervised by the Jeer of Vanamamalai Mutt. At one time, a dispute arose between Matathipathi of Manavala Mahamuni Mutt (hereinafter referred to as the Matathipathi) and the Jeer of Vanamamalai Mutt (hereinafter referred to as the Jeer) on the question whether the Matathipathi was subject to control of the Jeer. To establish his rights the Jeer filed a suit, O. S. No. 19 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge''s Court, Ramanathapuram. The then Matathipathi resisted the suit and for the purpose of defending the action, he borrowed moneys from a third-party who is the decree-holder in these proceedings. The trial Court decreed the suit, but on appeal to this Court in A. S. No. 485 of 1955, the judgment of the trial Court was reversed and a decision was rendered in favour of the Matathipathi. Thereupon, the Jeer preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 2 of 1960 and the Letters Patent Bench allowed the appeal and recognised the right of the Jeer to nominate the Matathipathi. The decree-holder who had lent moneys to the Matathipathi to contest the litigation started by the Jeer, filed a suit, O. S. No. 16 of 1957 to recover from the Matathipathi the sums of money advanced by him. The suit was decreed ex parte on 2nd August, 1957. During the pendency of A.S. No. 485 of 1955 the Matathipathi who originally borrowed moneys from the petitioner-decree-holder died and thereupon the Executive Officer of Sri Nachiar Devasthanam was appointed a fit person to look after the affairs of the Manavala Mahamuni Mutt. After duly taking charge of the affairs of the Mutt, the fit person filed a suit, O.S. No. 52 of 1962 to restrain the decree-holder in O. S. No. 16 of 1957 from executing the decree against the Mutt on the ground that the promissory notes on the strength of which the decree-holder-petitioner had obtained a decree in O. S. No. 16 of 1957 were not supported by consideration and, secondly, summons in the said suit had not been duly served on the institution. The trial Court agreed with the contentions of the fit person and the suit was decreed on 31st March, 1964 and a permanent injunction was granted in favour of the fit person. The decree-holder filed A. S. No. 365 of 1964 to this Court and the appeal was duly allowed. The resultant position was that the decree passed in favour of the decree-holder in O. S. No. 16 of 1957 became final.

2. After the disposal of A. S. No. 365 of 1964 which, as stated above left intact the decree awarded in favour of the decree-holder in O. S. No. 16 of 1957, the decree-holder filed the present execution petition E.P. No. 2 of 1972, so that it should be treated as a continuation of the prior execution petition E.P. No; 22 of 1959 so as to render the later execution petition within time and bring to sale the immovable properties of the Mutt for realisation of the amount decreed in his favour. It may be mentioned at this juncture that at one stage of the proceedings, the decree-holder had filed E. P. No. 22 of 1959, but the said execution petition was closed on 16th October, 1972 on account of the injunction granted in favour of the fit person in O. S. No. 52 of 1962. The injunction granted in the said suit was in force from 16th October, 1962 to 28th April, 1971 on which date this Court allowed A. S. No. 365 of 1964 and dismissed O. S. No. 52 of 1962.

3. The Jeer who contested the execution petition raised two objections, viz.: (1) that the properties of the Mutt are not liable to be proceeded against as the loans which culminated into a decree in O. S. No. 16 of 1957 were incurred by the Matathipathi in his individual capacity and not in exercise of office as Matathipathi of the Mutt; and (2) that E.P. No. 2 of 1972 cannot be tacked on to E. P. No. 22 of 1959 for limitation purposes. The learned Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram who enquired into the petition overruled both the objections of the Jeer and ordered execution. With regard to the first contention, he held the decree passed in O. S. No. 16 of 1957 did not disclose that the Matathipathi had incurred the loans in his individual capacity and as such, it was not possible for the executing Court to go behind the decree and make a probe to find out if the decree had been validly passed against the Mutt. On the second ground of defence raised by the Jeer, the learned Subordinate Judge held that E. P. No. 22 of 1959 had been closed only for statistical purposes on account of the temporary injunction granted in O. S. No. 52 of 1962 and such closing cannot be treated as a final disposal of the execution petitioner. For reaching this conclusion, the learned Subordinate Judge placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Muthuveeranna Chettiar Vs. Muthuvenkatarama Chettiar and Others, , which holds that "if an execution petition is struck off, lodged, recorded or closed, while yet the reliefs prayed for, or some of them, remain undisposed without being covered by final orders either granting or refusing those reliefs, then the petition will continue to be on the file of the Court despite its being struck off, lodged, recorded or closed". The learned Subordinate Judge, also accepted the decree-holder''s contention that during the period 16th October, 1962 to 28th April, 1971 the decree-holder was effectively injuncted from executing his decree and consequently, he is entitled to invoke Section 15 of the Limitation Act to exclude such period in computing the time within which the execution petition should be filed. Here again, the learned Subordinate Judge invoked to his aid the decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Lata Agarwal Vs. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and Others, for taking out of consideration the period during which the order of injunction passed against the decree-holder was in force. A third objection was also feebly raised by the Jeer before the lower Court against the maintainability of the execution petition on the ground that the attachment effected in E.P. No. 22 of 1959 ceased to be effective with the closing of the petition and consequently, the decree-holder was not entitled to bring the properties to sale without fresh attachment. This hesitant contention was also rejected by the lower Court on the ground that since E.P. No. 22 of 1959 had only been closed for statistical purposes and had not been effectively disposed of on merits, the attachment effected in the said petition cannot be deemed to have been raised on 16th October, 1962 when E.P. No. 22 of 1959 was closed. He therefore held that the attachment originally effected in E.P. No. 22 of 1959 would enure to the benefit of the decree-holder even in E.P. No. 2 of 1972. Having thus set aside all the objections raised by the Jeer, the learned Subordinate Judge ordered execution and called upon the decree-holder to file sale papers. It is in these circumstances, the Jeer has come forward with this appeal.

4. Mr. Alagar, learned Counsel for the appellant, advanced three arguments in the appeal to contend that the learned Subordinate Judge ought not to have allowed the decree-holder to proceed with the execution petition filed by him. The first argument of Mr. Alagar relates to the validity of the decree passed in favour of the decree-holder. An attempt was made by the learned Counsel to traverse once over again the objection raised by the Mutt in the earlier suit, O.S. No. 52 of 1962 that the decree obtained by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 will not be binding on the Mutt. Such a plea is raised on the basis that the Matathipathi who incurred the debt had not borrowed the amount for and on behalf of the Mutt or in connection with the activities of the Mutt and as such, the liability created by the Matathipathi cannot be imposed on the Mutt or its properties. This contention of the appellant cannot really be sustained. Though the contention of the appellant that the debt which ultimately ripened into a decree had not been really incurred for any of the religious or charitable activities in which the Mutt is engaged, but was incurred by the former Matathipathi for asserting his rights in the suit filed by the Jeer, the fact, nevertheless, remains that a competent Court of law has passed a decree against the Mutt in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 and this decree has not been varied or modified till this date in a manner known to law. No doubt, an attempt was made by the fit person to nullify the decree by seeking for a declaration in O.S. No. 52 of 1962 that the decree obtained in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 should not be executed against the properties of the Mutt, but such attempt proved abortive by reason of the decision of this Court in A.S. No. 365 of 1964. Having regard to the settled state of affairs, so far as the validity of the decree in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 is concerned, the appellant is not entitled to ask the executing Court to go behind the decree and assess once again the right of the decree-holder to proceed against the Mutt in execution of the decree granted in his favour in O.S. No. 16 of 1957.

5. The second ground of objection taken by Mr. Alagar, is that inasmuch as E.P. No. 22 of 1959 was closed on 16th October, 1962 and the present petition, E.P. No. 2 of 1972 was filed long afterwards, the lower Court should have held that E.P. No. 2 of 1972 is barred by limitation. This contention is clearly devoid of any merit and, in my opinion, has been effectively answered by the learned Subordinate Judge with succinct reasons. It is common ground that E.P. No. 22 of 1959 was not disposed of on merits, but was merely closed for statistical purposes as the execution of the decree passed in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 had been temporarily injuncted by orders of Court in O.S. No. 52 of 1962. This Court has held in several instances that such closing of an execution petition for the purpose of record will not amount to a judicial disposal of the execution petition. It necessarily follows that the execution petition must be deemed to be in suspended animation and it is open to the decree-holder to again revive the execution proceedings by means of a suitable petition at the appropriate time. Admittedly the decree-holder had been restrained, by means of an injunction in O.S. No. 52 of 1962 and A.S. No. 365 of 1964, from executing his decree and such restraint made on him remained in force till 28th April, 1971 when A.S. No. 365 of 1964 was disposed of. In these circumstances, the decree-holder is certainly entitled to claim the benefit afforded by Section 15 of the Limitation Act, and exclude the period of stay for the purpose of limitation while pursuing his remedies in execution proceeding; against the judgment-debtor. The law is well settled on this aspect of the matter and the Supreme Court has held in Prem Lata Agarwal Vs. Lakshman Prasad Gupta and Others, , that it is enacted in Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908 that while computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for decree, execution of which had been stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction shall be excluded. It is, therefore, futile for the appellant to contend that the period during which the operation of the decree obtained by the decree-holder was stayed should not be taken into consideration n deciding the question whether E.P. No. 2 of 1972 filed by the decree-holder is within time or not. The second objection raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant should, therefore, necessarily fail.

6. We are now left with the third objection raised by the appellant to assail the order of the lower Court. This objection has been raised in the following manner in the memorandum of appeal:

The lower Court failed to see that the lands which have been attached and ordered to be sold arc inam lands granted for the support of the Mutt under Inam Title Deed 518 and the shops, which also have been attached and ordered to be sold form part of the Matam building and are inalienable and hence cannot be sold in execution even if the debt is binding on the Mutt.

The contention of Mr. Alagar in support of this objection is that the properties of the Mutt which are sought to be proceeded against in execution are inam grants and as such they are inalienable properties and cannot be sold under any circumstances and such a bar would even extend to execution proceedings taken in a Court of law to execute a decree passed against the Mutt. In support of his contention Mr. Alagar placed reliance on Section 41 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 thereinafter referred to as the Act) and the decisions rendered by this Court in Neti Anjaneyalu Vs. Sri Venugopal Rice Mill (Limited), and Sundararajulu Naidu and Others Vs. B. Papiah Naidu, Section 41 of the Act (relevant portions alone extracted) reads as follows:

Section 41:

(1) Any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years of any inam granted for the support or maintenance of a religious institution or for the performance of a charity or service connected therewith or of any other religious charity and made, confirmed or recognised by the Government shall be null and void:

Provided that any transaction of the nature aforesaid (not being a gift) may be sanctioned by the Government as being necessary or beneficial to the institution....

(2) (a) The Collector may, on his own motion, or on the application of the trustee of the religious institution or of the Commissioner or of any person having interest in the institution who has obtained the consent of such trustee or the Commissioner, by order, resume the whole or any part of any such inam, on one or more of the following grounds, namely:

(i) ...

(ii) ...

(iii) that the holder of such inam or part has failed to perform or make the necessary arrangements for performing, in accordance with the custom or usage of the institution, the charity or service for performing which the inam had been made, confirmed or recognised as aforesaid, or any part of the said charity or service, as the case may be ....

Mr. Alagar''s contention is that if the properties granted to the Mutt by Government under Inam Grants are allowed to be sold in execution proceedings, the resultant effect would be that the Mutt will be unable to perform the charity or service for performing which the inam had been made, confirmed or recognised and consequently, the Government may resume the grant and such resumption will prejudicially affect the interests of the Mutt. In order to prove that the properties which are now attached and brought to sale are lands granted in inam settlement by the Government, the appellant has filed C.M.P. No. 12550 of 1972 for reception of the Inam Fair Register Extract as additional evidence. In the said Inam Fair Register Extract, it is stated that the land described therein has been granted as inam "for the support of Manavala Mahamuni Matam at Srivilliputhur now kept up ". The register also makes mention that the land is a whole ardhamaniyam village held for the support of the Manavala Mahamuni Matam. Yet another entry in the Remarks-column is to the effect that at the Matam daily pooja is maintained to Manavala Mahamuniswami and Brahmins are fed on important days and the whole of the proceeds of the inam is appropriated for charitable purposes. From the entries contained in the Inam Fair Register Extract, it is clearly seen that the lands which are attached and brought for sale by the decree-holder are inam lands and they have been granted to the Mutt so that the income therefrom may be utilised to perform daily poojas in the Matam and for feeding Brahmins on important days. Such being the case, it calls for determination as to whether the lands can be sold by the Matathipathi of his own volition or allowed to be brought to sale by a third-party to realise amounts due from the Matam. The appellant''s contention is that inam lands granted to a religious or charitable institution for specific purposes connected with the objective of the institution cannot be sold either by private treaty or by due process of law. In support of such a contention, the appellant places reliance on two decisions of this Court as referred to above (i) and (2).

7. Neti Anjaneyalu Vs. Sri Venugopal Rice Mill (Limited), is a case where a respondent-decree-holder attached certain lands in execution of a decree and the judgment-debtor raised an objection an the ground that the lands attached were burdened with swasthivachakam service and therefore inalienable. The Full Bench of this Court which decided the case held that the sale of such property is opposed to the nature of the interest effected and was also contrary to public policy. It further held that if the property were sold the purchaser could get no title of any value, for, at any moment the property might revert to the zamindar or the Government as the case may be when the inamdar ceased to render such service. In the later case, Sundararajulu Naidu and Others Vs. B. Papiah Naidu, , the question that arose for consideration was whether it was competent for the Government to make a heritable grant providing for a succession of limited interests, each grantee taking the estate for life and whether, by virtue of the limited nature of the grant, the property fell within the Exception to Section 60 of the CPC and was therefore not liable to be sold at the instance of the decree-holder. A difference of opinion arose between the two Judges who heard the appeal and consequently, the matter was referred to a third Judge for his opinion, Burn. J., held that the jaghir which was brought for sale fell within the terms of Section 60, CPC and the jaghir was certainly saleable property over the profits of which the judgment-debtors had a disposing power which they may exercise for their own benefit. Abdur Rahman, J., held that under the terms of the sannad or in pursuance whereunder the jaghir was granted to the grantee and his heirs, they are only entitled to the right to enjoy the rents and profits derived from the jaghir during the time of their natural lives, but they had no power of disposal over the corpus of the property, that they cannot be held to have any power to deal with its income beyond the period of their natural lives and that therefore, the jaghir cannot be held to be saleable property belonging to the judgment-debtor or ever which or the profits of which he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit, as defined in Section 60, Civil Procedure Code. Venkataramana Rao, J., the third Judge, to whom the matter was referred for his opinion, concurred with the view of Abdur Rahman, J. and held that it was competent for the Crown to make a heritable grant providing for a succession of limited interests each grantee taking the estate for life, that such grantees were only entitled to enjoy the rents and profits from the jaghir during their lives, that such rights alone, and not the jaghir itself, are attachable and saleable and consequently, the appropriate order that was to be passed in the case was to direct the appointment of a receiver to be in possession and management of the property who will collect the rents and profits thereof and pay the share of the net profits of the judgment-debtors in satisfaction of the decree.

8. Mr. Kesava Iyengar, learned Counsel for the decree-holder, vehemently opposes the contention of the appellant that the lands of the Mutt, being lands granted under inam, are not liable to be attached and brought to sale and advanced several arguments to sustain the order of the lower Court. It was firstly contended by Mr. Kesava Iyengar, that the objection raised to the inam lands of the Mutt being brought to sale is a new ground of objection and was not raised before the executing Court. It was therefore argued that the appellant cannot be permitted to raise this new ground of objection in the appellate stage of the case. To buttress this argument, Mr. Kesava Iyengar placed reliance upon (Lodd) Govindoss Krishnadoss Vs. Rajah of Karvetnagar and Another, where it was held that a party, who has objections to a proceeding before the Court, must put them forward at the earliest opportunity and must put all of them forward and not keep back any of them for subsequent presentation. It is, no doubt, true that the objection, as now projected by the appellant, was not raised before the executing Court. But, on that score, I do not think that the appellant can be denied opportunity to raise the contention, since it is a mixed question of law and fact. The second argument of Mr. Kesava Iyengar is that the properties which were brought to sale were attached even in E.P. No. 22 of 1959 and, since the appellant did not raise any objection to the attachment of the lands on the ground that they were inam lands and hence inalienable in character, the appellant was estopped from agitating the question that the lands were not liable for attachment and sale. To contend that though E.P. No. 22 of 1959 was closed, nevertheless the attachment effected in that petition must be deemed to be subsisting, the learned Counsel placed reliance on M.R.A.L. Lakshmanan Chetty Vs. M.R.A.P.L. Palaniappa Chetty, where it was held that when once execution is ordered, the subsequent dismissal of the execution petition either for want of prosecution or owing to inability of the process of the Court to reach the judgment-debtor or his property does not imply that the earlier orders passed on that application ceased to have effect. I am afraid that the proposition of law relied on by Mr. Kesava Iyengar cannot have application to the facts of this case. Admittedly, the fit person who was in charge of the Mutt had not only repudiated the liability of the Mutt to satisfy the decree obtained by the decree-holder, but had gone a step further and filed a suit, O.S. No. 52 of 1962, to restrain the decree-holder from executing the decree in O.S. No. 16 of 1957 against the Mutt and its properties. In such circumstances, it is difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the decree-holder that the Mutt or its representative had not raised any objection to the attachment effected in E.P. No. 22 of 1959 regarding the inam character of the lands of the Mutt and therefore it must be concluded that the Mutt had waived such an objection at the appropriate stage and, in any event, it was estopped from questioning the validity of the attachment after having meekly suffered such attachment in E.P. No. 22 of 1959. The third ground relied on by the decree-holder to meet the case of the appellant is that the plea of the appellant had already been considered by the Court in A.S. No. 365 of 1964 and therefore, the appellant is barred by res judicata from raising the plea once over again. The judgment in A.S. No. 365 of 1964 does not, however, provide any basis for such a contention being advanced by Mr. Kesava Iyengar. What was principally contended in O.S. No. 52 of 1962 and in A.S. No. 365 of 1964 was that the Matathipathi who had incurred the debt from the decree-holder had incurred the liability for personal causes and as such, the Mutt or its properties cannot be called upon to satisfy the decree. The question as to whether the inam properties of the Mutt are liable to be attached and brought to sale in execution of a decree obtained against the Matathipathi did not directly come up for consideration in those proceedings. There is, therefore, no force in the contention that the decision in A.S. No. 365 of 1964 will operate as res judicata and debar the appellant from raising the plea that the inam lands of the Mutt are inalienable and cannot be brought for sale. The last argument of Mr. Kesava Iyengar is that, in any event, there is a marked difference between inam grants in favour of individuals burdened with a service and inam grants in favour of institutions for religious and charitable purposes, and the restrictions impressed upon the grant to a grantee of the former category cannot be held to exist in so far as the grants of the latter category are concerned. So far as this contention is concerned, I am of opinion that Mr. Kesava Iyengar''s objection is well-founded.

9. As I have already stated, the appellant has filed C.M.P. No. 12550 of 1972 for reception of the Inam Fair Register extract as additional evidence. As the appellant places reliance on the entries contained therein and as I am of opinion that the entries in the Inam Fair Register have to be necessarily looked into for assessing the case of the appellant, the petition, C.M.P. No. 12550 of 1972 is allowed and the Inam Fair Register extract is received and marked on the side of the appellant, as Exhibit R-1. In Exhibit R-1, under column 10, the grant is shown as a permanent one. It is therefore not a restricted or a conditional grant. The decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant can have no application to the facts of this case. Anajneyalu v. Sri Venugopala Rice Mills Limited ILR 45 Mad. 620; 42 M.L.J. 477 was a case where the grant was to an individual and the grant was subjected to the condition that the grantee and his successors-in-interest should do swasthivachakam service in the temple and they would be entitled to enjoy the inam so long as they did the service. Even when the Inam Commissioner confirmed the grant, he incorporated the stipulation that the grant was to be continued so long as the service was performed. It was in those circumstances, the Full Bench held that the grant being burdened with service, was of a restricted nature and therefore the lands granted under the inam were not alienable. In so far as Sundararajulu Naidu and Others Vs. B. Papiah Naidu, , is concerned, the inam besides being an unenfranchised one, was also a heritable one, since the grantor intended the grant to descend to the heirs of the grantee. It was on account of that, a clause containing prohibition against alienation was inserted in the grant. No such restrictions are seen in so far as the inam grant of lands in the instant case is concerned. Further more, it is seen that the grant has been enfranchised and a jodi rent has been fixed for the lands. There is no evidence as to when exactly the inam was granted and by whom it was granted. If the grant had been made by the proprietor of an estate, even the Government has no right to resume an inam subsequent to the permanent settlement. The Secretary of State for India in Council Vs. Chinnapragada Bhanamurthy and Kalipatna Sriramulu, . In the Inam Fair Register extract, Exhibit R-1, under the column "Decision of the Inam Commissioner or his Assistants", the following endorsement is found: " Confirmed on present tenure subject to the jodi of Rs. 220. The tank will in future be repaired by the inamdar himself". It is apposite to note here that in another portion of Exhibit R-1, the following endorsement is found: "The tank of the village is in good order. The cost of the tank repairs has been borne by the Government and the Ardhamayamdar (Ardhanari Gounder) in equal shares." Thus it is seen that the Inam Commissioner has not only confirmed the grant of the whole ardhamanyam village in favour of the Mutt, but has subjected it to a jodi of Rs. 220 and has further directed the Mutt itself, viz., the inamdar, to meet the expenses of the tank in future. The following passage occurring in page 53 of Vedantachari''s Estates Land Act (Vol. I) makes it clear that if the word "confirmed" appears in the Inam Fair Register, as against inam, the presumption would be that the grant of the inam was made prior to enfranchisement:

The word ''confirmed'' appears to be used to indicate inams, which are confirmed by the Inam Commissioner, prior to enfranchisement.

With reference to enfranchisement of inams, this is what is found at page 53 of the abovesaid book:

Subsequently in 1859, what are known as the Inam Rules were framed for investigating into the titles of various inamdars and for enfranchisement of inams, by releasing the reversionary rig us of the Government, and granting free-hold title deeds to the inamdars to a fixed quit rent. An Inam Commissioner was appointed for the purpose.

After dealing with the various modes of proof regarding valid tit e for an inam, the author has stated as follows:

Where proof of title is adduced as above, the inam is ''confirmed'' and then enfranchised by the reversionary rights of the Government being surrendered and a free-hold title being issued. All enfranchised inams are therefore inams which are ''confirmed''. Wherever inams are not enfranchised, it has to be shown that they were at least ''recognised'' in the manner already stated. ''Recognised'' inams appear to be those which are not expressly settled or enfranchised by the ''Government'' but otherwise allowed to be continued, whereas ''confirmed'' inams are those which are expressly ''settled'' under the Inam Rules or otherwise.

In such circumstances, the entries in the Inam Fair Register extract themselves go to show that the inam was not only confirmed, but enfranchised by the Inam Commissioner. As I have already stated, there is no stipulation anywhere that the inam grant will suffer resumption if the grantee failed to perform any of the conditions imposed on it. Undoubtedly, if the lands of the Mutt are acquired, the Mutt will be entitled to compensation in respect of those lands. It therefore necessarily follows that the lands which have been attached by the decree-holder are the absolute properties of the Mutt and therefore liable to be attached and brought for sale by the decree-holder. Even Section 41 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act cannot be of any avail to the appellant. Section 41 prohibits a voluntary transfer of inam land by exchange, gift, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years. Even here, any of the abovementioned acts can be entered into by or on behalf of the institution, except a transaction amounting to gift, with the sanction of the Government. It is therefore clear that it is not as if an exchange, sale, mortgage, lease etc., can never be entered into by a religious or charitable institution in respect of its properties obtained by inam grant. In any event, these restrictions will not apply to the case of a forced sale as in the case of the property of a religious or charitable institution being brought to sale in Court-auction by a decree-holder. Hence the third ground of objection raised by the appellant must also fail.

10. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.

Exhibit marked in High Court.

Exhibit R-1 -- Inam Fair Register Extract, dated 19th January, 1951.