@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
1. Since, the issues arising for consideration and the facts and circumstances of all the writ petitions are similar in nature, a common order is passed.
2. The main challenge in the above writ petitionsrelates to the notifications issued by the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, u/s 4(1) of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, published in the ThiruvallurDistrict Gazette, and the notifications issued by theSpecial Commissioner and Commissioner of LandAdministration, Chepauk, Chennai, u/s 6 of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, published in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette, Part-VI-Section 1, to acquire the landsof the Petitioners for the public purpose of forming theOuter Ring Road, under the Outer Ring Road Project,proposed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. Some of thePetitioners have also prayed for a direction to direct theRespondents to form the Outer Ring Road by opting for thealignment passing through the lands in survey numbers,including S. Nos. 3,4,6,18,198,308,484,485,541 and 542, ofM.G.R. Nagar, Uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagaretc., and other adjoining areas of Thirunindravur Village,as proposed by the Pallavan Consultancy Services Ltd.,Egmore, Chennai.
3. It has been stated that the lands comprised inS. Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22 are classified as residential areas. Several residentialbuildings had been constructed in the said areas and theyhave been in existence for several decades. Based on theapproval obtained from the Chennai Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority, a large number of residents have been living inthe said buildings for a number of years. The website ofthe Registration Department reveals that the areas inquestion have been classified as ''residential zone'' and theguide line values for the lands therein, during therelevant period, prior to 1.8.2007, had varied from Rs. 52/-to Rs. 128/-per sq.ft. While so, the Petitioners had cometo know, from the newspaper reports, that the Government ofTamil Nadu has proposed to construct the Outer Ring Roadbetween Vandalur and Minjur.
4. As per the report, it had been learnt that theGovernment of Tamil Nadu had proposed to form the OuterRing Road, between the Vandalur and Minjur, having a lengthof about 63.2 kilometers, for the purpose of reducing thetraffic congestion in the city of Chennai and forfacilitating the heavy vehicles to by-pass the city ofChennai. It had been gathered that the width of the roadwould be 400 feet out of which 100 feet at the centre wouldbe earmarked for the railway lines. 60 feet width, on either side of the railway lines had been earmarked toaccommodate the roads. The remaining 90 feet, on eitherside, would be earmarked for the construction of shops andother commercial buildings, in order to reduce the quantumof toll on the vehicles, proposed to be collected for thepurpose of constructing the Outer Ring Road. The proposedproject is to be executed by private partnership.
5. It has also been stated that the residents of thearea concerned were of the belief that the Outer Ring Roadwould be aligned through poramboke lands available on theeastern side of Prakash Nagar and Lakshmi Nagar andtherefore, only a few houses, situated in Sri VignarajanNagar, would be affected. However, due to the agitation,caused by some of the local residents, the alignment of theroad had been shifted, marginally. However, in view of thefact that a large number of residents were being affected,the Association of the residents of Prakash Nagar had sentseveral representations to the authorities concerned. Inreply to the said representations, the authoritiesconcerned had informed that the Pallavan ConsultancyServices Limited, Chennai, would examine the feasibility ofshifting the alignment of the road. The PallavanConsultancy Services Limited had submitted a report, on 6.10.1997, to the Chennai Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority, Chennai, expressing its opinion that, byintroducing two curves at the starting point, with adequateradius, the alignment of the road could be shifted to theeastern side of Lakshmi Nagar. However, the ChennaiMetropolitan Development Authority had rejected the saidproposal. In such circumstances, the Lakshmi NagarResidents'' Welfare Association had filed a writ petitionbefore this Court, in W.P. No. 2000 of 1998, challenging therejection of the proposed realignment. This Court, by itsorder, dated 22.11.1998, had allowed the writ petition. However, the writ appeal filed by the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority, in W.A. No. 603 of 1999, (CHENNAIMETROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY REP. BY ITS MEMBERSECRETARY, CHENNAI - 600 008 v. LAKSHMI NAGAR RESIDENTSWELFARE ASSOCIATION, REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT, THIRUNINDRAVUR)had been allowed, by an order, dated 19.9.2000, dismissingthe writ petition filed by the Association. The reviewpetition filed in R.A. No. 20 of 2001, in W.A. No. 603 of 1999,had also been dismissed by this Court, by its order, dated31.7.2001.
6. It has also been stated that, in the meantime, theresidents of Morai village, situated in the line alignment of the road, as originally planned, had submitted similarrepresentations, as that of the residents of Lakshmi Nagarand Prakash Nagar. The said representations had beenrejected by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authoritystating that the shifting of the alignment to the westernside of Morai village, as requested by its residentsassociation, would raise a new problem and that the costsof the project would increase. However, the alignment,passing through Morai village, had been shifted, based onthe request of two of the members of the legislativeassembly. Thereafter, a writ petition had been filed by theEast Prakash Nagar Residents'' Welfare Association,challenging the alignment passing through Lakshmi Nagar andPrakash Nagar, in W.P. No. 2090 of 2001. The said writpetition had been dismissed by this Court, by its order,dated 23.2.2007, stating that the said public interestlitigation was not maintainable. However, it was made clearthat it would be open to the affected parties to agitatethe issues in question by appropriate proceedings.
7. It has been stated that notifications u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had been publishedin the Government Gazette calling for objections, if any,against the acquisition proceedings. In some cases, such intimations had not been received. Those, who had theknowledge of the notifications, had submitted theirobjections during the 5-A enquiry proceedings stating thatthe proposed alignment through the patta lands, ignoringthe Government Poramboke lands, on the eastern side of thealignment, is illegal, arbitrary, contrary to the publicinterest and based on the extraneous considerations. However, the objections raised by the Petitioners had beenrejected, without proper reasons being assigned. Therejection of the objections raised by the Petitioners hadbeen based only on the reason that the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority had not accepted the shifting of thealignment of the Outer Ring Road. Thereafter, thedeclaration, u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, had also been published in the Tamil Nadu GovernmentGazette. In such circumstances, the Petitioners hadpreferred the present writ petitions before this Court,under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. In the counter affidavit filed by the Respondents,it has been stated that the Government had approved theproposal of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authorityfor the development of the Outer Ring Road, betweenThiruvallur Road and Thiruvottiyur Ponneri Panjetty Road, for a distance of 33.1. kilo meters, under Phase II of theproject, in G.O. Ms. No. 303, Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment, dated 2.7.1996. The Government had sanctionedthe creation of four land acquisition units, comprising ofa Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) and one supervisoryunit headed by a District Revenue Officer (LandAcquisition), with the necessary supporting staff.
9. The District Revenue Officer (Land Acquisition)Outer Ring Road Project, Chennai Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority, Chennai, had divided the entire extent of landsproposed to be acquired, into 4 units. The lands located inPoonamallee Taluk, including those in ThiruninravurVillage, had been allotted to the Special Tahsildar (LandAcquisition) Unit IV.
10. It has also been stated that the member secretary,Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai, hadgiven a requisition for the acquisition of 10.49.5 hectaresof land, in Thirunindravur village, Poonamallee Taluk,Thiruvallur District. The acquisition of 10.49.5 hectaresof land, in Thiruninravur village, had been split intoeight blocks. The notifications, u/s 4(1) of theAct had been approved by the District Collector, Thiruvallur District and it had been published in theThiruvallur District gazette, as well as in the localityconcerned. It had also been published in the local Tamilnewspapers and announcement had also been made by way of''tom tom''. Thereafter, an enquiry, u/s 5A of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, had also been conducted. Theobjections raised by the land owners had been forwarded tothe requisitioning body, namely, the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority, for obtaining its remarks. Theobjections raised by the land owners had also been dulyconsidered before a final decision had been taken.
11. It had also been submitted that the Government ofTamil Nadu had approved the Outer Ring Road Scheme, in theyear, 1993, in G.O. Ms. No. 381, Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment, dated 25.5.1993. Thereafter, the first phase ofthe project had been completed. The lands, said to bebelonging to the Petitioners, had been acquired for thepurpose of phase II of the Outer Ring Road Project. Eventhough some of the lands, acquired for the said purpose,may form a part of the approved layout, they had beenacquired, due to the necessity that had arisen for theacquisition of the lands, for the said public purpose.
12. It had also been stated that the DistrictCollector had been given the power to issue thenotifications for the acquisition of the lands, having thevalue upto Rs. 25,00,000/-by the Government of Tamil Nadu,by its communication, vide letter No. 59440/LAI/1/1997Revenue Department, dated 31.8.2000, and by the Circular ofthe Special Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai,in letter No. Rc.50942/2000, dated 11.4.2001. Since, thelands sought to be acquired had been divided into units andblocks for the sake of administrative convenience, each ofthe notifications pertains to lands, the value of whichdoes not exceed Rs. 25,00,000/-.
13. The contention raised on behalf of the Petitionersthat the lands notified under the impugned notificationsare in respect of the lands having a value of more than25,00,000/-cannot be held to be correct. Therefore, the impugned notifications and the proceedings of the respondents, based on such notifications, are legal and valid.
14. It had also been stated that all the prescribed modes of publications had been made, within a period of 30days, as mandated, u/s 4(1-A) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894. The land owners had been given areasonable opportunity to raise their objections. Theobjections raised by the land owners had been consideredand only thereafter, the awards had been passed. If theland owners have any grievance with regard to the fixationof the amount of compensation, it is open to them to seek areference to the concerned Subordinate Court or the FastTrack Court concerned, u/s 18 of the landacquisition Act, 1894.
15. It had also been stated that the alignment of theroad had been drawn up, after verification of the physicalfeasibility, with the support of aerial photographs, fieldsurvey and satellite spot imagery carried out inassociation with the expertise available in the Instituteof Remote Sensing of the Anna University, Chennai. Thealignment had been proposed, after taking intoconsideration the various factors, including the speed ofthe vehicles using the road, the safety of the buses usingthe road, and other such relevant aspects. The proposedalignment had been finalised by avoiding the agriculturallands, built up area, major water bodies, reserved forests etc. The proposed alignment had also been approved by the Government.
16. The main points raised by the learned Counsels appearing for the Petitioners are as follows:
The impugned notifications u/s 4(1) of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, had been issued by the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, even though he does nothave the authority or the jurisdiction to issue the saidnotifications. As per Section 4(1-A) of the Act, asmandated by the State Government, the District Collectorconcerned would have the authority or power to issue thenotifications u/s 4(1-A) of the Act, only whenthe extent of the lands proposed to be acquired, does notexceed an extent of 40 acres and its value should notexceed Rs. 25,00,000/-. In the absence of a decision takenby the state Government, in approving the notifications,the said notifications are void ab initio. The impugnednotifications had been issued by the District Collector,Thiruvallur District, as a result of fraudulent andcolourable exercise of the power, attracting penal provisions. Further, it has been provided that the decisionof the State Government shall be issued in the name of theGovernor, as mandated under Article 166 of the Constitutionof India. They should also be duly signed by theSecretaries to the Government, as authorised under theBusiness Rules of the Government, under Article 166(3) ofthe Constitution of India. However, in the present case,the District Collector had issued the impugnednotifications without such authorisation. As such, theimpugned notifications ought to be quashed by this Court,without considering the technical pleas raised by theRespondents in the defence of the notifications, as per thefollowing decisions of the Supreme Court:
16.1. In DEVINDER SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB (2008) 1 SCC 728, it has been held as follows:
17. The Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963for acquisition of land for the companies havebeen framed by the Central Government in exerciseof its power u/s 55 of the Act. It isnot in dispute that the guidelines providedthereunder are followed by the State Government. Concept of constitution of a Land AcquisitionCommittee appears only from the Companies Rules;no other provision in respect thereof has beenmade either under the Act or the Rules framedthereunder. A bare perusal of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the said Rules categorically statesthat the same shall be applicable whereacquisition of land is to be made for the companyenvisaged under Part VII. The State, as indicatedhereinbefore, before this Court has categoricallystated that advice rendered by a sub-committee ofthe Land Acquisition Committee had been takeninto consideration by it with a view to proceedfurther in the matter. Rule 4 mandates theappropriate Government to arrive at asatisfaction in regard to the factors enumeratedtherein. Rule 4 of the Rules reads as under:
4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied withregard to certain matters before initiatingacquisition proceedings.-(1) Whenever a companymakes an application to the appropriateGovernment for acquisition of any land, thatGovernment shall direct the Collector to submit areport to it on the following matters, namely-
(i) that the company has made its bestendeavour to find out lands in the localitysuitable for the purpose of the acquisition;
(ii) that the company has made allreasonable efforts to get such lands bynegotiation with the persons interested thereinon payment of reasonable price and such effortshave failed;
(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose;
(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive;
(v) that the company is in a position to utilise the land expeditiously; and (vi) where the land proposed to be acquiredis good agricultural land, that no alternativesuitable site can be found so as to avoidacquisition of that land.
(2) The Collector shall, after giving the companya reasonable opportunity to make anyrepresentation in this behalf, hold an enquiryinto the matters referred to in Sub-rule (1) andwhile holding such enquiry he shall,-
in any case where the land proposed tobe acquired is agricultural land, consult the
(ii) determine, having regard to theprovisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act, theapproximate amount of compensation likely to bepayable in respect of the land which, in theopinion of the Collector, should be acquired forthe company; and
(iii) ascertain whether the company offereda reasonable price (not being less than thecompensation so determined), to the personsinterested in the land proposed to be acquired.
Explanation.-For the purpose of this rule''good agricultural land'' means any land which,considering the level of agricultural productionand the crop pattern of the area in which it issituated, is of average or above averageproductivity and includes a garden or grove land.
(3) As soon as may be after holding theenquiry under Sub-rule (2), the Collector shallsubmit a report to the appropriate Government anda copy of the same shall be forwarded by thatGovernment to the Committee.
(4) No declaration shall be made by theappropriate Government u/s 6 of the Actunless-
(i) the appropriate Government has consultedthe Committee and has considered the reportsubmitted under this rule and the report, if any,submitted u/s 5A of the Act; and
(ii) the agreement u/s 41 of the Act has been executed by the company.
30. We would proceed on the said assumptionbut it is a well-settled principle of law thatwhere an action taken is without jurisdiction,even an order which is conclusive may be subjectto judicial review. Jurisdictional errors, as iswell known, are divided in two broad categories -
(i) an order passed which is wholly withoutjurisdiction; and (ii) although the ultra vires, the jurisdictional error has been committed while exercising jurisdiction. (See John v. Rees (1969) 2 ALL ER 274)
31. In
32. Mr Sorabjee has strongly relied upon adecision of this Court in
40. Though we are of the opinion that thecourts are not entitled to go behind thedeclaration of the Government to the effect thata particular purpose for which the land is beingacquired is a public purpose we must emphasisethat the declaration of the Government must berelatable to a public purpose as distinct from a purely private purpose. If the purpose for whichthe acquisition is being made is not relatable topublic purpose then a question may well arisewhether in making the declaration there has been,on the part of the Government a fraud on thepower conferred upon it by the Act. In otherwords the question would then arise whether thatdeclaration was merely a colourable exercise ofthe power conferred by the Act, and, therefore,the declaration is open to challenge at theinstance of the party aggrieved. To such adeclaration the protection of Section 6(3) not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, provisions such as Section 6(3) notwithstanding.
(emphasis supplied)
33. When an order is passed withoutjurisdiction, it amounts to colourable exerciseof power. Formation of opinion must precedeapplication of mind. Such application of mindmust be on the materials brought on record. Thematerials should be such which are required to becollected by the authorities entitled therefor. The authorities must act within the four cornersof the statute. An opinion formed even on thebasis of an advice by an authority which is notcontemplated under the statute renders thedecision bad in law. A statutory authority isbound by the procedure laid down in the statuteand must act within the four corners thereof.
34. The effect of contribution of a sum of Rs 100 by the State purported to be towards the amount of compensation, may not be noticed.
35. In
52. We would like to add that the viewtaken in
55. The approach of the High Court in thisbehalf, in our opinion, is totally erroneous. Aprovision of a statute is either mandatory ordirectory. Even if a provision is directory, thesame should be substantially complied with. Itcannot be ignored in its entirety only becausethe provision is held to be directory and not animperative one.
56. In this case admittedly there has beenno compliance with Rule 4. If Rule 4 has not beencomplied with, the exercise of jurisdiction underPart VII must be held to have been erroneous.
16.2. In
6. It is not in dispute that Section 5A ofthe Act confers a valuable right in favour of aperson whose lands are sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State inexercise of its power of "eminent domain" mayinterfere with the right of property of a personby acquiring the same but the same must be for apublic purpose and reasonable compensationtherefor must be paid.
7. Indisputably, the definition of publicpurpose is of wide amplitude and takes within its sweep the acquisition of land for a corporationowned or controlled by the State, as envisagedunder Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (f) of Section 3of the Act. But the same would not mean that theState is the sole judge therefore and no judicialreview shall lie. (See
8. The conclusiveness contained in Section 6of the Act indisputably is attached to a need asalso to the purpose and in this regardordinarily, the jurisdiction of the court islimited but it is equally true that when anopportunity of being heard has expressly beenconferred by a statute, the same mustscrupulously be complied with. For the saidpurpose, Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Act must beread conjointly. The court in a case, where therehas been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5A ofthe Act, cannot fold its hands and refuse togrant a relief to the writ Petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act renders adeclaration to be a conclusive evidence. But whenthe decision-making process itself is inquestion, the power of judicial review can beexercised by the court in the event the orderimpugned suffers from well-known principles viz.illegality, irrationality and proceduralimpropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authorityexercises such enormous power it must be done ina fair and reasonable manner.
9. It is trite that hearing given to aperson must be an effective one and not a mereformality. Formation of opinion as regards thepublic purpose as also suitability thereof mustbe preceded by application of mind as regardsconsideration of relevant factors and rejectionof irrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making process must not commit any misdirectionin law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5A of the Act confers a valuable important rightand having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution it has beenheld to be akin to a fundamental right.
18. In view of the fact that the actionrequired to be taken by the State Government isdistinct and different from the action requiredto be taken by the Collector; when the ultimateorder is in question it was for the State tosatisfy the court about the validity thereof andfor the said purpose the counter-affidavit filedon behalf of a Collector cannot be held to besufficient compliance with the requirements oflaw. The job of the Collector in terms of Section 5A would be over once he submits his report. TheLand Acquisition Collector would not know thecontents of the proceedings before the State and,therefore, he would be incompetent to affirm anaffidavit on its behalf.
19. Furthermore, the State is required toapply its mind not only on the objections filed by the owner of the land but also on the reportwhich is submitted by the Collector upon makingother and further enquiries therefore as also therecommendations made by him in that behalf. TheState Government may further inquire into thematter, if any case is made out therefor, forarriving at its own satisfaction that it isnecessary to deprive a citizen of his right toproperty. It is in that situation that productionof records by the State is necessary.
20. In
50. No reasons or other facts need be mentionedin the Section 6 declaration on its face. If thesatisfaction is challenged in the court, theGovernment can show the record upon which theGovernment acted and justify the satisfactionexpressed in the Section 6 declaration.
It was, thus, for the State to justify its actionby production of record or otherwise.
21. The counter-affidavit filed on 30-10-2003 was also affirmed by a Special DeputyCollector. A presumption having regard to thepassage of time can be raised that he was not theCollector who had made enquiry u/s 5A of the Act and given an opportunity of hearing tothe owner of the land. It has not been averred byhim as to who had authorised him to affirm theaffidavit on behalf of the State or how he wasacquainted with the fact of the matter. In termsof the rules of executive business, he is not authorised to act on behalf of the State. We havenoticed hereinbefore, that only when the HighCourt directed production of records, that aPrincipal Secretary to the Government affirmed anaffidavit wherein it was not stated that therecords are lost but it was merely stated thatthey were not readily traceable.
22. The Court in a situation of this natureexpects that the authorities of the State wouldtake due care and caution in preserving therecords in relation whereto a lis is pendingbefore a court of law.
29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in
There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in acase of this nature due application of mind onthe part of the statutory authority wasimperative.
16.3. In
4. In view of the aforesaid observation,their Lordships of the Division Bench held thatsince the acquisition was colourable exercise ofthe power, therefore, delay cannot be a goodground to dismiss the writ petition. The saidjudgment of the Division Bench of the High Courtof Karnataka was affirmed by this Court inSpecial Leave Petitions (C) Nos. ...C Cs Nos. 525-32 of 1999 and Special Leave Petitions (C)Nos. ...C Cs 504-22 of 1999 decided on 14-7-1999and it was held that the Appellant Society is abogus housebuilding society and accordingly, theorder passed by the learned Single Judge was setaside by the Division Bench. Against the order ofthe Division Bench passed in Writ Appeal No. 2294of 1999 a review petition was filed which wasdismissed on 22-3-2002. Hence both these appeals.
5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant urgedbefore us that the view taken by the DivisionBench of the High Court is not correct as theDivision Bench should not have condoned the inordinate delay of 14 years and secondly,learned Counsel further submitted that the respondents herein being the beneficiary had entered into an agreement of sale and hadaccepted the whole amount not to file objectionsunder Section 5A of the Act for acquiring theaforesaid land. Learned Counsel for the Appellanthas emphasised that the Division Bench has gonewrong in setting aside the order of the learnedSingle Judge as the learned Single Judge has discussed the factual controversy in greater detail.
9. Learned Counsel for the Respondents hasalso invited our attention that same notificationwas set aside by the High Court and the saidorder of the High Court was also upheld by thisCourt by dismissing SLP (C) No. 6196 of 1998 on7-4-1998 and SL Ps (C) Nos. ...C Cs Nos. 495-98 of1999 on 14-7-1999 concerning the very sameAppellant Society. In this background, when theacquisition has been found to be totally malafide and not for bona fide purpose, the ground ofdelay and acquiescence in the present case has nosubstance. Learned Counsel for the Appellanttried to persuade us that as the amount inquestion has been accepted by the Respondents, itis not open for them now to wriggle out from thatagreement. It may be that the Appellant mighthave tried to settle out the acquisition but whenthe whole acquisition emanates from the aforesaidtainted notification any settlement on the basisof that notification cannot be validated. Thefact remains that when the basic notificationunder which the present land is sought to beacquired stood vitiated then whatever money thatthe Appellant has paid, is at its own risk. Oncethe notification goes no benefit could bederived by the Appellant. We are satisfied thatissue of notification was mala fide and it wasnot for public purpose, as has been observed bythis Court, nothing turns on the question of delay and acquiescence. Learned Counsel for theRespondents raised other pleas like decree forpartition was granted among brothers and theywere not made parties, we are not going intothose questions when we are satisfied that whenacquisition stands vitiated on account of malafide, nothing remains further.
16.4. In
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of lawthat if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.
22. It is thus settled proposition of lawthat a judgment, decree or order obtained byplaying fraud on the court, tribunal or authorityis a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the firstcourt or by the final court-has to be treated asnullity by every court, superior or inferior. Itcan be challenged in any court, at any time, inappeal, revision, writ or even in collateralproceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus EstatesLtd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 ALL ER 341 Lord Denningobserved: (All ER p.345 C)
No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister,can be allowed to stand if it has been obtainedby fraud.
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith''s LeadingCases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature offraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though ajudgment would be res judicata and notimpeachable from within, it might be impeachablefrom without. In other words, though it is notpermissible to show that the court was"mistaken", it might be shown that it was"misled". There is an essential distinctionbetween mistake and trickery. The clearimplication of the distinction is that an actionto set aside a judgment cannot be brought on theground that it has been decided wrongly, namely,that on the merits, the decision was one whichshould not have been rendered, but it can be setaside, if the court was imposed upon or trickedinto giving the judgment.
25. It has been said: fraud and justicenever dwell together (fraus et jus nunquamcohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefitnone (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
38. The matter can be looked at from adifferent angle as well. Suppose, a case isdecided by a competent court of law after hearingthe parties and an order is passed in favour of the Plaintiff applicant which is upheld by allthe courts including the final court. Let us alsothink of a case where this Court does not dismissspecial leave petition but after granting leavedecides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment towhich Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also getsattracted. All orders passed by thecourts/authorities below, therefore, merge in thejudgment of this Court and after such judgment,it is not open to any party to the judgment toapproach any court or authority to review, recallor reconsider the order.
17. It has also been stated that Section 4(1)notification had been issued by the District Collector,Thiruvallur District, without having the jurisdiction to doso, as per Section 4(1-A) of the Act, as it is clear fromthe guideline values fixed by the Registration Department,for the lands notified by the Government, for the periodfrom 1.4.2003 to 1.8.2007, and as per the rate adopted bythe District Collector in passing the awards.
18. It has also been stated that even for each blockof the lands, as formulated by the District Collector, thevalue of lands exceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction ofRs.25,00,000/-. The relevant records had not been produced by the Respondents to substantiate their claims that theDistrict Collector, Thiruvallur District, has the pecuniaryjurisdiction to issue the impugned notifications. Therefore, the impugned notifications issued by theDistrict Collector, Thiruvallur District, u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are illegal andvoid, as per the decision of this Court, in
10. In
It is a fundamental principle wellestablished that a decree passed by a courtwithout jurisdiction is a nullity, and that itsinvalidity could be set up whenever and whereverit is sought to be enforced or relied upon, evenat the stage of execution and even in collateralproceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether itis pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is inrespect of the subject matter of the action,strikes at the very authority of the court topass any decree, and such a defect cannot becured even by consent of parties. If the questionnow under consideration fell to be determinedonly on the application of general principlesgoverning the matter, there can be no doubt thatthe District Court of Monghyr was coram nonjudice, and that its judgment and decree would benullities.
11. On merits it was held that since theAppellant himself had invoked the jurisdiction ofthe civil court with undervaluation, theobjection as to jurisdiction was not available byoperation of Section 99 of the Code and as to theterritorial jurisdiction he was precluded by operation of Section 21 of CPC; and on such premise it was held that the decree of the District Court could not be treated to be a nullity and person who invoked the jurisdiction 35 cannot plead prejudice to himself by his own act.
12. This Court has held that it is a wellestablished principle that a decree passed by acourt without jurisdiction is a nullity and theplea can be set up whenever and wherever thedecree is sought to be enforced or relied upon,and even at the stage of execution or incollateral proceedings.
19. It has also been stated that the act of theDistrict Collector, Thiruvallur District, in issuingseveral Section 4(1) notifications, for acquiring the landsfor the same public purpose, in the same locality, duringthe same period is a fraudulent and mala fide exercise ofpowers. Section 4(1) of the Act, mandates that only asingle notification should be issued for a single publicpurpose in respect of the same locality, during the sameperiod. By issuing separate notifications, the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, had contravened themandatory provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act.
20. It has also been stated that the Supreme Court in its decision, reported in
21. The relevant paragraphs of the decision, in STATE OF M.P. v. VISHNU PRASAD SHARMA (1966) 3 SCC 1593 (1), read as follows:
3. It was said that the Government may havedifficulty in making the plan of its projectcomplete at a time, particularly where theproject is large and, therefore, it is necessarythat it should have power to make a number ofdeclarations u/s 6. I am wholly unableto accept this argument. First, I do not thinkthat a supposed difficulty would provide anyjustification for accepting an interpretation ofa statute against the ordinary meaning of the language used in it. General considerations ofthe kind suggested cannot authorise a departurefrom the plain meaning of words. Secondly, Icannot imagine a Government, which has vastresources, not being able to make a complete planof its project at a time. Indeed, I think when aplan is made, it is a complete plan. I shouldsuppose that before the Government startsacquisition proceedings by the issue of anotification u/s 4, it has made itsplan for otherwise it cannot state in thenotification, as it has to do, that the land islikely to be needed. Even if it had not thencompleted its plan, it would have enough timebefore the making of a declaration u/s 6 to do so. I think, therefore, that thedifficulty of the Government, even if there isone, does not lead to the conclusion that the Actcontemplates the making of a number ofdeclarations u/s 6. I would like toobserve here to avoid confusion that we are notconcerned now with extension of a completelyplanned project conceived later. The presentcontention is not based on any difficulty arisingout of such a case. It was said that if theGovernment has not finalised its plan when itmakes a declaration u/s 6, it wouldhave to start fresh acquisition proceedingsbeginning with a notification u/s 4 toprovide for the complete plan if it could notmake any more declarations and in such a case, inconceivable circumstances, it may have to pay more for the land that it then sought to acquire. This argument concedes that even if theGovernment has not been able to make its planwhen making a declaration u/s 6, theresult is not that it cannot acquire any moreland later when the plan is completed. The realpoint, therefore, of the present argument is thatthe Act should be so interpreted that theGovernment should not be put to extra cost whenit has been unable to complete its plan at atime. This seems to me to be a strange argument. First, there is no reason why the Act shouldprovide for the Government''s failure to completethe plan. Secondly, the argument is hypotheticalfor one does not know for sure whether a lateracquisition will cost more or less, arguments onhypothetical considerations can have littleweight in interpreting statutes. But evenotherwise, this view of the matter does notsupport the argument. After the issue of anotification u/s 4, an owner of land inthe locality notified cannot have full beneficialenjoyment of his property; he cannot, forexample, build on his land for if he does so andthe land is acquired, he will get no compensationfor the building put up and will lose the costsincurred for it. If it is a justification forsaying that a number of declarations can be madeunder Section 6 because otherwise the Governmentmay have to pay more, it seems to me that it isat least an equal justification for saying thatsuch declarations cannot have been contemplated by the Act because that would mean an avoidabledeprivation of the owners of their beneficialenjoyment of lands till such time as theGovernment is able to make its plan. As the Actis an expropriatory Act, that interpretation ofit should be accepted which puts the least burdenon the expropriated owner. The Government could,of course, always make a complete plan at a timeand I am unable to hold that the Act contemplatedthat it need not do so and go on makingdeclarations from time to time as its plan goeson taking shape even though the result might beto increase the hardship of persons whose landsare taken away.
16. Sections 4, 5A and 6 in our opinion areintegrally connected. Section 4 specifies thelocality in which the land is acquired andprovides for survey to decide what particularland out of the locality would be needed. Section 5A provides for hearing of objections to theacquisition and after these objections aredecided the Government has to make up its mindand declare what particular land out of thelocality it will acquire. When it has so made upits mind it makes a declaration as to theparticular land out of the locality notified inSection 4(1) which it will acquire. It is clearfrom this intimate connection between Sections 4, 5A and 6 that as soon as the Government has madeup its mind what particular land out of thelocality it requires, it has to issue a declaration u/s 6 to that effect. Thepurpose of the notification u/s 4(1) isat this stage over and it may be said that it isexhausted after the notification u/s 6. If the Government requires more land in thatlocality besides that notified u/s 6,there is nothing to prevent it from issuinganother notification u/s 4(1) making afurther survey if necessary, hearing objectionsand then making another declaration u/s 6. The notification u/s 4(1) thusinforms the public that land is required or wouldbe required in a particular locality andthereafter the members of the public owning landin that locality have to make objections underSection 5A; the Government then makes up itsmind as to what particular land in that localityis required and makes a declaration u/s 6. It seems to us clear that once a declarationunder Section 6 is made, the notification underSection 4(1) must be exhausted, for it has servedits purpose. There is nothing in Sections 4, 5A and 6 to suggest that Section 4(1) is a kind ofreservoir from which the Government may from timeto time draw out land and make declarations withrespect to it successively. If that was theintention behind Sections 4, 5A and 6 we wouldhave found some indication of it in the languageused therein. But as we read these three sectionstogether we can only find that the scheme is thatSection 4 specifies the locality, then there maybe survey and drawing of maps of the land and the consideration whether the land is adapted for thepurpose for which it has to be acquired, followedby objections and making up of its mind by theGovernment what particular land out of thatlocality it needs. This is followed by adeclaration u/s 6 specifying theparticular land needed and that in our opinioncompletes the process and the notification underSection 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. At the stage of Section 4 the land is notparticularised but only the locality ismentioned; at the stage of Section 6 the land inthe locality is particularised and thereafter itseems to us that the notification u/s 4(1) having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence of events from a notification of theintention to acquire [Section 4(1)] to thedeclaration u/s 6 unmistakably leadsone to the reasonable conclusion that when once adeclaration u/s 6 particularising thearea out of the area in the locality specified inthe notification u/s 4(1) is issued,the remaining non-particularised area standsautomatically released. In effect the scheme ofthese three sections is that there should befirst a notification u/s 4(1) followedby one notification u/s 6 after theGovernment has made up its mind which land out ofthe locality it requires.
22. It has also been stated that the impugned notifications issued u/s 4(1) of the Act had notbeen published in the official gazette, namely, the StateGovernment gazette, as mandated under its provisions, as ithad been published only in the district gazette. It hasalso been stated that the "official gazette" would mean thestate gazette and not the district gazette, in which thenotification had been published. Hence, there was no validpublication of the Section 4(1) notifications, as per therelevant provisions of law. As per the General clauses Act,1897, the expression ''Official Gazette'' means the gazetteof the central or the state Government. In fact, Section 6 declaration had been duly published by the authoritiesconcerned in the State Government gazette, even though thesame expression ''Official Gazette'' is used in Section 6 ofthe Act. This Court in its decision, reported in
23. It has also been stated that there was nopublication of the substance of the Section 4(1) notifications in the convenient places of the locality, asmandated u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, and Rule 2 of the Rules framed thereunder. Therecords produced by the Respondents does not disclose thepublication of the substance of Section 4(1) notificationsin Form-A, as mandated under Rule 2 of the Land AcquisitionRules. Public notices u/s 4(1) of the Act, saidto have been issued in form-3, as found from the recordsmade available by the Respondents, had not been approved bythe District Collector, as prescribed by the relevantprovisions of the Act. The form-3 notices, alleged to havebeen issued by the Special Tahsildar (LA), Chennai, isvague, and they did not contain the schedule of theproperties. The form-3 notices had been issued by theSpecial Tahsildar (LA) without the authority of law. Therefore, it is invalid in the eye of law, in view of decision of this Court reported in
2. Para 6(3)(e) of the counter-affidavit,which is relevant to decide the present casereads as follows:
6(e) The Personal Assistant to the Collector is empowered to pass orders of the procedure contemplated u/s 4(3)(a) and (b) of the Act.and confirms the contention of the petitioner. that the District Collector has not passed the. order as contemplated u/s 4(3)(a) of.the Act.
3. The District Collector has to exercisethe power under the Act. The delegation of suchpower is not contemplated nor it has been shownthat such power can be delegated for theaforesaid purpose and therefore the proceedingsare vitiated. See
24. Thus, it is clear that there was no validpublication of the public notices, u/s 4(1) ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He had also submitted thatwhen a statute prescribes a particular manner ofpublication, the Courts cannot modify the same for anyreason. For the said proposition, he had relied on the decision, reported in
4. Learned Counsel for the Appellants placedreliance on an unreported decision of this Courtin A.S. Naidu v. State of T.N. (SL Ps (C)Nos.11353-55 of 1988 wherein a Bench of threeJudges held that once a declaration u/s 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declarationunder Section 6 cannot be issued beyond theprescribed period of the notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. It has to benoted that there is another judgment of twolearned Judges in
8. Learned Counsel for the Respondentsreferred to some observations in
9. Courts should not place reliance ondecisions without discussing as to how thefactual situation fits in with the fact situationof the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of aspeech or judgment as though they are words in alegislative enactment, and it is to be rememberedthat judicial utterances are made in the settingof the facts of a particular case, said LordMorris in British Railways Board v. Herrington(1972) 2 WLR 537).Circumstantial flexibility, oneadditional or different fact may make a world ofdifference between conclusions in two cases.
14. While interpreting a provision the courtonly interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected tothe abuse of process of law, it is for thelegislature to amend, modify or repeal it, ifdeemed necessary. (See
25. It has also been stated that the substance of thenotifications ought to have been published in theconvenient places in the locality concerned. However, itwould not be proper on the part of the Respondents topublish the substance of the notifications in the office ofthe village administrative officer or the executiveofficer of the Thiruninravur Town Panchayat, as admitted bythe Respondents. The records produced before this Courtdoes not disclose such publication in the localityconcerned and no signature had been obtained from theresidents of the locality to prove such publication. Further, publishing of form-3 notices in the office of theDistrict Collector, Thiurvallur District and in theoffices of the State Government would not mean that theyare convenient places, as contemplated under the landAcquisition Act, 1894, and the rules framed thereunder. Even the records produced before this Court had not beenmaintained in the manner prescribed by the District OfficeManual.
26. It has also been stated that the particulars ofthe publication of the notices are not available. Even theparticulars regarding the authenticity of the claims madeon behalf of the Respondents that there was publicationregarding the land acquisition proceedings, in the localityconcerned, by the beating of ''Tom Tom'', have not been madeavailable by the Respondents. It is clear that the recordsproduced by the Respondents are false and fabricated innature. Therefore, such public documents cannot be presumedto be genuine, as per Section 79 of the Indian EvidenceAct, 1872. As such, the alleged publication of the impugnednotices, u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, have no legal sanction. Hence, they are liable to berejected, as void. Hence, the land acquisition proceedingsinitiated u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, are void ab initio. The learned Counsel for thePetitioners had relied on the following decisions insupport of the said contentions:
26.1. In E.BALU v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR (2008) 4 MLJ 64),it has been held as follows:
7. It is not in dispute that 4(1)notification was notified in the gazette dated 18.6.1997 in G.O. Ms. No. 223 and the gazettepublication was on 9.7.1997. There are two newspapers publications on 2.8.1997 and 3.8.1997 inMalaimurasu and Thinathoodu. As far as thepublication in the locality is concerned, aperusal of the record shows that except theproceedings of the Tahsildar dated 15.6.1998,wherein, in the narration he has stated thatapart from publication in Malaimurasu on 2.8.1997and Thinathoodu on 3.8.1997, there waspublication by Dhandora on 10.8.1997. There is norecord to show that necessary certificate fromthe concerned officials like VillageAdministrative Officer or any other authorityobtained to substantiate that the localpublication was made on 10.8.1997. This isparticularly relevant because while effectingsuch local publication in respect of 6declaration, the Tahsildar has followed theprocedure not only by Dhandora, but also hasaffixed in public places as certified by the VA Oapart from obtaining the signatures of variousresidents in the area numbering more than 11, asit is seen in page Nos. 552 and 553 of the file. As the locality publication in respect of 4(1)notification, which is a legal requirement hasnot been made with any such certificate exceptnarrating in the proceeding of the Tahsildar,wherein he has narrated stating that there was alocal publication on 10.8.1997. Therefore, it hasto be taken that there was no localitypublication of Section 4(1) notification and the newspaper publication which was on 3.8.1997 inThinathoodu has to be taken as a last date ofpublication. It is admitted that the 6declaration itself was issued in the gazette inG.O. Ms. No. 312, dated 7.8.1998. Therefore, bytaking the last date of publication of 4(1)notification, with the said 6 declaration dated7.8.1998, it is beyond the prescribed period ofone year. It is on this score, it has to be heldthat the land acquisition proceedings viz., 4(1)notification as well as 6 declaration in thiscase are not in accordance with the provisions ofthe land acquisition Act.
11. In view of the failure on the part ofthe Respondent not providing the mandatoryrequirement of publication of the substance of4(1) notification in convenient places in thelocality and inasmuch as the last of thepublication of 4(1) notification was on 3.8.1997and 6 declaration itself is as per the Governmentorder dated 7.8.1998, the land acquisitionproceedings are clearly against the provisions ofthe Land Acquisition Act.
26.2. In
16. In the present case, Section 4(1)notification was issued under the impugnedG.O. Ms. No. 73 Housing and Urban Development Department dated 19.02.1997; it was published inthe official gazette on 19.03.1997; publicationin two newspapers, viz., "Pirpagal" and "MalaiMalar" was on 29.03.1997; and the localitypublication as seen in the records is 16.06.1997. Therefore, by applying the said explanation (b)to Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition (TamilNadu Amendment) Act, 1997, if the earliest dateof publication in the notification u/s 4(1) in the official gazette is taken, viz.,19.03.1997, the local publication was effected on16.06.1997, and therefore, the same is clearlybeyond the period of 60 days. It is relevant topoint out that even from the date of newspaperpublication, which is stated to be on 29.03.1997,the local publication being on 16.06.1997, thereare more than 60 days in between the same and therefore, it is clearly against the said explanation to Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.
26.3. In PETHU CHETTIAR v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR, LAND ACQUISITION (2000 3 M.L.J. 430), it has been held as follows:
6. It is not in dispute that subsequent tothe amended Act No. 16 of 1997 there is noamendment by the Parliament with respect to theprovision in question. The decision relied on bythe learned Government Advocate in
7. In view of the above settled principles,and also in view of the fact that the Respondentshave not completed the acquisition proceedingswithin the said stipulated period, the entireproceedings are vitiated.
27. It is submitted that a perusal of the Act and theRule 4(b) of the Rules and the guidelines issued by theGovernment for approving the Section 6 declaration wouldshow that the District Collector shall receive theobjections, within 30 days from the date of Section 4(1)notifications. Thereafter, he shall send the objections tothe requisitioning body, if any, and shall receive theremarks from the said body. The remarks obtained from therequisitioning body should be furnished to the objectors, for their reply and thereafter, he shall fix a date for theenquiry. However, none of the said mandatory provisionsprescribed u/s 5A of the Act had been followedin the present case. The following decisions had beenrelied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners insupport of the said contentions.
27.1. In
5. In the first of the decisions, NainarSundaram, J. as he then was, held that if remarksof the requisitioning body had not been obtainedwhen the enquiry u/s 5A was held, muchless furnished to the owner of the land, it wouldvitiate the proceedings. In the second decisionKannammal (deceased) V.N. Devadoss v. State ofTamil Nadu and Ors. 1990 W.L.R. 439Kanakaraj, J.held that remarks of the requisitioning authorityshould be available to the owner/claimant whoseland is acquired at the time of the enquiry underSection 5A. As the remarks of the Tamil NaduHousing Board in that case had been communicatedto the Petitioners therein nearly two years afterthe enquiry u/s 5A, it was held thatit vitiated the entire enquiry u/s 5Aof the Act. The learned Judge held that in manycases, the Land Acquisition Officers held asecond enquiry after the remarks were obtained by issuing notices to the land owners as well as tothe requisitioning body and in the opinion of thelearned Judge, such a procedure will aloneconform to the requirements of Rule 3(b)/(c) ofthe Rules. The learned Judge held that theenquiry u/s 5A of the Act was vitiated.
6. In
7. In Balkis Ammal by Power of Attorney Agent
8. In
27.2. In
15. Now in the light of the above mentionedlegal decision, I shall consider the merits ofboth parties. There is no dispute that 5-Aenquiry was fixed on 26.10.1989. Admittedly thesaid enquiry did not take place. Likewise, evenat the beginning the learned Government Advocateappearing for Respondents 1 and 2 and learnedsenior counsel for third Respondent fairlyconceded that no further 5-A enquiry after26.10.1989. It is true that as per Section 5A(1)any person interested in any land which has beennotified u/s 4(1) may raise anobjection within 30 days from the date ofpublication of the Notification. In our case, thelast mode of publication is the local publicationwhich took place on 2.9.1989. Admittedly thePetitioners submitted their objections on20.10.1989, i.e., beyond 30 days period fixed inSection 5A(1) of the Act. By relying on Sub-Section 2, it is contended on the side of theRespondents that inasmuch as the Petitioners failed to submit their objections within 30 daysas per Sub-section (1), there is no need tocomply with Rule 3(b) of the Rules or any furtherenquiry as stated therein. I have alreadyextracted Rule 3 (b) and (c) of the Rules framedunder Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is true that in the Division Bench decision,viz. ILR (1996) Mad. 299, their Lordshipshave categorically held that if the personinterested failed to submit his/her objectionwithin 30 days the Land Acquisition Officer isexpected to conduct an enquiry u/s 5A only and it is not open to the interested personto contend that there is a violation of Rule3(b). With respect I am in agreement with thesaid proposition of the Division Bench and I ambound by the same. However, had the LandAcquisition Officer by pointing out Section 5A(1) of the Act, rejected the objection of thePetitioners or conducted an enquiry withoutforwarding the same to the requisitioning body asper Rule 3(b), the result would have beendifferent. In other words, if such procedure isfollowed by the Land Acquisition Officer, thecontention of the learned Counsel for thePetitioner has to be rejected even at thethreshold. Here, after receiving the objection ofthe Petitioners on 20.10.1989, the said objectionwas communicated to the requisitioning body on23.10.1989. After getting another statement on16.11.1989, the same was forwarded to the MadrasMetropolitan Development Authority for their remarks on 18.11.1989. The Madras MetropolitanDevelopment Authority have furnished theirremarks on the objections of the Petitioners on5.12.1989. On receipt of the remarks of theMadras Metropolitan Development Authority on27.12.1989, the Petitioners submitted furtherobjections on 29.1.90. Thereafter, the LandAcquisition Officer failed to conduct furtherenquiry i.e., 3(b) enquiry. I have alreadyobserved that admittedly there is no such enquiryin terms of Rule 3(b) or any enquiry after2.9.1989. If that is so, the law laid down by theDivision Bench of this Court reported in 1994Writ L.R. 326 is directly applicable to the factsof this case, hence Section 5A enquiry cannot besustained. Inasmuch as the Land AcquisitionOfficer accepted and acted on the objections ofthe Petitioner submitted on 20.10.1989 andforwarded the same to the requisitioning body forremarks and again communicated the remarks to thePetitioners, I am of the view that in the lightof the scheme of the Act and Rules, it ispresumed that the Land Acquisition Officer haswaived the default if any in submitting objectionas per 5-A(1) of the Act. As a matter of fact,Form B which is a notice issued u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act enables the landowner to submit his objection within a prescribedtime (in our case 30 days) and it is also open tothe land owner to appear in person or by a personauthorised in this behalf or by a pleader and hecan adduce any oral or documentary evidence in support of the said objections. A perusal ofNotice under Form B u/s 5A of the Actshows the intention of the Legislature. Even atthe time of 5-A enquiry if the land owner has anyfurther objection, it is open to him to raise thesame, or file it in the form of writtenrepresentation or it is open to the pleader torepresent the land owner and also place relevantdocuments in support of the objections. When suchopportunity is there, coupled with the conduct ofthe Land Acquisition Officer in our case inaccepting the objection of the Petitioner andforwarding the same to the requisitioning bodyfor remarks and again communicated the remarks tothe Petitioner, their objections cannot berejected on the sole ground that they were notfiled within 30 days as per 5-A (1) of the Act. In view of the peculiar factual position, theconduct of the Land Acquisition Officer, it isnot open to the Respondents to take advantage ofthe decision of the Division Bench rendered in ILR 1996 Mad. 299. The observation of theirLordships in
16. Before winding up regarding filing ofobjections by the aggrieved land owners beforethe Land Acquisition Officer, it is worth-whileto mention the following observation of theDivision Bench of Gujarat High Court in adecision reported in State v. D.F. Mukhi A.I.R.1975 Guj. 68. Their Lordships considered Section 5A of the Act. No doubt, one distinction is thatthere is a Rule framed by the Gujarat Government,for condonation of delay in filing objectionwithin the prescribed period, In that case, theland owner did not submit his objection within 30days. In this context, Their Lordships haveconcluded thus:... The essence of the matter is giving of suchopportunity, not giving it within a particularnumber of days. There is no conceivable virtue ormerit in affording a hearing "within" thirtydays. It is not as if the period of thirty daysis of mystical significance and is surrounded bysome magic halo. No principle or policy underliesthe selection of the period. Some time-limit hasto be provided for the sake of convenience andthat is why the tenure of 30 days was hit upon. There is no rationale underlying the selection ofthis particular period. It is not as if the success or failure of the objections or thevalidity of the decision on this question turnson whether or not the objections are lodgedwithin these 30 fateful days. We do not detectany "logos" or "etos", in investing a "now-or-never" significance to this period. The partywhose lands are placed under acquisition, it istrue, may not have an unrestricted right to lodgeobjections beyond the time limit of 30 daysembodied in Section 5A. But that time-limitoperates as a limitation on the right of theparty and not as a limitation on the power of theCollector to hear the objections. Surely, theparty whose lands are under acquisition cannotquestion the power of the Collector to hear theobjections on any conceivable rational groundnotwithstanding the fact that they have notlodged any such objections? Surely a party cannotbe reasonably expected to object to his beingdealt with fairly and his being afforded anopportunity to show cause against the proposedacquisition notwithstanding the expiry of thedead line for filing objections? Even if therules had not provided for extension of the time-limit, under no principle of law could it havebeen said that the Collector acted in violationof the principles of fair-play in affording himsuch an opportunity. All that the Collector doesby extending the time-limit of 30 days is to payhomage to the principles of natural justice andno more. He does a good turn to the land owner,not an evil act. Even if the rules are silent, the courts usually read into the relevantprovisions the principles of fair-play andnatural justice and insist on compliance withsuch principles notwithstanding the fact thatthere is no positive command by the Legislature. Is it not therefore futile (it certainly is) tocanvass that the Collector has no legaljurisdiction or competence to hear the personwhose land is proposed to be acquired merelybecause the time-limit for lodging suchobjections has expired?With respect I am in entire agreement with theview expressed by their Lordships. By giving suchan opportunity to the land owner by applying theprinciples of fair-play and natural justice theymust be provided with full opportunity and theprovisions of the Act and Rules must be strictlyand fully complied with.
27.3. In
7. The next ground on which Govindaswami, J. quashed the notification related to want ofpublic notice of the substance of thenotification. The learned Judge in paragraph 6 ofhis judgment has stated as follows:Insofar as the second contention that publicnotice of the substance of the 4(1) notificationwas not given in the locality as contemplatedunder Rule 1 of the Rules framed u/s 55 of the Act, learned Government Advocate represented that the public notice of thesubstance of the 4(1) Notification was given inthe locality by. beat of tom-tom as requiredunder the rules on 1.10.1985. In this context, itis relevant to consider the Rule 1 of the Ruleswhich is as follows; 1. Issue and publication ofnotice by the Collector-Immediately after thepublication of the notification u/s 4(1), the Collector shall issue a notice statingthat the land is needed as the case way be, for apublic purpose and requiring all personsinterested in the land to lodge before theCollector within thirty days after the issue ofthe Notification, a statement in writing of theirobjection, if any, to the proposed acquisition. This notice should be published at convenientplaces in the said locality, and copies thereoffixed up in the Offices of the Collector, theTahsildar, and in the nearest Police Station. The above rule clearly prescribed that the noticeshould be published at convenient places in thesaid locality and copies thereof should be fixedup in the Offices of the Collector, theTahsildar, and in the nearest Police Station. Itis obligatory on the part of the Respondents notonly to see that the notice is published in theconvenient places in the said locality but alsoto see that copies thereof are affixed in theOffices of the Collector, the Tahsildar and inthe nearest Police Station. The learned Counselfor the writ Petitioner contended that merepublication of the Notification would not suffice but notice should be published at convenientplaces in the locality and copies thereof shouldbe fixed up in the Offices of the Collector, theTahsildar and in the nearest Police Station andthat is mandatory, and failure to do so vitiatesthe acquisition proceedings. In this context, thelearned Counsel for the Petitioner referred tothe decision of a Division Bench of this Court inValleswarar Temple, Nerkundram represented bysole trustee Kasiviswanathan v. The State ofTamil Nadu represented by the Secretary toGovernment Housing and Urban Development and Anr.(1990) 2 M.L.J. 142, in which it was held asunder:
Mr. A. Sivaji, learned Counsel for the Appellant,covets the quashing of the very notificationunder Section 4(1) of the Act and for thispurposes, he advances the point that as enjoinedby Section 4(1) of the Act and Rule 1 of theTamil Nadu Rules under The Act, there was nopublication of the substance of the notificationunder Section 4(1) of the Act, point to the aboveeffect has been taken in the affidavit filed insupport of the writ petition. But, this point hasnot been adjudicated upon by the learned singleJudge. That the provisions of Section 4(1) of theAct and Rule 1 of the Tamil Nadu Rules under theAct with regard to publication of the substanceof the notification u/s 4(1) of theAct, are mandatory in nature and non-compliancewith them will vitiate the entire acquisitionproceedings, is a proposition well settled, which cannot permit any disputation. The Respondentshave not care to file any counter-affidavitrebutting the above contention of the Appellant,based on violation of the mandatory provisions of law, either during the pendency of the writ petition or during the pendency of the writ appeal. Mr. K. Ravi Rajapandian, learned Additional Government Pleader (Writs), is alsonot in a position to put forth any voice ofrebuttal supported by records in the course ofhis submissions, over this aspect. The result is,here we find a case where the mandate of law hasbeen breached and the Appellant must have therelief of quashing the Notification u/s 4(1) of the Act as converted through its learnedCounsel. It is clear from the above decision that theprocedure prescribed under Rule 1 of its rulesframed u/s 55 of the Act for givingpublic notice of the substance of the 4(1)Notification is mandatory and failure to followthe procedure will vitiate the entireproceedings. In the instant case, except theaverments that public notice of the substance ofthe notification u/s 4(1) of the Actpublication was given in the locality by beat oftom-tom under rules on 1.10.1985, there isnothing on record to show that the Respondent hasfollowed the prescribed procedure for givingnotice of the substance of the Notification inthe locality viz., publication of the notice atconvenient places in the said locality, and affixing copies thereof in the Offices of theCollector, the Tahsildar, and in the nearestPolice Station: Having regard to the aforesaidpeculiar circumstances of the case, the impugnedproceedings are liable to be quashed. So far as this point is concerned, the counterfiled on behalf of the Respondents does notadvert to the giving of public notice of thesubstance of the notification as required underthe section and the Rules framed thereunder. There is no specific answer in the counter thoughthe writ Petitioner has raised it as ground (a)in his writ affidavit. This point has thereforeto be held in favour of the writ Petitioner.
8. The third point urged before the learnedJudge and considered by him is that while holdingenquiry u/s 5A, the Petitioner had notreceived the views of the requisitioningdepartment. The learned Judge found that in thatcase, the Government was not in a position tosubstantiate its stand that any detailed enquirywas conducted as contemplated under the Rulesframed. J. Kanakaraj, J. In Kannammal (Deceased) v. N. Devaraj v. State of Tamil Naduand Ors.(1990) W L.R. 439 held that "remarks of theRequisitioning Authority should be available tothe owner so called claimant whose land isacquired at the time of enquiry u/s 5A. As the remarks of the Tamil Nadu Housing Boardin that case had been communicated to thePetitioner therein nearly two years after the enquiry u/s 5A, it was held that itvitiated the entire enquiry u/s 5A ofthe Act". The learned Judge held that in manycases, the Land Acquisition Officers held asecond enquiry after the remarks were obtained byissuing notices to the land owners as well as tothe Requisitioning Body and in the opinion of thelearned Judge, such a procedure will aloneconform to the requirements of Rule 3(b)(c) ofthe Rules. The learned Judge held that theenquiry u/s 5A of the Act wasvitiated. It does not appear in the present case,whether there was a further enquiry as requiredunder Rule 3(b). On this ground also, thePetitioner is entitled to succeed.
27.4. In ARUMUGHA MUDALIAR v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2002 (1) CTC 28),wherein it has been held as follows:
8. That being the position, as regards theviolation of mandatory Rule 3(b) as pointed out bythe learned Senior counsel for the writPetitioners, it is not satisfactorily shown as tohow the said stand of the writ Petitioners cannotbe sustained. As stated by me earlier, there areno details or information as to whether theobjections raised on behalf of the Petitioners wasforwarded to the requisitioning body and whetherany remark at all was received from them which wasfurnished to the writ Petitioners who areundoubtedly the owners of the lands which were sought to be acquired. In such circumstances, whenthe said violation strikes at the root of the 5(A)enquiry, it will have to be held that theproceedings at the stage of 5-A enquiry cannotalso be sustained. Consequently, the declarationmade u/s 6 of the Act should also fallto the grounds.
28. It has also been submitted that Section 5A enquiry had been conducted by an unauthorised person andtherefore, all further proceedings issued pursuant to thesaid enquiry are void ab initio.
29. It has also been stated that according to Section 5A of the Act, the District Collector should haveconducted the enquiry. Section 3(c) of the Act defines theword ''collector'', which means the Collector of a districtor a Deputy Commissioner or any other officer speciallyappointed by the appropriate Government to perform thefunctions of the Collector under the Act. However, in thepresent case, the Special Tahsildar (LA), Plan IV, OuterRing Road, Chennai, had not been appointed by theGovernment to act as the enquiry officer. There is nothingon record to show that he had been authorised by theGovernment to conduct the enquiry. The Special Tahsildar(LA) does not have the authority to conduct the enquiry, u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, all subsequent proceedings based on the saidenquiry are null and void. As such, the authorisation givento the Special Thasildar (LA), by the District collector,to conduct the enquiry, cannot be held to be valid. Insupport of the said contentions, the learned Counsel forthe Petitioners had relied on the following decisions:
29.1. In
4. As regards contention (2) the plea hasbeen taken up specifically in para 12 and againin para 18(h) of the writ petition. In thewritten statement filed by the Respondent-State,it is not specifically averred that the aforesaidGeneral Assistant (Shri Jagbir Singh) was everappointed to perform the functions of thecollector under the Act. All that is stated, inreply to para 12 is "para 12 in so far as itconcerns the Respondent No. 3 is admitted. Therest of the para concerns Respondent No. 2. Itmay, however, be added that the father of thePetitioner or the Petitioners never raised anypoint before the General Assistant, who is alsothe Land Acquisition Collector. Gurgaon withregard to his jurisdiction to hear objectionsunder Section 5A and hence they are estopped tochallenge his jurisdiction. General Assistant toRespondent No. 2 is also the Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon as is evident from Annexure filed by Respondent No. 3.
5. Similar is the reply to para 18(h). Itwill be seen, while Respondent 1 has evaded toanswer the point of substance in para 12 of thewrit petition by saying that it concernsRespondent 2 (Collector District Gurgaon), thelatter has filed no return at all.
6. Mr. Ashok Bhan, learned Counsel for theRespondents has been unable to refer to anynotification whereby the Government appointed theGeneral Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner,Gurgaon, as a Collector for the purposes of theAct. The expression "collector" has been definedin Section 3(c) of the Act which says:
-the expression "Collector" means the Collectorof a district and includes a Deputy Commissionerand any officer specially appointed by theappropriate Government to perform the functionsof a Collector under this Act." In
7. In the result, the order of the officerconcerned was struck down. In Gajjan Singh''scase, Civil Writ No. 1747 of 1964 (punj) (supra)it was contended, as it has been done before mein the instant case, that this objection withregard to lack of jurisdiction was not takenbefore the officer concerned and consequently thePetitioner was precluded from raising it for thefirst time in this Court. The contention wasrepelled in these terms:
this objection as to jurisdiction goes tothe very root of the matter. It is purely a lawpoint. It is, therefore, allowed to be raised now. It is well settled that even consent of theparties cannot cure inherent lack of jurisdictionin a tribunal
If further authority is needed, the law on thepoint as expounded by the Supreme Court,
8. For the foregoing reasons, I have nohesitation in holding that the proceedingsconducted by the General Assistant to the DeputyCommissioner, Gurgaon, u/s 5A of theAct, were without jurisdiction. The making of avalid report after hearing objections of thepersons interested in the land u/s 5A, by a person who is duly constituted Collectorwithin the meaning of Section 3(c) of the Act,being a sine qua non all further proceedings, thenotification made u/s 6 on the basis ofthe illegal report of such an officer lackinginherent jurisdiction, will also be vitiated. Inthe result, I allow this writ petition and quashthe impugned proceedings including the reportmade by the General Assistant to the Governmentand the impugned notification issued underSection 4(1), however, holds good and it is opento the collector of the District to rehear theobjections filed by the Petitioners u/s 5A and proceed further in accordance with law.
The Petitioners shall have their costs from Respondent 1. Counsel''s fee: Rs. 50/-.
29.2. In STATE OF TAMIL NADU v. POWN AMMAL (2004) 2 MLJ 726),this Court had held as follows:
8. We have already referred to the factthat Notification u/s 4(1) is to bepublished in 3 modes, namely, (i) in the Gazette, (ii) in two dailies, and (iiii) in the locality. Even as per the said section, it is only apreliminary notification. The three modes ofpublications are intended to give an opportunityto the land owner to make effectiverepresentation and participate in the enquiryunder Section 5A of the Act. We have alreadyheld that without a specific authorization by theGovernment, no officer can enter upon, survey anyland and perform the functions of the DistrictCollector u/s 5A of the Act. Accordingly, we are of the view that there mustbe a specific authorisation by the Government,authorising a particular officer to perform boththe functions, as prescribed under Sub-section (2) ofSection 4 and also under Clause (c) of Section 3 of theAct. The notification published in the officialgazette which is in English version, containsboth authorization not only conferring powersupon the Special Tahsildar (Adi-dravidarWelfare), Vellore, his staff and workmen to dothe acts, as provided under Sub-section (2) ofSection (4), but also conduct 5-A enquiry. One such mode was published in the official gazettewithout any ambiguity giving clear power to theofficer concerned, here the Special Tahsildar toproceed with the acquisition. With this, he canenter upon survey any land and also conductenquiry u/s 5A of the Act. Merelybecause the exact contents of the gazettenotification having not been reproduced in verbalin Tamil dailies, it cannot be construed thatthere is no specific authorisation on the SpecialTahsildar by the Government. Though thenotification published in the two dailiesnewspapers in the regional language did containauthorization under Sub-section (2) of Section 4, thereis a omission in mentioning Clause (c) of Section 3 authorising the Special Tahsildar to perform thefunctions of the Collector u/s 5A. Even ifwe accept that there is a omission, we hold thatthis is only an irregularity and it would notvitiate the acquisition proceedings. To put itclear, before initiation of proceedings, theGovernment should authorize any officer toperform the functions of a Collector both underSection 4(2) and Section 3(c) of the Act to enquiry underSection 5A of the Act. Since the GazetteNotification contained both the authorizations,we are of the view that the officer concerned,namely, Special Tahsildar can very well functionand perform the duties of the District Collector. It is worthwhile to refer a decision of thisCourt in
29.3. In
6. Under Article 163, the Council ofMinisters with the Chief Minister at the head isto aid and advice the Governor in the exercise ofhis functions, except insofar as he is by orunder the Constitution required to exercise hisfunctions or any of them in his discretion. TheChief Minister should be appointed by theGovernor and the other Ministers are appointed onhis advice by the Governor. The Council ofMinisters under Article 164 shall be collectivelyresponsible to the Legislative Assembly of theState. Under Article 167, the Chief Ministershall hold the duty to communicate to theGovernor all decisions of the Council ofMinisters relating to the administration of theaffairs of the State and proposals forlegislation etc. It would, thus, be clear thatthe Chief Minister holds the ultimateresponsibility to the Governor and is accountableto the people of the State for the goodgovernance of the State with the assistance ofhis Council of Ministers. The executive power ofthe State is carried on by the Governor with theaid and advice of the Council of Ministers, ChiefMinister being the head. In other words, theCabinet transacts the business of the State andit is discharged by its Chief Minister to whombusiness of the State on specified subjects areallocated for convenient transaction of thebusiness of the Government.
7. Article 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution state thus:
166. Conduct of business of the Governmentof a State.- (1) All executive action of theGovernment of a State shall be expressed to betaken in the name of the Governor.
(2) Orders and other instruments made andexecuted in the name of the Governor shall beauthenticated in such manner as may be specifiedin rules to be made by the Governor, and thevalidity of an order or instrument which is soauthenticated shall not be called in question onthe ground that it is not an order or instrumentmade or executed by the Governor.
In other words, Article 166(1) and (2) expresslyenvisage authentication of all the executiveactions and shall be expressed to be taken in thename of the Governor and shall be authenticatedin such manner specified in the rules made by theGovernor. Under Article 166(3), the Governor isauthorised to make the rules for the moreconvenient transaction of the business of theGovernment of the State, and for the allocationamong Ministers of the said business insofar asit is not business with respect to which theGovernor is by or under the Constitution requiredto act in his discretion. In other words, exceptin cases when the Government in his individualdiscretion exercises his constitutionalfunctions, the other business of the Governmentis required to be conveniently transacted as perthe Business Rules made by Article 166(3) of theConstitution. If the action of the Government andthe order is duly authenticated as per Article 166(2) and the Business Rule 12, it is conclusiveand irrebuttable presumption arises that decisionwas duly taken according to Rules. The letter ofthe Section Officer is not in conformity withRule 12 and Article 166(1) and (2), though underRule 13 he is one of the authorised officers tocommunicate the decision of the Government. In
8. Rule 15 of the Business Rules providesthat these rules may, to such extent as may benecessary, be supplemented by instructions to beissued by the Governor on the advice of the ChiefMinister. Under the Business Rules 33 subjectswere allotted to the Revenue Department of whichItem 15 relates to acquisition of property, principles on which compensation for propertyacquired for the purpose of the State or for anyother public purposes is to be determined and theform and manner in which such compensation is tobe ''given''; acquisition of immovable property fordefence purpose etc.
9. The Urban Development and Urban HousingDepartment gets allotted 18 items of which Item 8contemplates of Town Planning Scheme and Item contemplates Town Planning and ValuationDepartment. It would thus be seen that the twodepartments are entitled to deal with the landacquisition and valuation thereof. Urban PlanningScheme in the urban area was allotted to theUrban Development Department and UrbanDevelopment and Urban Housing Department and theland acquisition, though part of the TownPlanning Scheme, was equally an allotted subjectto the Revenue Department under the subjectreferred to hereinbefore.
10. It is seen from the note file that whenthe proceedings have gone before the Secretary tothe Revenue Department, by his note dated 3-7-1993 he stated thus:
(1) May be submitted to Government.
(2) Legal position being what it is, itwould serve no useful purpose in discussing theissue in a survival meeting with UDD.
11. It would appear that initially in thenote dated 2-7-1993, there was a suggestion torefer the matter to the Urban DevelopmentDepartment but later it was struck off and the above endorsement came to be made. On that basis,the Minister for Revenue had approved thesuggestion made by the Secretary on 6-7-1993. Itis also clear from the record placed before usthat the Urban Development Department afterfinding that the Revenue Department is notproceeding with the acquisition had taken adecision to approach the Chief Minister who, onreceipt thereof, sought legal opinion and the LawDepartment opined that the view of RevenueDepartment does not bind the Chief Minister. Thequestion then is who would take the decision inthat behalf. It would be appropriate to deal withthe instructions issued in this behalf.
12. Instruction 4 in Part II says that:
4. (1) Except as otherwise provided inthese instructions cases shall ordinarily bedisposed of by or under the authority of theMinister-in-charge, who may, by means of standingorders, give such directions as he thinks fit forthe disposal of cases in the Department.
Instructions 9 and 10 says that:
(9) When the subject of a case concernsmore than one Department no order shall be issuednor shall the case be laid before the Council orthe Cabinet until it has been considered by allthe Departments concerned unless the case is oneof extreme urgency.
(10) If the Departments concerned are not inagreement regarding a case dealt with underInstruction 9, the Minister-in-charge of theDepartment may, if he wishes to proceed with the case, direct that the case be submitted to theChief Minister for orders for laying the casebefore the Council or the Cabinet.
13. The instructions are integral part ofthe scheme of the Business Rules and haveconstitutional flavour and force to supplementthe rules. It would thus be seen that though theMinister-in-charge of the subject is empowered tohave the subject disposed of in the manner laiddown in the Business Rules and when two Ministersare not in agreement with the manner of thedisposal of a matter or decision, then underInstruction 10 the subject concerned should besubmitted to the Chief Minister for laying thesame before the Council or the Cabinet.
14. The responsibility of Council ofMinisters under Article 164(2) of theConstitution embodies the politicalresponsibility of the Ministry headed by theChief Minister. Collective responsibility makeseach Minister responsible to the Legislature forthe acts of himself and other members of theCouncil of Ministers. Since the Council ofMinisters would stay in office as long as itcommands the majority of the LegislativeAssembly, the Council of Ministers is politicallyresponsible as one entity. In case it loses itsconfidence the Ministry as a whole is required toresign. The responsibility to the Governor andaccountability to the people collectively by the Council of Ministers is through and by the ChiefMinister. It would, therefore, be clear that thedecision of a Minister under the Business Rulesis not final or conclusive until the requirementsin terms of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 166 are complied with. Before the action or thedecision is expressed in the name of the Governorin the manner prescribed under the Business Rulesand communicated to the party concerned it wouldalways be open by necessary implication, to theChief Minister to send for the file and have itexamined by himself and to take a decision,though the subject was allotted to a particularMinister for convenient transaction of thebusiness of the Government. The subject, thoughexclusively allotted to the Minister, by reasonof the responsibility of the Chief Minister tothe Governor and accountability to the people,has implied power to call for the file relatingto a decision taken by a Minister. The object ofallotment of the subject to a Minister is for theconvenient transaction of the business at variouslevels through designated officers. The ultimateobject is to secure an impartial, pure andefficient administration as propounded by DrAmbedkar in the Constituent Assembly videConstituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, p.546.
15. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab(1962 Supp (3) 713) a Constitution Bench of thisCourt was to consider whether the order of theRevenue Minister could not be reviewed and set aside by the Chief Minister. In that context itwas held that the order must be expressed in thename of the Governor as required by Clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. Until such an order is drawn up by the StateGovernment in accordance with Article 166(1), theState Government cannot be regarded as bound bywhat was stated in the file. The business ofState is a complicated one and has necessarily tobe conducted through the agency of large numberof officials and authorities. The action must betaken by the authority concerned in the name ofthe Raj Pramukh. The Minister is no more than anadvisor and as the head of the State the Governoror the Raj Pramukh has to act with the aid andadvice of the Council of Ministers. Until theadvice is accepted by the Governor, whatever theMinister or the Council of Ministers may say withregard to a particular matter, does not becomethe action of the State until the advice of theCouncil of Ministers is accepted by the head ofthe State. Until order is drawn up in the mannerindicated by Article 166(1) and communicated tothe person who would be affected by the order itwould be open to the Council of Ministers toconsider the matter over and over again and,therefore, till its communication, the ordercannot be regarded as anything more thanprovisional in character. Even if the rule doesnot contemplate that the Chief Minister would beentitled to pass an order but when the ruleenvisages that he is entitled to call for the file for issue of order, it clearly implies thathe has the right to interfere and make such orderas he may deem appropriate. The Chief Ministermay call any file and deal with it himself. Theorder passed by the Chief Minister even though itis a matter pertaining to the portfolio of theRevenue Minister will be deemed to be an order ofCouncil of Ministers. So deemed, its contentswould be the Chief Minister''s advice to theGovernor for which the Council of Ministers wouldbe collectively responsible. This view wasreiterated by a larger Bench of seven Judges ofthis Court in
30. It had also been stated that 30 days time had not been given to the land owners to submit their objections,as provided under the Act. Since, sufficient time had notbeen given to raise their objections, the Petitioners werenot in a position to make their effective representations,based on proper legal advise. From the records produced bythe Respondents, it is noted that the land owners hadsubmitted their objections only on the date of the enquiryfixed by the Respondents in their Section 5A notices. Thus, it is clear that the enquiry conducted by theRespondents is in violation of Section 4(1) of the Act.
31. It has also been stated that the Special Tahsildarhad failed to arrive at a decision and he had made nospecific recommendation, as mandated under the relevantprovisions of the Act. In fact, he had issued the Section 6 declaration, accepting the remarks of the requisitioningbody, to acquire the lands of the Petitioners withoutapplying his mind, independently. Further, Section declaration has been passed by the Special Commissioner andCommissioner of Land Administration, Chennai, withouthaving the authority to do so, as the value of the landsnotified is more than Rs. 25,00,000/-. In suchcircumstances, it is only the State Government, which isempowered to issue such a declaration. Therefore, the Section 6 declarations made in respect of the lands in question are ultra vires and void.
32. It has also been stated that no public notice,containing the substance of the Section 6 declaration, hadbeen published in the locality, by the District Collector,as mandated u/s 6(2) of the Act, within theperiod of 60 days, as contemplated in the explanation (b)of the State amendment issued to Section 6 of the Act. Since, no proper publication had been made, as prescribedby the relevant provisions of law, the declaration would benull and void. The learned Counsel had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court, in
9. Shri Anil Raj Kumar, Officer on SpecialDuty, MDA, Respondent 4 herein, in his counter-affidavit states that the High Court has takeninto consideration the award passed by theCollector specifically referring to 13-8-1985,the date of publication of notification underSection 6 of the Act and the fact that the stayorder was in operation w.e.f. 2-8-1985 till 19-9-1996. It is also stated that the High Court hasupheld the award having been passed on 18-9-1998 within the period of limitation as prescribed bySection 11A of the Act and as such the landacquisition proceedings would not lapse ascontended by the Appellants. He reasserted thatdeclaration u/s 6 of the Act was issuedon 13-8-1985 and not on 25-7-1985 as alleged bythe Appellants.
16. Section 6(2), on a plain reading, deals withthe various modes of publication and they are:
(a) publication in the Official Gazette, (b)publication in two daily newspapers circulatingin the locality in which the land is situate ofwhich at least one shall be in the regionallanguage, and (c) causing public notice of thesubstance of such declaration to be given atconvenient places in the said locality. There isno option left with anyone to give up or waiveany mode and all such modes have to be strictlyresorted to. The principle is well settled thatwhere any statutory provision provides aparticular manner for doing a particular act,then, that thing or act must be done inaccordance with the manner prescribed therefore inthe Act.
22. The statement of Smt Nisha Goel made in thecounter-affidavit filed by her on behalf ofRespondents 1, 2 and 3 that the declaration ofpublic notice by last mode u/s 6(2) ofthe Act by beat of drums in the locality on 13-8-1985 manifestly is wrong and on the face of it contrary to the contents of the notice (AnnexureR-2) filed by her with the affidavit. This noticedated 13-8-1985 was issued by the Land RecordInspector, Block Rohta, Tehsil Meerut, inresponse to the letter of MDA dated 9-8-1985 andthat of the District Land Acquisition Officer,Meerut, dated 1-8-1985. The relevant substance ofthe notice reads as under:"The land described in the enclosed list situatein Village Dantal, Block Rohta, Tehsil Meerut hasbeen acquired by Meerut Development Authority forits residential scheme and letter for obtainingits possession has been received on 12-8-1985 at3 p.m. and intimation of which has been giventoday, 13-8-1985 in Village Dantal to all farmersand residents concerned of the village by beat ofdrums and in loud voice that notification hadbeen published on 19-7-1985, 25-7-1985 in dailynewspapers, Meerut Samachar, Janta Express andHamara Yug and Government Gazette. Since the landhas been acquired for the residential scheme ofMeerut Development Authority, no farmer shouldchange the nature of rights in the land and thepossession of acquired land will be taken on 16-3-1985."
This notice appears to have been signed bymarginal witnesses Har Pal Singh, Sudhir Kumarand Yash Vir Singh and thumb mark by Chhote on13-8-1985. The language employed in this noticewould not prove that it was the last mode ofpublication referred to in Section 6(2) of theAct. In substance, this notice appears to have been issued in purporting exercise of power underSection 9 of the Act for taking possession of theacquired land on 16-8-1985. Thus, thisnotification, in no circumstances, would provethat it was the last mode of publication referredto in Section 6(2) of the Act.
27. The ratio of the judgment in
33. The learned Counsels for the Petitioners had alsosubmitted that it cannot be said that the Petitioners hadwaived their rights by participating in the enquiry and therefore, they would be barred from challenging the saidproceedings, based on the principles of acquiescence andestoppel, as their participation in the enquiry was basedon their belief that it was being conducted fairly andproperly. Subsequently, they had learnt that the enquiryhad not been conducted by the person authorized to do so,as per law. He had relied on the decision in
22. The judgment of a court, it is trite,should not be interpreted as a statute. Themeaning of the words used in a judgment must befound out from the backdrop of the fact of eachcase. The court while passing a judgment cannottake away the right of the successful partyindirectly which it cannot do directly. Anobservation made by a superior court is notbinding. What would be binding is the ratio ofthe decision. Such a decision must be arrived atupon entering into the merit of the issuesinvolved in the case.
26. We, however, are not unmindful of theprinciples of estoppel, waiver and res judicataare procedural in nature and, thus, the same willhave no application in a case where judgment has been rendered wholly without jurisdiction orissues involve only pure questions of law. Evenin such cases, the principle of issue estoppelwill have no role to play.
34. It has also been submitted that the acquisition ofland is beyond the scope of the public purpose notifiedunder Section 4(1) of the Act. When the Section 4(1) notifications state that the public purpose, for which thePetitioners'' lands are being acquired, is for the formationof the Outer Ring Road, the acquiring of additional extentof lands for about 90 feet, on either side of the road,would be arbitrary and illegal, especially, when theadditionally acquired lands are meant to be used forcommercial and residential purposes, by developing theminto plots, through private partners.
35. It has also been stated that the records producedby the Respondents would not show the correct picture. Infact, some of the aspects stated in the counter affidavitare contrary to the facts available from the records. Thus,it is clear that the non consideration of the requests madeon behalf of the land owners to shift the alignment to theeastern side, as proposed by the Pallavan TransportConsultancy Services Limited, Chennai, is arbitrary and illegal.
36. It has also been submitted that the Respondentshad played fraud on this Court by making false statementsand by producing fabricated records. Further, they areliable to pay compensation to the Petitioners and to paythe costs of the litigations, as the land acquisitionproceedings are totally illegal and void. Thus, Section 5A Enquiry conducted by the authorities concerned cannot besaid to be valid in the eye of law.
37. The learned Counsels for the Petitioners, inW.P. Nos. 13287, 13288 and 13289 of 2009, had submitted thatthe Petitioners were not served with Section 4(1) notices,said to have been issued by the Respondents. Since, thelands belonging to the Petitioners, sought to be acquiredby the Respondents, are vacant lands, the Petitioners arenot residing in the said lands. Therefore, it would not besufficient if the notifications, in respect of the landacquisition proceedings, are published in the districtgazette. In fact, wide publicity ought to have been made toinform all the land owners, including, those who areresiding far away from the lands.
38. It has also been submitted that the approval forthe formation of the Outer Ring Road project had beengranted in the year, 1993, vide G.O. Ms. No. 381, Housing andUrban Development Department, (UD III-1) dated 25.5.1993. While so, a formal approval had been granted to SriVignarajan Nagar Layout, on 16.8.1994, vide L.O. No. 85/1994. Thus, it is clear that the acquisition of lands belongingto the Petitioners is arbitrary and illegal. It had alsobeen stated that the District Collector has no jurisdictionto issue the notifications, as the value of the lands inrespect of which the Section 4(1) notifications had beenissued exceeds Rs. 50,00,000/-.
39. It had also been stated that the alignment of theOuter Ring Road, between the relevant points, is not basedon valid scientific reasons. It is only based on therecommendations made by certain interested parties. Thelearned Counsel had relied on the decision of this Court,dated 30.8.2010, made in W.P. No. 16417 of 1998, wherein thisCourt had quashed the notification holding that some of thelands were excluded from the acquisition proceedings merelyon the recommendations of the high level committee andhence, it is unlawful.
40. It has also been stated that Section 5A enquiryhad not been conducted by the proper persons authorised todo so as per law. The decision in KUMAR NAICKER K. Vs.STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHER (1998 W.L.R.417) had beenrelied on in support of the said contention.
41. It had also been stated that no notice had beensent for giving an opportunity of personal hearing, ascontemplated under the relevant provisions of law. In fact,the Section 5A enquiry has only been an empty formality,as the Petitioners had not been put on notice regardingsuch enquiry.
42. It had also been stated that the acquisition ofthe lands by the Respondents was not only for publicpurpose but it was also for certain commercial purposes andfor the construction of residential houses. Therefore, theacquisition is improper and invalid, as held in SHANMUGADURAI v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2001 (2) CTC 257).The relevant paragraphs of the said decisions are as follows:
8. Of course, in order to get-over theobjections based on vagueness of Section 4(1)notification, the Respondents would contend (vide counter affidavit filed on behalf of theRespondents in W.P. No. 21355 of 1993) that inorder to enlighten more about the project, it wasmentioned in the declaration u/s 6 ofthe Acquisition Act that the lands are needed forcommercial and residential neighbourhood schemesunder the project known as "land assembly anddevelopment project". In other words, thecontention is that failure to give detailedparticulars of the public purpose in Section 4(1)notification could not vitiate it, more so, whensufficient particulars had been provided in thenotification issued u/s 6(1) of theAcquisition Act. This is too untenable acontention to be accepted. In our consideredopinion, the Government may not be justified infilling up the lacuna in Section notification byimproving it further in Section 6 declaration. Itis well settled that when a statutory functionarymakes an order or issues a notification based oncertain grounds, its validity must be Judged bythe reasons so mentioned and cannot besupplemented by fresh reasons in the shape ofaffidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, any order badin the beginning, may, by the time it comes toCourt on account of a challenge, get validated byadditional grounds later brought out. We may heredraw attention to the observations of Bose J in
Public orders publicly made. In exercise ofa statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by theofficer making the order of what he meant, or ofwhat was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities aremeant to have public effect and are intended toaffect the acting and conduct of those to whomthey are addressed and must be construedobjectively with reference to the language usedin the order itself.
Orders are not like old wine becoming betteras they grow older. (See in this connection, theConstitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in
17. That apart, this case also disclosesnon-application of mind by the authoritiesconcerned and rather casual manner in dealingwith the property of the citizens vitiating theacquisition proceedings. Whereas the letter ofthe Executive Engineer of the Housing Board tothe Collector had indicated that the Chairman ofthe Board had found the land suitable for"construction of buildings and shops under theself-financing scheme", the notification issuedunder Section 4(1) makes no mention thereof and instead declares the "public purpose" to be"residential". Again, in the declaration issuedunder Section 4(1) of the Act the "publicpurpose" has been state to be "housing scheme ofHousing Board" and not "construction of buildingsand shops under the self financing scheme. Admittedly, apart from the letter referred toabove, there was no other material with the StateGovernment and therefore, it is not under standable on what material, did the State Governmentstate the "public purpose" in different terms inthe notifications issued u/s 4 and 6(1). No explanation has been furnished by thelearned Counsel as to why different publicpurposes were mentioned in the letter of theBoard and the two notifications issued underSection 4 and 6 of the Act. (Italics supplied byus). These factors go to expose non-applicationof mind by the authorities while issuing theimpugned notification and it appears that theywere not even sure about the "public purpose" forwhich the land was sought to be acquired.
This position stands settled as per thedecision of the Supreme Court rendered as earlyas in 1971 in
9. The Government have a case that theAppellants/Petitioners are guilty of laches in sofar as they failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court immediately after the issuance of notification u/s 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. This again is an untenable contention. Similar contention advanced in
The fact that the Petitioners (owners) didnot go to Court immediately after the publicationof the first notification is not a matter of anymoment. The defects were not cured and cannot beglossed over by reason of the fact that thePetitioners went to Court after the issue of thenotification u/s 6(1).
Accordingly, we reject the abovesaid contention of the Government as well.
16. At any rate, the facts of the cases onhand are clearly different from the facts of theabove mentioned cases cited by the Respondents. In the present batch of cases, the question ofvagueness was raised by the Appellants/land ownerbefore the authorities by way of objectionsimmediately after issuance of Section 4(1) notification. Before the Court, vagueness waspleaded and argued in the writ petitions, andthis Court, considered the vagueness in thenotification as an issue and answered the same inthe common order. In all the abovesaid casesreferred to by the Respondents, the land ownersdid not take up the plea of vagueness before theLand Acquisition Officer with a contention thatsince the public purpose is vague, they are notin a position to file a meaning objection. In thecases on hand, the specific contention was takenby the Appellants before the Land AcquisitionOfficer that since the public purpose in thenotification u/s 4(1) is vague, and asthe term: "land assembly and development project"is a very general term, they are not in aposition to object specifically against theacquisition. The extent, of land in the casesreferred to by the Respondents comes to thousandsof acres. On the other hand, the propertyacquired in the cases on hand is only 33.16acres. The public purpose shown in Section 4(1)and Section 6 are entirely different. Evenaccording to the Government, Section 4(1) doesnot contain the details of the public purposewhich necessitated them to explain the publicpurpose in Section 6 declaration. In all thecases referred to by the Respondents, the ApexCourt declined to interfere in the landacquisition proceedings, as the land owners werefound guilty of laches, whereas, the Appellantsin these batch of cases, are not guilty of laches.
43. It has also been stated that, when poramboke landsare available on the eastern side of the proposed lands, itwould be improper on the part of the Respondents to acquirethe lands wherein a number of residential buildings hadbeen constructed, based on the approval of the layouts, byspending huge amounts of money. Further, an extent of 3.5kilo meters of lands, from Nemilicherry to Palavedu,belongs to the state Government.
44. The learned Counsels had also submitted that nopublic notice, as contemplated u/s 6(2) of theAct, had been published, by the District collector, at theconvenient places in the locality. Therefore, thedeclaration is invalid in the eye of law.
45. Per contra, Mr. P.S. Raman, the learned AdvocateGeneral, appearing for Mr. M. Dhandapani, the learned SpecialGovernment Pleader, appearing on behalf of the Respondents1, 3, 4 and 5 had submitted that the Government of TamilNadu had issued the necessary orders, vide G.O. Ms. No. 381,Housing and Urban Development (UD III-1) Department, dated25.5.1993, for the formation of the Outer Ring Road, between Thiruvallur Road and Thiruvotriyur Ponneri PanjettyRoad, for a distance of 33.1 kilo meters, under phase II ofthe project. In the Government order, in G.O. Ms. No. 303Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 2.7.1996,the Government had sanctioned the creation of four landacquisition units. Eight notifications had been issued, inrespect of blocks 1 to 8, u/s 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of the acquisition oflands. Since, the value of each of the eight blocks did notexceed Rs. 25,00,000/-, the District Collector had issuedthe Section 4 notifications, which had been published inthe district gazette, as well as in two Tamil Dailies,namely, ''Dina Thanthi'' and ''Dina Malar''. Publication hadalso been done in the locality concerned.
46. It had also been submitted that the objections hadbeen called for from the land owners and an enquiry, underSection 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had beenheld, in accordance with the procedures established by law. Thereafter, an award had also been passed in respect of theacquired lands.
47. It has also been submitted that the contentionsraised on behalf of the Petitioners that the District Collector, Thiurvallur District, does not have thejurisdiction to issue the impugned notifications, foracquiring the lands in question, are not acceptable. As perSection 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, introduced bythe Tamil Nadu State Amendment the District collector isthe authority to publish the 4(1) notification, in respectof the lands not exceeding 40 acres in extent, the value ofwhich does not exceed Rs. 25,00,000/-. It cannot be saidthat there should only be a single notification, underSection 4(1) of the Act, in respect of the lands proposedto be acquired. Nothing in law prevents the Government fromsplitting large extents of lands, which are needed for apublic purpose, into different blocks for the purpose ofadministrative convenience in issuing the necessarynotifications.
48. It has also been submitted that the value of thelands acquired for the Outer Ring Road Project had beenascertained by the concerned officers by taking the marketvalue of the lands, located within an area of 1.6 kilometers radius from the lands sought to be acquired, duringthe period of 3 years prior to the issuance of the Section 4(1) notifications. From the records available, it could beclearly seen that the value of the lands sought to be acquired by the Respondents, in each of the blocks, wouldnot exceed Rs. 25,00,000/-. Thus, it is clear that theDistrict collector concerned was having the jurisdiction toissue the impugned Section 4(1) notifications.
49. It had also been stated that, while passing theaward, if the authorities concerned decides to give ahigher compensation, or if the sub court concerned comes tothe conclusion that the compensation given to the partieshad to be enhanced, such higher or enhanced compensation,granted in favour of the land owners, would not, in anyway, vitiate the notifications issued by the DistrictCollector, whose decisions had been made, based on thematerials available at the relevant point of time, as perlaw.
50. It had also been submitted that it is true thatthe publication of the impugned notifications had been madein the district gazette and not in the state gazette. However, the contention raised on behalf of the Petitionersthat the publication of the impugned notifications in thedistrict gazette, instead of publishing them in the stategazette, would invalidate the land acquisition proceedings,is hyper technical in nature, as held by the Supreme Court, in
51. It has also been stated that the Petitioners hadbeen given proper notice of the enquiry conducted, underSection 5A of the Act. The records available with theRespondents would show that the notices of Section 5A enquiry had been dispatched by the concerned authority tothe land owners, by registered post, with acknowledgmentdue. The notices had been sent to their addresses, asrecorded in the revenue records. In cases, where thenotices had been returned unserved, they have been affixedin the concerned notice boards and in the lands inquestion. Apart from such steps having been taken to servethe notices, the necessary information had been announced,by way of ''tom tom'', as contemplated under the Act.
52. It had also been submitted that the Supreme Courthad held, in
53. It had also been submitted that the objections hadbeen raised, regarding the alignment of the road, statingthat poramboke lands were available on the eastern side ofthe proposed alignment. In
54. It has also been submitted that the acquisition ofthe lands in question is for the public purpose of buildingthe roads, in order to prevent the congestion of the traffic in the city. Even though Phase-I of the project hadalready been completed, the whole project had been delayed,in view of the pendency of the present litigationsinitiated by some of the owners of the lands. Most of theowners of the lands, acquired by the Respondents for theOuter Ring Road Project, had accepted the compensation,without any protest.
55. It has also been stated that, in
56. It is seen that the main contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioners are as follows:
56.1. It has been submitted that the government ofTamil Nadu had not taken the decision to notify the landsin question for the purpose of acquiring the said land forthe Outer Ring Road Project, even though the notificationsstate that the Government had taken such a decision. TheDistrict Collector, Thiruvallur District, hadmisrepresented the facts stating that the Government hadtaken the decision for acquiring the lands in question. Assuch, it is a fraudulent and colourable exercise of powerand therefore, it is invalid in the eye of law.
56.2. It has also been submitted that the District Collector concerned did not have the pecuniary jurisdictionto issue the impugned notifications, since, the impugnednotifications are in respect of lands, the value of whichexceeds Rs. 25,00,000/-, even if it could be assumed thatthe division of the lands proposed to be acquired intounits and blocks is correct and valid.
56.3. It had also been submitted that the Respondentshad not produced the necessary records to show that theDistrict Collector concerned had applied his mind in fixingthe rate for the lands. There is nothing on record to showthe basis on which the rates had been fixed. Further, thevalue of the buildings in the lands sought to be acquired,by the Respondents, exceeds the limit fixed for thedetermination of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the DistrictCollector. When there are vacant lands available on theeastern side of the proposed alignment of the road, asporamboke lands, there is no proper explanation from theRespondents to justify the acquisition of lands belongingto the Petitioners, which are forming a part of theapproved layouts concerned. Enormous amounts of money arebeing spent by the State Government for acquiring thelands, when poramboke lands, belonging to the Government,are available.
56.4. The right of the citizen available under Article 300A of the Constitution of India cannot be taken away,except by the due procedures established by law. Even thesplitting of the lands into units and blocks had been donein an arbitrary manner, there is no publication of thesubstance of the notifications in the locality concerned. There is no evidence of the announcement regarding theacquisition, by way of ''tom tom''.
56.5. It had also been claimed that form 3 noticesshould have been issued only by the District Collector,whereas, it is the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition),who had issued the said notices. The Respondents have notbeen in a position to show the availability of form 3notices in the schedule. Further, the records produced onbehalf of the Respondents should substantiate theprocedures followed during the land acquisitionproceedings, specifically. As per Section 79 of the IndianEvidence Act, 1872, no evidentiary value can be attached tothe documents. The documents relied on by the Respondentsare not in the prescribed form. The improper maintenance bythe Respondents would go to show their lackadaisicalattitude, in respect of the impugned land acquisition proceedings. While the Outer Ring Road project is said tobe a public purpose, there is no proper reason shown by theRespondents for the acquisition of larger extents of lands,which are meant for commercial purpose. No clear reasonshad been given for the earlier realignment of the proposedroad.
56.6. It had also been stated that the ChennaiMetropolitan Development Authority had not filed a counter,denying the claims made on behalf of the Petitioners. Hence, adverse inference had to be drawn against the landacquisition proceedings. It had also been stated that theorder passed by this Court, on 19.9.2000, in the writappeal, in W.A. No. 603 of 1999, is not binding on thePetitioners, based on the principle of res judicata, as ithad been obtained by fraud. Further, the Division Benchorder does not conclusively deal with the issue regardingthe alignment. Since, the issues raised in the present writpetitions had not been raised in the earlier writ petitionfiled by the land owners, the principle of res judicatawould not be applicable to the present case. Therefore, theState Government should be directed to consider the aspectof re-alignment of the proposed road. The State Governmentought to have considered the technical, as well as the economic aspects of the land acquisition proceedings beforearriving at a final conclusion. The decision making processof the Respondents are totally arbitrary in nature,violating the wednesbury principle. Since, the acquisitionof land is also for commercial purpose and for theconstruction of residential houses, as seen from therecords available, the acquisition proceedings cannot besaid to be purely for a public purpose. Since, Section 4(1)notifications had been issued by the authority concerned,without having the jurisdiction to do so and as the Section 5A enquiry proceedings had not been conducted, as per theprocedure established by law, the entire land acquisitionproceedings in question would be invalid and void.
57. Mr.P.S. Raman, the learned Advocate Generalappearing for Mr. M. Dhandapani, the learned SpecialGovernment Pleader , appearing on behalf of the Respondents1, 3, 4 and 5 had submitted, in his reply, that theGovernment of Tamil Nadu is the authority empowered toacquire the lands necessary for a public purpose. The StateGovernment had authorised the District Collector,Thiruvallur District, to acquire the lands in question forthe purpose of phase II of the Outer Ring Road Project. Thefixing of the value of the lands had been done, based on a valid valuation report. However, the claim made on behalfof the Petitioners, for enhanced compensation, cannotvitiate the entire land acquisition proceedings. In fact,90 percent of the land owners had accepted the award. Since, there is no mala fide intention on the part of theRespondents, in the land acquisition proceedings underchallenge, the said proceedings cannot be held to beinvalid in the eye of law. The order of the Division Benchof this Court, in W.A. No. 603 of 1999, operates as resjudicata against the Petitioners in the present writpetitions. All the pleas raised by the Petitioners hadalready been rejected by this Court in the said order. Noinstructions had been given by the State Government for theacquisition of lands for commercial purpose. As the enquiryproceedings had been conducted by the authority concerned,as per Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, bygiving sufficient opportunity of representation to thePetitioners, it cannot be said that such enquiry is invalidin the eye of law.
58. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalfof the Respondents had relied on the decision in
59. In view of the averments made in the affidavitsfiled in support of the writ petitions and in the counteraffidavits filed on behalf of the Respondents and in viewof the submissions made by the learned Counsels appearingon behalf of the Petitioners, as well as the Respondents,and in view of the decisions cited by them, this Court isof the considered view that the Petitioners have not shownsufficient cause or reason to grant the reliefs, as prayedfor by them in the present writ petitions.
60. From the records placed before this Court, it isseen that the Government of Tamil Nadu had approved the proposal of the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority,for the development of the Outer Ring Road, betweenThiruvallur Road and Thiruvotriyur Ponneri Panjetty Road,for a distance of 33.1 kilo meters, in its order, in G.O.Ms.No.381, Housing and urban Development (UD III-1) Department, dated 25.5.1993. In its order, in G.O.Ms.No.303, Housing and Urban Development Department,dated 2.7.1996, the State Government had sanctioned thecreation of four land acquisition units, comprising of theSpecial Tahsildar, (LA) and a supervisory unit headed by aDistrict Revenue Officer, (LA), along with the necessarysupporting staff. The District Revenue Officer (LA) haddivided the entire extent of land, proposed to be acquiredand allotted for the purpose of the Outer Ring Road projectinto four units. The lands in Poonamallee Taluk, includingthose in Thirunindravur village, had been allotted toSpecial Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Unit IV. Theacquisition of 10.49.5 hectares of land, in ThirunindravurVillage, Poonamallee Taluk, Thiruvallur District, has beensplit into eight blocks. The necessary notifications, underSection 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had beenapproved by the District Collector, Thiruvallur District. Thereafter, they had been published in the ThiruvallurDistrict Gazette and in the locality concerned. The notification had been published in the local newspapers andhad also been announced, by way of ''tom tom''. Enquiries hadbeen conducted, as per Section 5A of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894. The objections of the land owners had beenforwarded to the Chennai Metropolitan DevelopmentAuthority, the requisitioning body, and their remarks hadbeen received. The objections raised by the land owners hadbeen duly considered. Thereafter, the awards had beenpassed, acquiring the lands in question.
61. It has also been noted that the necessarypublication had been made, within the period of 30 days, asmandated u/s 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. The land owners had been given a reasonableopportunity to file their objections, if any, and necessarypublication had been made. After considering theobjections raised by the land owners, the awards had beenpassed. Therefore, it is not open to the Petitioners tochallenge the land acquisition proceedings, at this belatedstage. However, it would be open to them to seek the reliefof enhancement of the amount of compensation by approachingthe concerned Court, u/s 18 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894.
62. It is also seen that the issue regarding therealignment of the road, raised in W.A. No. 603 of 1999, hadalready been rejected by a Division Bench of this Court, byits order, dated 19.9.2000.
63. It is also clear from the decisions of the FirstBench of this Court, in
64. It is also seen that the State Government hadgranted its approval for the formation of the Outer RingRoad, in the year, 1993, whereas the approval of thelayouts is said to have been given only in the year, 1994.
65. It is also seen that the Petitioners have not beenin a position to sufficiently substantiate their claimsthat the District Collector, Thiruvallur District, does nothave the jurisdiction to issue the notifications underSection 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thevaluation of the lands, as given by the Petitioners, cannotbe the basis on which it could be held that the value ofthe acquired lands, which had been divided into units andblocks, is more than Rs. 25,00,000/-. There is nothing shownon behalf of the Petitioners for this Court to come to theconclusion that the division of the lands, into units andblocks, has been done in a mala fide manner. It is for theconcerned Government to approve such divisions of the landsfor the sake of administrative convenience.
66. Once it is found that the procedures prescribedunder Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hadbeen followed by the Respondents, it cannot be said that sufficient opportunity had not been given to thePetitioners to raise their objections. There is nothing toshow that the Respondents had not sent the necessarynotices to the Petitioners, asking them to raise theirobjections, if any, by way of registered post, withacknowledgment due. In respect of those notices, which hadbeen returned unserved, the Respondents had served thenotices, by affixture. It is the claim of the Respondentsthat the notices had been issued to their addresses, asfound in the revenue records. In such circumstances, itcannot be held that the enquiry conducted by the authorisedauthority was improper, illegal and void.
67. The Petitioners have not been in a position toestablish their claim that the acquisition of the lands,said to be belonging to the Petitioners, is not for apublic purpose.
68. The allegation of the Petitioner that a portion ofthe land had been acquired both for commercial, as well asfor residential purposes, had not been established, bynecessary evidence. It is relevant to cite the decision ofthe Supreme Court, in
6. The main objection of the raiyats in theother appeal is that the notification underSection 6 has not been published in the OfficialGazette and was published only in the DistrictGazette and since the same is not in accordancewith the provisions of Section 6, the acquisitionproceedings should be quashed. This is a highlytechnical objection. The raiyats never raised anyobjection for so many years but sought tointervene for the first time in the High Court.
69. As such, it cannot be said that the landacquisition proceedings initiated by the Respondents, forthe acquisition of the lands, for the Outer Ring Roadproject, is vitiated by procedural irregularities and inviolation of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances ofthe case, this Court is of the view that the proceduresprescribed by the various provisions of the said Act hasbeen shown to be complied with, by the Respondents. In suchcircumstances, the contentions raised on behalf of thePetitioners cannot be countenanced. As such, the writpetitions are devoid of merits and therefore, they areliable to be dismissed. Hence, they are dismissed. Nocosts. Consequently, connected M. Ps are closed.
