@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
Srinivasan, J.@mdashM/s. Madras Aluminium Company Limited (MALCO), a H.T. consumer of Tamil Nadu Electricity Board filed two suits on the original side of this Court in C.S. No. 308 of 1977 and C.S. No. 524 of 1978 against the first respondent, viz, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. The prayer in C.S. No. 308 of 1977 was for declaration that the claim of the Board for Rs. 9.02 cores was illegal and the Board had no right to levy and collect surcharge, special surcharge, belated payment surcharge at revised rates of tariff from time to lime and penal charges for excess over quota. The prayer in C.S. No. 524 of 1978 was for recovery of Rs. 12,62,815.52 from the Board claiming refund of surcharge paid by the plaintiff. The first respondent filed a suit C.S. No. 107 of 1978 against MALCO for recovery of a sum of Rs. 61,93,953.80 being the current consumption charges for December, 1974 including belated payment surcharge. In C.S. No. 308 of 1977 the first respondent engaged the then Government Pleader Thiru T. Salhiadev and his junior M. Shakir Ali, the first petitioner herein, who filed vakalat on behalf of the first respondent. Immediately thereafter, Thiru Sathiadev was elevated to the Bench of this court and the matter was entrusted to his successor Thiru K. Venkataswami, who filed vakalat along with his junior Thiru A Sivaji. The vakalat given to the previous Government Pleader and his junior ceased to be in force. In the second suit C.S. No. 524 of 1978, Thiru K. Venkataswami and his junior A. Shivaji filed vakalat on behalf of the first respondent. In both the suits written statements were prepared and filed by them. In the third suit instituted by the first respondent, Thiru K. Venkataswami filed vakalat along with Tmt. Jayanthi Natarajan as his junior. They prepared the plaint and filed the suit. Before the suits were listed for trial, Thiru K. Venkataswami was elevated to the Bench of this Court, resulting in change of vakalat. Thiru R. Desabandhu, the next Government Pleader was engaged and along with him M. Shakir Ali and P. Chandrasekaran, the petitioners herein, filed vakalat and they were advocates on record. At the time of trial, the then Advocate General Thiru R. Krishnamoorthy was engaged as Senior Counsel and he had the assistance of his own junior, Thiru R. Muthukumaraswamy. The suits were disposed by a common judgment dated 22.10.1984 by a Division Bench of this Court. While the suits filed by M/s. MALCO were decreed, the suit filed by the first respondent was dismissed. Civil Appeals have been filed before the Supreme Court of India against the judgment of the Bench and it is stated that the Appeals are pending.
2. After the disposal of the suits, the Division Bench which decided the suits passed an order on 6.2.1985 that the value of the suit C.S. No. 308 of 1977 should be taken as Rs. 9,55,44,5l0/- for purposes of taxation between party and party though the plaintiff had valued the relief at Rs. 50,000/- on a notional basis. The parties were also permitted to amend their fee certificates, if they had been filed earlier on the basis of the notional value. Pursuant to the said order, the Assistant Registrar, Original Side, who is the Taxation Officer, issued a Certificate on 6.5.1985 that the fee payable for each of the respective counsel under the High Court Fees Rules, 1956, was fixed at Rs. 4,80,972.55 in C.S. No. 308 of 1977. With respect to C.S. No. 107 of 1978, the fee payable was fixed at Rs. 34,220/- and in C.S. No. 524 of 1978 the fee was fixed at Rs. 9,564/-. Thus, the total fee payable in the three suits to counsel for a party was fixed at Rs. 5,24,756.55. Thereafter, the Advocate General wrote a letter to the respondent in Roc. No. 182 of 1985, dated 27.6.1985 with a request to sanction the fees as indicated therein. The Advocate General claimed in the letter the amount of Rs. 5,24,756.55 as fees payable to the three seniors, viz., himself, Sri K. Venkataswami and Sri R. Desabandhu. The amount was apportioned by him in the ratio 6 : 2 : 2. In addition to the said amount, he claimed another l/3rd of the total amount as payable to the juniors who assisted the seniors in the case. According to the letter, a sum of Rs. 1,74,918.85, being 1/3rd of the total fee as taxed, was payable to the juniors and he named the Junior Advocates as M. Shakir Ali, P. Chandrasekaran and R. Muthukumarswamy. He apportioned the said amount into three equal shares and claimed that a sum of Rs. 58,306.30 was payable to each of the aforesaid three juniors.
3. Unfortunately, he did not lake note the fact that Thiru A. Sivaji, who was on record as junior counsel of Thiru K. Venkataswami till the latter was elevated to the Bench of this Court, would also be entitled to share the juniors fee, whatever it maybe, as he had actually assisted. Thiru K. Venkataswami. It should also be mentioned at this stage that immediately after Thiru K. Venkataswami was elevated to the Bench of this Court, Thiru Shivaji wrote a letter to the first respondent making a claim for payment of fees to himself and his senior. He had claimed nearly a sum of Rs. 87,000/- as payable for his fees That letter was written in November, 1983. That claim was not settled by the first respondent, obviously because, the suits had not been disposed and the costs had not been taxed. It should also be mentioned that the practice prevailing in cases when Government or Public bodies, like the first respondent are parties, is to pay the counsel''s fee as taxed by the Court after the conclusion of the case or according to the Schedule of Fees. In such cases, normally there is no agreement between the client and counsel at the time when the counsel is engaged and in all such cases, counsel is being provided with only funds for expenses, if any, to be incurred in the cases. It is only pursuant to such practice, the claim of Thiru Shivaji and his senior was not considered by the first respondent when it was made.
4. When the Advocate General wrote the letter dated 27.6.1985 as aforesaid claiming an additional l/3rd over and above the amount mentioned in the taxation certificates and referring expressly to three juniors omitting and name of Mr. Shivaji, the first respondent did not send any reply to the Advocate General inviting his attention to the claim of Thiru Sivaji which was already pending. The first respondent passed an order in B.P.Ms.(FB) No. 66 (Adm.Br.) dated 27th July, 1987, according sanction for payment of lees to the Advocate General and the two Government Pleaders as claimed and a sum of Rs. 58,306.25 to Thiru R. Muthukumaraswamy, Junior. The proceeding was silent with reference to the claim made by the Advocate General for the two junior advocates, who are the petitioners herein. Nor did it make a reference to the claim made by Thiru A. Sivaji, already pending with it.
5. Thereafter, the petitioners herein sent separate letters by Registered Post to the first respondent on 5.8.1987 demanding payment of Rs. 58,306.30 to each of them, In those letters, they referred to the claim of Mr. Sivaji without mentioning his name, as follows.
Now I come to understand that the Board has paid fees to the Advocate-General, the Government Pleader and Thiru R. Muthukumaraswamy, Advocate recently except myself and Thiru P Chandrasekaran. I also understand that one more Advocate, who was neither on record at the time of disposal nor connected with the final disposal of the suits, is being introduced at this distance of time.
As you arc fully aware as per rules legal fees is payable only to counsel who are on record at the time of final disposal of case. In this case, the counsel on record are
1. Thiru R. Desabandhu
2. Thiru M Shakir Ali
3. Thiru P. Chandrasekaran.
It is quite obvious that the contention put forward in the letter is unsustainable, particularly when the change of vakalat was not due to any volition on the part of counsel, but due to the elevation of the then Government Pleader to the Bench of this Court and the assumption of office by a new Government Pleader, who chose his juniors to assist him in the cases. Significantly, in the letters the petitioners did not make any claim for payment of interest. Thiru Sivaji, who also got knowledge of the payment of fees to the three senior counsel and Thiru Muthukumaraswamy, was sending several letters repeatedly to the first respondent. He made a claim not only for payment of the fees as claimed earlier, but also for payment of interest thereon.
6. The first respondent had been corresponding with the Government as to what should be done in this matter, without sending any intimation whatever to the three claimants.
7. The petitioners herein approached Thiru K. AIagiriswami, who succeeded Thiru R. Krishnamoorthy to the post of Advocate-General and requested him by their letter dated 29.10.1989 to intervene in the matter and direct the Board to make payment of the fees with interest at 18% per annum from 1.6.1985. The Advocate-General wrote a letter under DO/ROC No. 183/85, dated 27.10.1989 to the first respondent requesting an expeditious action in the matter and settlement of the fees to the petitioners as suggested by his predecessor in office. The letter demanded payment of fees to the petitioners within fifteen days there from ''''so as to avoid embarrassment to the T.N.E.B. and payment of interest to them". A copy of the letter of the previous Advocate General dated 27.6.1985 was enclosed for ready reference. Thiru S.R. Ramakrishnan, Member/Distribution of the Electricity Board, sent a letter dated 3.11.1989 to the Advocate-General setting out the aforesaid facts chronologically and referring to the claim made by Thiru Sivaji and the fact that it had not been settled till then, and requested the Advocate-General to examine the matter and offer his considered view in apportioning the balance amount available out of the fee specified for junior counsel in the letter of the previous Advocate-General. In other words, it was stated in the letter that out of the total fees of Rs. 1,74,918.90 claimed as Juniors'' fee in the letter of the previous Advocate-General, a sum of Rs. 58,306.30 having been paid to Thiru R. Muthukumaraswamy, the balance amount available was Rs. 1,16,612.60 which should be apportioned among the junior counsel who actually assisted their Seniors in the conduct of the cases on behalf of the Board. There was a specific averment in the letter that Thiru M. Shakir Ali, the first petitioner herein did no work as recommended by the former Advocate-General and on the other hand, Thiru Sivaji had actually conducted the proceedings along with his senior and he was entitled to be paid the junior fee.
8. The first petitioner wrote a letter dated 9.11.1989 to the Advocate-General stating that the reference by the Board to the claim of Mr. Sivaji was belated and it was contrary to the claim made by the former Advocate-General. He stated that the only course available to the Board was to settle the fees as per the letter dated 27.6.1985 expeditiously and if it was not done, the Board would be liable to pay interest from 27.6.1985 till date of payment. At the end of the letter it was stated that any delay beyond two weeks from the date of receipt of that letter, would lead to filing of appropriate proceedings in Court. No copy of the letter was sent to the first respondent and it was addressed only to the Advocate General.
9. Thiru S.Sellaratnam, Member (Distribution) of the Board wrote a letter on 17.11.1989 to the Advocate-General drawing his attention to the earlier letter dated 3.11.1989 and requesting him to state his considered views on the matter of payment of fees to junior counsel. The letter assured that immediately on receipt of a reply from the Advocate General, action will be taken for payment of fees to juniors. The Advocate General wrote a letter in reply on 20.11.1989 stating that the former Advocate General had considered the entitlement of all concerned and had made the claim accordingly, and there was no justification for the Board to introduce anybody else at belated stage. It was stated expressly that there was no question of apportioning the remaining amount viz., Rs. 1,16,612.60 among the three persons, i.e., the petitioners and Thiru A. Sivaji. It was further stated:
If the Board was particular to pay fees to Thiru A. Sivaji also part from the three to whom the former Advocate-General had claimed the junior fees, it ought to have consulted the former Advocate General before making payment to any one of the Juniors, and after obtaining his concurrence the entire junior fees of Rs. 1,74,918.90 should have been divided and paid equally to all the four juniors. laving failed to do so, it is not fair to come with a proposition to apportion the balance (two-third fees) among the three at this belated stage. Hence, I would advise that without reducing the fees of Rs. 58,306.30 each payable to Tvl.M. Shakir Ali and P. Chandrasekaran as claimed by the former Advocate-General the Board should consider payment of a separate fee to Thiru A. Sivaji.
The Advocate-General wrote another letter on 22.8.1990 to the first respondent that the fees should be settled as requested earlier and if there was any delay beyond a period of one month, the parties would approach the Court for appropriate remedies. The Board has been again and again approaching the Government to give a guidance in this matter as apparently it was not prepared to abide by the suggestion made by the Advocate-General that the remaining amount should be divided between the two petitioners and if any amount was to be paid to Mr. Sivaji, it should he done independently.
10. The present writ petition was filed on 12.12.1990. The petitioners impleaded only the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board as the sole response dent. The petitioners did not choose to implead Thiru Sivaji as a party in spite of their being aware of his claim and the stand taken by the Board that. Thiru Sivaji''s claim should also be considered along with the claims of the petitioners. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, a plea of estoppel had been taken on the footing that the first respondent having accepted the letter of the Advocate General and paid she fees of Thiru Muthukumarswamy, was not entitled to deny payment to the petitioners. Nothing has been stated in the affidavit as to how and why Thiru Sivaji is not entitled to any fee for the work done by him. A claim for interest has also been made in the affidavit and reference is made to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 2132 of 1987, which considered the free payable to a legal adviser of the Corporation of Madras for the cases conducted by him. Interested is claimed at 18% per annum from 22.10.1984 to 22.11.1990 and the amount is stated as Rs 63,838 The total claim with reference to each of the petitioners is for Rs. 1,22,144.30. A prayer is made for an interim direction to pay Rs. 70,000 to each of the petitioners.
11. When the writ petition came up for admission on 19.12.1990, Baklhavatsalam, J. or deed notice of motion returnable by 3.1.1991. After the respondent entered appearance, the matter was not listed for quite a long time and ultimately it was posted before Raju, J. By order dated 6.11.1992, the learned Judge directed the papers to be placed before the Hon''ble the Chief Justice in order that the case may be posted before some other Judge. The Hon''ble the Chief Justice directed the matter to be posted before me. Accordingly, it came before me on 3.12.1992. The first respondent produced the relevant files, on a perusal of which I found that Thiru A. Sivaji had J made a claim even as early as in November 1983 for payment of Rs. 87,000/- to him as junior fees I passed an order on 3.12.1992 impleading Thiru Sivaji as a party to this proceeding, as I found him to be a necessary party in whose absence the claim could not be decided. Notice was issued to Thiru Sivaji and he appeared in person on 9.12.1992. He has since engaged a counsel.
12. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit on 6.11.1992 disputing the claim of the petitioners and stating categorically that the first petitioner is not entitled to any fees as contended by him. However, it is added that if at all the first petitioner wishes to get junior fees, he could have the fees apportioned with Thiru P. Chandrasekaran, as both the petitioners assisted Thiru R. Desabandhu during the trial. The counter affidavit also referred to the fact of Thiru A. Sivaji assisting Thiru K. Venkataswamy in drafting the written statements in two suits and the plaint in one suit and for want of clarification from the Advocate General, the first respondent could not pay the juniors'' fees, as claimed by the petitioners. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the delay in settling the fees is neither wanton nor willful. Immediately after the case was opened for hearing, the first respondent''s counsel stated that his client is willing to deposit the balance amount viz. Rs. l,16,612.60 into Court and the same may be apportioned appropriately by the Court among the persons who are entitled thereto. On a suggestion by me, the two petitioners and Thiru Sivaji had a discussion in the matter and expressed their willingness to share the said sum of Rs. 1,16,612.60 equally. However, they insisted upon a direction to the first respondent to pay interest on the said amount. As the first respondent was not agreeable to pay interest, I heard counsel on both sides on the question of interest only. There was no necessity for me to hear on the merits of the contentions advanced by the first respondent in the counter affidavit in so far as the principal amount is concerned. The arguments were confined to the payment of interest.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the first respondent was negligent in not settling the claim of the juniors earlier. He relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in R. Thillai Villalan v. Government of Tamil Nadu and another W.A. No. 2132 of 1987 Judgment dated 14.6.1989. In that case, the claim was made by the writ petitioner on the ground that he was conducting the cases for the Corporation of Madras in courts and a balance of Rs. 2,65,213.13 was due to him which was not paid in spite of repeated demands. The writ petition was dismissed by a single Judge on the ground that it was a claim for recovery of money based on a contract which could be agitated only in a civil suit. On appeal, the Division Bench took a view that relief could be granted to the petitioner with reference to admitted claims. The Bench found on the basis of statements filed by both parties that the Corporation had admitted the claim to an extent of Rs. 84,212.21. Accordingly, by judgment dated 14.6.1989, the Bench directed the Corporation of Madras to pay the said sum within three months from that date on the appellant furnishing immovable property security for Rs. 1,50,000/- for a period of three years to the satisfaction of the Corporation of Madras. The security was directed to be furnished on account of another dispute between the parties with regard to certain amounts paid to the petitioner by the Corporation for expenses which, according to the Corporation, was not spent fully. It is not necessary to refer to that aspect of the matter in detail. What is relevant in this case is that a direction was given by the Bench to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 17.7.1982 to the petitioner therein till dale of payment. It is seen from the judgment that the said date was the date on which the Corporation wrote a letter to the petitioner that proper action would be taken on his claims. Apparently, no question was raised in that case as to whether interest was payable on the amount adjudged to be due to the petitioner therein. There was no discussion whatever in the judgment on that question. Aggrieved by the said direction, the State Government as well as the Corporation filed Civil Appeal in the Supreme Court of India, after obtaining Special Leave therefore. The Apex Court in its judgment dated 6.3.1991 reported in Government of Tamil Nadu and another v. R.T tiillai Villalan thought fit to fix the amount at Rs. one lakh in lump sum inclusive of interest. Two questions were raised before the Apex Court by the appellants. The first question related to the permissibility of the relief in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and quantification of the amount payable to the writ petitioner. The second question related to the award of interest. Referring to the two contentions, the Court observed that they are eminently arguable. The report contains the word "unarguable", which is obviously an error in print. The observations which follow that sentence in the judgment clearly show that the Bench did not throw out the contentions as unsustainable, but on the other hand thought that there was a question to be considered. However, the Bench did not decide questions in view of the fact that if the contentions of the appellants were to be accepted, it would expose both parties to fresh about of litigation. After hearing the parties on both sides, the Bench directed the Corporation to pay a sum of Rs. one lakh, lump sum, including the sum of Rs. 84,212.21 determined by the High Court and the liability for any interest thereon. It should be noted that the High Court granted interest at the rate of 12% from 1982. By the time the mater was decided by the Supreme Court, nine years had clasped and the total interest would work out to 108%, if the direction of the High Court were to be upheld. But, the Supreme court granted only about Rs. 15,787.79 towards interest, which would work out to less than 2% per annum. However, the question not having been decided by the Supreme Court either way, it cannot be taken as a proposition of law that counsel would always be entitled to interest at a particular rate on the amount decided to be payable as fees.
14. Learned counsel for the second respondent, Thiru Sivaji, placed reliance on my judgment in Lakshmi Animal v. The Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms) Vdlupuram.That case arose under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act (1961). After declaring a surplus of 117.81 acres of land in the holdings of the petitioner and her husband, the Government took possession of the lands on 2.6.1969. But, the compensation payable to the and owners was not settled for over a period of sixteen years. In that context, I had to decide whether the prescription of interest at the rate of 4% under Rule 4 of the Madras Land Reforms (Compensation of Surplus Land) Rules (1960) prevented the parties from claiming any higher amount by way of interest. I held that the rate prescribed by the Rule would be applicable only if the compensation was fixed and paid within the time prescribed by the Rules and if the period had elapsed, the Rules would not apply. Consequently, I held that the Court was entitled to grant higher rate of interest on the basis of equitable principles. I granted interest at the rate of 4% per annum from 2.6.1969 to 1.7.1978 as per the Rules and at the rate of 11% from that date upto actual payment. As directed by me, calculation memos were filed and I fixed the amounts to be paid by order dated 7.9.1991. In that order, I directed the respondents to pay the amount on or before 31.3.1991 failing which they were liable to pay interest at 15% per annum. That decision was based on the equitable principles and the principles enunciated by the provisions of the Interest Act. That was a case in which the parties had lost possession of their lands and were fighting for getting the compensation therefor. That ruling cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.
15. The question in this case would be whether the petitioners and the second respondent are entitled to interest and if so at what rate and from what date. Before deciding this question, reference should be made to the various provisions applicable to fees payable to advocates. The profession of a lawyer has always been viewed as a profession for public service and not a business or a trade. As a matter of professional ethics it was always considered better to yield something to the client''s grievance at the amount of the fee than to engage in a suit to justify, which ought to be always avoided, except as a resort to prevent imposition of fraud. It had been the consistent view that a lawyer should not stipulate for a larger fee on the contingency of a success in litigation and the Courts have always disapproved at such agreements, because the agreement between a lawyer and his client was considered to be directly concerned with the administration of justice as a lawyer is an officer of court.
16. The High Court was empowered by S. 27 of the Legal Practitioners Act of 1879 from time to time, fix and regulate the fees payable by any party in respect of the fees of his adversary''s advocate. Ss. 28 to 31 of the Legal Practitioners Act were repealed by the Legal Practitioners (Fees) Act, 1926. It is not necessary to refer to those provisions, as they have been superseded by Rules framed by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act. Sub.S. lA of S. 34 of the Advocates Act enjoin the High Court to make Rules for fixing and regulating by taxation or otherwise the fees payable as costs by any party in respect of the fees for his adversary''s advocate upon all proceedings in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto. Order V of the High Court Fees Rules. 1956, contains the relevant Rules for fees payable to Advocates appearing in suits on the Original Side of this Court. Rule 21 in Order V provides that where a dispute arises between a practitioner and his client as to the fees payable to the practitioner, either may apply to the Master for an order that the amount due might be taxed. Under Rule 22, the Master, after hearing the parties or their advocates may either refer the applicant to a suit or direct the Taxing Officer to tax the Bill. A similar provision is found in S. 29 of the Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920, which provided that a pleader whose bill of cost has been taxed, may apply to the Court by which or by whose officer the same has been taxed, for an order against his client for the sum allowed on taxation or such sum as may remain due.
17. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to refer to the Rules framed by the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu under S. 49(1)(c) of the Advocates Act. Some of them relate to the adjustment of fees payable to the Advocate from out of the unexpended amount remaining with the advocate after the termination of the proceedings. None of the Rules or the Sections referred to above deal with the question of interest payable by a client on the taxed fees.
18. In Halsbury''s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, page 581-Paragraph 753, the following passage occurs:-
Notwithstanding that orders for coasts have the same effect as judgments and that judgment debts carry interest from the dale of entering up the judgment, the modern practice, based on the principle that interest cannot run until payment is wrongfully withheld and that payment cannot be wrongfully withheld until a party knows what he has to pay. is that interest on costs runs from the date of the taxing officer''s certificate quantifying the costs or from such other date as may be ordered as the date on which payment is to be made.
In the foot-note, reference is made to Erven Wamink Besloten Vemootschap v. J. Townsend & Sons (Hall) Ltd. (1981) (125 Sol Jo 427) and it is stated that it is not clear whether the Court has a discretion to award interest prior to the Certificate of Taxation. Obviously, the passage relates to interest payable by the opposite party, who is directed by the judgment to pay the interest on costs. That will not apply automatically to a dispute between the advocate and his client, which is generally based on contracts.
19. As stated in the beginning, in the case of Government and Public Bodies like the first respondent, such contracts are not entered into and generally they go by the taxation certificates issued by the taxing officers. As per the Original Side Rules, when the taxation certificate is issued, it is normally with reference to the fee payable in the suit to counsel, including the junior''s fee. In the present case, the Advocate General, who argued the cases, actually claimed the juniors'' fees separately and the first respondent paid the fees of Mr.R. Muthukumaraswamy as claimed, but did not pay to the other two juniors mentioned in the letter of the Advocate-General on the fooling that the claim of Thiru A. Sivaji was pending. The first respondent could have immediately after the claim was made, filed an interpleaded suit in the appropriate court and requested the court to decide the dispute between the different claimants. The first respondent kept quiet and when the succeeding Advocate General issued the letter dated 27.10.1989, the first respondent made a request to the Advocate General to examine the matter and offer his considered views. Undoubtedly, there has been a negligence on the part of the first respondent in not having taken steps to get the matter settled through Court-or otherwise. But, it cannot be said that the first respondent has wrongfully retained the amount due to the petitioners herein. When there is a dispute as to whom the amount shall be paid and as to who will be entitled to claim the juniors'' fees, it is certainly open to the first respondent to say that the dispute should be settled before it is made to pay the amount. But, the fact remains that the first respondent could itself have initiated appropriate proceedings for settlement of the said claim.
20. There is also lapse on the part of the two Advocate-Generals, who addressed the first respondent to pay the juniors fees. They could have looked into the records and ascertained that Thiru Sivaji was also entitled to claim a portion of the juniors'' fees and they could have themselves settled the matter by properly apportioning the juniors'' fees among all those who were entitled thereto. Unfortunately, that was not done by the Advocate General, in spite of the first respondent making a specific request to the Advocate General to examine the matter and offer his considered views. On the other hand, the Advocate General was only insisting that whatever was claimed in the first letter dated 27.6.1985 should be complied with irrespective of the claim of Mr. Sivaji, which was already pending. If only the Advocate General had looked into the records, the mistake would have been discovered and rectified in proper time. There is lapse on the part of the petitioners themselves in not having taken appropriate proceedings in time. They kept quiet for more than two years after payments were made to the Seniors and Thiru Muthukumarasamy without making a claim. Further, they raised an unsustainable contention that no fee was payable to Thiru Sivaji as he was not on record at the time of final disposal. There is absolutely no substance in the contention raised by the petitioners in their letters dated 5.8.1987 that juniors fee was payable only to the advocates who were on record at the time of final disposal. Rule 24 of Order 5 of the High Court Fees Rules is relevant in this connection. That Rule provides that in cases where the practitioner had not conducted the whole suit or proceeding or his services have otherwise become terminated, before the suit or proceeding is over, the practitioner shall not be entitled to the full ad valorem fee but only to such a portion thereof as the Taxing Officer considers reasonable, provided that if the Taxing Officer considers that the termination was without just cause, he may allow the full ad valorem fee. Thus, there is a specific rule providing for the situation which entitles Mr. Sivaji to claim his fee for the work done by him. There is also no substance in the contention that the first respondent is barred by the principle of estoppel in as much as it had paid the fee claimed for Thiru R. Muthukumaraswamy. There was no representation, express or implied, on the part of the first respondent that the entire claim made in the Advocate General''s letter dated 27.6.1985 was accepted as it was.
21. When there is lapse on the part of both parties, it cannot be contended that the first respondent is liable to pay interest from the date on which Mr. Muthukumaraswamy''s fee was paid. I have already referred to the claim made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. Interest is claimed from 22.10.1984. The basis there of is not known. Even in their letter dated 5.8.1987 no claim was made for interest. For the first. time, reference was made to interest in the letter of the first petitioner dated 25.10.1989 addressed to the Advocate General. The copy of the letter was not sent to the first respondent. Even in the letter, interest was claimed only from 1.6.1985. The first claim made directly on the first respondent for interest by the petitioners was only in the writ petition. This petition was not properly framed at the time of the filing here of. Knowing the claim of Thiru Sivaji and being aware of the contentions of the first respondent, the petitioners chose to file the writ petition, without impleading Thiru Sivaji. When the petitioners were aware that their claim was disputed by the first respondent will be a question whether they are right in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, instead of filing a regular civil suit. It is only because the first respondent agreed to deposit the amount in Court and the petitioners and the second respondent agreed to share the same equally, I am considering the grant of relief in this petition itself to the petitioners. Otherwise, the writ petition would have been dismissed and the parties would have been directed to approach the civil court.
22. On the other hand, Mr. Sivaji made a claim for interest even as early as on 20.12.1989. Thus, the first respondent will be liable to pay interest, if at all, only from 20.12.1989. There is no express provision in any law for payment of interest. S. 34 of the CPC will not apply, as it refers to a decree for payment of money. The Interest Act, 1978 may apply. If the said Act is applied, the maximum rate at which interest can be claimed is the current rate of interest is defined by the Act. Current rate of interest is defined in S. 2(b) of the Interest Act as "the highest of the maximum rates at which interest may be paid on different classes of deposits (other than those maintained in savings account or those maintained by charitable or religions institutions) by different classes of scheduled banks in accordance with the directions given or issued to banking companies generally by the Reserve Bank of India under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The maximum rate of interest which is paid on deposits by scheduled Banks is 11%. Hence, the maximum rate of interest payable will be 11%. However, Mr. Sivaji has not instituted any proceeding in any court for recovery of the fees payable to him. The mere fact that he has been making claims again and again with the first respondent may not be sufficient to prevent the running of limitation. No doubt, the first respondent has not raised any such plea of limitation.
23. It should be remembered that the petitioners and the second respondent were not chosen by the first respondents as its counsel. The first respondent engaged only the successive Government Pleaders who decide to have their respective juniors as their assistants in the cases.
24. It is only in the background of all the aforesaid facts, the question of payment of interest in this case has to be decided. As stated earlier, the petitioners and the second respondent have agreed to divide the sum of Rs. 1,16,612.60 retained by the first respondent in three equal shares. Each of them will, therefore, get a sum of Rs. 38,871.87. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the interests of justice will be best served if the first respondent is directed to pay interest from 3.11.1989 when the Member (Distribution) of the Board wrote to the Advocate General agreeing to pay the sum of Rs. 1,16,612.60 to such persons as may be entitled to junior fees. In the circumstances of the case, an award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum is reasonable. On that basis, the amount of interest from 3.11.1989 till date works out to Rs. 21,923.25. The total comes to Rs. 1,38,535.85. The petitioners and the second respondent will each be entitled to Rs. 46,178.62, which is rounded off to Rs. 46,200/-. Having regard to the long lapse of time, the first respondent shall pay the same to the parties before 31.12.1992. In the result, the writ petition is admitted and allowed and the following directions are issued:-
The first respondent shall pay a consolidated sum of Rs. 46,200.00 (Rupees forty-six thousand and two hundred only) to each of the petitioners and to the second respondent towards their fee and interest thereon, on or before 31.12.1992. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
