C. Kavitha Vs State of Tamil Nadu and Others

V.S. Sirpurkar, J.@mdashThis judgment will govern W.A.No. 1731 of 2000 and W.P.No. 17720 of 2000. The subject of both these proceedings is more or the less identical and both have been filed by the same petitioner.

2. The following factual panorama will help to understand the controversy involved:

Petitioner is an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, serving as "stenographer". She joined this post on 18.7.1991. This was a post reserved for the "Scheduled Tribe" candidates. At the time she joined the post, it was on the basis of a community certificate dated 12.4.1990, issued by the Tahsildar, Mylapore-Triplicane Taluk, Chennai. According to the said certificate, the petitioner belonged to ''Hindu-Kurumans'', which is a Scheduled Tribe. It so happened that by letter dated 19.4.1995, that is almost about four years after the joining, the Life Insurance Corporation directed the petitioner to produce a community certificate duly signed by a Revenue Divisional Officer.

It is an admitted position that the State of Tamil nadu had withdrawn from all the Tahsildars the authority to issue community certificates, granting the status of "Scheduled Tribe", with effect from 11.11.1989. Therefore, any community certificate issued by the Tahsildar after 11.11.1989 did not amount to a valid certificate and, perhaps, because of this the petitioner was directed to produce the community certificate duly signed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, who was the "only authority" to grant such certificate.

The petitioner, therefore, filed an application on 29.1.1995 before the District Collector, Chennai for the grant of such a community certificate. Even before this enquiry was concluded in any manner, the petitioner received a show cause notice, dated 13.6.2000, from the District Vigilance Committee, Chennai asking her to give reasons why the caste certificate issued by the Tahsildar should not be cancelled. This show cause notice mentions that in pursuance of the request dated 23.12.1996 by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the "genuineness" (not the "correctness") of the community certificate dated 12.4.1990 was being enquired into. This letter dated 23.12.1996, in pursuance of which the said enquiry was initiated, was also served upon the petitioner.

The petitioner gave a reply vide letter dated 23.8.2000 and before even the matter could be finalised, she rushed to this Court by way of a writ petition (W.P.No. 14714 of 2000) for a declaration that the District Vigilance Committee was without jurisdiction and could not have gone into the "genuineness" of the community certificate. The petitioner urged that the formation of the said committee was by G.O.(2D) No. 18, dated 1.4.1997. According to the petitioner, this Government Order itself was in total derogation of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, . The petitioner had quoted the judgment in extenso in the writ petition and on that basis challenged the validity of the Government Order itself and in the result, the enquiry. The learned single Judge dismissed the said writ petition necessitating the present writ appeal.

3. The gravamen of the contentions of the petitioner before the learned single Judge was that the guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court were not followed by the State Government in formation of the District Vigilance Committee as in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, initially the Supreme Court had directed the formation of five members Committee at State Level and had also directed as to who would be the members thereof. The learned single Judge, however, took the view that the subject of the constitution of the District Level Vigilance Committee was dealt with by the Apex Court in Director of Tribal Welfare Vs. Laveti Giri and others, . The learned single Judge pointed out that the subject of the writ petition was the formation of a "District Vigilance Committee" and not the "State Level Caste Scrutiny Committee" as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Madhuri Patil''s case. Further arguments of the learned Counsel were rejected and the writ petition was dismissed.

4. Before us, Mr. Radhakrishnan, very vehemently contended and again relied on Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, . We have absolutely no difficulty with the principles evolved upon and the directions issued in that case. What is, however, relevant is that there is a difference in ascertaining the "genuineness" of the community certificate and the "correctness" of the claim of the applicant that he/she belongs to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe. This difference between "the genuineness" and "the correctness" unfortunately is being lost by the learned Counsel.

5. There is undoubtedly a State Level Caste Scrutiny Committee, which is in perfect consonance with the directions given by the Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, , inasmuch as it has Secretary, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department as Chairman, Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department as Member-Secretary and Director, Hill Tribes Research Centre, Ooty, an expert in the field, as Member. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no such Committee and, indeed, presently we are concerned with the "correctness or otherwise" of the petitioner''s claim that she belongs to the "Hindu-Kurumans", a Scheduled Tribe community. In that sense, the petitione''r is completely confused about the G.O.(2D) No. 18, dated 1.4.1997, which, in addition to a State Level Scrutiny Committee, also formulates a District Level Vigilance Committee. The District Vigilance Committee is given the task of reviewing the community certificates issued by the Tahsildar in the concerned Districts while, the community certificates issued by the Revenue Divisional Officers in the State are to be reviewed by the State Level Scrutiny Committee. It is obvious that the District Vigilance Committee and the State Level Scrutiny Committee would naturally operate in different fields. The task of the District Vigilance Committee becomes all the more clear from Clause 2(ii) of G.O.(2D) No. 18, dated 1.4.1997, which reads as follows:

The District Vigilance Committee will examine 100 certificates at random issued in the district during the current year. This committee will verify whether the certificates have been issued in proper form, whether the signature of the authority is genuine and whether correct community certificate has been issued. If necessary, the committee or the chairman of the committee or the member of the committee may summon the applicant for personal hearing. It can examine the certificates through the Revenue Divisional Officers. The community certificates issued for the purpose of admission to college, loan from TATCO and loan under the local authority development plan should find a place among those 100 certificates. The certificates regarding which complaints have already been received should compulsorily be verified.

[Italics supplied]

6. The learned Counsel very earnestly argues that the power of cancelling the community certificate once granted was that of the State Level Scrutiny Committee. The argument is completely incorrect as it has been pointed out that it is an admitted position that there is a Government Order in existence whereunder, it is specifically declared that after 11.11.1989, Tahsildar would have no power to issue any community certificate. We fail to follow as to, why the concerned authorities could not cancel the certificate issued by an officer, who had no authority to do so and where was the need for formation of a committee for that purpose. It was plain and simple that the said certificate was issued by the Tahsildar on 12.4.1990 and it is an admitted position that the Tahsildar did not have any such power to issue any such certificate, after 11.11.1989. Therefore, on the face of it itself, the certificate must go and any effort on the part of the concerned authorities could not be stalled by finding fault with the Government Order forming the District Vigilance Committee. Whether there was a committee or not, once a community certificate is issued, the concerned officers or, as the case may be, the State Government could always go into the genuineness of the community certificate. In this case, since the community certificate was issued by the Tahsildar after 11.11.1989, it could not be said to be a "genuine certificate" at all. Under such circumstances, there was nothing wrong with the authorities to issue a show cause notice to the petitioner for its cancellation. This precisely was done by the Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, where it was found that the certificate relied upon by Madhuri Patil was issued by a person not competent to do so and it was precisely on that ground that her admission to dental course was also cancelled along with the certificate of status.

7. This is nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of the petitioner to stick to her job which she has got on the basis of a "non est community certificate". Once this is an accepted position that the Tahsildar could not have issued the community certificate after 11.11.1989, there would be not even the question of cancellation of the certificate as the certificate itself would be a "non est" certificate. In our opinion, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the formation of the District Vigilance Committee was against the principles laid down in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, and, therefore, there could not be any enquiry against the community certificate must fall to the ground. The argument that community certificate once granted cannot be scrutinised cannot be countenanced at all. For good reasons, the community certificate could always be enquired into and in this case, there was every reasons for issuing a show cause notice. After all the task was taken at the request of the fourth respondent- Corporation, when the Corporation found that the certificate submitted by the petitioner was signed by the Tahsildar and that too after 11.11.1989.

8. The other arguments raised by the petitioner have been dealt with by the learned single Judge in paragraphs 10 to 12 of the judgment and we are in complete agreement with the views expressed by the learned single Judge. It must be observed that the whole affair of enquiry into the "genuineness" of the community certificate started way back in the month of April, 1995. It is really unfortunate that the matter should not have attained finality even till 2000. The only result was that the petitioner merrily kept on serving on the basis of a community certificate, which was "non est". Not only that, she was also promoted in the meantime. This attempt on the part of the petitioner to challenge the show cause notice itself on the ground of invalidity of the impugned Government Order is absolutely incorrect and the petition was rightly dismissed by the learned single Judge.

9. W.P.No. 17720 of 2000: It is now reported before us that the petitioner has now been ousted from the service since her community certificate has been found to be "not genuine" at all. The writ petition is against her ouster by way of a termination order dated 12.10.2000. In support of this writ petition, the petitioner argues and is heavily relied on the service regulations and more particularly Regulation 39(1)(g) of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and points out that the petitioner was not given any opportunity of being heard before terminating her services in terms of Regulation 39(2).

10. We have seen the concerned order. The concerned order specifically suggests that the District Vigilance Committee by order dated 26.9.2000 has decided and ordered that the petitioner did not belong to "Hindu-Kurumans" community, a claim made on the basis of the community certificate dated 12.4.1990. It is also pointed out that the said community certificate has been cancelled by the District Vigilance Committee by the aforementioned proceedings. In the next paragraph, the Corporation points out that in view of the guidelines formulated by the Supreme Court and further in view of the aforementioned communication dated 26.9.2000 by the District Vigilance Committee and the Collector of Chennai, conveying the cancellation of the community certificate and requesting the Corporation to terminate the appointment of the petitioner on account of the cancellation of certificate produced by the petitioner at the time of her joining the service, her services were being terminated. We find absolutely nothing wrong in this approach. It is obvious that the petitioner had been eating the cake meant for a Scheduled Tribe candidate on the basis of a community certificate given by a person unauthorised to do so. In fact, in paragraph 4 of its order, the Vigilance Committee has dealt with this subject. Not only this, but it is also pointed out to us by the learned Government Pleader that there was no record available regarding the aforementioned community certificate dated 12.4.1990 thereby suggesting that it was a "bogus certificate". Under such circumstances, the only course open for the Corporation was to straight away terminate the services of the petitioner, which has been rightly done. This is the command of the Apex Court in Rule 14 of the Scheme suggested by the Apex Court in Kumari Madhuri Patila and another Vs. Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and others, and reiterated in Director of Tribal Welfare Vs. Laveti Giri and others, . In our opinion, the writ petition has also no merits and must be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed.

11. It is now found that the community certificate, on the basis of which the petitioner got the job, was issued by an officer who had no authority to do so. This is apart from the fact that in its order, the District Vigilance Committee itself has recorded that no such record was available in the said Tahsildar''s office supporting the issuance of the community certificate to the petitioner. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner obtained the job, which was meant for a genuine person belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community, and continued on the same for good ten years. We, therefore, dismiss this writ appeal and the writ petition along with the costs Rs. 5,000 against the petitioner. This would be besides any such action as the authorities may contemplate on account of production of a "bogus certificate." C.M.P.No. 14939 of 2000 is closed.