The Nagercoil Bar Association (Regd) Vs The State of Tamil Nadu, High Court of Judicature at Madras and The District Collector, Nagercoil District

Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) 26 Jul 2012 Writ Petition (MD) No. 8791 of 2011 and M.P. (MD) No''s. 1 and 2 of 2011 (2012) 07 MAD CK 0069
Bench: Division Bench
Result Published
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

Writ Petition (MD) No. 8791 of 2011 and M.P. (MD) No''s. 1 and 2 of 2011

Hon'ble Bench

R. Banumathi, J; B. Rajendran, J

Advocates

Manianand for Mr. V. Raghavachari, for the Appellant; K.P. Krishnadoss, Government Advocate for Respondents 1 and 3 and Mr. G. Prabhu Rajadurai for Respondent 2, for the Respondent

Final Decision

Dismissed

Acts Referred
  • Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21, 216, 225, 235, 311
  • Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 - Section 11

Judgement Text

Translate:

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

1. The Nagercoil Bar Association has come forward with this writ petition challenging G.O.Ms. No. 310, Home (Court-III) Department, dated 07.06.2011 as it is passed without jurisdiction and consequently forbearing the respondents from transferring the pending cases on the file of District Munsif Court, Nagercoil to District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi. According to the petitioner the second respondent has redrawn the jurisdiction of the District Munsif Court, Nagercoil without consultation and contrary to the rules framed by this Hon''ble High Court. Their only grievance is that the second respondent, without the consultation of the respondents 1 and 3 and the elected body and without following due process of law, has passed the order on 25.01.2010. According to them, the transfer instead of aiding the litigants in getting justice has only made access to the Court even more difficult mainly on the ground that some of the villages which are now attached to Boothapandi transferred from Nagercoil is not connected with bus facility. Even though the distance may be less, it is more difficult for the said villages to approach Boothapandi by any mode of transport rather than to approach Nagercoil. Further, in respect of five villages they will have to change minimum two buses to reach Boothapandi whereas to reach Nagercoil a direct bus is available at every hour.

2. Further, in allotting the villages to Boothapandi, the second respondent has not taken into consideration the Judicial District and drawn the classification as per the Revenue District. By redrawing the District, they have pushed the Court further away from the litigants.

3. According to Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873, though the power is given to the High Court to redraw the jurisdiction, the manner in which it has to be exercised is found in the rules framed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 225 of the Constitution of India and as per the Court circular, the convenience of the public at large should be the criteria before recommending to the Government for any alteration. Similarly, the District Judge should consult the Chief Executive of a District for any suggestion which the latter may consider it desirable to make for a redistribution of the areas of civil jurisdiction and the Collector''s suggestion has to be sent not directly but through the channel of the District Judge so that the District Judges local knowledge could be taken note of. According to the petitioner, such exercise has not been done as the third respondent has orally replied that he is nothing to do with the notification. Therefore, they have come forward with this writ of mandamus.

4. The Collector has not filed any counter. The High Court has produced all the relevant history papers for consideration of the Court. As per which, the Administrative Committee meeting was held on 8.1.2008, in which it was specifically considered that the Judicial Magistrate Court/District Munsif Court may be converted as District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, where there is no separate Judicial Magistrate Court/District Munsif Court. The High Court had called for detailed remarks from all the Principal District Judges with regard to feasibility of converting the existing Judicial Magistrate Court/District Munsif Court as District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court. The Kanyakumari District Judge had submitted remarks stating that the existing Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi may be converted as District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court and the Administrative Committee in the meeting held on 12.10.2009 resolved to approve the proposal to convert the concern courts into District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Courts and pursuant to the same, the High Court has recommended the proposal to the Government on 25.01.2010 for the conversion of existing Judicial Magistrate Court/District Munsif Court as District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court where there is no separate District Munsif Court/Judicial Magistrate Court are functioning and one among them is conversion of the existing Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi as District Munsif Court-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi. In this connection, earlier a Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No. 10957 of 2010 was filed by one Bar member for a direction to either constitute a new District Munsif Court at Boothapandi in Thovalai Taluk or to convert the present Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi into District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi. An order was passed by a Division Bench of the Madurai Bench on 27.01.2011 directing the second respondent to consider the proposal and pass necessary orders within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. It is further specifically made that while considering the proposal the authority shall bear in mind the right of the residents to seek speedy justice in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Government have sought extension of time till 31st July and pursuant to the extension granted, the impugned Government Order in G.O.Ms.No. 310, Home (Courts-III) Department, dated 07.06.2011 has been passed. Pursuant to the same, the District Judge, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil was requested to send necessary draft notification for constitution of District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi.

5. Further, the representation of the Bar Association itself was considered and their main grievance at that point of time was that there is no direct conveyance to approach Boothapandi where the Court is situated. This Court had also ordered proper and adequate transport facility are provided to the lawyers and the clients will not suffer the inconvenience to approach Boothapandi. This Court also requested the Government to provide transport facilities to Boothapandi so as to enable the lawyers and the litigant public of Thovalai Taluk in attending the Civil and Criminal cases in Boothapandi and finally notification was made in the Government gazette.

6. Heard both parties. By consent, the main writ petition itself its taken up for final disposal.

7. The main and only argument which was made by the petitioner was that by virtue of altering the judicial Magistrate Court into District Judicial-cum-Magistrate Court in Boothapandi and when the Civil cases are transferred from Nagercoil, the litigant public as well as the lawyers would be put to peril because of the transport difficulty. They would mainly contend that some of the villages were delinked from Nagercoil and attached to Boothapandi and those villages do not have frequent bus facilities whereas they have direct connection to Nagercoil.

8. Unfortunately, this cannot be a ground for attacking the very constitution of the Court. As the Constitution of this Court is mainly on the basis of the public interest. The public in the area would be benefited by virtue of the conversion of the Court. As per the report of the District Judge, more than 226 cases arising out of Boothapandi area were pending in Nagercoil and the Administrative Committee has taken note of the need for having a combined Court in the area where there is only one Court. Before considering the details, the High Court has called for detailed remarks from the Principal District Judges and then only approved in the Administrative Committee meeting held on 12.10.2009. In this connection, it is also pertinent to point that it was also mooted by one of the members of the Bar Association who hails from that District who filed a Writ Petition in W.P.(MD)No. 10957 of 2010 wherein this Court directed the second respondent to consider the pending proposal with the second respondent. Even in that order it is very clearly stated as follows:

In the light of pendency of the matter before the second respondent right from July 2010, as per the proposal already submitted by the High Court, the second respondent is directed to consider the proposal and pass necessary orders within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The second respondent while considering the proposal shall bear in mind the right of the residents to seek speedy justice in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

9. Further, this Court has also recommended on the basis of the recommendation of the Portfolio Judge to Government to provide transport facilities to Boothapandi to enable the lawyers and litigant public of Thovalai Taluk in attending the Civil and Criminal cases in the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court, Boothapandi. Thereafter only the draft notification has been made which came into force. Therefore, the main grievance of the petitioner association cannot be accepted.

10. Further, as per the resolution of the Full Court, insofar as it relates to constitution and abolition of the Courts the Administrative Committee is empowered to take decision to transfer, modify, alter or constitute new Courts for which the Administrative Committee''s sanction is sufficient. In this case, the Administrative Committee''s decision is final as there is no specific provision insofar as to the placing any material before the Full Court regarding the revisional jurisdiction of Civil Court is concerned, the matter shall be decided only by the Administrative Committee which has been duly done in this case. In fact, in this connection, we rely upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Another, wherein the Supreme Court has categorically held that the Administrative Committee is empowered to take a decision of the Court and it is fully authorised to decide the matter in this regard. A Full Bench of this Court in The High Court of Judicature at Madras v. T.S. San karanarayanan ( 1997 (III) CTC 1 = 1997-1-L.W. 11 S.N.) relying upon the above said judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

26. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by special leave and affirmed the minority judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In the said judgment the apex Court has held thus:-

Yet another misconception may now be cleared. It is urged on behalf of the respondent by his learned counsel Shri Misra that under Article 216, ''High Court'' means the entire body of Judges appointed to the Court and therefore, the control over the subordinate judiciary which is vested by Article 235 in the High Court must be exercised by the whole body of Judges. The thrust of the argument is that the High Court cannot delegate its functions or power to a Judge or a smaller body of Judges of the Court. This argument requires consideration of the question whether any delegation as such is involved in the process whereby a Judge or a Committee of Judges of the Court, like the Administrative Committee in the instant case, is authorised by the whole Court to act on behalf of the Court.

For answering this question it is necessary in the first place to bear in mind that the power of control over the subordinate courts which is vested in the High Court comprises such numerous matters, often involving consideration of details of the minutest nature, that if the whole High Court is required to consider every one of those matters, the exercise of control instead of becoming effective will tend to cause delay and confusion in the administration of justice in the State. A construction which will frustrate the very object of the salient provisions contained in Article 235 ought, as far as possible, to be avoided. The control vested in the High Courts by that Article comprehends, according to our decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent posting, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rolls and so forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the decision on every one of these matters, several important matter pertaining to the High Court''s administrative affairs will pile into arrears like courts arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which that article confers on the High Courts, we are of the opinion that it is wrong to characterise as ''delegation'' the process whereby the entire High Court authorizes a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court. Such an authorisation effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts will tend gradually to become Tax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a part, though an important part, of the High Courts'' constitutional functions. Judicial functions, ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of the Judge''s time. For balancing these two fold functions it is inevitable that the administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all the Judges. Judicial functions brooke no such sharing of responsibilities by any instrumentality.

.........

We have pointed out above that the amplitude of the power conferred by Article 235, the imperative need that the High Courts must be enabled to transact their administrative business more conveniently and on awareness of the realities of the situation, particularly of the practical difficulties involved in a consideration by the whole court, even by circulation, of every day to day matter pertaining to control over the District and subordinate Courts, lead to the conclusion that by rules framed under Article 235 of the Constitution the High Court ought to be considered the power to authorise an Administrative Judge or an Administrative Committee of Judges to act on behalf of the Court. Accordingly, we uphold the minority judgment of the Full Bench that Rule 1 of Chapter III of the 1952 Rules framed by the Allahabad High Court is within the framework of Article 235. The recommendation made by the Administrative Committee that the respondent should be compulsorily retired cannot therefore be said to suffer from any legal or constitutional infirmity.

(Italics supplies)

Therefore, when the Administrative Committee takes a decision in regard to the viability and comes to the conclusion, then it is the decision of the Full Court. In fact, the grievance of the petitioner cannot be accepted as in this case, the report has been properly taken from the District Judge also. In this connection, the learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the order passed in W.P.(MD)No. 1643 of 2011. In that case, the question which arose was whether the Administrative Committee passed the resolution or not. Wherein the Court has held that the order was passed not by the Administrative Committee only by the Portfolio Judge of the District concerned. In any view of the matter, the said case went upto appeal and the appeal is pending. Even otherwise, in that case it is also clearly held that once the decision is taken by the Administrative Committee it is enough and the matter has been directed only to place before the Administrative Committee whereas in this case, admittedly the Administrative Committee has passed the resolution. Therefore, the facts of this will not applicable to the facts of this case. Even otherwise, the public at large will be very much benefited by this and therefore, we do not find any reason to grant any order to cancel the Government Order. The Government Order is issued by the Government after taking into the location especially even admitted by the petitioner the distance between the most of the villages between Boothapandi and Nagercoil is just 10 kilometers. There is no extra length. In fact, it will enable the people to have both the civil cases as well as the criminal cases. Whereas, now they are plying between Nagercoil and Boothapandi for Civil cases and criminal cases respectively. Considering all these aspects, the Government has also considered it proper and necessary and passed the said Government Order which is in accordance with law. Therefore, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.

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