Kolli Venkata Mohan Rao Vs J.M. Patricia

@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER

K. Ravichandra Babu, J.@mdashThe defendants 3 and 4 in O.S. No. 65 of 2012 on the file of the Principal District Court, Chengalpattu, are the petitioners herein. The respondents 1 and 2 herein are the plaintiffs and the respondents 3 and 4 herein are the defendants 1 and 2 therein. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 27.11.2013 made in I.A. No. 691 of 2012 in O.S. No. 65 of 2012, in dismissing their application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of the plaint. The respondents 1 and 2 as plaintiffs, filed the said suit in O.S. No. 65 of 2012 for declaration to declare the alleged Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 executed by one Andrew Xavir Packiam in favour of the first defendant as null and void; to declare the sale deeds, dated 15.9.2000 executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant as null and void; to declare the sale deeds dated 9.6.2003 executed by the second defendant in favour of the defendants 3 and 4 as null and void and for consequential mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to vacate and handover possession of the schedule mentioned property to the plaintiff.

2. Originally, the said suit was filed before this Court in C.S. No. 215 of 2005, after obtaining leave granted on 3.3.2005 in Application No. 1085 of 2005. The defendants 3 and 4, who are the petitioners herein, filed Application No. 3531 of 2005 before this Court, for revocation of the leave, mainly on the ground that this Court is not having Ordinary Original Territorial Civil Jurisdiction over the suit property. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 also filed Application No. 5370 of 2011 seeking permission to withdraw the plaint, with liberty to file separate suit before the competent Court. Both the said applications were heard together and by common order, dated 9.4.2012, this Court revoked the leave and directed the Registry to return the plaint under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC, so as to be presented in proper Court with proper Court fee applicable for suits to be filed in the said Court. The plaintiffs were also granted four weeks'' time for presentation of the plaint before proper Court. The application filed in A. No. 5370 of 2011 was however dismissed. Consequent upon such order passed by this Court, the respondents 1 and 2 herein presented the plaint before the Principal District Court, Chengalpattu on 24.4.2012 and the same was numbered as O.S. No. 65 of 2012.

3. The case of the plaintiffs, as stated in their plaint, in nut-shell, is as follows:

"The first plaintiff was married to one Maria Christina and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 are the daughters born to them. One Andrew Xavier Packiam was the brother of the said Maria Christina and was a bachelor, living with the plaintiffs. The said Andrew Xavier Packiam purchased Plot Nos. 41, 42, 44 and 46 in S. Nos. 220/5 and 220/87-A, measuring six grounds 948 Sq.Ft. in Madipakkam Village from one E. Adikesava Pillai, by sale deed dated 4.5.1975, registered as Document No. 1965. The said Andrew Xavier Packiam died intestate on 22.8.1978, leaving behind his sister Maria Christina as his sole surviving legal heir, since his parents pre-deceased him. The said Maria Christina also fell ill and expired on 14.7.1987. During her lifetime, she, by virtue of being the only legal heir of the said Packiam, succeeded to all the properties left behind him. She died intestate, leaving the plaintiffs as the surviving legal heirs. Therefore, the plaintiffs succeeded to all the properties of Maria Christina. The second plaintiff, after her marriage, had been staying in Malaysia and the third plaintiff was staying in Ooty, after her marriage. Their respective husbands died on 3.3.2002 and 7.4.1998, and consequently, they returned to Madras and are staying with their father, namely the first plaintiff. The plaintiffs applied for Letters of Administration in respect of the property of the said Andrew Xavier Packiam. This Court, by order dated 15.7.2004 in O.P. No. 269 of 2004, granted Letters of Administration in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the abovesaid property. When they applied for Encumbrance Certificate on 3.8.2004, they were shocked to learn that the property had been sold by the first defendant, claiming to be the Power of Attorney of the said Andrew Xavier Packiam on 15.9.2000 to the second defendant by four sale deeds. The Encumbrance Certificate further revealed that the property was once again sold by the second defendant on 9.6.2003 to the third and fourth defendants by way of four sale deeds. The plaintiffs obtained certified copy of the alleged Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 said to have been executed by the deceased Andrew Xavier Packiam and also the sale deeds, dated 15.9.2000 and 9.6.2003 referred to above. As the said Packiam expired on 22.8.1978, the alleged Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 was a forged and fraudulent document obtained by impersonation. Therefore, all the consequential transactions were done by forging and fabricating the documents. The defendants are land grabbers and have illegally put up compound wall around the property. All the abovesaid transactions are null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs."

4. The defendants 3 and 4 filed I.A. No. 691 of 2012 in O.S. No. 65 of 2012 under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint on the grounds that there is no cause of action for the plaintiffs to file the said suit, that no proper Court fee has been paid by properly valuing the suit property and that the suit is barred by limitation. In the said application, the contentions of the defendants 3 and 4 are as follows:

"The plaintiffs have not registered the death of the said Andrew Xavier Packiam and therefore, they cannot contend that the said person died in the year 1978. The said person would have died only after the execution of the Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 and the Death Certificate subsequently obtained by the plaintiffs is false and the said document was obtained by fraudulent act of the plaintiffs. The High Court, while allowing the application to revoke the leave, directed the plaintiffs to pay proper Court fee according to the market value of the suit property at the time of presentation of the plaint in the present Court. However, the plaintiffs deliberately omitted to pay the correct Court fee by estimating the value of the suit property properly. The plaintiffs are not the legal heirs of the deceased Andrew Xavier Packiam and the Letters of Administration is not the Legal Heirship Certificate and the same had been obtained at the back of the defendants."

5. The said application was resisted by the plaintiffs. The trial Court, after elaborate discussion of facts and case laws, rejected the said application. Hence, this Civil Revision Petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the suit is barred by limitation, in view of the fact that there is a clear admission of knowledge of sale in paragraph 12 of the plaint. The suit originally filed before this Court, was returned for presenting before the other Court, and therefore, such presentation before the other Court is to be construed as filing a fresh suit and not as re-presenting the earlier suit. Section 14 of the Limitation Act will not come to the rescue of the plaintiffs, since there was no bona-fide in prosecuting the earlier suit before this Court. In support of such submission, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in ONGC Ltd. Vs. Modern Construction and Company, .

7. With regard to the cause of action to maintain the suit is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the plaintiffs are totally strangers and their request for withdrawing the relief of mandatory injunction has already been rejected by this Court in 2012 itself. The Letters of Administration had been obtained behind the back of the petitioners, and therefore, the same does not confer any title on the plaintiffs. In support of such submission, he relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Vijaya C. Gurshaney and Another, .

8. With regard to the payment of Court fee, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the plaintiffs have not valued the property as per Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Courts Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Insofar as the relief of recovery of possession is concerned, it has to be valued as per the market value of the property as per Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. In support of such submission, he relied on the decision of this Court reported in D. Pattammal Vs. K. Kalyanasundaram, .

9. Learned counsel for the fourth respondent, who is the second defendant in the suit, supported the case of the petitioners/defendants 3 and 4 and adopted the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Apart from that, he submitted that the very re-presentation of the suit before the present Court was with a delay and there was no bona-fide in prosecuting the matter. He further submitted that as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the relief sought for in the suit ought to have been claimed within three years from the date of the impugned transactions and the suit having been filed beyond such period, is barred by limitation. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the fourth respondent relied on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, and The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, : The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, .

10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs submitted as follows:

"This Court while revoking the leave, has granted time to the plaintiffs to re-present the suit in proper Court and accordingly, the suit was presented within time and therefore, there was no delay. The Letters of Administration was granted on 15.7.2004 after publication of notice in the newspapers, and therefore, the defendants cannot be permitted to say that the same was obtained behind their back. The valuation of the suit property was done as per the valuation as on 15.7.2004 and the Court fee was paid according to the valuation of the property. All the issues raised by the petitioners are triable issues and not admitted by the plaintiffs in their plaint and therefore, those issues cannot be raised as grounds for rejecting the plaint."

11. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials placed before this Court.

12. The plaintiffs filed the present suit for declaration to declare the Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 as null and void; to declare the sale deeds dated 15.9.2000 and 9.6.2003 as null and void and consequently for mandatory injunction to direct the defendants to vacate and handover the possession of the suit property. The suit property is measuring six grounds 948 Sq.Ft. in S. No. 220/5, situated in No. 154, Madipakkam Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpet District, bearing Plot Nos. 41, 42, 45 and 46. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiffs claim right and title over the suit property as successors-in-interest, pursuant to the death of the said Maria Christina. It is their further case that they obtained the Letters of Administration in their favour in respect of the suit property in O.P. No. 269 of 2004, by order of this Court, dated 15.7.2004. It is their specific case that the original owner, namely Andrew Xavier Packiam, the brother of the said Maria Christina, died intestate on 22.8.1978, leaving behind the said Maria Christina as his sole legal heir and thereafter, the plaintiffs succeeded to the property, after the death of the said Maria Christina on 14.7.1987 who also died intestate. By claiming title so to the suit property, the plaintiffs further averred that they came to know about the impugned sale deeds as well as the Power of Attorney only on 3.8.2004, when they applied and obtained the Encumbrance Certificate for the suit property in the Sub-Registrar Office at Velachery. It is their categorical case that when the said Andrew Xavier Packiam expired on 22.8.1978, the alleged Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 said to have been executed by the said person in favour of the first defendant, is a forged and fraudulent document obtained by impersonation. Based on the said Power of Attorney only, the impugned sales had taken place on 15.9.2000 and 9.6.2003 respectively. Therefore, it is contended by the plaintiffs that those sale deeds are also not valid and not binding on the plaintiffs.

13. Going by the above averments made in the plaint, if we consider the grounds raised by the petitioners in their application for rejection of plaint, it would undoubtedly show that the plaint cannot be rejected as claimed by the petitioners based on those grounds.

14. Let me now reason out for my above conclusion. First, it is the contention of the petitioners that the suit is barred by limitation. It is contended by them that the sale deeds and the Power of Attorney having been executed in the year 2000 and 2003 respectively, filing of the suit in the year 2012 is hopelessly barred by limitation. Further they contend that even though the plaintiffs have averred in paragraph 12 of the plaint that they came to know about the impugned sale deeds and the Power of Attorney as early as on 3.8.2004, they have presented the suit before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet only on 24.4.2012, and therefore, the suit is barred by limitation. According to the plaintiffs, the filing of the suit originally before this Court in the year 2005 in C.S. No. 215 of 2005 has to be eschewed and presenting of the suit before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet in the year 2012 alone has to be taken and construed as fresh filing for the purpose of considering the question of limitation.

15. I am unable to appreciate the above contention. It is well settled that insofar as the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is concerned, the averments made in the plaint as such, have to be taken into consideration to find out as to whether the grounds contemplated under the abovesaid provision, are made out or not. In other words, the facts as projected by the defendants cannot be looked into to find out as to whether the grounds are made out for rejecting the plaint, unless such grounds projected by the defendants are also otherwise available and evident on plain reading of the plaint itself. In this case, the plaintiffs specifically pleaded that they came to know about the impugned transactions only on 3.8.2004 and after obtaining the Letters of Administration on 15.7.2004 from this Court in O.P. No. 269 of 2004, immediately they have filed the suit before this Court. It is also to be noted that before filing the said suit, the plaintiffs have obtained the leave of this Court in Application No. 1085 of 2005, by order dated 3.3.2005. However, the defendants 3 and 4 have filed Application No. 3531 of 2005 seeking revocation of the leave granted in the said Application No. 1085 of 2005. The said application along with another application in A. No. 5370 of 2011, filed by the plaintiffs seeking permission to withdraw the prayer, were taken up together and finally disposed of only on 9.4.2012 by this Court, whereby the leave granted was revoked and the plaint was returned by this Court so as to be presented in proper Court with proper Court fee applicable for suits to be filed in the said Court. This Court has also granted four weeks'' time from 12.4.2012 till 7.5.2012 for the plaintiffs to present the plaint in proper Court. The other application filed by the plaintiffs in A. No. 5370 of 2011 for permission to withdraw the prayer with regard to mandatory injunction, with liberty to file separate suit for the said prayer before competent Court, was however dismissed by this Court. The decretal order dated 9.4.2012 passed by this Court in the said Applications in A. Nos. 3531 of 2005 and 5360 of 2011, reads as follows:

"That the leave granted by this Court in A. No. 1085 of 2005 on 03.03.2005 to sue defendants 1 to 4 in respect of the schedule mentioned property be and hereby is revoked.

2. That the plaint filed in C.S. No. 215 of 2005 deserves to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC so as to be presented in proper Court with proper Court fee applicable for suits to be filed in the said Court.

3. That the plaintiffs herein, be and hereby are granted four weeks time from this date till 07.05.2012 for presentation of the plaint in the proper Court.

4. That the A. No. 5370 of 2011 do stand dismissed."

Accordingly, the plaintiffs immediately presented the plaint before the Principal District Court, Chengalpet on 24.4.2012 and it was numbered as O.S. No. 65 of 2012.

16. With the above factual background, if the attitude of the plaintiffs in prosecuting the matter is considered, this Court is not in a position to find out any lack of bona-fide on the part of the plaintiffs at any point of time. As already pointed out, the plaintiffs have filed the suit before this Court in the year 2005 itself immediately on coming to know about the impugned transactions and after obtaining the Letters of Administration from this Court. Therefore, there is no delay. It is also to be noted that this Court has originally granted leave to file the said suit and such leave was subsequently revoked only after a period of seven years. Therefore, presentation of the plaint before the District Court, Chengalpet on 24.4.2012, that too within the time granted by this Court while revoking the leave, would show that the plaintiffs are very serious in prosecuting the matter against the defendants at all stages.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Sri Amar Chand Inani Vs. The Union of India (UOI), , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. and Another, and ONGC Ltd. Vs. Modern Construction and Company, to contend that the suit presented before the District Court, Chengalpet is to be construed as fresh suit and not as the proceedings in continuation of the earlier suit filed before this Court. But a perusal of the latest decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in ONGC Ltd. Vs. Modern Construction and Company, , more particularly in paragraph 17, would show that the plaintiffs are entitled to exclude the period during which they have prosecuted the case before this Court, in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Paragraph 17 of the said decision reads as follows:

"17. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if the court where the suit is instituted, is of the view that it has no jurisdiction, the plaint is to be returned in view of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 10 CPC and the plaintiff can present it before the court having competent jurisdiction. In such a factual matrix, the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the period during which he prosecuted the case before the court having no jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and may also seek adjustment of court fee paid in that court. However, after presentation before the court of competent jurisdiction, the plaint is to be considered as a fresh plaint and the trial is to be conducted de novo even if it stood concluded before the court having no competence to try the same."

18. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Deena (Dead) through LRs. Vs. Bharat Singh (Dead) thr. LRs. and Others, to contend that the plaintiffs have not acted in good faith and therefore, they are not entitled to maintain the suit. A perusal of the said decision would show that the facts are totally different, wherein it was held by the Apex Court that the time taken for proceeding with the suit without impleading necessary party, cannot be excluded under Section 14(3) of the Limitation Act and the party pursuing the said suit cannot said to be acting in good faith. The facts of the present case, as discussed supra, are totally different and therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the present case.

19. As I have already pointed out that the plaintiffs are bonafidely prosecuting the matter all throughout, Section 14 of the Limitation Act would certainly come to their rescue, and therefore, by applying Section 14 as well as the above decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in ONGC Ltd. Vs. Modern Construction and Company, , I am of the view that the petitioners/defendants 3 and 4 are not entitled to seek for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation, especially when there is no admission in the plaint averment, as contended by the petitioners.

20. Further, the question of limitation was pressed into service also by contending that the impugned transactions were made in the year 2000 and 2003 and the suit was filed only in the year 2012 and therefore, it is barred by limitation. The discussion made by me supra, while considering the limitation aspect, more particularly by considering the fact that the plaintiffs have already approached this Court as early as in the year 2005, is equally applicable to the above issue also. Even otherwise, it is to be noted that the question of limitation is not purely a question of law. On the other hand, it is a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, the date of knowledge of the impugned transactions certainly plays a major rule to decide as to whether the relief is barred by limitation or not. Such decision is possible only by allowing the parties to lead evidence by conducting trial, and therefore, such mixed question of law and fact cannot be considered and decided in an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, especially when the plaint averments on the face of it, do not show that such exercise is unnecessary and the Court can come to the conclusion based on the plaint averments themselves. Therefore, on the question of limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected, as the averments made therein do not warrant such rejection.

21. The following decisions are also cited to contend that the suit is barred by limitation:

"(a) The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, : The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, ;

(b) Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, and

(c) Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company, ."

22. In The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, : The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, , it has been observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in paragraph 11 as follows:

"11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p.560, para 9)

"9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit-before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court." It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in M/s. Raptakos Brett and Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Others Vs. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Others, "

(emphasis supplied)

23. In Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company, , the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows in paragraph 21:

"21. The language of Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. is quite clear and unambiguous. The plaint can be rejected on the grounds of limitation only where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Mr. Nariman did not dispute that "law" within the meaning of clause (d) of Order VII Rule 11 must include the law of limitation as well. It is well settled that whether a plaint discloses a cause of action is essentially a question of fact, but whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is whether the averments made in the plaint if taken to be correct in their entirety a decree would be passed. The averments made in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII is applicable. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction of words or change of its apparent grammatical sense.........."

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, , the Honourable Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 11 and 12 as follows:

"11. In I.T.C. Limited Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and Others, it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

12. The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satyapal and Another, ."

(emphasis supplied)

25. A perusal of the abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court relating to the question of limitation would show that the Court has to see only the plaint averments to find out as to whether a real cause of action has been set out and as to whether the suit is barred by limitation and as to whether the same is evident even on the face of the plaint. I have already pointed out that the plaint averments made by the plaintiffs are not making any admission, as contended by the petitioners and therefore, the above decisions, in fact, only support the case of the plaintiffs.

26. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Letters of Administration obtained behind the back of the petitioners, does not confer any title on the plaintiffs. In support of such contention, learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Vijaya C. Gurshaney and Another, . In my considered view, such issue is not a ground for rejection of plaint, since the petitioners herein are questioning the right and title of the plaintiffs over the suit property, whereas the plaintiffs herein specifically allege forgery and impersonation. Denial of title cannot be a ground to reject the plaint, especially when such issue involving mixed question of law and fact, is purely a matter for trial, and therefore, based on such ground, the plaint cannot be rejected.

27. Further, the petitioners cannot contend that the Letters of Administration obtained by the plaintiffs is bad or invalid, since such order was obtained behind their back. It is already pointed out that such Letters of Administration was obtained by the plaintiffs only after issuing paper publication and therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted to say that the same was without notice. Even assuming that the petitioners are not aware of such proceedings, unless and until they challenge such proceedings and get it set aside, the petitioners cannot be permitted to say that the Letters of Administration granted by this Court is invalid. In this aspect, the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia and Others Vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group and Others, can be safely relied upon, wherein, in paragraph 16, the Apex Court observed as follows:

"16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In State of Kerala Vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and others, , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc., , M. Meenakshi and Others Vs. Metadin Agarwal (D) by LRs. and Others, and Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup and Others, , this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum."

28. Insofar as the ground raised regarding payment of Court fee is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the suit ought to have been valued as per Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act and the market value of the suit property should have been assessed as per Section 30 of the said Act. In support of such submission, he relied on the decision of this Court reported in D. Pattammal Vs. K. Kalyanasundaram, . Here again, the petitioners are totally misconceived and misconstrued the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC by making such allegation. A careful perusal of the said provision would show that the plaint can be rejected only when a plaintiff fails to pay the deficit Court fee, even after he was called upon by the Court to pay the same. The factual situation of the present case is not so. Therefore, whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiffs is correct or not, is certainly an issue for trial, which can be raised and considered by the trial Court after completion of the pleadings by the respective parties. As rightly pointed out by the Court below, the Court fee was paid as per the plaint averments, and if there is any dispute with regard to such payment, it is always open to be agitated at the time of trial. Therefore, on that ground also, the petitioners are not justified in seeking for rejection of plaint.

29. Finally, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no cause of action for filing the said suit. But a perusal of the plaint, more particularly in paragraph 16, would disclose that the plaintiffs have referred to various dates and events as the cause of action for filing the said suit. It is needless to say that the cause of action as pleaded in the plaint alone has to be taken as the cause of action and not as projected by the defendants in their pleadings. It is well settled that the cause of action is a bundle of facts set out in the plaint and such cause of action has to be gathered not by merely reading one paragraph of the plaint dealing with cause of action, but by reading the entire plaint as a whole. On such reading of the plaint, if the Court comes to the conclusion that there is only one view possible as projected by the applicant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, then the Court can reject the plaint. On the other hand, if there is a slightest possibility of another view, however smaller the percentage may be, such benefit must go only to the plaintiff to retain the plaint.

30. This Court has recently considered the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC in C.R.P.(PD). No. 2282 of 2014, and by order dated 19.11.2014, it has been observed in paragraph 15 as follows:

"15. It is well settled that plaint should be rejected only when the requirement as contemplated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is pleaded and proved. Such pleading in support of the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC raising any of the grounds set out therein, should straightaway pinpoint to the relevant averments made in the plaint supporting the claim of the defendant made in his application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. In other words, the plaint averments on the face of it, must show that the case of the party who files an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is made out. On the other hand, if the grounds raised by the party in his application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC require further enquiry or probing of the matter, which otherwise is not possible without conducting a trial, the plaint cannot be rejected simply based on the allegation made by the party who filed the said application. It is needless to say that rejection of the plaint is an extreme step in a suit proceedings, since such rejection amounts to dismissal of the suit even before considering the claim of the plaintiff by conducting trial. It is also to be noted that such application can be filed by the defendant even before filing the written statement or at any time thereafter. Therefore, such exercise of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC should be done by the trial Court with utmost care and caution, since the right of a party to have a full-fledged trial cannot be denied at the threshold by rejecting the plaint based on the averments contained in the application alone, unless the grounds raised in such application are also justified through a plain reading of the plaint itself."

31. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on a decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society, represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson/Managing Trustee, in support of his submission that the plaint can be rejected at this stage itself, as there is no cause of action. A perusal of the said decision would show that the plaint averment made in that case was bereft of required materials as mandated by statutory provisions and therefore, the Apex Court held that the plaint is liable to be rejected, as the cause of action pleaded in the plaint vitiated. It is needless to say that each and every case has to be considered on its own merits as pleaded therein. This Court has already found that the plaint averments are sufficient to hold that the same cannot be rejected on the grounds raised by the petitioners. Therefore, the abovesaid decision is not helping the petitioners in any manner.

32. Above all, in this case, a thorough reading of the plaint would show that the plaintiffs have pleaded that the impugned transactions were made by committing the act of forgery and impersonation. According to them, the original owner, namely, Andrew Xavier Packiam died intestate on 22.8.1978, and therefore, the alleged Power of Attorney, dated 18.8.2000 said to have been executed by such dead person, was a rank forgery and by impersonation. This allegation is certainly a very serious one and if the same is proved, all the impugned transactions cannot be sustained and they become void-ab-initio. Therefore, the plaintiffs who made such allegation should be given sufficient opportunity to prove the same by conducting trial. Unless it is found that such allegation is baseless or false and without supporting evidence, the person against whom such serious allegation is made, cannot be permitted to raise certain technical objections to escape from the clutches of trial. It is well settled that if technicalities and substantial justice are pitted against each other, only the latter should be preferred. At this juncture, the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case reported in Laxmibai (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Another Vs. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Others, in particular, are relevant to be quoted:

"49........When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred and the courts may in the larger interests of administration of justice may excuse or overlook a mere irregularity or a trivial breach of law for doing real and substantial justice to the parties and pass orders which will serve the interest of justice best."

Therefore, these technical objections raised by the defendants 1 and 2 in their application for rejection of plaint, cannot be sustained at this stage, especially when those objections are matters for trial. This Court is not to be mistaken as if it holds that no such technical objections can be raised in the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. What it wants to emphasise is as to who can raise such technical objections. As stated supra, a person against whom forgery and impersonation are pleaded, is not certainly a person entitled to speak about the technicalities and seek for a decision on such technical objections first at the threshold, without submitting himself to the trial to disprove such serious allegations.

33. Considering all the above facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned order of the Court below in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for rejection of the plaint, does not warrant any interference. Accordingly, I find no merits in this Civil Revision Petition. The Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. The Miscellaneous Petition is closed.