@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
G. Rajasuria, J.@mdashC.R.P. (PD) (MD) No. 2298 of 2012 has been filed to get set aside the order dated 25.8.2012 made in C.M.A. No. 8 of 2011 passed by the learned V Additional District Judge, Madurai. C.R.P. (PD) (MD) No. 2299 of 2012 has been filed to get set aside the order dated 25.8.2012 made in C.M.A. No. 9 of 2011 passed by the learned V Additional District Judge, Madurai.
2. C.R.P. (PD) (MD) No. 2300 of 2012 has been filed to get set aside the order dated 25.8.2012 made in C.M.A. No. 10 of 2011 passed by the learned V Additional District Judge, Madurai.
3. Heard both sides.
4. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status before the trial Court.
5. Compendiously and concisely, the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of these Civil Revision Petitions, would run thus:
(i) One Rathinavel and Sathiyabama, who are the revision petitioners herein in all these three Civil Revision Petitions, filed the suit in O.S. No. 737 of 2008, seeking the following relief''s:
(a) by declaring that the plaintiffs are the educational agency of the school namely Sri Valliappa Nadar Kshatriya Vidhyasalai (Sri V.K.V. Sala Middle School) Gopinacikanpatti, Peraiyur Taluk, Madurai District and in consequence thereof granting permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 1 to 4 from in any way interfering with the plaintiffs'' administration and management of the said school and its properties;
(b) granting permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 1 and 2 from in any way either claiming themselves as educational agency of the said school or constituting any school committee of the said school;
(c) granting permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 5 and 6 from in any way either approving the claim of the Defendants 1 and 2 as educational agency of the said school or from approving constitution of school committee proposed by Defendants 1 and 2 for the period commencing from 14.11.2008 and for future period;
(d) granting mandatory injunction directing the Defendants 5 and 6 to continue to administer and manage the suit school till adjudication as to educational agency of the suit school is made.
(extracted as such)
(ii) The same plaintiffs filed the following three I.As seeking the following relief''s:
(a) I.A. No. 863 of 2008:
For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit that this Hon''ble Court may graciously be pleased to pass an order of interim mandatory injunction directing the Respondents 1 and 2/Defendants 5 and 6 to continue to administer and manage the suit school till the disposal of the suit and to grant ad interim injunction ex parte of the same till the disposal of this application and thus render justice.
(b) I.A. No. 864 of 2008:
For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit that this Hon''ble Court may graciously be pleased to pass an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondents/Defendants 1 and 2 from in any way either claiming themselves as education agency of the suit school or constituting any school committee of the suit school till the disposal of the suit and to grant ad-interim injunction ex parte of the same till the disposal of this application and thus render justice.
(c) I.A. No. 865 of 2008:
For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit that this Hon''ble Court may graciously be pleased to pass an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondents 3 and 4/Defendants 5 and 6 from in any way either granting approval of the alleged claim of Respondents 1 and 2 Defendants 1 and 2 as educational agency of the suit school or granting approval of the school committee constituted by Respondents 1 and 2/Defendants 1 and 2 in relating to suit school for the period commencing from 14.11.2008 and for future period till the disposal of the suit and to grant ad-interim injunction ex parte of the same till the disposal of this application and thus render justice.
(iii) The counter affidavits were filed jointly by the concerned respondents 1 and 2 and the fourth defendant also filed the counter affidavit; whereupon evidence was recorded by the trial Court. Thereafter, the trial Court passed the common order mandating as under:
(a) I.A. No. 863 of 2008:
(b) I.A. No. 864 of 2008:
(a) I.A. No. 865 of 2008:
(iv) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the Defendants 1 and 2 preferred the three Civil Miscellaneous Appeals as against the orders and decreetal orders passed in those three I.As., whereupon the first appellate Court, after hearing both sides, set aside the orders of the trial Court.
6. Challenging and impugning the same, these three civil revision petitions have been focussed by the plaintiffs.
7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs would pyramid his arguments which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus:
(i) The settlement deed of the year 1922 is a crucial document, by which the original founder of the school dedicated the properties for the welfare of the school and for the running of the school. Virtually the founder, viz. Valliappa Nadar, formed the School by name Valliappa Kshatriya Vidya Sala Middle School. He also contemplated that his grandsons, viz. Kaliappa Nadar and Mariappa Nadar should be the Managers of the said school and after their demise, their descendants, by virtue of primogeniture theory, should be the Managers. He also contemplated a seven member committee as the one to see that there was no mismanagement and in the event of any mismanagement, they were vested with the power to remove the Managers therein and appoint suitable persons in their place. On failure of those seven members, the majority of the members of the Nadar Committee could appoint somebody else from their community as the Managers.
(ii) It so happened that a dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the Defendants 1 to 4 in running the school, because according to the plaintiffs, the first defendant-K.K. Stalin sold away a part of the Trust property and misappropriated the funds. A criminal case was also registered as against him and the case is pending.
(iii) Accordingly, a suit was filed and an interim relief was obtained from the trial Court. As per the order of the trial Court, the Educational Authorities are virtually disbursing the salaries and looking after the school management, as the school happens to be an aided school.
8. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs would make a submission that the plaintiffs would be satisfied if some interim arrangement is made till the disposal of the suit.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2, in a bid to slap down and pulverise the arguments as set forth and put forth on the side of the plaintiffs, would advance his arguments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:
(i) From 30.12.2002 onwards, the first defendant was functioning as the Secretary of the school committee with the approval of the educational authorities. The second defendant was assisting the first defendant. Such approval was for a period of three years. After that also, the first defendant applied for approval for him to continue as Secretary.
(ii) Whereupon, there were several litigations erupted. One G. Shanmugam, representing Gopinaickanpatti M. Sengulam, Chinna muthulingapuram Nadar Uravinmurai Society, filed several writ petitions and got directions and ultimately, the educational authorities granted the approval in favour of the first defendant as Secretary. Thereafter, that order was set aside vide order of this Court dated 31.3.2008 passed in W.P. (MD) Nos. 10984 to 10986 of 2007 and 1432 to 1434 of 2008, with certain directions. The operative portion of it, would run thus:
15. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, when the authorities have considered the orders passed by this Court in the writ petition filed by Mr. K.K. Stalin equally the authorities should have considered the order that has been passed in the writ petition filed by the Society, represented by Mr. G. Shanmugam in W.P. (MD) No. 4925 of 2006. In W.P. (MD) No. 4926 of 2006 by an order dated 29.6.2006 this Court has clearly directed the authorities to pass appropriate orders after giving opportunity not only to the petitioner in the said writ petition but also the Respondents 4 to 6 after complying with the Provisions of Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act. The authorities should have considered both the orders passed by this Court. But unfortunately the authorities referred to above have not considered the orders passed by this Court in W.P. (MD) No. 4925 of 2006, dated 29.6.2006. Furthermore, the authorities referred to above have not assigned any reason whatsoever for approving the name of Mr. K.K. Stalin as Secretary of the said School. Thus the orders of the Joint Director, dated Nil. 12.2007 and the District Elementary Educational Officer dated 17.12.2007 are liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. The matter is remitted back to the authorities concerned. They are directed to pass orders afresh after giving notice to all the persons concerned including the petitioners in W.P. (MD) Nos. 10985 and 10986 of 2007.
16. In view of the orders passed in W.P. (MD) Nos. 10984 of 2007 and 1432 of 2008, I am not going into the other aspects namely whether the Writ Petition can be maintained by the writ petitioner in W.P. (MD) Nos. 10985 and 10986 of 2007.
17. The writ petitions are ordered accordingly. The Director of Elementary Educational officer is directed to pass appropriate orders on merits after hearing all the parties concerned within a period of three months from the date of receipt or production of the order. It is needless to say that the Director of School Education has to disburse not only the salary but also other benefits which the teachers entitled to directly to the teachers. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.
(iii) Thereafter, one other order was passed by the Director of Elementary Education on 26.9.2008 and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
(iv) The said order was challenged by the said Shanmugam by filing the writ petition in W.P. No. 24449 of 2008 and this Court, vide order dated 29.9.2009, passed orders to the effect that the said writ petition became infructuous. As such, the order dated 26.9.2008 passed by the Director of Elementary Education, remained in tact. Thereafter, the first defendant approached the authority for approving him as the Secretary and matter is pending with the fifth defendant educational authority. In the meanwhile, the present suit was filed by the plaintiffs and injunction was obtained and because of that alone, the first defendant''s application was pending for approval with the educational authorities.
(v) All along till the presentation of the suit, the plaintiffs have not raised any dispute and they have also not interfered with the administration run by the first defendant with the assistance of the second defendant. Only at the instance of the said Shanmugam, the suit has been engineered.
(vi) The first defendant, as per the settlement deed of the year 1922, being the eldest son of the deceased Kandasamy who was the son of the deceased Kaliappa Nadar is entitled to run the school. Whereas the plaintiffs are having no locus standi to claim any role in the administration as per the said deed.
10. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2 would submit that absolutely there is no perversity or illegality in the order passed by the lower appellate Court warranting any interference in revision.
11. The points for consideration are:
(i) Whether the first appellate Court was justified in setting aside the orders of the trial Court as extracted supra?
(ii) Whether there is any illegality or perversity in the order passed by the trial Court as above?
Point Nos. (i) and (ii)
12. The learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs detailed and delineated the gist and kernel of the clauses in the settlement deed of the year 1922 and I could see no reason not to accept the nitty-gritty as put forth by the learned senior counsel in respect of the said deed of the year 1922. It is, therefore, just and necessary to delineate the genealogy thus:
13. Before analysing the genealogy, I would like to refer to a pertinent clause in the settlement deed of the year 1922 as under:
14. It is, therefore, ex facie and prima facie clear that the theory of primogeniture is found exemplified and displayed in the settlement deed of the year 1922. Accordingly, if the genealogy as extracted supra, is visualised, the first defendant happened to be the eldest son of the deceased Kandasamy who was the son of the deceased Kaliappa Nadar, who was one of the original Managers under the settlement deed of the year 1922. In fact, the said Kandasamy''s brother also died. In such a case, I am having no hesitation in recognising the first defendant as the descendant of the deceased Kaliappa Nadar within the meaning of the said settlement deed of the year 1922. Similarly, the first plaintiff-Rathinavel, happened to be the son of the deceased Mariappa Nadar and in fact, the first son of the deceased Mariappa Nadar namely Balasubramanian died and now, Rathinavel is the next surviving son of the deceased Mariappa Nadar and in my considered opinion, he is also to be considered as one of the descendants of the original Managers within the meaning of the settlement deed of the year 1922. The third defendant happened to be the third son of the deceased Mariappa Nadar.
15. As of now, what I would hold is that the first plaintiff-Rathinavel and the first defendant could be termed as the persons legally interested in the running of the administration of the said school within the meaning of the settlement deed of the year 1922.
16. The first plaintiff-Rathinavel and the first defendant are at loggerheads and they cannot see eye to eye. Considering the factual position, the trial Court in a judicious manner mandated that the educational authorities, so to say, the defendants 5 and 6 shall continue to disburse the salary and look after the administration till the disposal of the suit. However, without any rhyme or reason, in my considered opinion, the first appellate Court after narrating the arguments on both sides, set aside the order of the trial Court assuming and presuming as though ad nauseam and ad infinitum such control of the defendants 5 and 6 should not be allowed to be executed and the first appellate Court misconstrued virtually the purport of the order of the trial Court.
17. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs inviting the attention of this Court to Section 53A of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, which is extracted hereunder:
"Section 53-A. Settlement of dispute as to educational agency, etc.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 53, whenever any dispute as to the constitution of any educational agency, or as to whether any person or body of persons, is an educational agency, in relation to any private school, or as to the constitution of a school committee, or as to the appointment of the secretary of the school committee arises, such dispute may be referred by the persons interested or by the competent authority to the Civil Court having jurisdiction, for its decision.
(2) Pending the decision of the Civil Court on a dispute referred to it under sub-section (1), or the making of an interim arrangement by the Civil Court for the running of the private school, the Government may nominate an officer to discharge the functions of the educational agency, the school committee or the secretary, as the case may be, in relation to the private school concerned.
would highlight that when there is a dispute of this nature, the plaintiffs have got the right to approach the Court and accordingly alone, they sought for a direction and got it from the trial Court, but the first appellate Court reversed it.
18. The learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2 by referring to the Rule 7 of the Tamil Nadu Recgonised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, which is extracted hereunder;
Rule 7. Approval of transfer of permission.- (1) The competent authorities to approve any change in the constitution of the educational agency or to approve the transfer of the management of any private school shall be the Chief Educational Officer concerned, in respect of Pre-primary, Primary and Middle Schools and the Joint Director of School Education (Secondary Education) in respect of High Schools and the Deputy Director (Teachers'' Education) in respect of Teachers'' Training Institutes and the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) in respect of Higher Secondary Schools.
(2) The application for approval of a change in the constitution of the educational agency shall be in Form III.
(3) The application for approval of transfer of the management of any private school or for approval of such transfer where the transfer was made without approval having been obtained for such transfer, shall be in Form IV.
would vehemently argue that the appropriate authority namely the competent authority is competent to pass suitable orders and already, vide order dated 26.9.2008, he gave a finding that the first defendant was competent to be the Secretary and that no conviction was recorded as against him and hence, he could not be treated as the one disqualified to hold the post of Secretary. Such a finding still holds good and no interference by the civil Court by way of interim measure is warranted.
19. Not to put too fine a point on it, I would like to point out that as correctly held by the trial Court, the defendants 5 and 6 can continue to disburse the salary and exercise their administration over the school and in the meantime, if the persons interested, so to say, the first plaintiff and the first defendant are totally excluded from the school, then that may not be in commensurate with the avowed object and intention of the founder of the school.
20. Hence, while restoring the order of the trial Court and to put it on an even heel, I would like to supplement the said order by mandating that the first plaintiff and the first defendant shall be advisors of the school and they are entitled to make demands on behalf of the school and get things done for the welfare of the institution, but they are having no right to alienate or encumber or in any manner take any major decisions. They can only see that the interest of the school is protected by bringing it to the knowledge of the educational authorities as well as to the trial Court which is seized of the matter and accordingly, they could also get suitable further orders from the trial Court.
21. Wherefore, Point Nos. (i) and (ii) are answered accordingly.
22. On balance, these civil revision petitions are disposed of as above. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. No costs. On hearing the pronouncement of the order, the learned counsel on both sides in unison, would make an extempore submission that suitable direction might be given to the trial Court to dispose of the suit itself within a time frame. Accordingly, I would like to mandate the trial Court to dispose of the suit within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
