@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
M. Venugopal, J.@mdashThe Petitioner has focussed the instant Criminal Revision Case as against the Order dated 20/5/2013 in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai. The Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, while passing the impugned order in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 on 20/5/2013 has in paragraph 3, observed that
The complainant filed this complaint, on the basis of false complaint given by the accused, on 6.1.07. As per the sworn statement of the complainant, also the same was made out. In complaint, one Ganesan and Jeyapalan only cited as witnesses. They also stated that, the complainant is Secretary of Nadar Sangam, he was gone to jail, in false case given by the accused, and due to that reason, the complainant''s reputation was damaged. On the basis of the sworn statement of the complainant evidence of the witnesses and averments of the complaint, the complainant filed this complaint for the offence committed by the accused on 6/1/2007. As per Section 500 IPC, the punishment for the defamation is imprisonment for two years, or with fine or with both. Hence the cognizance of the offence has to be taken within 3 years as per Section 468(2) Cr.P.C. The complainant has to file this complaint, on the basis of false case given by the accused on 6.1.07 on or before 7.1.2010. But this complaint was filed on 31.8.2012 is barred by limitation. Hence this Court cannot taken the cognizance of the offence u/s 499, 500 IPC. Hence this complaint is liable to be dismissed u/s 468(2) Cr.P.C.
and resultantly, dismissed the complaint u/s 468(2) of Cr.P.C.
2. The Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner submits that the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, passed the impugned order of dismissing the private complaint filed under Sections 199, 200 of Cr.P.C., against the Respondent, which is contrary to Law and probabilities of the case.
3. According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, failed to compute the Period of Limitation as envisaged u/s 468 of Cr.P.C.
4. Advancing his arguments, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the trial Court, failed to appreciate that the Petitioner, who was arrayed as a sole accused in Crime No. 17 of 2007 dated 6/1/2007 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Vathalakundu in respect of the offence u/s 379 IPC and after filing of the final report by the Respondent/Police, the same was taken cognizance in C.C. No. 354 of 2007 on the file of the trial Court and ultimately, the case ended in acquittal on 17/4/2012. Further, it is the plea of the Petitioner that the Petitioner/Complainant, filed an application No. 225 for obtaining copy of the order on 6/6/2013 and the copy was made ready on 13/6/2013 and delivered to him on 14/6/2013, from which date, the Period of Limitation commences.
5. Expatiating his contentions, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the trial Court failed to take note of the fact that the punishment for the offence u/s 500 IPC is 2 years and as such, the Period of Limitation is 3 years for taking cognizance and the Petitioner/Complainant, presented his complaint before the Magistrate concerned on 7/9/2012 well within the Period of Limitation. Therefore, the stand taken on behalf of the Petitioner is that the Learned Magistrate could not have dismissed the complaint as barred by Limitation, without taking cognizance although the above mentioned complaint clearly disclose the offence u/s 500 IPC against the Respondent.
6. The gist of the plea of the Revision Petitioner is that the trial Court has failed to take into consideration that the date of filing of the complaint is material one for the purpose of computing the period of limitation prescribed u/s 468 of Cr.P.C.
7. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner brings it to the notice of this Court that in Wharton''s Law Lexicon, the term ''prosecution'' is mentioned as follows:--
A proceeding either by way of indictment or information, in the criminal courts, in order to put an offender upon his trial. In all criminal prosecutions the King is nominally the prosecutor. See titles PUBLIC PROSECUTOR and ADVOCATE LORD.
8. Further, the word ''prosecution'' as used in Article 20 contemplated a proceeding of a criminal nature either before the Court or a judicial Tribunal as per decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
9. Also, the term ''Prosecution'' is mentioned as "a criminal action proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before a competent Tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt of innocence of a person charged with crime" as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
10. The Learned Counsel refers to ''Advanced Law Lexicon'' wherein the term ''Prosecution'' is mentioned as "Institution or commencement of a criminal proceeding, the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment on behalf of the state or government or by indictment or information. A prosecution exists until terminated in the final judgment of the Court, to wit, the sentence, discharge or acquittal."
11. The Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner, cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited with Criminal Appeal No. 842 of 2008 Anil Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited With Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009 Avnish Bajaj v. State and Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2009 Ebay India Private Limited v. State and Another {2012 (3) SCC (Cri.) 241} at page 258, wherein in paragraph 36, it is observed as follows:--
In
37. ...It was argued that the legislature might well have used the word ''deemed'' in sub-section (4) of Section 171 not in the first of the above senses but in the second, if not the third. In our view, the meaning to be attached to the word ''deemed'' must depend upon the context in which it is used.
12. He relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court
The Limitation prescribed under Chapter 36 of the Cr.P.C., is only for filing of complaint or initiation of prosecution and not for taking cognizance of offence.
13. That apart, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner invites the attention of this Court to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
Where two alternative constructions are possible, the Court must choose the one which will be in accord with the other parts of the statute and ensure its smooth, harmonious working, and eschew the other which leads to absurdity, confusion or friction, contradiction and conflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat or destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment. These canons of construction apply to the interpretation of our Constitution with greater force, because the Constitution is a living, integrated organism, having a soul and consciousness of its own. The pulse beats emanating from the spinal cord of the basic framework can be felt all over its body, even in the extremities of its limbs. Constitutional exposition is not mere literary garniture, nor a mere exercise in grammar. As one of us (Chandrachud J. as he then was) put it in
14. Also, he cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground that the "cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not arise before he (respondent) was acquitted by the Court of Sessions". As the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appears that the High Court took the view that the "protection of S. 468(c)" was not available to the appellant. We are constrained to say that the question of "cause of action" could not really arise in this case as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. As has been stated, sub-sec. (1) of S. 469 of the Code specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in S. 468, in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore follow that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for the purpose of calculating the three years'' period of limitation. The High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.
15. The Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner, in the interest of Justice, refers to the following decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court.
a. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
On 18/10/1995, the respondent wife filed a complaint under, inter alia, Sections 498A and 406 of IPC and Section 190(1) of Cr.P.C., alleging that she was beaten up by her husband, mother-in-law and sisters-in-law for want of dowry. Under the Magistrate''s order, the police investigated the complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., and submitted charge-sheet (final report) u/s 498A IPC on 22/12/1995. On that report, the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Sections 498A and 406 IPC and issued summons to the appellants. The case was posted on 23/4/1996 for framing charges. On that date the Magistrate found the complaint to be time-barred and discharged the appellants. The High Court set aside the Magistrate''s order and directed the Magistrate to proceed with the case. In the instant appeal, the following two questions arose before the Supreme Court:
(i). whether the Magistrate can discharge an accused after taking cognizance of an offence by him but before the trial of the case; and
(ii). whether the Magistrate was right in discharging the appellants on the grounds that the complaint was barred by limitation u/s 468 Cr.P.C.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court.
Held:
The object of having Chapter XXXVI in Cr.P.C., is to protect persons from prosecution based on state grievances and complaints which may turn out to be vexatious. The reason for engrafting the rule of limitation is that due to a long lapse of time necessary evidence will be lost and persons prosecuted will be placed in a defenceless position. This may even result in miscarriage of justice. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that due to delays on the part of the investigating and prosecuting agencies and the application of rules of limitation, the criminal justice system is not rendered toothless and ineffective and the perpetrators of crime are not placed in an advantageous position. Parliament obviously taking note of various aspects, classified offences into two categories. Grave offences for which the punishment prescribed is imprisonment for a term exceeding three years are not brought within the ambit of Chapter XXXVI. The period of limitation is prescribed only for offences for which the punishment specified is imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and even in such cases a wide discretion is given u/s 473 to the Court in the matter of taking cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation.
The essence of the offence in Section 498A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the respondent was subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation. The last act of cruelty was committed against the respondent, within the meaning of the explanation, on 13/10/1988. Having regard to the provisions of Sections 469 and 472, the period of limitation commenced for the offences under Sections 406 and 498A from 13/10/1988 and ended on 12/10/1991. But the charge sheet was filed on 22/12/1995. Therefore, it was clearly barred by limitation u/s 468(2) (c) CR.P.C.
But Section 473 of Cr.P.C. enables the Court to take cognizance of an offence after the period of limitation, inter alia, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. The expression "in the interest of justice" in Section 473 does not mean in the interest of prosecution. What the Court has to see is "interest of justice." The interest of justice demands that the Court should protect the oppressed and punish the oppressor/offender. In complaints u/s 498A the wife will invariably be oppressed. It is, therefore, appropriate for the Courts, in case of delayed complaints, to construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C. in favour of a wife who is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the accused is such that applying the rule of limitation will give an unfair advantage to him or result in miscarriage of justice, the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation in the interests of justice. This is only illustrative, not exhaustive.
b. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court AIR 2003 SCC 702, it is held as follows:--
The second complaint would not be completely barred. There is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts. In a case where a previous complaint is dismissed without assigning any reasons, the Magistrate under S. 203 Cr.P.C., may take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient grounds for proceeding. Second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. Further, second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, namely, where the previous order was passed on an incomplete or an a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings have been adduced.
16. It comes to be known that the Petitioner/Complainant, filed a Petition in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 under Sections 199 and 200 of Cr.P.C., to take cognizance of offence under Sections 499, 500 of IPC against the Respondent/Accused. In the complaint, the Petitioner/Complainant had stated that the Respondent/Accused gave a false complaint against him in Vathalakundu Police Station alleging that he cut two trees, which was in Respondent/Accused land and sold the same, due to previous enmity. The dispute between them related to the partition of land and the Petitioner/Complainant was arrested by the Police on 6/1/2007 in respect of an offence u/s 379 of IPC and he was in jail for five days till 10/1/2007. Later on, the Petitioner/Complainant was released on bail and he was charge sheeted and after trial, in C.C. No. 354 of 2007, he was acquitted in 17/4/2012. Because of the false case lodged by the Respondent/Accused, the Petitioner/Complainant and his family members suffered mental agony. The Respondent/Accused knowing the case was a false one, with an intention to defame the name of the revision Petitioner/Complainant stated that his brother was a thief, in the meeting of Nadar Uravin Murai Koottam, which was seen by one Ganesan and Jayabalan. Further, the Respondent/Accused also stated in the Village that the Petitioner/Complainant had gone to jail for a theft case and as such, damaged his fame and some of the Villagers also enquired the complainant in this regard. Under these circumstances, the Revision Petitioner/Complainant, filed the private complaint in issue on 31/8/2012.
17. Before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai, a sworn statement of the Petitioner/Complainant was recorded and the witnesses mentioned in the complaint were also examined. As a matter of fact, the copy of the complaint lodged by the Respondent/Accused on 6/1/2007, the First Information Report in Crime No. 17 of 2007 on the file of Vathalakundu Police Station, Remand Report, Bail Order in Cr.M.P. No. 152 of 2007 dated 10/7/2007 and the Judgment in C.C. No. 354 of 2007 dated 17/4/2012 were filed by the Petitioner/Complainant before the trial Court.
18. It is to be pointed out that Section 499 of IPC defines ''Defamation'' and speaks of exceptions thereto. To constitute an offence in terms of Section 499 of IPC, it is sufficient to prove that an accused 307 intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant, irrespective of whether the complainant really suffered either directly or indirectly from the imputation so made.
19. Indeed Section 499 of IPC has three salient features.
a. Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person
b. Such imputation should have been made
(i). by words, either spoken or intended to be read; or
(ii). by signs; or
(iii). by visible representations.
20. Imputation so made ought to have been made with an intention of harness or with knowledge or having reason to believe that it will cause harm to the reputation of the persons against whom they are made.
21. The Eighth exception to Section 499 of IPC under the caption ''Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person runs thus:--
It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.
Illustration
If A in good faith accuses Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z''s master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to Z''s father - A is within this exception.
22. The Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner/Complainant submits that the Revision Petitioner/Complainant comes within the purview/protection of the ingredients of 8th Exception to Section 499 of IPC and as a matter of fact, in the theft case in C.C. No. 354 of 2007, the Complainant/Revision Petitioner was acquitted by a Judgment dated 17/4/2012 passed by the competent Criminal Court and in fact, the Respondent/Accused on 6/1/2007 filed a false complaint against the Revision Petitioner/Complainant and ultimately, the Revision Petitioner/Complainant was acquitted on 17/4/2012 and therefore, the period of 5 years 3 months and 5 days are to be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation in filing the present private complaint by the Revision Petitioner/Complainant in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 against the Respondent/Accused.
23. Yet another submission of the Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner is that no opportunity was provided by the trial Court to the Revision Petitioner/Complainant because of the simple reason that the trial Court had dismissed the Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 filed by the Revision Petitioner/Complainant holding that the same is barred by limitation since it was filed on 31/8/2012.
24. The pith and substance of the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner is that since the period of 5 years 3 months and 5 days is to be excluded and also because of the fact in view of the pendency of C.C. No. 354 of 2007 for 5 years 3 months and 5 days period, there is a legal bar on the part of the Petitioner/Complainant to project the private complaint in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012. But this material fact was not taken into account by the trial Court. In this regard, the Learned Counsel referred to Section 470 of Cr.P.C. which deals with ''Exclusion of Time in certain cases'' and the same is as follows:--
1. In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded:
Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2). Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.
(3). Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction or the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing, the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.
Explanation:- In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the order of the Government or other authority shall both be excluded.
4. In computing the period of limitation, the time during which the offender
a. has been absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under the administration of the Central Government, or
b. has avoided arrest by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.
25. Apart from the above, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioner/Complainant that the averment made by the Revision Petitioner/Complainant in paragraph 5 to Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 viz., that in the Village, the Respondent/Accused has stated that the Complainant had gone to bail in a theft case and therefore, spoiling his respect and these are a continuing offence as per Section 472 of Cr.P.C.
26. Conversely, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Accused that the Limitation starts from the date of filing of complaint viz., the earlier complaint in C.C. No. 354 of 2007 filed by the Respondent/Accused on 6/1/2007 and not from the date of acquittal of C.C. No. 354 of 2007 on the file of trial Court on 17/4/2012. To lend support to this contention, the Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Accused relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
6. The High Court ignored the bar of limitation on the ground that the "cause of action for proceeding for defamation could not arise before he (respondent) was acquitted by the Court of Session". As the respondent was acquitted on April 1, 1975, it appears that the High Court took the view that the "protection of S. 468(c)" was not available to the appellant. We are constrained to say that the question of "cause of action" could not really arise in this case as the controversy relates to the commission of an offence. As has been stated, sub-sec. (1) of S. 469 of the Code specifically provides that the period of limitation prescribed in S. 468, in relation to an offender, shall commence (inter alia) on the date of the offence. It would therefore, follow that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, when the defamatory complaint was filed in the Court of the Magistrate, and that was the starting point for the purpose of calculating the three years'' period of limitation. The High Court clearly erred in taking a contrary view.
7. An attempt was made to argue before us that the respondent was, at any rate, entitled to the exclusion of time under sub-sec. (1) of S. 470 of the Code in computing the period of limitation. The Sub-section reads as follows:--
470 (1) In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded:
Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
It is an essential requirement of the sub-section that the person who seeks its benefit should be able to establish that he was "prosecuting" another prosecution in one Court or the other referred to in the sub-section. But it is not the case of the respondent that he was prosecuting the appellant in any other prosecution. It is also not his case that that prosecution related to the "same facts" within the meaning of the proviso to the sub-section. The provision of sub-sec. (1) of S. 470 cannot therefore avail the respondent, and he is not entitled to the exclusion of any time thereunder. It may be mentioned that the respondent has not sought the benefit of S. 473 which permits the extension of the period of limitation in certain cases.
8. It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of sub-sec. (1) of S. 468 which prohibits every Court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-sec. (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated a bar to the taking of cognizance has been prescribed under S. 468 of the Cr.P.C., and there is no reason why the appellant should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.
27. At this juncture, this Court pertinently points out that the maxim ''Vigilantibus, et non dormientibus, Jura Subveniunt'' (vigilant, and not the sleepy or assisted by the laws). It is to be remembered that the provisions as to limitation have been inserted by the Parliament in the larger interest of administration of criminal justice keeping in view two conflicting considerations.
(a). The interest of individuals sought to be prosecuted (prospective Accused) and
b. Organs of State (prosecuting Agencies).
28. Ordinarily/General Rule of Criminal Justice is that ''a crime never dies''. The principle is embodied in the well known maxim of ''NULLUM TEMPUS AUR LOCUS OCCURRIT REGI'' (Lapse of Time is No Bar to Crown in proceeding Against Offenders). But at the same time, an individual cannot be kept under apprehension that he can be prosecuted ''At Any Time'' for ''Any Crime'' irrespective of the nature of seriousness of the offence. After all, an HOMO-SAPIEN is to have a peace of mind and harmony in his life span.
29. Admittedly, a Court of Law cannot take cognizance of an offence, if it is barred by limitation. Delay in filing a complaint petition is to be condoned. If the delay in question is not condoned, then a Court of Law will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter. In short, the extension of period mentioned in Section 473 of Cr.P.C., is only by means of an exception to the period fixed as per provisions of Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C.
30. The issue of limitation is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of law and facts. For deciding the said question, certain disputed question of facts are to be resolved after providing opportunities to parties to produce evidence.
31. As far as the present case is concerned, the Revision Petitioner/Complainant has filed the Complaint in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 in respect of an offence committed by the Respondent/Accused on 6/1/2007. The Limitation, as a matter of fact in C.C. No. 354 of 2007 on 17/4/2012, the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai has acquitted the Revision Petitioner/Complainant (who figured as Accused therein) by giving him the ''Benefit of Doubt'' in respect of an offence u/s 379 IPC. The Limitation commences only from the date of filing the complaint/false case given by the Respondent/Accused only from 6/1/2007. Therefore, the complaint ought to have been filed by the Revision Petitioner/Complainant within three years from 6/1/2007 viz., on or before 7/1/2010. But the Revision Petitioner/Complainant filed Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 only on 31/8/2012 which is clearly barred by limitation. Also, as per Section 469(1) of Cr.P.C., the period of limitation enjoined u/s 488 of Cr.P.C., in relation to a offender shall commence on the date of the offence and the question of ''cause of action'' would not arise in such a case as the controversy centers around the commission of offence.
32. Coming to the plea of ''continuing offence'' taken on behalf of the Revision Petitioner/Complainant to the effect that the Respondent/Accused also stated in the Village that the Complainant had gone to bail in theft case and damaged the fame of the Complainant in village etc., it is to be pointed out that ''continuance offence'' is one which continues and a non-continuing offence is one which is committed once and for all. However, this question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which specifies that offence, the nature of offence and above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence, as per the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in
33. In the upshot of detailed discussions and in view of the fact that the Revision Petitioner/Complainant has filed the complaint in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 only on 31/8/2012 in respect of the offence committed by the Accused on 6/1/2012, after a lapse of 5 years 3 months and 5 days, this Court comes to an irresistible conclusion that in terms of the ingredients of Section 500 of IPC, the punishment for defamation is 2 years imprisonment or with fine by both and therefore, the cognizance of the said offence has to be necessarily taken by a Court of Law within three years as visualised u/s 468(2) of Cr.P.C. However, the Revision Petitioner/Complainant has not adhered to the time limit prescribed u/s 468(2) of Cr.P.C., and his acquittal in C.C. No. 354 of 2007 in Crime No. 17 of 2007 on the file of the Inspector of Police, Vathalakundu through Judgment dated 17/4/2012 of the trial Court has no nexus/bearing with his complaint in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 dated 31/8/2012, which is barred by limitation, in the considered opinion of this Court. Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Revision fails. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. Consequently, the order passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Nilakottai in Cr.M.P. No. 8320 of 2012 dated 20/5/2013 is confirmed by this Court for the reasons assigned in this revision.
