@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.@mdashIn both these Writ Petitions, the challenge is to the order of the first respondent dated 26-12-1994 in KP 80/94/KBK, determining the amount of compensation payable to the petitioner as specified in Schedule-II of the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971 (Tamil Nadu 40 of 1971) and amended Act 39/90 vested in the Kudiyiruppudars. Though initially, the challenge was on the ground that the compensation was not rightly fixed, by W.P.M.P. Nos. 146 and 147 of 2004, the petitioner raised a question of constitutional validity of the provisions contained in Schedule-I of the above said Act.
2. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that while under the above said Act, the rights of ownership of the land of the petitioner have been done away with, the compensation prescribed under the Schedule-I based on the survey assessment is ''illusory'' in nature, therefore the said Schedule is liable to be set aside.
3. At the outset, it is required to be stated that the petitioner has not raised any other challenge on any other aspect in these Writ Petitions. In support of the above submissions, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the Judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in "AIR 1965 SC 1017 (P. Vajravelu Mudaliar and others versus The Special Deputy Collector For Land Acquisition, West Madras and another)", and contended that the Legislature cannot make a law in derogation of Article 300-A of the Constitution, that a law of acquisition should provide for ''adequate compensation'' and if the Legislature makes a law for acquiring a property by providing for an ''illusory compensation'' or by indicating the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide compensation at all, it will have to be held that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its powers.
4. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that since the Schedule to the Act empowers the Authorised Officer to determine the compensation based on the survey assessment, and any compensation so determined on that basis would be wholly ''illusory'', the said Schedule should be held to be unconstitutional violating Article 14 and 300(A) of the Constitution.
5. As against the above submissions, learned Advocate General contended that Act 40 of 1971 is intended to advance the cause of agriculturists and agricultural labourers as a part of agrarian reforms, that by virtue of Article 31(C) of the Constitution, since the present enactment would fall within the ambit of Clause (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution, any argument of contravention of Article 14 and 19 of the Constitution will be of no avail. The learned Advocate General placed heavy reliance upon the Judgment of the Division Bench of this court reported in "1985 Writ L.R.(Suppl.) 1 (His Holiness Sri La Sri Ambalavana Pandara Sannadhi Avergal, Adheena Karthar, Thiruvavaduthurai Adheenam & Others Versus The State Of Tamil Nadu By Secretary To Government, Law Department, Madras-9 & Others)", wherein, the Division Bench of this court held that the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Amendment Act (17 of 1980) and Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Amendment Act (18 of 1980) would be a law to give effect to the State policy towards securing the principles set out in Clause (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution. According to the learned Advocate General, in the light of the Division Bench Judgment which considered Article 31(C) as well as 300(A) of the Constitution and held that even 300(A) which confers only a legal right cannot be read as overriding the constitutional immunity granted under Article 31(C), the Act should be held to be valid. It was also contended that in the absence of any challenge to the substantive provisions of the Act, in particular Section 7, which is the charging section for payment of compensation, a challenge to the Schedule alone cannot be entertained.
6. I find force in the contention of the learned Advocate General. Article 31(C) of the Constitution, as per the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 reads as under:
Art.31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles-
Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or Article 19.
7. Though by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, the Parliament enlarged the object of shielding all the Directive Principles set out in Part IV, the said object was frustrated by the majority decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of "Minerva Mills Ltd. And Others Versus Union Of India And Others" reported in AIR 1980 SC 1789, as a result of which. Article 31(C) as it originally stood in its pre-1976 position, namely, only to protect laws which seek to implement Art. 39(b) and (c), subject of-course to judicial review, as held in "Kesavananda Bharti Versus State Of Kerala reported in AIR 1973 SC 1461". Therefore, it has to be examined as to whether the argument advanced on behalf of the State that Act 40 of 1971 falls within the ambit of Clause (b) and (c) of the Article 39 of the Constitution and thereby its validity cannot be tested in the anvil of violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
8. Article 39(b) and (c) which falls under Part IV of the Constitution reads as under:
Art.39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State-
(a)..... ..... ..... .....
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community re so distributed as best to subserve the common good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
(d)..... ..... ..... .....
(e)..... ..... ..... .....
(f)..... ..... ..... .....
9. The objects and reasons of Act 40 of 1971 reads as under:-
1. As a further measure of agrarian reform, the Government have decided that agriculturists and agricultural labourers occupying any kudiyiruppu, that is to say, the site of any dwelling house or hut, should be conferred ownership rights in respect of such kudiyiruppu. If the superstructure in respect of such kudiyiruppu belongs to any person other than the agriculturist or agricultural labourer, such superstructure also will vest in the agriculturist or agricultural labourer. Compensation is proposed to be given for the property vesting in the agriculturists or agricultural labourers. As it may not be possible for the agriculturists or the agricultural labourers who are very poor to pay in a lumpsum the compensation to the landowners or other persons interested, the Government have taken over the liability to pay the compensation to the landowners or other person interested. The compensation will be payable either in cash or in bond. But, the agriculturists or agricultural labourers should reimburse the Government the amount paid by the Government as compensation. Such reimbursement may be made in such installments as may be prescribed under the rules.
2. The Government have taken power to acquire lands used for common purposes by the occupants of kudiyiruppu and make them available to the occupants of kudiyiruppu to be used. The lands be acquired will vest with the Government and the compensation for such lands will be paid by the Government.
3. The object of the legislation is to give the large number of agriculturists and agricultural labourers in the State economic security, thus creating conditions that will favour the orderly growth of the agricultural economy and also increased agricultural production.
10. A reading of the object of the Legislation disclose that it was by way of a rehabilitative measure for the upliftment of the poor agriculturists and agricultural labourers by protecting their dwelling units in order to ensure that irrespective of their poor financial and social status, a secured abode is provided and thereby eliminate any disharmony in the society. The definition of ''agriculturist'' and ''agricultural labourer'' described in Section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Conferment of Ownership) Act, 1971 can be usefully referred to, which reads as under:
Section 2(1). "agricultural labourer" means a person whose principal means of livelihood is the income he gets as wages for his manual labour on agricultural land but does not include a plantation laborer ;
Section 2(3). "agriculturist" means a person who cultivates agricultural land by the contribution of his own manual labour or of the manual labour of any member of his family.
Section 2(8). "Kudiyiruppu" means the site of any dwelling house or hut occupied either as tenant or as licensee, by any agriculturist or agricultural labourer and includes such other area adjacent to the dwelling house or hut as may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment of such dwelling house or hut.
11. Section 3 of the Act denotes that any agriculturist or agricultural labourer who was occupying any kudiyiruppu on the 19th June, 1971, either as tenant or as licensee should, with effect from the date of the commencement of this Act, be the owner of such kudiyiruppu and such kudiyiruppu should vest in him absolutely free from all encumbrances and any superstructure which does not belong to such agriculturist or agricultural labourer also vest with him.
12. u/s 7 of the Act, the compensation payable in respect of any vested kudiyiruppu or superstructure is to be as specified in the Schedule and the Authorised Officer has been vested with the powers to determine the amount of compensation payable under the said provision. After the amount of compensation is determined by the Authorised Officer u/s 10 of the Act, the Government undertakes to pay the compensation to the persons entitled thereto on behalf of the occupant of the Kudiyiruppu.
13. u/s 14 of the Act, every occupant of kudiyiruppu in whom the kudiyiruppu or the superstructure has vested, is liable to reimburse the Government the amount of compensation paid by it u/s 10. However, it provides for such repayment in instalments to be prescribed by the Authority.
14. Sub-section 3 of Section 14 also empowers the Government to recover such amounts from kudiyirupputharan by way of arrears of land revenue in the event of his failure to reimburse the same.
15. Under the Schedule to the Act, it is mentioned that the compensation in respect of the kudiyiruppu of the land shall be one hundred times the survey assessment on the kudiyiruppu or the land, as the case may be. However, the compensation payable in respect of superstructure should be the market value of such superstructure. In the explanation to Schedule 1, it is stated that "survey assessment" means assessment in accordance with the settlement or re-settlement notification and where ever it is not in force, the assessment of a comparable dry or wet land, as the case may be, in a village in the neighbourhood where the settlement or resettlement notification is in force.
16. A conspectus reading of the above referred to provisions only suggests that the whole intention of the Legislature was to achieve the avowed object of uplifting or atleast maintain the status quo of the standard of living of the agricultural labourer or agriculturist, atleast in so far as it related to their abode and thereby protect reasonable living condition by providing a permanent roof over their heads. Such an objective of State Legislature, in my considered opinion, would fall well within Clause (b) and (c) of Article 39 which seeks to ensure the ownership and control of the material resources of the community to be distributed in the best manner possible to subserve the common good as well as the operation of economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. As the very term "kudiyiruppu" suggests any dwelling house or hut, meaning thereby any "agriculturist" or "agricultural labourer" would at best be in occupation of a very negligible portion of land by way of his dwelling house and that atleast such a minimal space occupied by a poor agriculturist or agricultural labourer should be allowed to continue under his occupation and thereby avoid any imbalance in the matter of holding a house site of an agriculturist or agricultural labourer who cannot otherwise dream of such a basic necessity as compared to the other sections of the affluent people in the society at large for whom such a negligible holding will be of no consequences. Therefore, once I reach the above conclusion that the purport of the enactment, namely, Act 40 of 1971 was in furtherance of the avowed object to be achieved under Article 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution, the validity of the statute is certainly protected by Article 31(C) of the Constitution and therefore, the submission of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. Therefore, the contention that illusory nature of compensation provided under the Schedule is hit by Article 14 is not available to the petitioner having regard to the protective umbrella under Article 31(C) of the Constitution over the statute under consideration, namely. Act 40 of 1971.
17. As far as the reliance placed upon the Judgment reported in "AIR 1965 SC 1017 (cited supra)" is concerned, the said decision was relied upon for the proposition of law that the Schedule to the Act should be held to be bad as it does not provide for compensation i.e. "just equivalent for the land acquired as such compensation fixed under the Schedule would be illusory". While dealing with the said proposition, the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the question of constitutional validity of the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act (23 of 1961) which provided for the acquisition of lands for housing schemes by laying down principles for fixing the compensation which is different from those prescribed in the Principal Act. It was in that context, when the contention was raised that though the acquisition of land under the Amending Act purported to be for housing scheme, it was really intended for selling the lands acquired and raising the Revenue for the State and therefore, it is colourable exercise of such power. An argument was also addressed to the effect that the Amending Act offended Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and also on the ground that it did not provide for payment of compensation within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Constitution. In paragraph 16 of the Judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court as a proposition of law, stated that-
.... if the Legislature makes a law for acquiring a property by providing for an illusory compensation or by indicating the principles for ascertaining the compensation which do not relate to the property acquired or to the value of such property at or within a reasonable proximity of the date of acquisition or the principles are so designed and so arbitrary that they do not provide for compensation at all, one can easily hold that the Legislature made the law in fraud of its powers. Briefly stated the legal position is as follows: If the question pertains to the adequacy of compensation, it is not justiciable; if the compensation fixed or the principles evolved for fixing it disclose that the Legislature made the law in fraud of powers in the sense we have explained, the question is within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Ultimately, in that case, it was held that the Amending Act clearly infringes Article 14 of the Constitution and therefore, void.
18. The principles set out in the above said decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court wilt have no application inasmuch as the Constitutional validity of the Amending Act was tested in the light of Article 14 and 31(2) of the Constitution, as against the case on hand, where such an argument is not available in the light of applicability of Article 31(C) of the Constitution vis-a-vis Art. 39(b) and (c). It is to be remembered that the decision relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner reported in AIR 1965 SC 1017 (cited supra) came to be rendered when Article 31(2) was in force, and the said Article came to be repealed by the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. The said Article 31(2) as it stood then after the Constitution (4th Amendment) Act 1955 was as under:
No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which under the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.
It was in the above said background, the Constitutional validity of the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act (23 of 1961) came to be tested by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Further, by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971, Clause (2) of Article 31 was substituted and Clause 2(B) was inserted. After the said amendment, the position was that all the case law which applied to Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2) (as amended) on 19-6-1979 was held to be material in determining the validity of a law of acquisition of property which was enacted before 20-6-1979. In the various decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported between 1981 and 1988, the gist of the law so far as the right to compensation under Article 31(2) as it stood on 19-6-1979 was to the effect that it was open to the Legislature to fix principles for determining compensation, unless it was shown that the principles were irrelevant to the determination of the value of the property, or, by working out the compensation according to the principles so specified, the compensation becomes illusory, the law was beyond the pale of challenge before the court of law on the ground that it did not provide for compensation under Ar. 31(2), as it stood after the 25th Amendment Act, 1971. In a case of acquisition by an Act coming into force on 1-11-1972 (i.e. subsequent to the amendment of Art. 31(2) by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971), the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the Judgment reported in AIR 1992 SC 938 (Assam Sillimanite Ltd. Versus Union of India), held as under:
23. Article 31(2) by virtue of the Constitution (Twenty-fifth) Amendment has knocked down the word ''compensation'' and has substituted the word ''amount'' which gives ample discretion to the State to fix a reasonable amount if the property of an individual is taken over for public purpose. As result of the amendment, it is now clear that the quantum of compensation provided by the law of acquisition cannot be subjected to Judicial review on the ground that it is tower than the value of the property or that the potential value of the property has not been included, ft can no longer be contended that the very word ''compensation'' as it existed in the original clause obliged the State to pay full and fair equivalent of the property taken.
24. ..... .... ....
25. As concluded by Chandrachud, J. In ''Kesavananda Bharati case'' (cited supra), though the Court has no power to invalidate a law described in Article 31(2) on the ground that the amount fixed or determined for compulsory acquisition is not adequate, such a law can be questioned if the amount fixed is illusory or the principles stated for determining the amount are wholly irrelevant for fixing or if the power of compulsory acquisition is exercised for a collateral purpose or the law offends other principles of Constitution or the law in the nature of a fraud on the Constitution.
19. It is also relevant to note that alter repealing of Article 31(2) by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the Parliament has once and for all removed the very right to property from Chapter III of the Constitution. By the very same 44th Amendment Act, 1978, ''Right to Property'' guaranteed under Article 31 as provided under Clause 1(1) of that Article was shifted from Part-III to Article 300-A. In the same breath. Clause (2) of Article 31 which dealt with compulsory acquisition of property came to be repealed. Simultaneously, Article 19(1)(f) which guaranteed the ''right to acquire and hold property'' was also omitted by the same 44th Amendment Act, 1978. Therefore, the result of these changes brought out the position, viz.,
(a) the ''right to hold the property'' ceased to be a Fundamental Right under the Constitution.
(b) it has been left to the Legislature to deprive a person of his property by the Authority of Law.
Having regard to the above position, the ''Right to Property'' as provided under Article 300-A of the Constitution is not basic feature of the Constitution, but is only a Constitutional right subject to State restraints and regulations. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in "1983 (3) SCC 387 (State of Maharashtra Versus Chandrabhan Tale)" wherein, in paragraph 2, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
2. ..... The fundamental right to property has been abolished because of its incompatibility with the goals of "justice, social, economic and political" and "equality of status and of opportunity" and with the establishment of a socialistic democratic republic, as contemplated by the Constitution.....
Again in the Judgment reported in "1995 Supp. 1 SCC 596 (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar Versus State of Gujrat)", the Hon''ble Supreme Court has explained the legal position as under in paragraphs 55 and 56:-
55. It would thus be clear that acquisition of the property by law laid down in furtherance of the Directive Principles of State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the community including acquisition and taking possession of private property for public purpose. It does not require payment of just compensation or indemnification to the owner of the property expropriated. It is the very negation of effectuating the public purpose. The payment of market value in lieu of acquired property is not sine quo non for acquisition. Acquisition and payment of amount are part of the scheme and they cannot be dissected. However, fixation of the amount or specification of the principles and the manner in which the amount is to be determined must be relevant to the fixation of amount. The amount determined need not bear reasonable relationship. In other words, it is not illusory. The adequacy of the resultant amount cannot be questioned in a Court of law. However, the validity to irrelevant principles are amenable to Judicial scrutiny.
56. It is, therefore, clear that the appellants are not entitled to compensation or just equivalent of property they are deprived of or indemnification of the property expropriated i.e. mines, whether worked or not, minerals whether discovered or not or quarries deprived by law made under Article 300-A of the Constitution. The principles u/s 69-A(4) of the code are relevant. The resultant amount is not illusory. Thereby they are not void. We further hold that after the Constitution Forty-forth Amendment Act has come into force, the right to property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 had its obliteration from Chapter III, fundamental Rights. Its abridgement and curtailment does not retrieve its lost position, nor gets restituted with renewed vigour claiming under the garb "deprivation of property" under Article 300-A. The Amendment Act neither receives wrath of Article 13(2), nor does Section 69-A become ultra vires of Article 300-A.
Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, by reproducing the said right under Article 300-A of the Constitution, what was once a Fundamental Right ceased to be a Fundamental Right and it became a mere legal right by virtue of shifting of the said right from Chapter-III to Chapter-IV.
20. Having regard to the above legal position on Article 31(2) of the Constitution after its repeal, I am not in a position to apply the ratio of the decision rendered in AIR 1965 SC 1017 (cited supra).
21. It is well settled that a Judgment can be an authority for the proposition which was canvassed before it. In "Divisional Controller, KSRTC (Versus) Mahadeva Shetty (2003 (7) SCC 197 = 2004-2-L.W. 60", the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under in para 23:
23. ..... The decision ordinarily is a decision on the case before the Court, while the principle underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent in a case which comes up for decision subsequently. Therefore, while applying the decision to a later case, the court dealing with it should carefully try to ascertain the principle laid down by the previous decision. A decision often takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope and authority of a precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. The only thing binding as an authority upon a subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught with difficulty as without an investigation into the facts, it cannot be assumed whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as a measure of social justice. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all, nor every passing expression of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an ex cathedra statement having the weight of authority.
The principle set out in the above decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court was also followed and applied by the Division Bench of this court in the Judgment reported in "2005 (1) CTC 8 = 2005-1-L.W.48 (The Secretary, Saliar Mahajana Higher Secondary Schools, Aruppukottai, Virudhunagar District Versus G. Subburaj and others)".
The principle set out by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the Judgment reported in AIR 1965 SC 1017 was in the context of application of Art. 14 read with Art. 31(2) of the Constitution and the ratio of the said Judgment cannot be applied to the facts of this case. But, the issue has to be necessarily examined in the light of Art. 31-C read along with Art. 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution.
22. So examined, I find that the Division Bench Judgment reported in 1985 Writ L.R. Suppl. 1 (cited supra), fully supports the stand of the State. The challenge therein was to the constitutional validity of Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Amendment Act (17 of 1980) and Tamil Nadu Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Amendment Act (18 of 1980). Dealing with the said issue, the Division Bench has held as under in para 17:
17. .... The enactment was intended as a part of the agrarian reform to give relief to the cultivating tenants from the burden of discharging arrears of rents, on condition of payment of current rents to their landlords......
23. The argument in that case was that by virtue of the amendment, an unreasonable restriction on the right of the landowners under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution came to be made. Dealing with the said contention, the Division Bench by referring to Article 31(C) of the Constitution vis-a-vis. Article 39(b) and (c), after following the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in "AIR 1959 SC 519 (Atma Ram versus State Of Punjab and others)" and "AIR 1963 SC 239 (Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company Versus M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. And Another)", held as under in para 63.
63. We do not think that it is permissible for us to go into the question as to whether the State has justified in the present case, that the restriction is reasonable or not. Any enquiry into the unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by the impugned legislation will be clearly contrary to the mandate of Article 31(C) of the Constitution of India....
.... We do not therefore think it proper to enter into a debate as to whether the impugned enactments contravened the provisions of Article 19, that is, whether the restrictions on the right of the landowner to receive only the fair rent of 25 percent is reasonable or unreasonable.
24. Argument was also addressed before the Division Bench on the ground that the Act was violative of Article 300(A) of the Constitution. The said contention was also repelled by the Division Bench of this court in para 89 in the above referred to Judgment, which is to the following effect:
89. .... On a further consideration of the matter, we are inclined to take the view that importing the concept of ''just, fair or reasonable'' de hors Art. 19 of the Constitution of India, in a case where the protection of Art. 19 is taken away by the provisions of Art. 31-C read with Art. 39-B and 39-C, would have the effect of completely ignoring the constitutional provision in Art. 31-C. On the other hand, if the protection of Arts. 14 and 19 is otherwise available, there cannot be a different standard for determination of ''justness, fairness or reasonableness'' than what is contemplated by Art. 14 or Art. 19. In our view, therefore the provision of Art. 300-A cannot be lightly construed as reintroducing the concept of Art. 14 and 19 in a case where the Constitution expressly rules out the concept by a specific provision in the Constitution itself like in Art. 31-C. We are therefore, inclined to differ from the view taken in ''Basantibai''s case (1984) Mh.L.J. 534)'', that de hors the provisions of Arts. 14 and 19 a law contemplated by Art. 300-A must be just, fair or reasonable.
25. I find the above Division Bench Judgment to be apposite to the case on hand and the principles stated therein mutatis mutandis would apply to the challenge made in these Writ Petitions as to the validity of the Schedule to the enactment. Further as rightly contended by the learned Advocate General, in the absence of any valid challenge being made to the substantive provision of the Act, namely. Section 7 and 17 of the Act which provides for determination of compensation, the challenge in isolation to the Schedule of the Act cannot be maintained. Therefore, on this ground as well, I do not find any merit in the challenge made to the Schedule of the Act.
26. Consequently, in the absence of any other valid challenge to the amount of compensation determined by the Authorised Officer under the impugned order, there is no scope to interfere with the orders impugned in these Writ Petitions. In the result, the Writ Petitions fail and the same are dismissed. No costs.
