T.V. Masilamani, J.@mdashThe appellant is the defendant in the suit and respondent in the first appeal before the lower appellate court. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment of the defendant from the suit premises and in the trial court, the suit was dismissed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Nagapattinam on 20.9.1990. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred the appeal before the Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam in A.S. No. 48 of 1991 and the learned Subordinate Judge had. in turn, having analysed the recorded evidence and after hearing both sides, allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. Hence, the defendant who lost before the first appellate court has preferred the above Second Appeal.
2. The contentions of the respondent/plaintiff in the plaint are briefly as follows:- The plaintiff''s association was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the same is known as Nagore Kowdhiya Association having its Memorandum of Association and bye-laws framed in accordance with law. The suit was laid by the Secretary authorised by the Association. The suit building belonged to the plaintiffs association and the defendant''s husband was inducted into the same as tenant on a monthly rent long prior to the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. When the defendant''s husband fell in arrears of rent, steps were initiated by the plaintiffs association to evict him from the premises and at that time, after he was evicted, the defendant entered into a fresh lease agreement with the plaintiff agreeing for a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. Subsequently, the defendant also was irregular in paying the rent as she used to pay once in three or four months in spite of repeated warning by the plaintiff. While so, when the defendant failed to pay the rent due for the months from November, 1986 to February 1987, the plaintiff issued a legal notice through counsel on 11.3.1987 calling upon the defendant to pay the arrears and also terminating the tenancy with effect from 31.3.1987 and demanding her to hand over possession on 1.4.1987 to the plaintiff. Having received the same, the defendant gave a reply with false and untenable allegations. Hence, the suit.
3. The contentions of the appellant/defendant in the written statement are briefly as follows:- The plaintiff Sangham is a registered society and since it is not a public and religious trust constituted under law, the suit for ejectment is not maintainable. But, on the other hand, the plaintiff has to file a petition for eviction before the Rent Controller for evicting the defendant from the premises. The defendant agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 75/- per month in respect of the suit premises and a fresh agreement dated 2.7.1985 had been entered into between her and the plaintiff in writing. She has paid advance of Rs. 150/- and the rent due for the premises had been collected by the agent of the plaintiff''s association once in three months or more and therefore the contention that the defendant committed willful default in the payment of rent is denied as false. When the agent or the persons working in the plaintiff''s association failed to receive the rent due for several months, the defendant remitted the same to the plaintiff by means of M.Os. and one such M.O. dated 11.3.1987 had been refused by the plaintiff. Hence the suit is filed with the oblique motive of evicting the defendant from the suit premises. The notice issued by the plaintiff terminating the tenancy by 31.3.1987 is not valid in law. Similarly, the plaintiffs Secretary was not authorised to institute the suit and therefore the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs.
4. On the basis of the above pleadings the following issues were framed by the trial court:-
(1) Whether the Secretary of the plaintiffs Association has been duly authorised to file the suit ?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs association is exempted from the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 ?
(3) Whether the notice to quit is valid in law ?
(4) Whether the defendant committed willful default in the payment of rent ?
(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief as prayed for ?
(6) To what relief, the plaintiff is entitled to?
5. The respondent/plaintiffs association examined its Secretary as P.W.1 and produced 12 documents and the appellant/defendant has examined herself as D.W.I and produced 2 documents. In this case, learned District Munsif after considering the evidence adduced on either side, held on the above said issues that the plaintiff has to proceed against the defendant only before the Rent Controller, as the said association was registered as a Society under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. Similarly, it was held that the suit has not been laid by the Secretary of the association under proper authorisation; that the notice issued u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is not valid in law; that the defendant had not committed willful default in the payment of rent; and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as prayed for in the suit. In view of the above said findings, learned District Munsif dismissed the suit with costs.
6. Learned Subordinate Judge perused the records of the case and the evidence adduced on either side and framed two points for consideration as follows:-
(1) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial court are liable to be dismissed?
(2) To what relief the appellant is entitled to ?
7. On a careful consideration of the recorded evidence, both oral and documentary and after hearing both sides, learned Subordinate Judge held on the above said points that the suit has been laid by the plaintiff in accordance with law; that the plaintiff is exempted from the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960; that the notice to quit issued by the plaintiff is valid in law; and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for in the suit and for the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.
8. Heard Mr. P.N. Kothandaraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. T.P. Sankaran, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted the following in the course of his argument advanced in this appeal:-
The first appellate court was incorrect in holding that the plaintiffs association is exempted from the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 contrary to the provision under G.O.Ms. No. 2000 of 1974; the first appellate Court ought to have seen that u/s 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 and the G.O. referred to above only religious and charitable public trusts are exempted from the provisions of the said Act and not any other association, such as the plaintiff; the plaintiff has nowhere claimed exemption under the said Act as religious or charitable public trust; lower appellate Court failed to consider that P.W.1, Secretary has not been authorised to institute the suit even though the bye-laws contain a provision that the Secretary is entitled to file a suit; the notice terminating the tenancy has not been issued in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore the same is not valid in law; since the plaintiff accepted the payment of rent, the suit is not maintainable on the ground that there was waiver of notice of termination of tenancy and therefore the appeal has to be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court and restoring that of the trial Court.
10. In the above circumstances, the following questions of law formulated by this Court on 6.1.1994 arise for consideration :-
(1) Whether the lower court is correct in holding that the respondent is exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act as against the provisions of the exemption G.O. Ms. No. 2000 of 1974 which exempted only public trust and not any other association such as the plaintiff Sangham ?
(2) Whether the lower court is correct in holding that without the proof of P.W. I status as secretary of the plaintiff Sangham, he had the locus standi to maintain the suit ?
(3) Whether the notice of termination ending with 31.3.1987 is valid in law ?
(4) Whether the suit is maintainable as contended by the appellant ?
11. The parties to this appeal may be referred to hereunder as they were arrayed before the trial court for the sake of convenience.
12. The admitted case of both the parties is that originally the appellant''s husband became the tenant of the suit building under the respondent and that thereafter since he was evicted from the premises, his wife, the appellant herein was inducted into possession as tenant of the same building on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/- under a fresh lease agreement dated 2.7.1985. Therefore, the landlord and tenant relationship between the parties to the proceedings is fairly conceded by both of them.
13. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the respondent is exempted from the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 on the ground that the suit premises belongs to a Muslim religious public trust, namely, the respondent represented by its Secretary. In this context, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the respondent is not a religious public trust, but it is only an association registered under the Societies Registration Act and that therefore the exemption of all buildings owned by the Muslim religious public and charitable trust from all the provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960") conferred under G.O.Ms. No. 2000 Home Department dated 16.8.1976 is not available to the respondent. Hence it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the suit filed by the respondent is misconceived one as the appropriate proceedings to be taken up for eviction of the appellant is only under Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960.
14. In answer to such contention, learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out the evidence of the appellant as D. W. 1 to the effect that she is aware of the fact that the respondent Sangham is a public charitable trust even though she had no knowledge of its bye-laws and regulations and that she was inducted into possession of the suit premises only by the Secretary of the said Sangham. Similarly, it is in her evidence that she had in fact executed the rental agreement as stated in the plaint in favour of the respondent. Further as has been rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant having received the notice Ex.A-1, issued the reply Ex.A-2 wherein she has neither questioned the status of the respondent as public charitable trust nor alleged that the Secretary of the respondent Sangham has no locus standi to maintain the suit. In this regard, Ex.A-12, minutes of the respondent sangham makes it clear that P.W.1 herein, Secretary has been authorised to institute the suit against the appellant. It is in these circumstances, a careful perusal of Exs.A-1. A-2 and A-12 would disclose that the appellant had not only admitted the lease agreement dated 2.7.1985 entered into between herself and the respondent in respect of the suit premises, but also contended that she has been paying the rent to the Secretary of the respondent Sangham and that the Secretary has been authorised to file the suit.
15. In this context, learned counsel for the respondent has adverted the attention of this Court to Ex.A-3, bye-laws of the sangham and contended rightly that the same would disclose that the respondent is a public religious trust entitled to the exemption under the Government order referred to above from the provisions under Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. Hence, learned counsel for the respondent has argued in my opinion rightly that in view of the above circumstances, it is no longer open to the appellant to contend that the respondent is not entitled to the exemption from the provisions of the said Act.
16. For the reasons above mentioned, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Subordinate Judge has correctly appreciated the facts and evidence of the case to come to the right conclusion that the respondent Sangham is exempted from the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960 as per G.O.Ms. No. 2000 Home Department dated 16.8.1976 referred to above and that P.W. 1 is the Secretary of the respondent Sangham who has got locus standi to maintain the suit. But, on the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant has not shown any circumstances to interfere with such finding of facts rendered by the lower appellate Court.
17. The next question raised by the appellant in this case is that the notice to quit issued by the respondent is not valid in law. In this context, Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 may be extracted hereunder to appreciate the facts and evidence of the case on this aspect of the matter:-
106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage.-- In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months'' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days'' notice expiring with the end of a month of tenancy.
18. It is not disputed that the appellant received the notice dated 11.3.1987 under Ex.A-1 issued by the respondent through counsel at any rate prior to 15.3.1987 and then issued the reply under Ex.A-2 through her counsel. Further, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the clear recital in Ex.A-1 left no room for interpretation as the same is categorical that the lease agreement stood terminated with effect from the midnight of 31.3.1987 and that the premises should be vacated and handed over on 1.4.1987 by the appellant to the respondent. It is not disputed that the tenancy is a monthly one terminable by giving 15 days'' notice (vide) Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is in these circumstances that the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this Court to the decision,
The last moment upto which the respondents, could, according to the notice to quit, lawfully continue to remain in possession of the premises was the mid-night of 31st October, 1962. We fail to see any difference between a notice asking a tenant to vacate "within the month of October, 1962" and a notice requiring a tenant to vacate latest by the mid-night of 31st October, 1962. because in both cases, the tenant would be entitled to occupy the premises upto the expiration of 31 st October, 1962 but not beyond it. This position would seem to follow logically and in-contestably as a matter of plain natural construction, from the use of the words "within the month of October, 1962" without anything more, but here it is placed beyond doubt or controversy by the notice to quit proceeding to add that otherwise the respondents would be treated as trespassers from 1st November, 1962. This makes the intention of the authors of the notice clear that they are terminating the tenancy only with effect from the end of the month of October, 1962 and not with effect from any earlier point of time during the currency of that month. If the respondents do not vacate the premises within the month of October, 1962, they would be treated as trespassers from 1st November, 1962 and not from, any earlier date, clearly implying that they would lawfully continue as tenants up to the expiration of the month of October, 1962. The tenancy was, therefore sought to be determined on the expiration of the month of October, 1962 and not earlier and the notice to quit expired with the end of the month of tenancy as required by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was in the circumstances a valid notice which effectively determined the tenancy of the respondents with effect from the mid-night of 31st October, 1962.
19. Learned Single Judge of this Court. K. Govindarajan, J., (as he then was) relying upon the said decision and also other decisions of various High Courts held in Karthikeyu Press v. Madarsa Dawuodiya Arabic College Trust (2002 (1) C.T.C. 641:2002-2L.W. 713) as under:-
So from the above said decision it is clear that the intention of the author of the notice has to be looked into. Since the tenant was caused to vacate the premises on or before 30th November, 1986 the tenant could lawfully continue to remain in possession of the premises till midnight of 30th November. 1986. So, the intention of the author of the notice is clear not to terminate the tenancy with effect from any earlier point of time or during the currency of that month.
20. In view of the principles of law on this aspect of the matter referred to above, this Court is of the considered view that in this case also, the respondent terminated the tenancy with effect from the midnight of 31 st March, 1987 and I called upon the tenant to hand over possession of the premises on 1.4.1987 and therefore, the above ratio of the said decisions squarely apply to the facts of this case. Following the said principles of law enunciated therein, this Court finds that the notice to quit under Ex.A-1 is valid under the provision of Section 106 of the '' Transfer of Property Act, 1882. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no material circumstances to interfere with the judgment rendered by the first appellate court and therefore the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
21. Thus, the Second Appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court in A.S. No. 48 of 1991 dated 15.9.1993. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The appellant, who is the tenant, is directed to vacated the suit premises and hand over the same to the respondent within three months from today. Further, the appellant is directed to pay the future rent for three months without default.
