T. Sundanthiram, J.@mdashThe Petitioner National Insurance Co. Ltd. has filed this petition u/s 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, seeking condonation of delay of 253 days in filing the civil miscellaneous appeal against the judgment passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Second Small Causes Court), Chennai in M.C.O.P. No. 1451 of 2004 dated 27.11.2007.
2. Baskara Rao, Administrative Officer of the Petitioner insurance company has filed an affidavit setting out the reasons for the delay in preferring the appeal. Admittedly, the judgment was delivered on 27.11.2007, copy application was made on 30.11.2007 and copies were made ready on 1.2.2008 and delivered on 2.2.2008. They by way of procedure adopted in the Divisional Office, for deciding the fact whether to prefer an appeal, certified copies of deposition of witnesses were to be obtained and on careful examination, it was decided to prefer an appeal by last week of March 2008. Unfortunately, thereafter during the exercise of annual audit and review, the file relating to this claim got mixed up with the other closed files and it could be traced only after some time. In the meantime, as attachment proceedings were taken by the opposite party, a cheque for total amount of the award was also handed over to the court bailiff on 11.2.2008. A letter dated 29.12.2008 being sent to the counsel, he had prepared the appeal papers and filed it on 12.1.2009. In the said process, there had been delay of 253 days in preferring the appeal.
3. The Respondent No. 1 herein is the claimant who is the wife of the deceased. The Respondent No. 2 is the owner of the vehicle who had remained ex parte before the trial court. The Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 herein are the parents of the deceased and though they were originally shown as claimants in the application before Tribunal, subsequently they have been made as Respondents and they have also remained ex parte. The effective notice was served only to the Respondent No. 1 who is now represented by a counsel. The Respondent No. 1 herein has filed a counter objecting for condoning the delay. It is stated in the affidavit of the Respondent No. 1 that the delay of 253 days is enormous and the reasons given by the Petitioner as administrative exigencies are not valid and the insurance company being a government undertaking cannot be equated with the government and the delay due to administrative exigencies is untenable.
4. This Court heard both parties. Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 strenuously contended that each and every day''s delay has to be explained and by merely making a statement that the delay was due to administrative exigencies is not acceptable and the negligence and carelessness which resulted in the enormous delay of 253 days should not be condoned and if a lenient view is taken by a court, it may cause prejudice to the claimant-Respondent No. 1 herein. Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 also relied on the decision of this Hon''ble court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pravin Paul 1993 (1) LW 68 and the decision of the Hon''ble Rajasthan High Court in
5. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner insurance company submitted that the insurance company being a public sector organization, procedures and practices of processing claim and appeal against awards have been set up and the considerations are made at various levels and administrative exigencies are to be followed.
6. The learned Counsel further submitted that here the application is filed under second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and as per second proviso to Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, ''sufficient cause'' has been shown for the delay and the expression ''sufficient cause'' should receive the liberal construction which requires adoption of pragmatic approach. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner also pointed out that the appeal is with merits and refusal to condone the delay may result in meritorious matter being thrown at the threshold.
7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on the following decisions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d) Ravi Enterprises v. Indian Bank 2008 (1) CTC 785.
8. This Court considered the submissions made by both parties. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides for preferring an appeal against the award of Claims Tribunal within 90 days from the date of the award. The same section provides for entertaining the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 90 days, on satisfying the court that Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. The word of expression used u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and also the second proviso to Section 173 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act is ''sufficient cause''. Therefore, it is to be seen whether the reason given by the Petitioner could be considered as ''sufficient cause'' in the light of the decisions laid down as precedent.
9. In the decision cited by the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 in
If the delay is to be condoned mechanically on the ground of administrative exigencies, then in almost all cases the court has to condone the delay. That is never the intention of the Supreme Court while laying down the law for condoning the delay on the ground of administrative exigencies.
10. In the decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pravin Paul, 1993 (1) LW 68, it has been held as follows:
The averment that the administrative delay cannot be avoided in government undertaking for more reasons than one cannot be accepted and that it is not a valid reason to condone the delay. The Petitioner has failed to come forward as to how the delay has occurred. He must give fuller details with dates as to when the papers were sent to the Regional Office, when the managers concerned were deputed to attend policy matters of importance, when they advised the Petitioner to file appeal and why such delay has occurred. The affidavit is bereft of details. It is well established that every day''s delay has to be explained properly and there must be reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay. In this case except the averment that the administrative delay cannot be avoided, there is no acceptable reason for the delay, with all particulars. We are not happy with the reasoning given in para 5 of the affidavit wherein it is stated ''I most respectfully submit that in a government undertaking like the Petitioner administrative delay cannot be avoided for more reasons than one''. This is not a valid and proper explanation for the delay. ''The government undertaking cannot be equated with the government and they are expected to give details with regard to the delay''. We cannot condone the delay, it is simply stated, administrative delay''. Hence, we are of the view that this is a case where the Petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the delay, which is inordinate, in filing the appeal. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
11. In the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner in
(10) It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court -- be it by the private party or the State--are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts a liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that the litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condo nation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that the decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for a considerable time causing delay, intentional or otherwise, is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their decision making is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression ''sufficient cause'' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day''s delay. The facts which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standard to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether the cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condo nation of the delay.
12. In the decision in Ravi Enterprises v. Indian Bank 2008 (1) CTC 785, it has been held as follows:
We are of the view that refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the early stage and cause of justice being defeated. Moreover, the law courts should not prefer to adopt a pedantic approach and on the other hand a pragmatic approach has to be made to deliver substantial justice overriding technical considerations as far as the present case is concerned.
13. In the decision in
Thus, from the narration of the facts and circumstances of the case, in my view it is a fit case for condoning the delay by giving liberal construction to ''sufficient cause'' and taking a pragmatic approach keeping in view that the insurance company is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants who may have worked at snail pace but they cannot be held guilty of inaction or negligence. Moreover, if the delay is not condoned and appeal is not considered on merits public interest would also suffer.
14. In the decision in
The facts had been explained supra and need not be repeated again. The Appellant is New India Assurance Co. Ltd., represented by the Branch Manager. Apart from giving the dates, it was also specifically stated that the insurance company had requested the local office at Guntur and they have appointed one Shaik Ahmed Sharief as investigator in relation to ascertainment of the financial status of the owner of the vehicle also. In the question of ascertaining the liability and also while taking a decision whether to prefer an appeal or not, these are relevant questions in the opinion of the Appellant insurance company and hence in the light of such reasons which had been given, it cannot be said that sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act had not been explained at all. It is no doubt true that insurance companies are expected to be more careful and cautious in preferring the appeals within time as far as possible. But, however, there may be cases because of the reasons beyond the control of the concerned officials or because of the delay in obtaining the opinion or any other delay in the administrative process. If such delay caused is not condoned, the insurance company definitely will suffer and it is needless to say that the result will be affecting the public money and the public interest
15. It appears from the various decisions of the Hon''ble Apex Court and the Hon''ble High Court, no hard and fast rule can be laid while considering the application for condoning the delay, whether u/s 5 of Limitation Act or under Sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but it has to be seen only whether ''sufficient cause'' is shown for condoning the delay. As ''sufficient cause'' is not defined, to decide whether the explanation offered for the delay constitutes sufficient cause, it depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. It should be understood from the decision of Hon''ble Apex Court that the expression ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay should receive a liberal construction in rendering justice. This Court is also to keep in mind the consequences by shutting the doors of adjudicatory jurisdiction to the party even before entering. The pristine maxim ''vigilanti bus non dormientibus jura subveniunt'' which means ''law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights''. The litigants on either side are, prone to commit mistakes. It becomes necessary to see whether it is possible to entertain grievance, if it is genuine. Of course, the law of limitation is same for private citizen as for governmental affairs. When the claimants-affected party come for an appeal with the considerable delay and the court is to make a liberal approach, nothing wrong in giving same approach for the parties against whom the award is passed, as the doctrine of equality before law demands all the litigants including the State to be accorded the same treatment. As observed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, the expression ''sufficient cause'' therefore be considered with pragmatic and justice-oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explanation of every day''s delay.
16. From the reasons given in the affidavit filed along with the petition, this Court is satisfied that the Petitioner was prevented by ''sufficient cause'' from preferring the appeal in time. The delay is condoned.
17. While condoning the delay, incidentally this Court see the hardship caused to the claimants because of the delay. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that Rs. 1,000 shall be the appropriate cost.
18. In the result, the petition is allowed on condition that the Petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 as costs of the Respondent No. 1 within a period of 15 days from today.
