Meenakshi Madan Rai, J
1. In this Second Appeal, the Judgment and Decree, both dated 28.02.2019, in Title Appeal No.18 of 2017, is being assailed. By the impugned
Judgment, the Learned First Appellate Court reversed the Judgment in Title Suit No.21 of 2013, dated 28.11.2017, by which the Learned Trial Court
had dismissed the Suit of the Respondents herein.
2. The substantive questions of law framed for determination before this Court, are as follows;
“1. Whether the Judgment of the learned First Appellate Court is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence?
2. Whether a karta of a joint family needs a Power of Attorney to deal with the properties of Hindu Undivided Family?â€
3. The Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein were the Plaintiffs before the Learned Trial Court and hereinafter they shall be referred to as the
Plaintiffs/“P1,†“P2†and “P3.†The Appellants No.1, 2 and 3 herein were the Defendants before the Learned Trial Court. They shall be
referred to as the Defendants/“D1,†“D2†and “D3†hereinafter.
4. The Suit was originally instituted as Civil Suit No.10 of 1994 by the surviving Plaintiffs and one Bhaskaranand Agarwal, father of P1 and D1.
Bhaskaranand passed away in 1999 and thereafter his name was deleted from the array of the Plaintiffs and the surviving Plaintiffs renumbered as
Plaintiffs No.1, 2 and 3.
5.(i) To comprehend the dispute between the parties in its entirety, it is essential to briefly narrate the facts of the case. The Genealogical Chart of P1
and of D1 who are blood brothers, is as follows;
(ii) The Plaintiffs‟ (P1, P2 and P3) case is that one Sriram Agarwal (see Chart supra) had three sons viz. Mulchand Agarwal, Nandalal Agarwal and
Deepchand Agarwal of whom Nandalal separated from the joint family. Mulchand had five sons, of whom one i.e. Bhaskaranand, was adopted by
Mulchand‟s brother Deepchand. Together, the five sons constituted the joint family and joint family business in or around 1940 by the name of
“M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons.â€
6.(i) The joint family business originally was in Kalimpong, West Bengal but also had properties in Bombay, Calcutta and Siliguri. The twelve
properties in Sikkim described in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, were acquired around 1939-40 by the joint family of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons
which included the Schedule „B‟ property allotted to them by the then Maharani of Sikkim, on 14.09.1944. A seven storeyed RCC building was
raised on the Schedule „B‟ land for residential purposes of the joint family and for joint family business and presently, the families of both P1 and
D1 are residing in this building of which they are in joint possession.
(ii) In 1968, M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons settled the joint family properties amongst themselves amicably whereby the properties mentioned in
Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, were allotted in favour of Late Bhaskaranand and his two sons. The three formed an undivided Hindu coparcenary
governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and were in collective ownership of the Schedule „A‟ properties, income from these properties
went into a joint fund. As per P1, although some of the said properties have been recorded in the individual names of P1 and D1 in the State records,
they are joint family property and none of the members thereof had individual or independent rights on the property. As D1 did not take part in the
running of the business, he executed a Power of Attorney for this purpose in favour of his father, his mother Smt. Bimala Devi Agarwal and
grandmother Smt. Narayani Devi Agarwal (wife of Deepchand Agarwal) on 31.03.1973. That, as females are not coparceners in a Mitakshara Hindu
family, Bimala Devi and Narayani Devi were not impleaded as parties to the suit.
(iii) In 1979, D1 registered a firm in the name and style of “Shree Mulchand & Sons†for the exclusive purpose of running the joint family
business but such registration does not create any absolute right, title and interest for him in the joint family properties and business nor does it confer
him with powers to dispose of the properties in Schedule „A.‟
(iv) That, in order to deal with the property in Schedule „A‟ to the exclusion of his coparceners, D1 took into his custody all documents and
properties of the joint family business and properties of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and Agarwal Trading Company on 25.01.1994, in regard to
which a First Information Report (“FIRâ€) was lodged against him.
(v) That, in February, 1994, D3 started demanding monthly rentals from the tenants of Schedule „B‟ property and on enquiry, P1 and his father
came to learn that D1 had on 31.01.1989, fraudulently executed a Deed of Gift of Schedule „B‟ property in favour of D3 without the concurrence
of the coparceners. D3 then mortgaged Schedule „B‟ property for loan to a Bank. That, the Deed of Gift is void, invalid and inoperative in the eyes
of law on account of non-compliance of the mandatory requirements of law, therefore no right, title or interest accrues on D3. That, D1 collusively
with D3, is attempting to dispose of and may interfere in the running of the joint family business. P1, P2 and P3, therefore, sought for the following
reliefs;
“a) For declaration that the suit properties mentioned in the Schedule „A‟ hereunder are joint family properties and/or the
coparcenary properties of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
b) For declaration that the deed of gift executed and registered on 31.1.1989 by the Defendant No.1 in favour of Defendant No.3 in respect
of the properties mentioned in Schedule „B‟ hereunder is void and inoperative in law and is not binding upon the Plaintiffs and/or in
coparceners of the Hindu undivided family or upon any members of the joint family of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants.
c) For permanent injunction restraining the Defendants and each one of them from transferring, alienating, encumbering, dealing with
and/or from disposing of any of the joint properties of the parties mentioned in Schedule „A‟ hereunder and also from interfering with
the peaceful possession of the Plaintiffs and their family members in all the joint properties as aforesaid including the specific residential
house described in Schedule „B‟ hereunder and also from interfering with running of the joint family business in any manner
whatsoever.
d) For Receiver.
e) For Costs.
f) For such other relief or reliefs to which the Plaintiffs are entitled in law and equity.â€
7.(i) In response, the Defendants, while admitting the genealogy of the family, denied and disputed the averments in the Plaint and stated that no joint
family existed nor was there joint family business in Kalimpong or other places. That, neither did Bhaskarananda and his sons P1 and D1 constitute a
joint family or coparcenary, besides, the Plaintiffs failed to describe the joint family properties and denied that the properties described in Schedule
„A‟ and Schedule „B‟ belonged to any joint family with no independent right of any individual. That, the Plaintiffs are residing in Schedule „B‟
property as licensees of D3 and are not in joint possession of the property but have failed to vacate the premises despite expiry of the stipulated
period. The Defendants asserted that D1 is the sole proprietor of the business of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and all properties and assets
belonging to and standing in the name and style of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons, were acquired from its funds. That, the property described in
Schedule „B‟ of the Plaint was the property of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and D1 became its absolute owner and gifted it to his wife D3. It
was denied that Schedule „B‟ property was allotted to any Hindu family in 1944.
(ii) That, by the partition of 1968, the entire properties and business of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons in Sikkim were allotted in favour of D1 and P1
separately, with nothing given to Bhaskaranand who relinquished his interest in 1968 and the partition was between the heirs of Mulchand and P1 and
D1 and the properties vested in them separately. It was stated that the concept of Hindu joint family and coparcenary governed by Mitakshara Hindu
Law has no application in Sikkim.
(iii) That, in 1973, to avoid disputes and differences in the family, Bhaskaranand initiated division of all the properties allotted in 1968 to his two sons.
Thereafter, the properties described in Item Nos.1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, vested on D1 as its absolute owner of which he
gifted the Schedule „B‟ properties to D3, with the knowledge of P1 and Bhaskaranand. Properties described in Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 of Schedule
„A‟ were allotted and given exclusively to P1 which he registered in his name as owner on 30.07.1980. D1 was the proprietor of Item No.2
premises “M/s. Laxmi Stores.†In “1989,†he gave up his right, title and interest in favour of Sheila Agarwal, the wife of P1, as evident from
Exhibit 8, dated 30.05.1973. D1 applied for registration of the Firm “Shree Mulchand & Sons†on 07.09.1977 which was duly registered on
16.06.1979.
(iv) That, Item No.8 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint i.e. M/s. Agarwal Trading Company was handed over to D1 in 1975 by one Balkrishna Agarwal,
the ostensible owner of the Company. That, Item No.9 of Schedule „A‟ belongs to M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and P1 in moiety, P1 having
purchased the said land on 18.10.1976 from M/s. Indo Sikkim Company. That, transfer of all properties described in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint
were made as per the laws in force in Sikkim and whatever be the source of the properties described in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, these now
belong to different individuals, as detailed above. That, the Power of Attorney was executed by D1 in 1973 as he was engaged in the running of the
Agarwal Wire Industries Private Limited, established in 1981. That, when D3 offered Schedule „B‟ as collateral security against the loan availed
from the Bank when objections were invited, Bhaskaranand raised a belated objection which was rejected. D1 denied any alleged illegalities or
collusive acts by him and D3 and the Suit deserves to be dismissed being meritless.
8. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Learned Trial Court settled the following issues for determination;
“1. Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action to bring the instant suit?
2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
3. Whether the suit is properly valued?
4. Whether the properties as described in Schedule „A‟ to the plaint are co-parcenary property/joint family property of the plaintiffs and
the defendants?
5. Whether the transfer of the property under Schedule „B‟ to the plaint as effected by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3
by way of gift is void, inoperative and not binding upon the plaintiffs?
6. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties?
7. To what relief or reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled?
8. Had the defendant No.1 any right and authority to transfer the joint property as described in schedule „B‟ to the plaint by executing
the alleged Deed of gift?â€
The Learned Trial Court while taking up the Issues, considered the evidence on record and reached a finding that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any
of the reliefs claimed and dismissed the Suit of the Plaintiffs.
9.(i) The Judgment was assailed before the Learned District Judge, Special Division-I, Sikkim at Gangtok. While setting aside the Judgment of the
Learned Trial Court, the Learned First Appellate Court observed that the challenge in the Appeal before him was confined to Issues No.1, 4, 5, 7 and
8. That, Issues No.2, 3 and 6 were decided by the Learned Trial Court in favour of the Defendants. The findings in that regard were not assailed by
the Defendants by Cross-Objection.
(ii) The Learned First Appellate Court took up Issue No.4 first and while considering Exhibit 1 filed by P1, concluded inter alia that vide Exhibit 1, the
properties in Sikkim (Schedule „A‟ and Schedule „B‟) had been allotted to the branch of Late Bhaskaranand which included Bhaskaranand as
well and that a joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu society. Bhaskaranand and his sons constituted a joint Hindu family. The
Court found no reason to doubt the clear recitals made in the endorsements in Exhibit 1. That, D1 had failed to substantiate his stand that the
concerned properties had only been allotted to him and the present P1 and not their father Late Bhaskaranand. It was concluded that the Learned
Trial Court, while considering the use of different pens and spacing in the endorsements made in Exhibit 1, had embarked on an issue which was not
contested by either of the parties. The Learned First Appellate Court opined that there was nothing worthy on record to show that any partition with
respect to the Schedule „A‟ and Schedule „B‟ properties ever took place between Late Bhaskaranand and his sons or even between P1 and D1
whether earlier or after the demise of Late Bhaskaranand and held the properties to be joint family/ancestral/coparcenary properties. The Learned
First Appellate Court also declined to place reliance on Exhibit „G‟ filed by D1 on grounds of vagueness and found that the reliance placed on it by
the Learned Trial Court was totally misplaced. That, the Learned Trial Court had accepted the Defendants‟ claim that M/s. Shree Mulchand and
Sons could not be a joint family business as one of its partners was an outsider, but no restriction under law prohibits any member of a joint family to
enter into a partnership with an outsider. The Learned First Appellate Court, however, declined to place reliance on Exhibit 18 Cash Book and its
English translation Exhibit 20, filed by P1, on grounds that no witness in support thereof was examined and ultimately decided Issue No.4 in favour of
the Plaintiffs adding that the Learned Trial Court was influenced by the admissions made by P1 in Civil Suit No.76 of 1986 but the claims of D1 so far
as admissions of P1 were abandoned, as P1 was not confronted with his admissions, denying him the occasion to explain them.
(iii) Issue Nos.5 and 8 were next taken up for discussion and it was opined that unless there is clear partition and allotment of the concerned
properties/businesses in D1‟s name, he cannot claim exclusive rights over it and found the purported transfer/gift by D1 to D3 invalid sans authority of
D1 to make the transfer. The finding of the Learned Trial Court was set aside and Issue Nos.5 and 8 decided by the Learned First Appellate Court in
favour of the Plaintiffs.
(iv) Issue Nos.1 and 7 were taken up finally and decided in the affirmative by the Learned First Appellate Court relying on its own findings in Issue
Nos.4, 5 and 8, as discussed supra. It was found that the Plaintiffs had succeeded in proving their case and was entitled to the reliefs claimed by them
in Prayers (a), (b) and (c) of their amended Plaint and the Suit decreed accordingly.
10.(i) Before this Court, Learned Senior Counsel Mr. N. Rai while advancing his arguments for the Defendants, contended that Issue No.4 is the
crux of the case. That, the Learned First Appellate Court set aside the findings of the Learned Trial Court in respect of the document Exhibit 1 and
held that the suit properties are a joint family property solely relying on Exhibit 1. That, in fact, vide Exhibit 1, the properties in Sikkim were allotted
only to D1 and P1 and Bhaskaranand had endorsed acceptance on their behalf as their natural guardian.
(ii) That, the onus to prove their case is on the Plaintiffs and they cannot take advantage of the weaknesses of the Defendants‟ case as done by the
Learned First Appellate Court. On this aspect, reliance was placed on Rangammal vs. Kuppuswami and Another (2011) 12 SCC 220. Reliance was
also placed on Anil Rishi vs. Gurbaksh Singh (2006) 5 SCC 558 and Md. Kalu Sheikh @ Abdul Gani Sarkar vs. On the death of Shahjahan Ali
His Legal Heirs Hazarat Ali and Others (2020) 2 Gauhati Law Reports 391.
(iii) It is contended that the properties in Schedule „A‟ recorded in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons were allotted in favour of D1 while
those in the name of Mulchand were in favour of P1. That, those in the name of the Firm Agarwal Trading Company was transferred from
Balkrishna, cousin of P1 and D1, to D1 in terms of Clause 8 of Exhibit 1. However, the Learned First Appellate Court wrongly observed that in the
pleadings, the Defendants took a stand that nothing was given to Late Bhaskaranand and he had relinquished all his rights, but in the Evidence-on-
Affidavit of D1, he had stated that Late Bhaskaranand had retained three properties about which he has not stated anything in his Written Statement
on the plea that at the time of preparation of the Written Statement, he was not aware of the existence of Exhibit 3. That, in fact, Exhibit 3 is not a
proved document and mere marking of a document does not dispense with its proof. The document finds no mention in the pleadings and was
produced only at the time of evidence. On this count, reliance was placed on Sait Tarajee Khimchand and Others vs. Yelamarti Satyam alias
Satteyya and Others AIR 1971 SC 1865. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Learned First Appellate Court while disagreeing with the
Learned Trial Court, concluded that the Trial Court while considering Exhibit 1 had found the words “and self†interpolated and there was no
mention of Bhaskaranand being the Karta sans raising of this issue by the parties. Learned Senior Counsel urged that the Learned Trial Court can
consider all aspects of the exhibited documents.
(iv) It was next submitted that P1 did not rely on and chose not to argue on Exhibit 2, which mentions that “Shree Mulchand & Sons†of Kolkata
is a “Partnership at Will†and not a joint family, indicating the frail foundation of P1‟s case. That, as per the Learned First Appellate Court, the
Defendants had not put forward any cogent evidence to prove that Bhaskaranand was not the Karta of their family during his lifetime but overlooked
Exhibit „C,‟ the admitted document of Firm Registration in 1977-1979, presented by Bhaskaranand neither did the Court consider Exhibit „M‟
being a General Power of Attorney executed in 1973 by D1 in respect of his properties and businesses in favour of Bhaskaranand. Exhibit „P,‟
„Q‟ and „R‟ are Eviction Suits filed by P1 and Exhibit „T‟ by D1, in their individual names in which Bhaskaranand had appeared and deposed
as their Constituted Attorney. That, the partition of Schedule „A‟ amongst the two brothers is indubitably proved by the admission of P1 being
Exhibit „U‟ in Civil Suit No.76 of 1986 and the General Power of Attorney executed by both brothers (D1 vide Exhibit „M‟ and P1 vide
Document „D18‟) in favour of their father, mother and grandmother who all through, acted as their Constituted Attorneys while Bhaskaranand did
not act as Karta. In the said Suits, the Learned Court has declared that P1 was the owner of the suit property which is mentioned as Item No.3 in
Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint. In Exhibit „T,‟ D1 was declared as owner of Item No.1 (Schedule „B‟ property) of the Schedule „A‟ property.
Exhibit „V‟ is the deposition of P1 as witness in the Eviction Suit admitting that by virtue of the Firm registration in 1977-1979, D1 had become the
absolute owner of the Schedule „B‟ property. On this count, reliance was placed on Dattatraya Shripati Mohite vs. Shankar Ishwara Mohite
and Another AIR 1960 Bombay 153. That, evidence given by P1 in Civil Suit No.76 of 1986 can be considered by this Court without him having been
confronted, as per the provisions of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Actâ€), as a previous admission is a substantial piece
of evidence. That, there is a difference between previous statement and previous admission. To fortify these arguments, reliance was placed on
Bhagwan Singh vs.State of Punjab AIR 1952 SC 214; Venkatlal Baldeoji Mahajan vs. Kanhiyalal Jankidas and Others AIR 1963 MP 155;
Biswanath Prasad and Others vs. Dwarka Prasad and Others AIR 1974 SC 117; Smt. Jai Shree Lalla vs. Sri Harbans Singh 2014 SCC
OnLine Del 1752; Karam Kapahi and Others vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Anothe rAIR 2010 SC 2077; Suzuki Parasrampuria
Suitings Private Limited vs. Official Liquidator of Mahendra Petrochemicals Limited (In Liquidation) and Other s(2018) 10 SCC 707 and
Dasa Singh and Another vs. Jasmer Singh 2003 (2) RCR (Civil) 361.
(v) It was canvassed by Learned Senior Counsel that there is no document on record filed by P1 to indicate the role of Bhaskaranand as Karta or any
document signed by him as Karta. That, Exhibit 18 was the only document claimed by P1 to have been signed by Bhaskaranand which was rejected
by the Learned Trial Court and the Learned First Appellate Court as not proved. That, the documents which could have been of assistance to P1
were “Annexure 1†and “Annexure 2†filed by them in the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(“CPCâ€), but these documents were not produced by P1 in the instant case. That, the Learned First Appellate Court while rejecting Exhibit
„G‟, the document of the Defendants, recorded it as being vague and unregistered, although Section 67 of the Evidence Act allows the party to
prove the document by identifying handwriting. On this aspect, reliance was placed on Bank of India vs. Allibhoy Mohammed & Ors AIR 2008
Bombay 81. Besides, D1 has identified Exhibit „G‟ as being in his father‟s handwriting as also PW Gitanjali Jalan, witness for P1 b(efore the
Learned Trial Court, the witness was variously numbered as “PW3†and “PW2†hence, hereinafter for convenience, shall be
referred to by name) but P1 denied such claim and deposed that the document was devoid of his father‟s signature although he admitted that the
handwritten portion and signature in Exhibit 1 was that of his father which is similar to that in Exhibit „G.‟ That, Exhibit „G‟ clearly sets out the
details of the properties allocated to the two brothers and correlates to the allocation made in the settlement of 1968. The document was rejected as
an unregistered document while reliance was placed on Exhibit 1 by the Learned First Appellate Court also an unregistered document, but admittedly
accepted by both parties.
(vi) The Learned First Appellate Court overlooked the fact that the partition was done in metes and bounds in terms of the allotment made in Exhibit
1. The admissions of Bhaskaranand and P1 in their evidence Exhibits „U‟ and „V‟ were also not considered. Exhibit 8 and Exhibit 21 prove the
transfer and registration of business of M/s. Laxmi Stores in the name of P1‟s wife Sheila Agarwal from that of D1. Exhibit „B‟ establishes
transfer of Schedule „B‟ property in favour of D3 by D1. Learned Senior Counsel also urged that no common family account, one of the essential
requirements of a joint family, was produced by P1. The different properties in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint said to be in the individual exclusive
ownership of P1 and D1, was highlighted by Learned Senior Counsel.
(vii) The next argument advanced was that the Learned First Appellate Court held that the eldest member of the family would be the Karta, but in
granting the Reliefs No.(a), (b) and (c) of the Plaint, he injuncted D1, the eldest member of the family from running the joint family and joint family
business, if any.
(viii) It was urged that no “Power of Attorney†is required for a Karta by others constituting the coparcenary under the Mitakshara School of
Hindu Law, as was given by the P1 and D1 to Bhaskaranand and the Learned First Appellate Court was on agreement on this aspect by placing
reliance on Sunil Kumar and Another vs. Ram Prakash and Others AIR 1988 SC 576 : (1988) 2 SCC 77. The Learned Court failed to consider that
the registration of a Deed of Gift under the Sikkim Registration of Documents Rules, 1930, can be attested by one witness alone and is in force in
Sikkim in terms of Article 371-f(k) of the Constitution of India. That, P1 in his evidence, has admitted the fact of partition by stating,
“……………in order to complete the process of partition, the original plaintiff No.1 got some of these allotted properties mutated either
in my name or in the name of the defendant No.1 from the name of the coparceners in whose name the properties were acquired prior to
1968.â€
(ix) That, the evidence on record establishes that the properties were individual properties on which reliance was placed on Mudi Gowda Gowdappa
Sankh vs. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh AIR 1969 SC 1076 : (1969) 1 SCC 386;M st. Rukhmabai vs. Lala Laxminarayan and Others AIR
1960 SC 335; Sunil Kumar (supra); Union of India vs. Sree Ram Bohra and Others AIR 1965 SC 1531; Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai
Etc. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat AIR 1967 SC 762; Tribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Others
(1991) 3 SCC 442; A. C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (2014) 11 SCC 790. That, in view of the arguments advanced, the
Appeal may be allowed and the Judgment of the Learned First Appellate Court set aside.
11.(i) Per contra, the arguments advanced by Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Anmole Prasad for the Plaintiffs, were that both P1 and D1 have
descended from a common ancestor “Sriram.†That, a settlement by an amicable partition took place on 06.06.1968 regarding the joint properties
of the Hindu Undivided Family (for short, “HUFâ€) of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons amongst the five brothers being the sons of Late Mulchand
Agarwal. Schedule „A‟ property (nine immovable properties) and three businesses, were allotted in favour of the coparceners of Bhaskaranand
and his two sons, P1 and D1 which constituted a HUF, as all coparceners were engaged in the joint family business and properties were thrown into
the joint family fund, no acquisition of property was independent. That, the evidence also reveals that over and above the nine immovable properties,
there were three more properties received in the amicable partition of 1968 which was disposed of by Bhaskaranand alone, prior to the institution of
the Suit. That, only in February, 1994, when the illegal alienation of Schedule „B‟ property in 1989 by D1 to D3 was discovered, that the dispute
arose between the parties. Relying on the ratio of Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade vs. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade and Other s(2007) 1
SCC 521 and Adiveppa and Others vs. Bhimappa and Another (2017) 9 SCC 586, it was urged that in a Suit for Declaration based on Title, once
the Plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the Defendant, it is for the Defendant to discharge his onus
in absence of which, the burden of proof lying on the Plaintiff must be held to have been discharged, thereby amounting to proof of the Plaintiff‟s
Title.
(ii) That, the Plaintiffs have discharged the burden cast on them firstly, by establishing that there was a Hindu joint family comprising of one Sriram
and his three sons, Mulchand, Nandalal and Deepchand. The parties have admitted that they are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law
being Hindu by religion. Thus, the existence of a HUF consisting of members of the family of Late Mulchand having a nucleus of property, is firmly
established. Drawing the attention of this Court to the documents relied on by P1, it was contended that Exhibit 1 reveals that the Gangtok allotment
consisting of eleven properties, required the cooperation of all allottees for transfer of all the properties in the name of the allottee or representative.
Paragraphs 2 to 7 of Exhibit 1 indicate a clear intention of separation in the family with conditions of independent business expenses, cost and liabilities
and the document bears the signature of all the sons of Mulchand. The acceptance of the allotment and all terms and conditions therein proves that it
was Bhaskaranand who received the Gangtok allotment for himself and his two minor sons, coparceners of the joint family. The partition was clearly
amongst the brothers who were the sons of Late Mulchand and not between Bhaskaranand and his two sons. The interpretation of the Defendants
that Exhibit 1 was a partition amongst Bhaskaranand and his two sons is nowhere borne out by documents. The rights of P1 and D1 over the suit
properties accrued solely by virtue of the fact that they were the sons of P1. The document also does not establish that D1 was allotted all the
property standing in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons or that Bhaskaranand took three properties as his share or that P1 was allotted the
remainder. That, Exhibit 1 was filed along with the Plaint and no challenge arose regarding its authenticity and, in fact, D1 has actually relied on it. The
first challenge thereof emanated from the Learned Trial Judge who took upon herself the forensic duty of deciding the genuineness of Exhibit 1
ignoring that both parties were relying on the document and concluded that Bhaskaranand having mentioned the words “for and on behalf of
Mahesh, Umesh and for self†does not show him to be acting as a Karta of his family. She also held that the words “and self†had been written
by a different pen, doubting the rights of Bhaskaranand. This opportunity was thus seized by the Defendants and they questioned the endorsement in
Exhibit 1.
(iii) Exhibit 3, another important document, corroborates and confirms the genuineness of Exhibit 1. Exhibit 3 is dated 04.06.1968 and was prepared by
Bhaskaranand two days before Exhibit 1 was executed on 06.06.1968. That, in Exhibit 3, the valuation of the twelve Gangtok properties and other
assets and liabilities amounting to a net of Rs.8.59 lakhs is rounded off and valuation is shown in Exhibit 1, i.e., Rs.8.59 lakhs. That, the Defendants
raised no objections to the proof and admission of Exhibit 3 but, in fact, corroborated and relied upon it for their own evidence. In his evidence, D1
confirmed that, as per the assessment of Bhaskaranand on 04.06.1968, the valuation of the Gangtok properties was shown in Exhibit 3 and that the
properties described in Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint are out of the eleven properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 and that the eleven
properties in Exhibit 3 were registered and stood in the name of different persons/entities. He further reconfirmed that of the eleven properties of
Exhibit 3, there is landed property of Agarwal Trading Company at Jorethang which was transferred to the family vide Exhibit 1. That, since he was a
minor, his father might have got Exhibit „H‟ executed by his first cousin Balkrishna. Exhibit „A‟ establishes that site allotment was made to the
HUF of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons of Gangtok on which the Schedule „B‟ building was constructed.
(iv) Exhibit 2 shows a partnership business in Calcutta registered in 1940. Taking advantage of this document, the Defendants have attempted to deny
the existence of a HUF but that it was a “Partnership at Will†and not a HUF, sans pleadings to this effect. The statements made by D1, in fact,
indicates the existence of a HUF doing diverse business and admission that M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons had properties and businesses in Dikchu,
Mangam, Dentam, Gangtok and Deorali since before 1968. Relying on Exhibits 16, 17, 18 and 19 which are Cash Books of property and business in
Sikkim, it was contended by Learned Senior Counsel that no objection was taken by the Defendants at the time they were marked as genuine, the
entries therein reveal jointness of the finances of the family of Bhaskaranand and their extensive businesses throughout Sikkim. Both the Learned
Courts below, however, did not consider Exhibit 18 on grounds of unreliability of its translation (Exhibit 20), raised by D1 but bad translation cannot
impeach the genuineness of Exhibits 16 to 19.
(v) The best evidence of physical joint status and joint possession of Schedule „B‟ property comes from the testimony of D3 who admitted that
when she came to Sikkim after her marriage in 1983, Bhaskaranand and his family including P1, were residing in the Schedule „B‟ property. D1
admitted as much as well. The suggestions made to P1 about Bhaskaranand inducting Central Reserve Police Force (“CRPFâ€) in the property at
Item No.7 of Schedule „A‟ negates D1‟s claim that Bhaskaranand relinquished his share in 1968. The sisters of P1 and D1 have all corroborated
the Plaintiffs‟ case. PW Sonam Topden (before the Learned Trial Court, the witness was variously numbered as “PW2†and “PW3†hence,
hereinafter for convenience, shall be referred to by name), a senior citizen, also stated that he had seen the family of Bhaskaranand and his sons and
their families, living jointly in the matter of mess and enjoyment and occupation of Schedule „B‟ property without disputes till 1994. D1 agreed to the
suggestion of the said witness to settle the dispute, provided the share of Bhaskaranand was divided equally between him and P1. That, PW Gitanjali
Jalan gave evidence that Late Bhaskaranand and his two sons constituted a joint family and Bhaskaranand was the Karta thereof. PW4 Kusum
Bazaz also supported the evidence of PW Gitanjali Jalan and that of Bhaskaranand and P1 concerning the family dispute in 1994. The evidence of
PW5 M. M. Jalan, corroborated the evidence of P1 indicating that Bhaskaranand took charge of the properties and business asK arta of the family
comprising of himself, D1 and P1. As a Karta, he frequently consulted PW5 on important matters pertaining to the affairs of joint family business and
initiated the process of transferring the properties and business standing in the names of Mulchand, Balkrishna and Bhagwandas Agarwal, transferred
in the names of his family members. Reliance was also placed by Learned Senior Counsel on Document “X5†by which, according to him, D1
confirmed that the aforestated properties were ancestral properties and admitted to have been retained by him. Asserting that Bhaskaranand and his
sons formed a coparcenary, reliance was placed on Sunil Kumar (supra).
(vi) That, there are glaring discrepancies between the pleadings of D1 and proof that cannot be resolved in any manner whatsoever. To substantiate
this point, the attention of this Court was invited to the Evidence-on-Affidavit of D1 as well as the Document “X4†alleged to have been admitted
by D1. That, D1 averred in his Written Statement that Bhaskaranand took no share in the alleged partition of 1968, which stood demolished by
evidence wherein he deposed that Bhaskaranand had held the properties mentioned in Item Nos.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3 and had also disposed of
these properties. That, he attempted to explain this lapse by stating that he only came to learn of this after Exhibit 3 was filed.
(vii) That, the Defendants perforce had to take resort to Exhibit „G‟ to substantiate their claim of partition. That, although the Defendants had
pleaded that the process of dividing all the properties started in or around 1973, however, as appears from the evidence of the Defendants in 1969, the
name of D1 was recorded in respect of M/s. Laxmi Stores located in the building being Item No.2 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint. This shows that
there was no partition as alleged and the joint properties of the family of Bhaskaranand were being mutated in the names of his sons without specific
allotment of shares. That, so far as Agarwal Trading is concerned, Exhibit „H‟ reveals that Balkrishna, a cousin, was acting as a nominee of D1
since 1966, that is two years before the family settlement of 1968, indicating that the family was a joint family prior to 1968. At the relevant time viz.
1975, D1 was studying at Pune and hence, it cannot be said that the business of Agarwal Trading came to his absolute share when he himself stated
that Balkrishna was the ostensible owner on his behalf from 01.01.1966.
(viii) That, it was the case of D1 that he became the absolute owner in respect of all the businesses, assets and properties of M/s. Shree Mulchand
and Sons by virtue of the fact that in 1977-79, an entirely new Firm by the same name had been registered under his proprietorship at Mangan and
Item Nos.1, 4, 6, 8 and half of 9 of Schedule „A,‟ vested absolutely on him as its owner. Except Exhibit „C,‟ no other document showing
mutation of the properties of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons, were ever produced by D1 nor did he have documents to show transfer of Schedule
„B‟ property to him. The registration of “Shree Mulchand & Sons†was, in fact, only for business in general goods at Mangan Bazar having an
approximate value of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one & Transports, Kalahasti & lakh) only. On this count, reliance was placed on Sankalchan
Jaychandbhai Patel and Others vs. Vithalbhai Jaychandbhai Patel and Others (1996) 6 SCC 433.
(ix) The claim of the Defendants is based upon the alleged partition vide Exhibit 1. They do not claim that any of the suit properties were the self-
acquired properties of D1, but denied the existence of a HUF or that the suit property was coparcenary properties. Even if D1 is claiming rights over
the suit properties through succession by inheritance under the Hindu Law, no scope exists for a great grandson to lay claims over his great
grandfather‟s property nor could he lay claim over his grandfather‟s property during the lifetime of this father. The only manner in which D1 could
possibly have any direct claim over the suit property is as a coparcener of the third generation from his grandfather. Relying on the ratio of Adiveppa
(supra), it was contended that the Defendants have not pleaded a clear chain of Title and have deliberately kept it vague and ambiguous.
(x) That, the Defendants have taken a plea that the land of Indo Sikkim Company was purchased by a Deed dated 18.10.1976, but at the same time
alleged that the property at Item No.9 of Schedule „A‟ belonged to M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and P1 in moiety. This establishes that it was a
part of the HUF property of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons. Relying on the ratio ofR amkrishna vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad 1966 SCC OnLine AP 155, it was argued that the ratio observed that the Karta of a joint Hindu family may enter into a
partnership with a stranger. Therefore, it establishes that the partnership by the five sons of Mulchand Agarwal in conjunction with one stranger, was
a family business. The Schedule „B‟ property is included in Exhibit 1 as part of the Gangtok allotment but the Defendants claim right, title and
interest in Schedule „B‟ vide Exhibit 1. They are estopped from turning around and deposing that Schedule „B‟ property did not belong to the
family of Mulchand as when they opposed the application under Order XXII Rule 3 of the CPC, they averred that only coparceners of the deceased
Hindu, i.e., the male heirs, could be parties. Having obtained an Order in their favour, the Defendants are now estopped from denying the fact that
they are all members of a HUF as they cannot approbate and reprobate.
(xi) During the mutation of immovable property vide Exhibit „D‟ in the name of P1, the General Power of Attorney was never utilized by
Bhaskaranand and the properties standing in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons were never mutated in the name of D1. Exhibit „H‟ was
also created only for the purpose of giving effect to the transfer of joint family businesses in accordance with Clause 8 of Exhibit 1. The same
arguments apply to Exhibit 7. That, Exhibit „L‟ is ambiguous and does not help the Defendants‟ case. That, the onus to prove partition was on the
Defendants. On this count, reliance was placed on Madanlal (Dead) by LRS. And Others vs. Yoga Bai (Dead) by LR.S (2003) 5 SCC 89 and
Chinthamani Ammal vs. Nandagopal Gounder and Another (2007) 4 SCC 163.
(xii) Exhibits „P,‟ „Q,‟ and „R‟ are also rife with ambiguities as Exhibit „D‟ shows that the suit properties in these litigations had already
been mutated for convenience in the name of P1. That, examination of Exhibits „S,‟ „T,‟ „U,‟ „V‟ and „W‟ would reveal that the HUF
was dealing with the properties as a matter of convenience in the names of either of the two sons of Bhaskaranand. The ambiguity in the documents
relied on by the Defendants went unexplained as no opportunity was given to do the same. That, Bhaskaranand took all actions vis-Ã -vis the tenants
vide Exhibits „U‟ and „V.‟ The Defendants chose not to confront P1 during cross-examination with the alleged admission in terms of Section 145
of the Evidence Act nor did the Defendants afford P1 with an opportunity of explaining the same. On this count, reliance was placed on Karan Singh
and Others vs. State of M.P. (2003) 12 SCC 587, Sita Ram Bhau Patil vs. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) By L.Rs. and Anothe (r1977) 2 SCC
49 and Udham Singh vs. Ram Singh and Another (2007) 15 SCC 529. That, the Learned First Appellate Court rightly came to the finding that the
Defendants are seen to have more or less abandoned their claim so far as it rested on the so called admissions of P1. Reliance was placed on
Nagubai Ammal and Others vs. B. Shama Rao and Other sAIR 1956 SC 593. In any event, the Defendants cannot fall back on the principles of
admissions, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence to confer Title upon themselves. This submission was fortified by the ratio of Union of India vs.
Purushotam Dass Tandon and Another 1986 (Supp) SCC 720 and Pant Nagar Mahatma Phule Co-op. Hsg. Society Ltd. and Others vs. State
of Maharashtra and Others (2016) SCC OnLine Bom 1784. The reliance of D3 is on Exhibit „B‟ which contains several infirmities, besides being
executed without the consent of the coparceners. On this count, reliance was placed on Thamma Venkata Subbamma (Dead) by LR vs. Thamma
Rattamma and Others (1987) 3 SCC 294.
(xiii) Advancing arguments on the second substantial question of law, it was contended that the Power of Attorney Exhibit „M‟ was taken at a
time when D1 was away for studies at Darjeeling and Bhaskaranand was the Karta managing and looking after the joint properties in Gangtok.
Exhibit „M‟ was made out not only to Bhaskaranand, but also to the wife of Bhaskaranand as well as the Defendant‟s grandmother Narayani
Devi. Exhibit „M‟ was never used by P1 to represent D1 except in Civil Suit No.76 of 1986. Besides, it is not unusual for aK arta to take a Power
of Attorney from other coparceners and the mere fact that he did so, does not divest him either of his status as Karta or of his right, title and interest
in the coparcenary property. Reliance was placed on Tvl. M. Muthuraj (HUF), Represented by its Karta/Power of Attorney Holder vs. The
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another W.P.(MD) No.13340 & 13344 of 2015 and W.P.(MD) No.1 & 1 of 2015, dated 26.06.2019
before the Madurai Bench of the Hon‟ble Madras High Court. Reliance was also placed onT ribhovandas Haribhai Tamboli (supra). Hence, it
was submitted that the Judgment of the Learned First Appellate Court requires no intervention.
12. The submissions advanced by Learned Senior Counsel for the parties were heard at length and duly considered. The pleadings, all evidence,
documents on record, the Judgments of Learned Courts below and the citations placed at the Bar have also been perused.
13. Before embarking on an examination of the merits of the matter, the air needs to be cleared with regard to the personal law which governs the
parties. In general, it may be said that in matters of status, every person is governed by the law of his personal status (See Duggamma, Kom Krishna
Bhat and Another vs. Ganeshayya Bin Keshayya and Others AIR 1965 Mysore 97). Where a Hindu family migrates from one State to another,
the presumption is that it carries with it, its personal law, that is, the laws and customs as to succession and family relations prevailing in the State from
which it came. However, this presumption can be rebutted by showing that the family has adopted the law and usage of the province to which it has
migrated (See Bikal Chandra Gope and Another vs. Manjura Gowalin and Other sAIR 1973 Patna 208). In this regard, in the matter at hand, it
is clear that the Plaintiffs assert that they are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. Although the Defendants denied such governance in
their averments, during the course of arguments, it was conceded by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants that the Defendants are indeed
governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. In view of the fact that the documents and evidence reveal that the parties originally belonged to
Haryana and migrated to Sikkim from Mumbai (then Bombay), Maharashtra and in view of the principles enunciated above pertaining to migration and
the personal law, and the subsequent admission made by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants during the arguments, it is clear that the parties
are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.
14.(i) Now addressing the substantial questions of law framed. The apple of discord between the parties arises on account of P1, P2 and P3 asserting
that the property is ancestral and no partition of the joint properties of the family that fell in the share of Bhaskaranand, P1 and D1 took place, that
mutation of the properties in the names of P1 and D1 were resorted to without specific allotment of shares. D1 contrarily claims that properties which
came to P1 and D1 vide Exhibit 1 excluded Bhaskaranand from its ambit and were partitioned and mutated in the names of P1 and D1, whereby Item
Nos.2, 3 and 7 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint fell in the share of P1 while Item Nos.1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 of Schedule „A‟ were the share of D1.
(ii) In Adiveppa (supra), it was held inter alia as follows;
“16. It is a settled principle of law that the initial burden is always on the plaintiff to prove his case by proper pleading and adequate evidence (oral
and documentary) in support thereof. The plaintiffs in this case could not prove with any documentary evidence that the suit properties described in
Schedules B and C were their self-acquired properties and that the partition did not take place in respect of Schedule D properties and it continued to
remain ancestral in the hands of family members. On the other hand, the defendants were able to prove that the partition took place and was acted
upon.
………………………………………………………………………………….……
19. It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the
absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after
admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-
acquired property. (See Mulla, Hindu Law, 22nd Edn. Article 23 “Presumption as to coparcenary and self-acquired propertyâ€, pp. 346 and
347.)â€
(iii) It thus emanates that the essence of a coparcenary under Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership. It is well settled that the normal state of every
Hindu joint family is one of jointness. Every such family is joint in food, worship and estate in the absence of proof of division and in the absence of
any positive steps taken to effect a partition.
15 P1 has placed reliance on Exhibit 1 (in four pages) as proof of existence of joint family. D1 has not denied this document. This document bears the
heading “Terms and Conditions for Gangtok Allotment.†The total assets therein are described as follows, “Rs.8,59,500/- Less
Rs.59,500/- Joint Pool A/c. Nett asset 8,00,000/-.†It indicates that eleven properties of Gangtok are to be received by the allottee. The three
other pages bear the heading “General Terms†and are signed by Pitamberlal, Rameshwarlal, Tikaram, Lakshmi Narayan and Bhaskaranand.
They are the sons of Mulchand, their grandfather being Sriram. When Exhibit 1 (first page) is read with the remaining pages being theâ €œGeneral
Terms,†it appears that business of the five brothers named above (lineally descended from Sriram) had been divided into five lots. Exhibit 1, in no
uncertain terms, reveals this circumstance and it is specified therein that the share which fell into the lot of any brother would have to be accepted
without any objection by the allottee. Exhibit 1 is said to have been made by way of family settlement. In Kokilambal and Others vs. N. Raman AIR
2005 SC 2468 it was held that a settlement or family arrangement is recognized as a valid transfer of properties under Hindu Law. Normally, Courts
do lean in favour of enforcement of such an arrangement or settlement.
16. Exhibit 2 was identified by P1 as the certified copy of Firm Registration of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sonsa lias Mulchand and Sons. P1 relied on
Exhibit 2 on grounds that the name of the Firm reflected in Exhibit 2 is the same as the name of the Hindu Undivided Family, i.e. Shree Mulchand and
Sons. That D1 had taken advantage of the fact that the document was one showing a “Partnership at Will†and not a HUF, sans pleadings. While
examining Exhibit 2, although the name of the Firm is “Shree Mulchand & Sons alias & Mulchand & Sons,†the words “Duration or
date of registration: Partnership at will.†reflects that it was a “Partnership at Will.†The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 at Section 7 provides
that where no provision is made by contract between the partners for the duration of their partnership or for determination of their partnership, the
partnership is a “Partnership at Will.†It is settled law that members of an undivided Hindu family can form a partnership without disturbing their
status as members of the joint family and without disrupting the same, just as they can acquire separate property or carry on business for themselves
(See Chandrakant Manilal Shah and Another vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay-II AIR 1992 SC 66).
17. That having been said, it is evident that even if there was a partnership of the five brothers with an outsider, the five brothers were members of
the same family lineally descended from a common ancestor and evidently maintained a joint pool of their accounts, as reflected in the “General
Terms†of Exhibit 1 indicating their joint ownership of property and accounts. The existence of a Partnership Firm cannot wish away the existence of
a HUF which undoubtedly existed, as can be gauged from the terms of Exhibit 1. Even if it is to be assumed that the allotment that fell in the share of
P1, D1 and Bhaskaranand, was not joint family property as sought to be asserted by D1 (without fortifying such assertion with proof), once the
property came into the share of Bhaskaranand, P1 and D1, it became their joint family property. The family is a joint family if it is joint in affairs of
food, worship and estate as observed in Mst. Rukhmabai (supra). In a joint family business, no member of the family can say that he is the owner of
one-half, one-third or one-fourth. The essence of joint Hindu family property is unity of ownership and community of interest, and the shares of the
members are not defined. (See Mulla, Hindu Law, 23rd Edition, Page 354). Hence, the family of Bhaskaranand formed a joint Hindu family
comprising of Bhaskaranand, his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters and his mother. The minor sons could not be said to be independent at that
stage. Bhaskaranand signed on Exhibit 1 duly accepting the shares of P1 and D1 as also his own and being their father, became the Karta by virtue of
the Mitakshara Law. The shares in the allotment made as per Exhibit 1 nowhere indicates that the division of properties was only between P1 and D1
or between the heirs of Mulchand and P1 and D1 and that Bhaskaranand had relinquished his claims, as claimed by D1, neither was any proof
furnished by D1 that he had invested separate funds to obtain any of the Schedule „A‟ properties standing in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and
Sons, although he made such an averment in his pleadings.
18. So far as discharging the burden of proof is concerned, Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants relied onR angammal (supra). In the said
ratio, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while discussing Section 101 of the Evidence Act, has inter alia held that;
“21. ………………
Thus, the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts it. Until such burden is
discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom the
burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of the other
party.â€
The ratio in Anil Rishi (supra) relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, in sum and substance, deals with the same matter. Md. Kalu
Sheikh @ Abdul Gani Sarkar (supra) relies on the ratio in Anil Singh and Rangammal (supra).
19.(i) On examining the evidence of PW Gitanjali Jalan, the blood sister of P1 and D1, she statedi nter alia that Bhaskaranand lived
“.....alongwith all his family members comprising of my brothers the Present Plaintiff No.1 and the defendant No.1, two maiden sisters
and mother and grand-mother.†PW Sonam Topden claimed close acquaintance with the family of Bhaskaranand Agarwal and saw
Bhaskaranand, his sons and other members living jointly in Schedule „B‟ property. He came to learn of the dispute pertaining to Schedule „B‟
property and on the request of Bhaskaranand, took up the matter with the Defendant No.1 who was agreeable to partitioning of the properties in three
shares i.e. between his father, himself and his brother (P1) on the condition that on the demise of Bhaskaranand, the property would then be divided
equally between him and P1. According to him, “......Seeing the relation maintained by the family of late Bhaskarananda Agarwal I felt that
plaintiff no.1 and def. no.1‟s family were joint. ......â€
(ii) PW4 Kusum Bazaz, blood sister of P1 and D1, stated that prior to 1968, they were living at Bombay (now Mumbai) and her father Bhaskaranand
Agarwal used to take care of and manage all affairs relating to the business and properties belonging to and owned by the then joint family known as
M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons. According to her, there was harmony and unity in the joint family in Sikkim. Her cross-examination however reveals
her ignorance of the dealings made by Bhaskaranand Agarwal with regard to the properties and contrary to the evidence of the other witnesses of P1,
she stated that Bhaskaranand received the properties in Sikkim only on his own behalf when the allotment of 1968 took place and P1 and D1 were not
given any share on the said day.
(iii) PW5 M.M. Jalan is the husband of PW Gitanjali Jalan. He deposed that his father-in-law used to consult him in matters connected to the family
and business matters of importance, more particularly since the middle of 1968, as all the children of Bhaskaranand Agarwal were then minors. Under
cross-examination, he however admitted to having no knowledge about whether D1 transferred the business of Laxmi Stores in the name of Sheila
Agarwal, wife of P1 or of the transfer of the seven storeyed building in the name of D3 on 31.03.1989. According to him, a state of distrust and
hatred was prevailing amongst the members of the joint family and he tried to bring an amicable partition of the properties and businesses owned by
the family but due to a condition set forth by D1, the settlement could not be achieved and this was in February, 1994.
(iv) The evidence of P1‟s witnesses reveal that they were unaware of the internal dealings with regard to the property of the family of Bhaskaranand
but they all were aware and had seen Bhaskaranand, P1 and D1 living in a joint family.
20. Considering the above arguments advanced by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, it is pertinent to mention that the reliance of P1 is on
Exhibit 1. A detailed discussion has ensued on Exhibit 1 and how the property came to the coparcenary of Bhaskaranand and his two sons. Exhibit 1,
on pain of repetition, it may be stated, is not denied by D1. Reliance was also placed on Exhibit 3 by P1, the contents of which were also admitted by
D1. Hence, so far as burden of proof lies on P1 that the properties in Exhibit 1 fell in the share of Bhaskaranand, P1 and D1 vide the said document
and that they were living in a joint family with joint properties, has duly been discharged by him. Consequently, it falls on the Defendants to prove
partition, with cogent and reliable evidence.
21. While relying on Exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 viz. Ledger Book/Cash Books of various businesses said to indicate maintenance of joint accounts
by the joint family of Bhaskaranand, the argument advanced by Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs was that no objection was taken by the
Defendants at the time they were marked as Exhibits. P1, in his evidence, has identified Exhibit 16 as the Hand Book accounts of Laxmi Store;
Exhibit 17 as the Ledger Book of the property and business in entire Sikkim; Exhibit 18 as the record of Cash Book of business and properties of
entire Sikkim; Exhibit 19 as the record of Cash Book of Laxmi store and Exhibit 20 as the translated version of Exhibit 18. P1 admitted however that
the entries in Exhibit 18 were in the handwriting of one “Arvind Tripathi†but “Arvind Tripathi†was not produced as a witness to prove the
contents of the document. In the absence of the proof of the contents of the document, both Learned Courts below rightly disregarded these
documents. In Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra), it was held that mere marking of an Exhibit does not dispense with its proof. Once the contents are
proved, should the opposing party fail to raise objections or extract any contradictory evidence by way of cross-examination, then the contents of the
document can be accepted as evidence. The probative value of a document must be established in the absence of which, the document deserves to be
and is consequently disregarded.
22.(i) So far as the properties in Schedule „A‟ and Schedule „B‟ to the Plaint are concerned, as can be culled out from the evidence on record,
more importantly of P1 and D1, Item No.2 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint is one wooden shop house with land measuring 17‟x65‟ at M.G. Marg,
Gangtok and Item No.10 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint is property in the form of business styled as “Laxmi Stores†at M.G. Marg, Gangtok.
The business in Item No.10 is being run from the property in Item No.2. P1, in his Evidence-on-Affidavit has stated that this property was acquired by
the joint family in the year 1963 and that although it is recorded in his name with the concerned Department but Item No.2 is a joint family business.
However, he went on to admit that the properties mentioned in Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint are recorded in his name. Exhibit
8 reflects that Item No.10 is recorded in the name of the wife of P1, Sheila Agarwal. It was in the name of D1 and prior to that in the name of one
Bhagwandas Agarwala. Although P1 denied in his Evidence-on-Affidavit that the change of name in the record of the business known as Laxmi
Stores was the result of mutual agreement between Bhaskaranand, D1 and himself, however, under cross-examination, it was extracted from him that
Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 were recorded in his name. D1, while supporting the fact that Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 were recorded in the name of P1, stated that
P1 is the absolute owner of the properties described in Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint and his wife is the sole proprietor of the
business of M/s. Laxmi Stores. The evidence on record establishes that Item No.2 is in the name of P1 and Item No.10 is in the name of his wife,
Sheila Agarwal who is not a coparcener in the family. A Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family. It includes only those
persons who acquire by birth, an interest in the joint or coparcenary property. (See Surjit Lal Chhaabda vs. CIT Bombay AIR 1976 SC 109). For
the aforesaid reason, Item No.10 cannot therefore be said to be joint family property having been recorded in the name of the wife of P1. No
documents indicating a joint pool of expenditure for the said properties were furnished to support the contention of jointness by P1.
(ii) Item No.3 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint viz. one three storeyed RCC building measuring 40‟X30‟ at Deorali, Gangtok according to P1, was
acquired by the joint family in or around the year 1963 and let out to different tenants but is recorded in the name of P1. D1 admitted that Item No.3
was allotted and given exclusively to P1. Exhibit „D‟ dated 30.07.1980 is a Mutation Certificate reflecting that Item No.3 is recorded in the name of
P1. No proof whatsoever was furnished by P1 to prove that it was held as a joint family property having a joint pool of accounts after such mutation.
In my considered opinion, it is the sole property of P1.
(iii) For Item No.7 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint i.e. one two storeyed wooden house and land measuring 20‟x80‟ at Rangpo, East Sikkim, P1
submits that this property was acquired by the joint family in or around the year 1955 and is standing in his name but is a joint family property and let
out to the Government of Sikkim where CRPF have their camp. In fact, as already stated, his admission is that Item Nos.2, 3 and 7 were allotted to
him and given to him exclusively and cross-examination extracted so much from him. D1 lent strength to this deposition of P1. The claim of P1 that
Item No.7 is a joint family property lacks support sans any joint fund in the name of the family. Exhibit „D‟ relied on by D1, proves that Item No.7
was recorded in the name of P1. In my considered opinion duly supported by the evidence in record, Item Nos.2, 3, 7 and 10 are the exclusive
properties of P1.
(iv) So far as Item No.9 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint is concerned, although parties admitted that it was held in moiety by them, according to P1,
this property was acquired by the joint family in the year 1955 and is standing both in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and himself. D1, for
his part, stated that P1 purchased Item No.9 from M/s. Indo Sikkim Company vide a Deed dated 18.10.1976 and is held in moiety by P1 and himself.
No documents were furnished by either party in support of their respective evidence but both P1 and D1 are in agreement that the property belongs to
them in moiety. In light of this admission of both parties even if no documents are furnished, the Court is of the view that Item No.9 belongs to them
jointly.
(v) Item No.1 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, according to P1, is the same property as mentioned in Schedule „B‟ to the Plaint which, according to
him, was built out of the joint fund of the family Firm and was recorded in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons with the concerned authorities.
D1, for his part, deposed that since the registration of the Firm “Shree Mulchand & Sons†in the year 1979, he had become the owner in respect
of all business, assets and properties of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and the properties described in Item Nos.1, 4, 5, 6 and half of 9 in Schedule
„A‟ to the Plaint, vested on him as the absolute owner thereof. While examining the documents relied on by the parties it appears that so far as
Item No.1 is concerned, Exhibit „A‟ was relied on by D1. This is a document indicating that a site in theâ €œNew Extension Bazar, Gangtokâ€
was allotted to “Messrs. Shree Mulchand & Sons†in the year 1944. The only reason for D1 to lay claim on Item No.1 of Schedule
„A‟/Schedule „B‟ property is the fact that he is the proprietor of a Firm registered in the year 1979 by the name of “Shree Mulchand &
Sons.†It is not denied that vide Exhibit „A‟ the land on which Item No.1 of Schedule A‟/Schedule „B‟ building stands, was an allotment made
by the then Maharani to “Messrs. Shree Mulchand & Sons†in the year 1944. There is no ambiguity in the fact that Item No.1 in Schedule
„A‟/Schedule „B‟ property, was allotted to M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons in the year 1944. The house on the allotted Plot was built before 1968
as per the evidence of P1. D1 does not contradict this evidence. It is evident from the deposition of the witnesses and documents on record that no
transfer of Item No.1 of Schedule „A‟/Schedule „B‟ property had been made fromâ €œM/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons†of 1944 to
“Shree Mulchand & Sons†registered in 1979 of which D1 is shown to be the sole proprietor. Thus, in my considered opinion, D1 cannot lay
claim on Item No.1 of Schedule „A‟/Schedule „B‟ property, sans documentary evidence of transfer or partition of the property causing it to fall
in his share, relying on the serendipitous circumstance of having registered a Firm by the name of “Shree Mulchand & Sons†in his name in
1979, which was the name of the Firm to which the allotment of land was made in the year 1944, and in which Item No.1 of Schedule
„A‟/Schedule „B‟ property was built. The fortuitous circumstance of the same name as elucidated above, cannot be a ground for D1 to claim
Item No.1 of Schedule „A‟/Schedule „B‟ property to be his separate property, lacking as it is, in supportive evidence.
(vi) That having been said, while dealing with Item Nos.4, 8, 11 and 12 mentioned in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint;
(a) According to P1, Item No.4 is standing in the name of D1. Exhibit „C‟ relied on by D1 indicates that registration of a Firm by the name of
“Shree Mulchand & Sons†took place on 16.06.1979, the document having been presented for registration on 07.09.1977 by Bhaskaranand
Agarwal. The sole proprietor of the Firm “Shree Mulchand & Sons†as already discussed, is D1. Exhibit „O‟ relied on by D1, is a document
dated 03.07.1979 addressed to “M/s. Mulchand & Sons, Gangtok.†It is certified therein by theâ €œUnder Secretary, Local Self Govt. &
Housing Departt.†that M/s. Mulchand & Sons owned one wooden godown in Deorali Bazar. Now, while reverting back to Exhibit „C,‟ the Firm
came to be registered in the name of D1 on 16.06.1979 and Exhibit „O‟ is dated 03.07.1979 thereby lending credence to the fact that Item No.4
belonged to D1 as the proprietor of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons in view of Exhibit „C‟ and Exhibit „O‟ and is therefore his sole property. P1
has failed to supplicate his evidence that it is a joint family property, with any specific documentary evidence.
(b) Item No.8 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint according to P1, is also a joint family property which was acquired in or around the year 1960. The said
property comprised of a two storeyed brick built structure wherein the joint family business of petrol, diesel and kerosene oil dealership was carried
out in the name and style of M/s. Agarwal Trading Co. Contrarily, D1 in his evidence, stated that the properties in Item Nos.1 and 8 belonged to him
absolutely and nobody has any right, title and interest in the said property and relied on Exhibit „L‟ for this purpose. No cross-examination was
conducted to contradict this document. Exhibit „L‟ is seen to be a “Rent Note†between „Mahesh Agarwal, son of Bhaskaranand Agarwal‟
as Lessor and “Devendrasingh Sanjaysingh†as the Lessee for the premises in Jorethang, Naya Bazar, South Sikkim. Thus, although P1 deposed
that Item No.8 is also a joint family property, Exhibit „L‟ proves that D1 is the owner of the said property mentioned in Item No.8. The position with
regard to Item No.1 of Schedule „A‟/Schedule „B‟ property has already been explained supra.
(c) Item Nos.11 and 12 in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint are evidently recorded in the name of D1, Item No.11 vide Exhibit „H‟ dated 06.05.1975,
giving D1 the reason to have executed Exhibit „M‟ and Item No.12 vide Exhibit „C‟ dated 07.09.1977. These documents can well be considered
by this Court since no cross-examination of D1 was conducted with regard to these documents.
(vii) So far as Item Nos.5 and 6 are concerned, P1 stated that these properties were also acquired by the joint family in or around the year 1943-44
and under cross-examination, volunteered to state that Item Nos.5 and 6 “are not recorded in the name of def. no.1 but in the name of Shri
Mulchand and Sons.†D1, for his part, could only state that because it was recorded in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons, the properties
belonged to him but no documentary evidence was furnished, as before, to indicate transfer of these properties acquired by M/s. Shree Mulchand and
Sons of circa 1940, prior to 1979, when the Firm of D1 was registered as “Shree Mulchand & Sons.â€
(viii) It is evident that Schedule „B‟ property was transferred to the name of D3 by D1 vide Exhibit „B,‟ dated 31.01.1989, merely on the
strength of the property standing in the name of M/s. Shree Mulchand and Sons and the fact by which D1, in 1977-79, registered a Firm by the name
of Shree Mulchand & Sons in his name. The presentation of Exhibit „C‟ before the concerned authority allegedly by Bhaskaranand, makes no
difference to the position of Schedule „B‟ property, as Bhaskaranand had not transferred the said property to D1 when he presented the application
and sought registration of the Firm “Shree Mulchand & Sons†in the name of D1 nor has such intention been indicated or evidence led by D1.
The transfer of Schedule „B‟ property to D3 by D1 is, as a consequence, void and inoperative in law, D1 being devoid of such power. Therefore,
the argument advanced by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants that the properties in Schedule „A‟ recorded in the name of M/s. Shree
Mulchand and Sons were allotted in favour of D1 while those in the name of Mulchand were allotted in favour of P1, are not borne out by the
documents relied on by D1.
23.(i) Now coming to the question of whether a Power of Attorney is required to be executed in favour of a Karta by the coparcener, it is necessary
to understand that a property belonging to a joint family is ordinarily managed by the father or other senior member for the time being of the family.
The Manager of a joint family is called “Karta.†So long as the members of a family remain undivided, the senior member of the family is entitled
to manage the family property including even charitable properties and is presumed to be the Manager until the contrary is shown. The Karta as the
head of the family, has control over the income and expenditure and he is the custodian of the surplus, if any. The Manager has power over the
income of the joint family pertaining to maintenance, education, marriage and other religious ceremonies of the coparceners and of the members of
their respective families. He also has power to contract debts for family purpose and family business. On going through Exhibit „M‟ which is the
General Power of Attorney executed by D1 in favour of Narayani Devi Agarwal, Bhaskaranand Agarwal and Bimla Devi Agarwal, it is clear that
this document was not a Power of Attorney given solely to Bhaskaranand. Besides, it appears that D1 was a student at the relevant time and Item
No.10, later transferred to Sheila Agarwal, was registered in his name in 1972 as he had attained the age of majority in 1971 as per P1, which went
uncontested, and presumably should any action be required with regard to this property owned by him, he had jointly empowered Narayani Devi
Agarwal, Bhaskaranand Agarwal and Bimla Devi Agarwal.
(ii) The argument of Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants that there is no document on record filed by P1 to indicate the role of Bhaskaranand
as Karta or any document signed by him as Karta, flies in the face of the assumed state of a Hindu joint family. Bhaskaranand was the father of P1
and D1 who were both minors at the time of the settlement of 1968. As per P1, he attained majority in 1973 while D1 did so in 1971. By virtue of him
having signed on the document of allotment and having taken care of the family itself makes him (Bhaskaranand) a Karta. An objection was raised by
Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs that no Power of Attorney is required for aK arta by others constituting the coparcenary under the
Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, as was given by P1 to Bhaskaranand and the Learned First Appellate Court was on agreement on this aspect by
placing reliance on Sunil Kumar and Another (supra). There is indeed no reason for this Court to differ from the finding of the Learned First
Appellate Court. It is worth mentioning that in the said ratio, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held inter alia as follows;
“22. In a Hindu family, the karta or Manager occupies a unique position. It is not as if anybody could become Manager of a joint Hindu family.
“As a general rule, the father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family, is alone entitled to manage the joint family
property.†The Manager occupies a position superior to other members. He has greater rights and duties. He must look after the family interests. He
is entitled to possession of the entire joint estate. He is also entitled to manage the family properties. In other words, the actual possession and
management of the joint family property must vest in him. He may consult the members of the family and if necessary take their consent to his action
but he is not answerable to every one of them.â€
Document D18, dated 18.02.1977, is the Power of Attorney issued by P1. This document was neither proved nor contradicted and therefore requires
no further discussion by this Court, while discussions on Exhibit „M‟ have already ensued supra. These discussions would, therefore, soundly quell
the second substantive question of law, extracted above.
(iii) Now, while examining and analyzing the other documentary evidence on record, Exhibit 3 was relied on by the Plaintiffs which is not an original
document, D1 also relied on the contents of Exhibit 3 and stated inter alia in his evidence that, “...The original Plaintiff No.1 held the
properties mentioned in item No.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3. He disposed of the said properties by himself. Document No. „X-4‟ describes
one of the said three properties. ...†P1 in his Evidence-on-Affidavit, at Paragraph 25, has deposed inter alia as follows;
“25. ....The original plaintiff No.1, Bhaskaranand Agarwal(since deceased) had even in his capacity as karta of his joint family, sold one
of the properties allotted to his joint family by the said family settlement/arrangement of 1968, situated at Singtam Bazar....â€
These properties in Exhibit 3 are described as, “Naya Bazar old building,†“Naya bazaar thekedar building†and a building in Singtam.
Both P1 and D1 are in agreement that one property, being a building situated at Singtam Bazaar, East Sikkim, was sold by Bhaskaranand, their father,
in the year 1989. Although P1 has deposed that the proceeds of the said property were deposited in a joint family account, he admitted that he had no
proof of such deposit. The argument of D1 that the properties were divided only amongst himself and P1, appears to be a figment of his imagination as
he himself has admitted in his evidence extracted supra, that three properties in Exhibit 3 were retained by Bhaskaranand.
24. Although Learned Senior Counsel for D1 contended that Exhibit 3 is an unproved document as mere marking of a document is not proof thereof,
however, we may relevantly refer to Section 58 of the Evidence Act which provides;
“58. Facts admitted need not be proved.â€"No fact need to be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to
admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at
the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.â€
Hence, although the document has not been proved in terms of the Evidence Act, in view of the admission of the contents of the document by P1 and
D1, this Court takes note of the evidence furnished in Exhibit 3.
25. Addressing the rival arguments of “non-partition†submitted by P1 and “partition†made by D1, we may relevantly refer to the ratio in
Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh (supra) relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, wherein it was inter alia observed as follows;
“5. .........It is now well established that an agreement between all the coparceners is not essential to the disruption of the joint family
status, but a definite and unambiguous indication of intention by one member to separate himself from the family and to enjoy his share in
severalty will amount in law to a division of status.â€
The joint state of a Hindu family is a given, the coparcener who claims that he has separated, must prove that he has done so in terms detailed above.
On careful examination of the evidence on record, it emanates that there was partial partition of the properties that came to the family of
Bhaskaranand. A partition between coparceners may be partial either in respect of the property or in respect of the persons making it. (See Mulla
supra 23rd Edition, Page 522). D1 has not been able to establish by any documentary evidence that the entire joint family properties had been
divided at any point of time neither has he been able to establish by an unambiguous indication of intention that he sought to separate himself from the
family. The assertion of P1 that there was no partition at all, stands belied by the evidence pertaining to Item No.10 of Schedule „A,‟ by which the
property came to be registered in the name of his wife.
26. It thus concludes from the documentary evidence on record that after the settlement of 1968, there was a partition of the properties amongst
Bhaskaranand and his two sons i.e. P1 and D1, in terms of which P1 was given Item Nos.2, 3, 7 and 10, D1 was given Item Nos.4, 8, 11 and 12, as
detailed in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint and Bhaskaranand held the properties mentioned in Item Nos.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3 which he admittedly
disposed of.
27. The evidence of both P1 and D1 is a clear indication of the partial partition of the joint family property and in the absence of documentary
evidence indicating transfer of Item Nos.1, 5 and 6 to either P1 or D1 or for that matter to Bhaskaranand during his lifetime, it continues to remain a
joint family property.
28.(i) While referring to Exhibits „P,‟ „Q,‟ „R,‟ „T,‟ „U‟ and „V,‟ Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs relied on Section 145 of
the Evidence Act and argued that D1 had failed to comply with the legal mandate of this provision and P1 was not confronted with the said Exhibits.
To the contrary, Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants submitted that there is no hard and fast rule as regards the compliance with Section 145
of the Evidence Act and vehemently argued that in the light of the provisions of Section 80 of the Evidence Act, the necessity of Section 145 of the
Act, in the instant matter, does not arise.
(ii) A careful reading of Section 80 of the Evidence Act reveals that the Section deals with presumptions attached to deposition of witnesses in a
judicial proceeding or before any Officer authorized by law to take such evidence or statements or confessions by any person, taken in accordance
with law. It must be borne in mind that the Section has nothing to do with the admissibility of any particular kind of evidence which has to be decided
by reference to the other Sections of the Act. Section 80 of the Act dispenses with the necessity for formal proof in the case of certain documents
taken in accordance with law and gives legal sanction to the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta, viz., that all acts are presumed to have been
rightly done. This, however, does not tantamount to dispensing with the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act, which provides as follows;
“145.Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.â€"A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him
in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to
contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of
contradicting him.
(iii) If D1 sought to contradict the evidence of P1 in the previous Civil Suits, his attention ought to have been drawn to these parts. InB hagwan
Singh (supra), relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, it was held that all that is required under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is
that the witness must be treated fairly and be afforded a reasonable opportunity of explaining the contradictions after his attention has been drawn to
them in a fair and reasonable manner. In the said ratio, evidently the witness concerned had been questioned about each separate fact point by point,
the whole statement was read out to him and he admitted that he had made it in the Committing Court. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court opined that this
procedure may be open to objection when the previous statement is a long one and only one or two small passages in it are used for contradiction
which may thereby confuse a witness. However, in the said case, the witness had been questioned about every material passage in it point by point
and hence it was observed that the procedure adopted was in substantial compliance to Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
(iv) In Biswanath Prasad and Others (supra), relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court heldi nter alia
as follows;
“8. ......There is a cardinal distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness who is examined and is sought to be
discredited by use of his prior statement. In the former case an admission by a party is substantive evidence if it fulfills the requirements of S. 21 of
the Evidence Act: in the latter case a prior statement is used to discredit the credibility of the witness and does not become substantive evidence. In
the former there is no necessary requirement of the statement containing the admission having to be put to the party because it is evidence proprio
vigore: in the latter case the Court cannot be invited to disbelieve a witness on the strength of a prior contradictory statement unless it has been put to
him, as required by S. 145 of the Evidence Act. ……â€
Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants did not address whether the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act was fulfilled or not.
(v) In Sita Ram Bhau Patil (supra), relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observedi nter alia as
under;
“17. If admission is proved and if it is thereafter to be used against the party who has made it the question comes within the provisions of Section
145 of the Evidence Act. The provisions in the Indian Evidence Act that “admission is not conclusive proof†are to be considered in regard to two
features of evidence. First, what weight is to be attached to an admission? In order to attach weight it has to be found out whether the admission is
clear, unambiguous and is a relevant piece of evidence. Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act
and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, “it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an
opportunity, if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. ………â€
(vi) Later in time, in Karan Singh and Others (supra), relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
explaining the object of Section 145 of the Evidence Act, held inter alia as follows;
“5. When a previous statement is to be proved as an admission, the statement as such should be put to the witness and if the witness denies having
given such a statement it does not amount to any admission and if it is proved that he had given such a statement the attention of the witness must be
drawn to that statement. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is clear on this aspect. The object is to give the witness a chance of explaining the
discrepancy or inconsistency and to clear up the particular point of ambiguity or dispute. In the instant case, Ext. D-4 statement as such was not put to
the witness nor was the witness given an opportunity to explain it. Therefore, Ext. D-4 statement, even if it is assumed to be a statement of PW 1
Hari Singh, that is of no assistance to the appellants to prove their case of private defence.â€
(vii) From a reading of all of the above ratiocination, it is clear that a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to the party alleged to have made the
admission and he should be allowed to explain the contradictions in his evidence before the Court and any admission made previously. The deposition
is to be put to the witness and his attention drawn to the admission. From the evidence on record, it is seen that P1 was never put the admissions said
to have been made by him in the proceedings being Exhibits „P,‟ „Q‟ and „R‟ neither was he confronted with the statements made by him in
the said Civil Suits and it must be noted and considered that in his evidence, P1 had inter alia stated as follows,
“21. ………….I say that, being told about such registration, and on misapprehension of law and in good faith, I believed that the
defendant No.1 owned the properties standing in the name of Shri Mulchand and Sons and even deposed in one civil suit No.76 of 1986,
which now stands disposed of, that the defendant No.1 is the owner of the schedule „B‟ property, out of such belief.â€
(emphasis supplied)
(viii) The argument of Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants that P1 had admitted that by virtue of the Firm Registration in the name of D1 in
1977-79, D1 had become the absolute owner of the Schedule „B‟ property, is an erroneous contention as emerges from the evidence on record
wherein P1 has deposed inter alia as follows;
“It is true that item no.1, 4, 5, 6, 8 and half of 9 of schedule A property are recorded in the name of def. no.1 ………….. It is true that
I did not make any complaint against the above properties (1, 4, 5, 6, 8 and half of 9) being recorded in the name of def. no.1. Witness
again volunteers to say that properties mentioned in 1, 4, 5, 6 and half of 9 are not recorded in the name of def. no.1 but in the name of Shri
Mulchand and Sons.â€
(emphasis supplied)
(ix) The admission of Bhaskaranand and P1, in their evidence (in Civil Suit No.76 of 1986) viz. Exhibit „U‟ i.e. deposition of Bhaskaranand before
the Learned Civil Judge, East, Gangtok in July, 1987 and Exhibit „V‟ i.e. deposition of P1 before the Learned Civil Judge, East, Gangtok in August,
1987, also needs no discussion in view of the discussions that have emanated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act supra.
29. It was the contention of Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants that the Learned First Appellate Court had held that the eldest member of the
family would be the Karta, but in granting the Reliefs No.(a), (b) and (c) of the Plaint, had injuncted D1, the eldest member of the family from running
the joint family and joint family business. Towards this argument, it may be pointed out that D1 had stood his ground insisting that there was already a
division of the properties between him and P1, in the face of the stand taken by D1, the Learned First Appellate Court had evidently granted the
Reliefs to prevent D1 from taking detrimental steps or otherwise with regard to the properties in question as the finding of the Learned First Appellate
Court was that all property in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, were joint family property.
30.(i) While addressing the point on whether Bhaskaranand had relinquished his claim to any property, the averment and deposition of D1 in this
context needs to be considered. D1, in his Written Statement averred as follows;
“17. ……..It is further denied that by virtue of partition in the year 1968, the entire properties and business of M/s Shree Mulchand
and sons in the state of Sikkim were allotted absolutely in favour of the co-parceners of the family of the Plaintiff No.1. In fact by the said
partition all the properties in Sikkim given (sic) to Defendant No.1 and Plaintiff No.2 separately. Nothing was given to the Plaintiff No.1
who also gave up his claim and relinquished his rights, even if there was any. ….â€
but his evidence is to the contrary. In his Evidence-on-Affidavit, D1 has deposed that,
“…………The original Plaintiff No.1 held the properties mentioned in item No.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3. He disposed of the said
properties by himself. Document No. „X-4‟ describes one of the said three properties. …….â€
During cross-examination, he deposed as follows;
“........The statement made in paragraph 5 of exbt-DD “but in fact, the said partition was between original plaintiff no.1, the present
plaintiff no.1 and me†is a true statement. It is not true the original plaintiff no.1 did not hold the properties mentioned in item no.6, 9 and
10 of exbt-3. It is true that in the W.S I have stated that “the plaintiff no.1 did not claim any interest in any property and gave up his
claim and also relinquished his interest in the property so partition in 1968â€. Witness volunteers to say that during the time of preparation
of the W.S, since exbt-3 was not in his possession and knowledge and the same was only later filed by the plaintiffs, the above statement had
been given by me. Witness also states that there is no mention of the said properties in the schedule of the plaint. ......â€
The vacillating averments and evidence of D1 raises doubts about the authenticity of his case and his grip on the facts and circumstances.
(ii) Although the matter with regard to the earlier Suits vide Exhibits „P,‟ „Q‟ and „R‟ have already been discussed, I deem it imperative to
emphasize that Exhibit „P‟ pertains to Civil Suit No.42 of 1980. The Suit evidently was for eviction of a tenant. Exhibit „Q‟ pertains to Civil Suit
No.27 of 1985. This Suit was also for eviction and other reliefs. Exhibit „R‟ pertains to Civil Suit No.47 of 1986. This is another Suit for eviction and
other reliefs. These Suits were filed by P1 against different persons. Exhibit „T‟ pertains to Civil Suit No.76 of 1986 filed by D1 against different
persons for recovery of rent. None of the said Suits were Suits for declaration of Title or Ownership. InK eshar Bai v. Chhunulal (2014) 11 SCC
438, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held inter alia as follows;
“14. The High Court has expressed that the respondent was justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents. Implicit in this observation
is the High Court's view that the respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in
this reasoning. In eviction proceedings the question of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be
decided finally. …â€
(emphasis supplied)
This ratio (supra) would suffice to establish the position that “Title†is not decided in Suits for “Eviction.â€
(iii) It is also worth remarking here that although D1 is of the opinion that Exhibit 3 ought to be dispensed with, being an unregistered document but
seeks to garner support from Exhibit „G‟ which is clearly an unregistered document as well. The rejection of Exhibit „G‟ by the Learned First
Appellate Court aggrieved D1, I am of the considered opinion that such rejection was not erroneous. Although PW Gitanjali Jalan the witness of P1
identified the handwriting in Exhibit „G‟ as being that of her father‟s and D1 then proceeded to invoke the provisions of Section 67 of the Evidence
Act, this provision elucidates that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part, by any person, the signature or the
handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person‟s handwriting, must be proved to be in his handwriting. The mode of proving
the contents of a document are detailed in Sections 61 to 66 of the Evidence Act. The production of a document purported to have been signed or
written by a certain person is no evidence of authorship. In other words, as per the Rules of evidence, a person who makes an assertion must prove it.
The handwriting can be proved by circumstantial evidence besides direct evidence but in the instant case, the Defendants failed to furnish any other
documents to indicate that Exhibit „G‟ was authored by Bhaskaranand and although the handwriting may be similar to that in Exhibit 1, this, by no
means establishes that it is indeed the handwriting of Bhaskaranand. Section 47 of the Evidence Act also becomes imperative for the present purposes
wherein it is laid down that;
“47. Opinion as to handwriting, when relevant.â€"When the Court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was
written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or
was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.
Explanation.â€"A person is said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he has seen that person write, or when he has received
documents purporting to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself or under his authority and addressed to that person, or
when, in the ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually submitted to him.â€
(iv) In Bank of India vs. Allibhoy Mohammed & Ors (supra) relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, the Hon‟ble High Court of
Bombay inter alia held as follows;
“36. The definition of “proved†given under Section 3 must be read along with Section 67 which requires that there must be specified evidence
that the signature purporting to be that of the executant is in the handwriting of the executant. Until this is proved the Court cannot proceed to consider
whether execution is proved. In other words Section 67 makes proof of execution of a document something more difficult than proof of matter other
than execution of a document. Original of the public document must be proved in the manner required by the provisions of the Act………..â€
(v) The evidence of PW Gitanjali Jalan for the purposes of Exhibit „G‟ was not fortified by any other proof as laid down in Section 47 of the
Evidence Act supra and the ratio relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, extracted above.
(vi) Reference made to and reliance placed by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants on Documents “X4†and “X5†are beyond the
ambit of consideration of any Court being unproved documents.
(vii) In Karam Kapahi and Others (supra) relied on by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, the main issue under consideration was
pertaining to Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and dealt with Judgment based on admission which, in my considered opinion, is not relevant for the present
purposes.
(viii) Reliance placed on Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Private Limited (supra) by Learned Senior Counsel for the Defendants, in my considered
opinion, is of no assistance to the case of D1 as the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held inter alia therein that a litigant can take different stands at
different times but cannot take contradictory stands in the same case. In other words, a party cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate on the
same facts and take inconsistent shifting stands in the same case.
(ix) Disagreeing at this juncture with the argument of Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs that no partition as alleged, of the joint properties of
the family of Bhaskaranand had taken place, the evidence on record, I find, cogently indicates that Item Nos.4, 8, 11 and 12 of Schedule „A‟ to the
Plaint were found mutated in the name of D1, Item Nos.2, 3, 7 and 10 of Schedule „A‟ in the name of P1 and Bhaskaranand held the properties
mentioned in Item Nos.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3.
(x) D1 has denied in his averments that the Schedule „B‟ property was allotted to any Hindu family in 1944 but has relied on Exhibit „A‟ which
is a document that clearly states that a site in the “New Extension Bazar, Gangtok†was allotted to “Messrs. Shree Mulchand & Sonsâ€
in the year 1944. On pain of repetition, it may be stated that “Shree Mulchand & Sons†of which D1 claims to be the proprietor, was registered
only in 1979, Exhibit „A‟ speaks for itself and thereby requires no explanation in terms of Section 92 of the Evidence Act.
31. In the end result, it concludes that;
(i) Vide Exhibit 1, a family settlement, which Courts are wont to accept, the properties described therein came to the family of Bhaskaranand and his
two minor sons who thus formed a coparcenary in the joint Hindu family, comprising of Bhaskaranand, his wife, his minor sons, unmarried daughters
and his mother;
(ii) Partly differing with the Learned First Appellate Court on its finding that all properties described in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint was joint family
property, I find that there was partial division of the joint family properties which were allotted vide Exhibit 1 amongst Bhaskaranand, P1 and D1,
wherein the properties at Item Nos.4, 8, 11 and 12 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint were allotted to the share of D1, Item Nos.2, 3, 7 and 10 of
Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint fell in the share of P1 while Bhaskaranand held the properties mentioned in Item Nos.6, 9 and 10 of Exhibit 3. In view of
this finding, the Learned First Appellate Court had misinterpreted the documents pertaining to Item Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 of Schedule „A‟
to the Plaint.
(iii) There is no proof whatsoever of relinquishment of any property by Bhaskaranand or that the partition of properties detailed in Exhibit 1 was only
between the heirs of Mulchand and P1 and D1 or only between P1 and D1, as claimed by D1.
(iv) The properties at Item Nos.1, 5, 6 and 9 of Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint are found to be joint family properties.
32.(i) The Learned First Appellate Court opined that unless there is clear partition and allotment of the concerned properties/businesses in D1‟s
name, he cannot claim exclusive rights over Schedule B property and found the purported transfer/gift by D1 to D3 invalid.
(ii) While agreeing with this view of the Learned First Appellate Court to the extent that no proof emanates to establish that Item No.1 of Schedule
„A‟ to the Plaint corresponding to Schedule „B‟ property, fell in the share of D1, I augment it with the finding that Item No.1 of Schedule „A‟
to the Plaint corresponding to Schedule „B‟ property, was not partitioned, neither was it transferred or fell in the share of D1. Consequently, D1 had
no right to transfer Schedule „B‟ property to D3 on the basis of a serendipitous circumstance of having a Firm registered in 1979 in his name
bearing the name “Shree Mulchand & Sons.†Hence, the said Deed of Gift (Exhibit „B‟) executed and registered on 31.01.1989 by D1 in
favour of D3, is void and inoperative in law and not binding upon the Plaintiffs and/or coparceners of the HUF or upon any member of the joint family
of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. Conversely, the argument of Learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs that there was no partition of the
properties received vide Exhibit 1, is belied by the evidence on record.
33. Resultantly, the Defendants are restrained from transferring, alienating, encumbering, interfering with or disposing of any of the joint properties of
the parties (already discussed supra) mentioned in Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, including the specific residential house described in Schedule „B‟
to the Plaint, except by D1 in terms of the Hindu Law, he being the eldest male member and thereby the Karta of the family, who will expectedly stay
his hands from acting to the detriment of his family or coparceners.
34. The Judgment of the Learned First Appellate Court is modified to the extent above and this Appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
35. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
36. No order as to costs.
37. Records of the Courts below be remitted forthwith along with a copy each of the Judgment, for information.
