Sharad Kumar Sharma, J
1. As per the writ petition and particularly in reference to the pleadings as raised in paragraph 4 of the writ petition, which is quoted hereunder:
“4. That the demised property is situated in Khasra No. 112 at Haridwar, District Haridwar. The aforesaid property actually belongs to state of
Punjab, known as Kapoorthala House. On behalf of Governor of Punjab, the demised property was given on lease to the petitioner’s society
through Shri P.H. Nehru, Officer on Special Duty outside property P.W.D. B & R Patiala for a period of 5 years through registered lease deed dated
29.03.1962 and the petitioner’s society was put in actual possession of the property. Now the aforesaid property is known as Kapoorthala House.
It is pertinent to mention here that the other property known as Patiala Hosue was also given to the petitioner’s society by the Government of
Punjab, which is also with the petitioner. Subsequently a lease deed was executed on 27.06.1997 between the parties and lastly the lease deed was
executed on 16th November, 1988 in respect of the demised property, whereby the lease of 99 years was given to the petitioner.
Copy of lease deed dated 29.03.1962 & 16.11.1988 are being filed herewith and collectively marked as Annexure no. 2 to this writ petition.â€
The petitioner admits his status is as that he is the lessee of the property as leased having being executed in his favour on 27.06.1997 and 16.11.1988
by the Government of Punjab. By virtue of the said lease deed which was executed in favour of the petitioner he holds the lease hold rights and the
title of the property leased still continues to be vested with the Government of Punjab. Apprehending a forceful interference over the property in
question over which he claims his lease hold rights. The occupants of the property thus leased had approached this Court by filing various writ
petitions contending thereof that since they are occupying the property under their possession and if the respondents are ever intending to initiate the
proceedings under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, they had sought an exemption from acquisition by filing an application under Section 5A of
the Land Acquisition Act, which was issued on 08.12.2008., as by the publication made on 08.12.2008, while issuing notification under Section 4(1)
State Government had invoked the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The effect of which is that the right of objection under
Section 5A was to be exempted. The Coordinate Bench while passing judgment in the bunch of petitions on 22.05.2014 has passed the following
order:
“Admittedly, Mahakumbha Mela of 2010 is over by now. Therefore, as on date, there seems to be no urgency to acquire the property in question.
Therefore, exemption of Section 5-A of the Act cannot be said to be justified even today.
Undisputedly, no award was ever passed till date under Section 11 of the Act nor any compensation was paid to the petitioner. There was no restrain
order by this Court against the passing of the award. The only interim order was to maintain staus quo over the property in question. Therefore, in
view of the above too impugned notices do not sustain in the eyes of law.
Consequently, all the writ petitions are allowed. Impugned notifications dated 8.12.2008 and 2.2.2009 are hereby quashed. However, respondents shall
be at liberty to initiate acquisition proceedings afresh, if need be, in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.â€
2. The purpose as expressed for acquiring the property covered by the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) was for extending the
Ghaat in view of the forthcoming Kumbh Mela of 2010. Consequent thereto a notification under Section 6 was also issued on 02.02.2009, but it has
been observed and pleaded that no possession was ever taken from the petitioner and ultimately the Court had passed an interim order directing the
parties to maintain the status quo.
3. The said writ petition where an exemption was sought under Section 5 A from the land being acquired came for consideration before this Court and
the Coordinate Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 22.05.2014 had allowed the writ petition referred above and had quashed the notification
under Section 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, giving liberty to the State to initiate the acquisition proceedings afresh, if need be, in
accordance with the provisions contained under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013.
4. Based on the same premise the petitioner too had filed a writ petition being Writ Petition (M/S) No. 748 of 2009 ‘Shri Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi
Sabha vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others’, which was also disposed of vide its judgment dated 02.06.2015, in the light of the judgment dated
22.05.2014 referred to above. When despite of setting aside of the notification under Section 4(1) and 6(1) dated 8.12.2008 and 02.02.2009 respectivly
according to the petitioner when the respondent still started interference over the property in question without resorting to the process of the
determination of the fair compensation under the Act of 2013 as directed by the judgment dated 22.05.2014, the petitioner preferred a writ petition and
yet again it was reiterated in paragraph 4 of the writ petition that the petitioner holds a lease hold rights over the property in question for which the
lease was executed in his favour, though the property belongs to the State of Punjab. In fact, there is nothing on record to show that the State of
Punjab, the actual owner of the property, who would could be actually said to be aggrieved by any act of interference or taking over of the possession
and if at all the petitioner contends to be the lease holder in pursuance to the lease executed in his favour by the State of Punjab and if the
petitioner’s right is being infringed in contravention to the provisions contained in the lease said to have been executed in his favour the
petitioner’s right if it is determined in the light of the judgment rendered earlier by this Court while directing the respondents to proceed under the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, under the statute the petitioner’s
right as against a wrongful interference is protected by Section 98 of the Act of 2013, which reads as under:
“98. Notice in case of suits for anything done in pursuance of Act- No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against any person for
anything done in pursuance of this Act, without giving to such person a month’s previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding, and of the
cause thereof, nor after tender of sufficient amendments.â€
5. Only limitation which is provided therein for settlement of any right or action under the Act is that before instituting any suit as against the act of
wrongful interference the petitioner would be mandatorily required to give a thirty days’ prior notice to the opposite side before initiation of the
proceedings for filing of the Suit.
6. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the provisions of Section 98 will not come into play and he may not be forced to go to
institute a Suit for seeking a decree of injunction on the premise, that firstly he is the lease holder, secondly, the Court has already directed that in case
if possession is to be taken it is to be taken in the light of the provisions contained under the Act of 2013 and, thirdly, the right to retain his possession is
protected by the provisions contained under Section 300 A of the Constitution of India.
7. The provision of Article 300 (A) which speaks about the deprivation of a property has attached a rider to it to the effect that it would be saved by
the authority of law. Article 300 (A) is quoted hereunder:
“300 A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law-No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.â€
8. The authority of law herein would mean the direction issued by the learned Single Judge that in case if any possession is required to be taken, then
has to be taken after the recourse under the Act of 2013, and without issuing any notification for acquiring the property if interference is being made
for, then the Act in itself provides a forum to the petitioner to protect his interest by filing a suit after following the procedure under Section 98 after
giving thirty days’ prior notice to the opposite side.
9. Writ petition would not be the remedy for the petitioner for the reason that since the actual owner of the property who admittedly has leased the
property to the petitioner, as a matter of fact, has not approached this Court to protect the act of wrongful interference in the property by the
respondent. It is the lessee only who had come after the lessee’s right are claimed to have been infringed in contravention to the terms of the
lease, the recourse available would be to file a Suit, because it will involve an interpretation of the terms of the lease, the determination of the title, the
determination of the right to continue to occupy the property, which could only be done into by the Court, which could entertain and appreciate the
evidence and not by writ courts.
10. So far as Article 300 (A) is concerned restraining interference except with authority of law herein would attract an action under the Act of 2013
to be read with Section 98 as contained therein, hence, this writ petition is being disposed of with the liberty to the petitioner to approach the Civil
Court after giving prior notice to the respondent in case if he is apprehending any act of forceful interference likely to be made by the respondent in
contravention to the provisions of the Act of 2013.
11. Subject to above observation, the writ petition is disposed of.
12. However, there would be no order as to cost.
