Alok Kumar Verma, J
1. This is an application, filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to quash the charge-sheet dated 03.04.2022,
cognizance/summoning order dated 22.04.2022 and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No.3314 of 2022, “State vs. Shivam Kumar and
Othersâ€, pending before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udham Singh Nagar.
2. Subsequent to the submission of the charge-sheet, the learned trial court took the cognizance and passed the summoning order under Section 304B
of IPC against the present applicants â€" accused persons.
3. According to the present matter, the marriage of the deceased Smt. Anju Devi, daughter of the informant, took place with Shivam Kumar, the
applicant no.1 on 29.04.2021. Her husband, her mother-in-law Smt. Meena, the applicant no.2 â€" accused, and, her sister-in-law (nanad) Aanchal,
the applicant no.3 â€" accused were demanding that the father of the deceased should sell his property and give half of the amount to them and while
demanding that they were torturing the deceased continuously. On 09.11.2021, they treated the deceased with cruelty, inflicted serious injuries on her
and killed her in their house (matrimonial house of the deceased). According to the post-mortem report, the cause of the death was hanging.
4. Heard Mr. Lokendra Dobhal, the learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. V.S. Rathour, the learned AGA for the State.
5. Mr. Lokendra Dobhal, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants â€" accused persons submitted that the applicants have been implicated in
this matter; according to the suicide note of the deceased, the applicant no.1 â€" the husband of the deceased, is not guilty, and, there was no demand
of dowry.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State opposed the said submissions and submitted that sufficient evidence has been found against the
present applicants â€" accused persons during the investigation.
7. Admittedly, the marriage of the deceased was solemnized with the applicant no.1 â€" Shivam Kumar on 29.04.2021 and she died on 19.11.2021 in
her matrimonial house under unnatural circumstances. During the investigation, evidence are found that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon
before her for demand of dowry by the applicants. At this stage, the presumption of the provision of Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
attracts against the applicants.
8. Section 482 of the Code envisages three circumstances in which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, “to give effect to an order
under the Code, or, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or, to secure the ends of justice.†Section 482 of the Code reads as follows:
“Saving of inherent powers of High Court:- Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.â€
9. This inherent jurisdiction though wide should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice. While exercising jurisdiction under this section, the Court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision.
Therefore, quashing of charge-sheet or setting aside the summoning order on the appreciation of evidence is not justified.
10. The scope of Section 482 of the Code has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments.
11. In Madhu Limaya Vs. State of Maharashtra, 1978 AIR 47, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the following principles would govern
the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court â€" (1) Power is not to be resorted to, if there is specific provision in Code for redress of
grievances of aggrieved party. (2) It should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. (3)
It should not be exercised against the express bar of the law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
12. In Pepsi Food Limited vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, 1998 (36) ACC 2,0 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that
under Section 482 of the Code have no limits, but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers.
13. In Lee Kun Hee and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others, JT 2012 (2) SC 23,7 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate evidence, if any,
available on record.
14. In Shakson Belthissor vs. State of Kerala and another, (2009) 14 SCC 466, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed,
“The scope and power of quashing a first information report and charge-sheet under Section 482 of the CrPC is well settled. The said power is
exercised by the court to prevent abuse of the process of law and court but such a power could be exercised only when the complaint filed by the
complainant or the charge-sheet filed by the police did not disclose any offence or when the said complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or
oppressive. A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court on the aforesaid issue wherein the law relating to quashing of a complaint has
been succinctly laid down.â€
15. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp.(1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the legal position by laying the
following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of its jurisdiction:-
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.â€
16. In ‘M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Private Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others’, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 31 5t,he
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“10. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad (supra), the
following principles of law emerge:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to
investigate into cognizable offences;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on;
iv)The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare cases standard in
its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death
penalty, as explained previously by this Court);
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of
activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482
Cr.P.C.
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or
that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application
made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by
the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more
diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more
particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint; and
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to
consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether
the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the
FIR.â€
“23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be
justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adoptedâ€, during the pendency of the quashing petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be
justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted†during the investigation or till the final
report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/ complaint/
FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:
i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to
investigate into a cognizable offence;
ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences;
iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an
investigation to go on;
iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be
confused with the formation in the context of death penalty).
v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;
vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;
vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule;
viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of
activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere;
ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping;
x) Save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences;
xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice;
xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the
investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or
that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure;
xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and
more diligent duty on the court;
xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more
particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the
FIR/complaint;
xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only
has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits
whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the
allegations in the FIR;
xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an
interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However,
an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should
not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire
evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive
steps to be adopted†and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The
High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps†either during the investigation or till
the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing
petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further
investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be
passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court
while passing such an interim order.
xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted†within the aforesaid parameters, the High
Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted†as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted†can be said to be
too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.â€
17. In Kaptan Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 58, 0the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that in the
case of Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191 after considering the decisions of Bhajan Lal (Supra), it is
held that exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide is to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such exercise is justified by tests
specifically laid down in section itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Similar view has been expressed in the case of C.B.I. vs. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686,
Telangana vs. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87 and in the case of XYZ vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 10 SCC 337.
18. In the present case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took the cognizance after considering the evidence available on the record. The said
allegations are required to be tested only at the time of trial. This Court cannot hold a parallel trial in an application under Section 482 of the Code. It is
well settled that at the time of considering of the case for cognizance and summoning, merits of the case cannot be tested and it is wholly
impermissible for this Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations. This Court would not also examine the
genuineness of the allegations since this Court does not function as a Court of Appeal or Revision, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Code. In this matter it cannot be said that there are no allegations against the applicants. Apart this, learned counsel for the applicants could not
able to show at this stage that allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the applicants.
19. Therefore, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the present case does not fall in any category set out by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the prayers for quashing the charge-sheet, cognizance/summoning order and entire proceedings of Criminal Case
No.3314 of 2022 are refused.
20. Since, the case has to be tried, I make it clear that the observations made earlier are only for the disposal of this application, filed under Section
482 of the Code. These observations will not influence the trial court while deciding the case.
21. With the aforesaid directions, the application, filed under Section 482 of the Code is dismissed at the admission stage.
