Shree Chandrashekhar, J
 1. This is an assigned matter by virtue of order dated 30th November 2017 passed on the administrative side by Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice,
High Court of Jharkhand.
2. In the writ petition, the petitioner has made a prayer for direction upon the respondents to make payment of post-retiral benefits to him.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid prayer has been made placing reliance upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in “State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava†(2013) 12 SCC 210.
4. The petitioner who was posted as Block Co-operative Development Officer and was in-charge of Kuru LAMPS Project as Member Secretary
was placed under suspension vide memo dated 16th September 2003 â€" he retired from the service on 30th June 2008. A departmental proceeding
was initiated against him vide memo dated 24th February 2003 and memorandum of charges was served upon him in Form “K†dated 18th
October 2003.
5. The charge-memo contained the following charges :
Charge No.(i)- The delinquent employee defalcated Rs. 12,58,048/-in different development projects within Kuru Blocks.
Charge No.(ii)- The delinquent employee defalcated Rs. 77,000/-from the amount deposited in the recurring deposit scheme under Kuru LAMPS.
6. A supplementary charge-memo was served upon the petitioner on an allegation that he defalcated Rs.11,22,125/- and destroyed relevant records
with a view to cause disappearance of the evidence.
7. In the departmental proceeding, the petitioner asked for some records which were not provided to him and presumably for that reason he did not
co-operate in the departmental proceeding.
8. The inquiring officer submitted the inquiry reports in which the charges contained in memorandum dated 18th October 2003 and the supplementary
charge dated 18th August 2006 are held proved. A second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 28th March 2007
to which he responded and again denied the charges. The disciplinary authority considered the materials on record and accepted the findings recorded
by the inquiring officer.
9. By an order dated 23rd July 2012, the following punishments are awarded to the petitioner:
(i) The delinquent employee shall not be entitled for any payment except subsistence allowance during the period of suspension,
(ii) Recovery of Rs. 24,57,173/- from post-retiral dues payable to the delinquent employee, and
(iii) Deduction of 10% pension.
10. Mr. Abhay Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised two fold submissions; (i) the departmental proceeding against the
petitioner was conducted in complete breach of the rules of natural justice inasmuch as neither a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner nor a
copy of the inquiry report was furnished to him, and (ii) the right of appeal under Jharkhand Pension Rules has been taken away because the
punishment order dated 23rd July 2012 was approved by the Secretary, Co-operative Department.
11. Rule 43 of the Jharkhand Pension Rules are extracted below:
“43. (a) Future good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of pension. The Provincial Government reserve to themselves the right of
withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, if the pensioner is convicted of serious crime or be guilty of grave misconduct. The decision of
the Provincial Government on any question of withholding or withdrawing the whole or any part of a pension under this rule, shall be final and
conclusive.
(b). The State Government further reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or
for a specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government if the
pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceeding to have been guilty of grave misconduct; or to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by
misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on re-employment after retirement: Provided that-
(a) such departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment;
(i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the State Government;
(ii) shall be in respect of an event which took place not more than four years before the institution of such proceedings; and
(iii) shall be conducted by such authority and at such place or places as the State Government may direct and in accordance with the procedure
applicable to proceedings on which an order of dismissal from service may be made;
(b) judicial proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was on duty either before retirement or during re-employment, shall have been
instituted in accordance with sub-clause (ii) of clause(a); and
(c) the Bihar Public Service Commission, shall be consulted before final orders are passed.
Explanation.- For the purposes of the rule-
(a) departmental proceeding shall be deemed to have been instituted when the charges framed, against the pensioner are issued to him or, if the
Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date; and
(b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to have been instituted:-
(i) In the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which a complaint is made or a charge-sheet is submitted, to a criminal court; and
(ii) In the case of civil proceedings, on the date on which the complaint is presented, or as the case may be, an application is made to a civil Court.â€
12. A mere glance at Rule 43 would disclose that the appellate authority under Rule 43 is the State Government and not the departmental secretary.
13. The departmental proceeding which was initiated against the petitioner by serving a charge-memo under Prapatra “Ka†was not conducted in
violation of the principles of natural justice. The materials on record clearly indicate that the petitioner was afforded opportunity to defend himself but
on a specious plea that he was not provided some documents so as to prepare his defence he did not participate in the departmental proceeding. Even
in the present writ proceeding, the petitioner has not shown that the documents sought by him were so important that in absence of the same he could
not have effectively defended himself. By now it is well-settled that a charged employee has no unfettered right to ask for any document on which the
department does not intend to place reliance â€" in many cases the procedure adopted by the department is that the charge officer is permitted to
inspect the records.
14. In “U.P. State Textile Corpn. Ltd. v. P.C. Chaturvedi†(2005) 8 SCC 211, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that in absence of
showing how the alleged non-supply of documents caused prejudice to workman, the same cannot by itself vitiate the enquiry.
15. In “SBI v. Bidyut Kumar Mitra†(2011) 2 SCC 316, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“40.…. By now, the legal position is well settled and defined. It was incumbent on the respondent to plead and prove the prejudice caused by the
non-supply of the documents. The respondent has failed to place on record any facts or material to prove what prejudice has been caused to him.â€
16. In my opinion, in a departmental proceeding in which the delinquent employee refused to co-operate, it was lawful for the departmental authority to
proceed in the matter and take a final decision [refer, “Major U.R. Bhatt v. Union of India†AIR 1962 SC 1344].
17. The charges framed against the petitioner were definitely very serious. The professed pretension of the petitioner that he was not offered
sufficient opportunity to defend himself is not substantiated by any independent material on record, rather there is a host of materials on record which
would show that to delay the departmental proceeding the petitioner did not co-operate. In exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the writ Court would issue a certiorari if it is established that the order was passed contrary to the service rules or in breach of
the rules of natural justice. The writ Court may also interfere in the matter where it is shown that the punishment order is so outrageous that no
reasonable employee would have taken such a decision or that it shocks the conscience of the Court [refer,“Ranjit Thakur v. Union of Indiaâ€
(1987) 4 SCC 611]. The order of punishment is definitely not outrageous or disproportionate to the charges framed and found proved against the
petitioner. It is also well-settled that the quantum of punishment is within the exclusive domain of the departmental authority and the writ Court would
not interfere with the same.
18. In “SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava†(2021) 2 SCC 612, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by
constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or
procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an
appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan and later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian
and further examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India wherein it has been held as under: (B.C.
Chaturvedi case, SCC pp. 759-60, para 13)
“13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate
the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this
Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is
perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.â€
19. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the challenge to the punishment order dated 23rd July 2012 and, accordingly, W.P.(S) No. 67
of 2012 is dismissed.
