Rajesh Kumar Vs State Of Jharkhand

Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J

1. In all these petitions, the prayer is made for quashing of the order taking cognizance dated 15.12.2016 passed in connection with R.C.Case No.11(A)/2014-R, pending before Special Judge, C.B.I. (A.C.B.), Ranchi.

2. During pendency of these petitions, the petitioners have filed the discharge petition which was rejected and pursuant to that, the charge has been framed and those orders were challenged by way of filing I.A. No.1410 of 2024 in Cr.M.P.No.759 of 2018 and the same prayer was made in I.A. No.1413 of 2024 in Cr.M.P.No.708 of 2018 which was allowed by order dated 26.04.2024 and the petitioners were directed to file the amended petition.

3. The F.I.R has been registered alleging therein that the case of the prosecution in nutshell is that one Shri S.K. Khare, Superintendent of Police/H.O.B., C.B.I., A.C.B. Ranchi, stated that information has been received from reliable source that Shri Darlando Thanmi Khathing, the then Vice-chancellor, Central University of Jharkhand (CUJ), Ranchi, Jharkhand, Narendra Pal Garg, OSD (Project), Central University of Jharkhand, Sitaram Sowarnkar, Accounts Officer, Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Sanjay Kumar Singh, the then Civil Engineer, Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, Abhay Nindkan Tigga, the then Electrical Engineer, Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi entered into a criminal conspiracy with the Proprietors/Directors/partners of 12 private firms, viz. M/s Rock Drill India, Ranchi, M/s Sadanand Gupta, Ranchi, M/s Park Sarva Mangala Project, Ranchi, M/S. J.C. Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s Raj Construction, Garhwa, M/s Mourya Heritage Inn Pvt. Ltd, Ranchi, M/s Pushpanjali Homes Pvt Ltd, Ranchi, M/s R.K. Mishra & Co., M/s BD Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s Aditya Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s B.P. Construction, Ranchi, M/s Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt Ltd, Ranchi and unknown others, during the period 2010 to 2014, and committed the offences of cheating, forgery for the purpose of cheating, using forged/ fake documents as genuine and criminal misconduct, and in pursuance thereof, cheated the Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, by causing to it a wrongful loss of Rs.7,11,89,776/- (Approximately) and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves, in the matter of award of construction works of different buildings for the Permanent Campus of Central University of Jharkhand, located at Cheri-Manatu, Ranchi by abusing their official position and awarding the works at exorbitant rates to the said firms and getting executed similar type of civil and electrical works at different rates from them. It is alleged that Shri Darlando Thanmi Khathing, the then Vice-chancellor, conspired with Sri Narendra Pal Garg, and dishonestly and fraudulently, by appointing him to the post of OSD(Project), Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, on contract basis, without sanction from University Grants Delhi went for the development of permanent campus of Commission (UGC), New Central University of Jharkhand at Cheri-Manatu village, Ranchi through him, in violation of University Grants Commission XI th Plan Guidelines and GFR (General Financial Rules) of Government of India, which stipulates that the construction of different buildings for the Central University is to be got done through CPWD/State PWD/ Central Public Undertakings, as there was no full fledged Engineering Department in the Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi. It is further alleged that Sri Narendra Pal Garg, OSD (Project) and Shri Darlando Thanmi Khathing, the then Vice-chancellor, without preparation of details of project report and without approval of Finance Committee of Central University of Jharkhand and University Grants Commission (UGC), New Delhi, invited an Expression of Interest (EOI) for preparation of panel of contractors under four categories, i.e. for Civil and Electrical Works valued above Rs.25 Crores, between Rs.10 Crore to Rs.25 Crore, between Rs.5 Crores to 10 Crore and Rs.3 Crore to 5 Crore, for construction of different buildings at permanent campus of Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi.

It is further alleged that no open tender were floated by accused public servants of Central University of Jharkhand, for construction of the various buildings for permanent campus, as no detailed project report, financial clearance and UGC approval was available, CPWD, Ranchi, had requested Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, for awarding the works of construction of permanent campus to it as per GFR-2005 and University Grants Commission (UGC) guidelines. However, the accused public servants viz. Darlando Thanmi Khathing, Narendra Pal Garg, Sita Ram Sowarnkar, Sanjay Kumar Singh, Abhay Nindkan Tigga, in conspiracy with the 12 private firms as mentioned above, dishonestly and fraudulently, did not allot the work to CPWD, Ranchi by creating false/ fake comparative charts and wrongly mentioning therein that an excess charge of 27.5% of capital value of the work, as agency charges, will be levied by CPWD, due to which project cost would escalate. They awarded the construction buildings to their favoured 12 firms on the basis of bogus comparative charts and negotiation papers, prepared and works of different signed by accused public servants viz. Narendra Pal Garg, Sita Ram Sowarnkar, Sanjay Kumar Singh and Abhay Nindkan Tigga.

It is further alleged that the accused public servants of Central University of Jharkhand, by abusing their official positions, awarded the work of construction of buildings at permanent campus to 12 firs at exorbitant rates. Further, similar works of construction of buildings were awarded to above 12 accused firms at different rates i.e. above 56.5%, above 54% and above 49% of Delhi Schedule of Rates ( DSR)-2007, whereas the rates should have been the same. It is alleged that some of the firms even were not having experience for particular category of work and some of them had not submitted the required documents during empanelment for the said works. The accused Narendra Pal Garg, dishonestly and fraudulently entered into agreement with all 12 firms for doing the works, without having any detailed project report and master plan. It is further alleged that all the empanelled contractors of 3 groups i.e. B.C and D, had quoted the same rates i.e. above 58% of DSR-2007, hence re-tendering should have been done by the accused public servants, but the same has not done.

It is further alleged that on 09.02.2012, the 12th Building Committee of Central University of Jharkhand, observed that the master plan had not been finalized and resolved that re- tendering be done for selection of builders, but Shri Darlando Thanmi Khathing, the then Vice-Chancellor and Sri Narendra Pal Garg, abused their official position and awarded the work to their favoured firms.

It is alleged that the above mentioned public servants of Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi, entered into conspiracy with 12 firms and by abusing their official position and on the basis of fake and bogus documents, awarded the work of construction of different buildings to the said firms at exorbitant rates and fraudulently made payments of Rs.93,94,77,420/- to them and cheated the Central University of Jharkhand Rs.7,11,89,776/- as a result of fraudulent payment made to to the tune of those firms. Thus, Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi was put to a wrongful loss of Rs.7, 11, 89,776/-and corresponding wrongful gain was made by the accused firms. Since the allegations mentioned above disclose commission of cognizance punishable under Section 120B, 420, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a regular case vide RC-11(A)/2014-R is registered under the above sections of law against Shri Darlando Thanmi Khating, the then Vice-chancellor, Narendra Pal Garg, OSD(Project) Sita Ram Sowarkar, Accounts Officer, Sanjay Kumar Singh, the then Civil Engineer and Abhay Nindkan Tigga, the then Electrical Engineer (all of Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi) and 12 private firms, viz- M/s Rock Drill India, Ranchi, M/s Sadanand Gupta, Ranchi, M/s Park Sarva Mangala Project, Ranchi, M/S. J.C. Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s Raj Construction, Garhwa, M/s Mourya Heritage Inn Pvt. Ltd, Ranchi, M/s Pushpanjali Homes Pvt Ltd, Ranchi, M/s R.K. Mishra & Co., M/s BD Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s Aditya Enterprises, Ranchi, M/s B.P. Construction, Ranchi, M/s Bharat Drilling & Foundation Treatment Pvt Ltd, Ranchi (all represented through their proprietors/directors/partners) and unknown others and investigation of the case is entrusted to Shri Sudhir Kumar, Inspector of Police, C.B.I., ACB, Ranchi.

4. Heard Mrs. Anjana Prakash, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.759 of 2018, Mr. Kumar Harsh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.385 of 2018, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.702 of 2018 & Cr.M.P.No.708 of 2018 as well as Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned A.S.G.I appearing on behalf of the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).

5. Mrs. Anjana Prakash, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the respective case has submitted that the petitioner is doing construction work for the last 27 years and is one of the reputed firm. She further submitted that in the financial year 2015-16, turn over of the petitioner’s firm was Rs.28 crores and income-tax was also paid on it. She then submitted that  the  charge  sheet  No.13/16  dated  30.11.2016  was  submitted under section 120B, 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and thereafter the learned court has taken cognizance on 05.12.2016. According to her, Central University of Jharkhand, Ranchi on 22.10.2011 issued a notice or inviting tender vide no. CUJ/OHD(Project)/2011-12/10-12 with certain terms and condition and in the said tender, it is specifically mentioned that interested builder/contractor may submit their details for empanelment. She further submitted that in the said notice inviting tender there is four categories for empanelment which are as follows- (1) Group-A- Civil/ Internal Electrification/ H.A.V.C./ Services estimated value above Rs.25 crores, E.M. Rs.5 lacs; (2) Group-B- Civil /Internal Electrification/ H.A.V.C./ Services Estimated value above Rs.10 Crores to 25 Crores, E.M. Rs.3.5 lacs; (3) Group-C- Civil/Internal Electrification/ H.A.V.C./ Services, Estimated Value Rs.5 Crores to 10 Crores, E.M. Rs.2.5 lads; and (4) Group-D-Civil/Internal Electrification/ H.A.V.C/ Services, Estimated Value Rs.3 Crores to 5 Crores, E.M. Rs.1 lac. She further submitted that the petitioner's Firm had applied for empanelment in Group "B" and "C" and also deposited the Earnest money through Demand draft being No. 955316 dated 15.11.2011 of Rs.2,50,000/- and Demand Draft no. 955317 of Rs.3.00 Lacs dated 15.11.2011 in favour of Central University of Jharkhand. The Central University of Jharkhand vide letter dated 13.1.2012 informed the petitioner that his firm has been empaneled under the category of Group "B" and Central University of Jharkhand has invited quotation as per DSR 2007 for Civil and Electrical. After negotiation the Central University of Jharkhand has send offer to the petitioner's firm to do a work under the Group-B at  the rate of 56% above DSR 2007 for Civil and internal electrification works duly approved by the competent authority. Therefore, an agreement was executed for construction of building of Academic Block including other allied structures and total agreement value of the work was Rs.25.00 Crores and the Central University of Jharkhand provided the time period of 11 months 25 days for construction of the entire project. She further submitted that the petitioner's firm did the construction work 56% above DSR 2007 but at the relevant point of time, the Government of India issued the office Memorandum dated 28.12.2011 in which the Government has approved rate for Ranchi is 158 i.e. above 58% of the DSR 2007 as well as during the period of contract agreement, the Government of India vide its letter dated 3.7.2012 issued fresh guidelines and hike in the construction rate i.e. 174 above of DSR 2007 i.e. 74% above of the DSR 2007. She submitted that in this background, without analyzing the entire facts, the CBI submitted charge sheet against the petitioners. She submitted that the allegation against the petitioner was made that he has obtained the work 7% above of the L1 rate of Group-D, due to which the Central University of Jharkhand has suffered wrongful loss of Rs.57,66,991/- and she submitted that, however, Central University of Jharkhand has retained the security deposit i.e. Rs.42,02,481/- and the earnest amount i.e. Rs.6,00,000/-and outstanding bill of Rs.3,00,61,611/- and she submitted that the same was more that the alleged wrongful loss. She submitted that contractor of Group-D has given the rate of 49% above of DSR 2007 and the contractor of Group-D are empowered to do a work up to Rs.5.00 Crores, but the petitioner's firm has been empaneled under Group-B and therefore, he is empowered to do a construction work up to Rs.25.00 Crores. She submitted that after following due guidelines and norms the said work was done, and to buttress all these arguments, she placed the order of framing charge as contained at page no.110 of the amended petition and with regard to rates she referred to Annexure-4 which is Office Memorandum of the Department as well as Annexure-4/1. Relying on Annexure-4 and 4/1 she pointed out that poly emerges: -

The important dates relevant herein are:

• Expression of Interest (EOI) for empanelment and award of work for construction of different buildings at the permanent campus on 22.10.2011.

• On 07.01.2012 empanelment of contractors stood approved in principle.

• On 09.01.2012 the empaneled contractors were requested to pour their rates over the DSR 2007. They were submitted in sealed covers on 20.01.2012.

• On 27.01.2012 the award of work was shown approved by the Building Committee.

Thus, the entire foundation of the present case is based on wrong premise.

6. She drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure-1 which is F.I.R and submitted that there are 17 accused persons and the petitioner name has stated as accused no.6 and further strengthening her argument, she placed the charge sheet and further submitted that in absence of any allegation the charge sheet has been submitted and charge sheet is silent against the petitioner. She further  elaborated  her  argument  by  way  of  submitting  that  C.B.I itself is not clear about the charge and some of the persons have been exonerated. By way of referring section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, she submitted that the ingredients are not made out. On this ground, she submitted that since the matter was pending the petitioner was compelled to file discharge petition which was rejected and subsequently the charge has been framed and that is why the said order by which the discharge petition was rejected framing charge is also under challenge. She relied in the case of A Shivaprakash v. State of Kerala, (2016) 12 SCC 273 and referred to paragraph nos.12, 13 and 14 of the said judgment which are quoted below:

“12. It is not in dispute that two works were awarded to A-3: one was known as “JRY — consignment semi-permanent building in Vandiperiyar” and other was known as “JRY — construction of permanent building in Vandiperiyar”. In the present case, we are concerned with release of payments to A-3 in respect of the second works contract. As is clear from the nomenclature of these two contracts, they were under JRY. The Commissioner, Village Development, Thiruvananthapuram had issued Circular No. 14514/J.R.Y. 1/91/C.R.D. dated 23-4-1991 which prescribes the procedure for implementation of JRY and contains certain suggestions. Para 2 thereof is relevant for our purposes which mentions about the manner in which 50% of the advance can be released by the Panchayat. It reads as under:

“2. It was directed that for all works under JRY, contractors shall be avoided and the works shall be directly taken up by the panchayats or by the convenors elected by the consumers. It was directed that the amount for such works will be paid in advance. As per the circular of Village Development Commissioner, No. 29786/J.R.Y 1/90/CRD dated 23-7-1999, instructions have been issued to panchayats to give necessary funds in advance. By this way preparing bills every now and then can be avoided and the 50% of estimated cost can be given in advance. But such funds have to be sanctioned considering the work in hand in part-instalments. Otherwise without starting a project work 50% advance expenditure cannot be given in advance. To do so will not be in order. Money required to start a work can be given in advance and as the work progresses according to the work, more funds can be sanctioned. Funds entrusted with the panchayats for the works of JRY are included in the public funds and the panchayats are reminded that unnecessary withdrawals from such funds would tantamount temporary misutilisation of public funds. When 50% of budget work is given as advance and when works are completed, a part-bill can be prepared and advance amount can be written off against completed works. Panchayats are further informed that without preparing part-bill more than 50% advance payment cannot be allowed and doing so would amount to misutilisation of government funds.” (emphasis supplied)

13. Based on the aforesaid paragraph, the submission of Mr Basant was that it was permissible for the Panchayat to release 50% of the estimated cost of the project as advance payment, though it was to be sanctioned only after the project/work has started. This circular, however, mentioned that money required to start the work can be given in advance and as the work progresses, more funds can be sanctioned. He, thus, submitted that release of 50% payment was not contingent upon the stage of the execution of the work, but on the mere start of the work.

14. There appears to be merit in the aforesaid submission of the learned Senior Counsel. PW 4 who was the Assistant Executive Engineer in his deposition has categorically admitted that in JRY Scheme Work, there is a provision to give advance amount of 50% of work. The total cost of the work in question, for which the payments were made, was Rs 4 lakhs and 50% thereof comes to Rs 2 lakhs.”

7. Relying on the above judgment, she submitted that the case of the petitioner is fully covered and the petitioner may kindly be discharged from the case as there is no evidence against the petitioner to proceed with the said charge in light of section 14 of the Evidence Act. With regard to exercising power under section 482 Cr.P.C, to the extent that even material that can be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed to be maintained or not, the High Court can exercise said power and to buttress her this argument, she relied in the case of  Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2012) 3 SCC 330.  On  the  same  line,  with  regard  to  exercise  of  power  under section 482 Cr.P.C, she further relied in the case of Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 614, and relied on paragraph no.14, which is quoted below:

“14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to be interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognised to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfy the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually come on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in their entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused.”

8. Relying on the above judgment, she submitted that the power to quash the proceeding after framing of charge appears to be somewhat wider as at that time all the materials are before the court. Relying on the above two judgments, she submitted that the High Court can exercise its powers under section 482 Cr.P.C as the order of rejecting the discharge petition and framing of charge are not in accordance with law.

9. On the point of Prevention of Corruption Act, she relied in the case of C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State (through, CBI), (2013) 1 SCC 205 and relied on paragraph nos.16 and 17, which are quoted below:

“16. A fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence with regard to the liability of an accused which may have application to the present case is to be found in the work Criminal Law by K.D. Gaur. The relevant passage from the above work may be extracted below:

“Criminal guilt would attach to a man for violations of criminal law. However, the rule is not absolute and is subject to limitations indicated in the Latin maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. It signifies that there can be no crime without a guilty mind. To make a person criminally accountable, it must be proved that an act, which is forbidden by law, has been caused by his conduct, and that the conduct was accompanied by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind. Thus, there are two components of every crime, a physical element and a mental element, usually called actus reus and mens rea respectively.”

17. It has already been noticed that the appellant besides working as the Minister of Railways was the head of the two public sector undertakings in question at the relevant time. It also appears from the materials on record that the four persons while in London had assisted the appellant in performing certain tasks connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister. It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the aforesaid four persons. If the statements of the witnesses examined under Section 161 CrPC show that the aforesaid four persons had performed certain tasks to assist the Minister in the discharge of his public duties, however insignificant such tasks may have been, no question of obtaining any pecuniary advantage by any corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of the position of the appellant as a public servant can arise. As a Minister it was for the appellant to decide on the number and identity of the officials and supporting staff who should accompany him to London if it was anticipated that he would be required to perform his official duties while in London. If in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant. A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala [AIR 1963 SC 1116 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 186 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 724] while considering the provisions of Section 5 of the 1947 Act.”

10. Relying on the above judgments, she submitted that the dishonest intention with the gist of the offence under section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act i.e. corrupt or illegal means and pecuniary advantage are not taken by the petitioner as such the case is fit to be allowed. She further relied in the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, (2003) 9 SCC 700, and she referred to paragraph nos.31 and 32 of the said judgment, which are quoted below:

“31. There is no occasion to draw any inference due to non-execution of a written agreement that the supplies have been illegally made with dishonest intention. There is nothing to indicate that Karnataka State/KEB could not make available electricity to M/s GIL like it did to its other consumers. As a matter of fact electrical energy was only continued to be supplied to Karnataka/KEB during the relevant period as well with upward revised rates to the advantage of the State of Kerala.

32. We are not undermining the requirement or necessity to execute an agreement in writing for any contract entered into for and on behalf of the State or such bodies like KSEB but such omission, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would not lead to any inference of commission of any offence. It is though always necessary that an act must be performed in a manner it ought to be under the law. The State Government may of course take steps as may be necessary to see that such omissions may not occur and such transactions may take place by means of a written agreement. Otherwise, there always remains a risk of the other party resiling from the contract or may raise disputes about the terms and conditions of the agreement. A written instrument avoids the scope of uncertainty and leaves no room for speculation about the terms and conditions of a contract.”

11. Relying on the above judgment, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in the respective case has submitted that there are no effort, initiative or request on the part of the petitioner by which it can be said that the said action was obtained by the petitioner on any concealment. She further submitted that mens-rea is another aspect of the matter. She submitted that the case of the petitioner is covered in view of the judgment rendered in the case of R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala(supra). Lastly, she relied in the case of Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2022) 15 SCC 720 and relied on the paragraph nos.15 and 17 of the said judgment, which are quoted

below:

“15. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The court has to sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] ]. Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.

17. The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that “discharge” is a valuable right provided to the accused. In line with the fact that the High Court and the court below have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this case and other related aspects concerning improvement of witness statements, it is necessary for the High Court to reconsider the entire matter and decide the revision petition afresh. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order dated 28-11-2018 [Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5995] and remand the case back to the High Court for its reconsideration in accordance with law.”

12. Relying on the above judgment, she submitted that the discharge is a valuable right provided to the accused and the fairness of the criminal investigation is required to be considered by the High Court and the Court is not a mere post-office. She relying on the above judgments submitted that the case of the petitioner is fit to be allowed as there is no fraudulent act and no pecuniary gain is obtained by the petitioner and as such, the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed and the discharge order as well as order framing charge may kindly be quashed. On these grounds, she submitted that Cr.M.P. No.759 of 2018 may kindly be allowed. It was also argued by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in respective case that mala-fidely the case has been lodged against the petitioners.

13. Mr. Harsh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No.385 of 2018 has adopted the argument of Mrs. Anjana Prakash, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in respective case and submitted that the case of the petition is fit to be allowed.

14. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner(s) in Cr.M.P. No.702 of 2018 as well as Cr.M.P. No.708 of 2018 has also adopted the argument of Mrs. Anjana Prakash, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in respective case and has further added by way of relying in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512 and relied on paragraph no.24 of the said judgment, which is quoted below:

“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy.

Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.”

15. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in respective case has submitted that the criminal conspiracy for making out offence of criminal conspiracy, there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or doing by illegal means and then only the ingredients can be made out and in view of the facts of the present case that is absent and as such the case of the petitioners is further strengthened in view of that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed and the petitioners may kindly be discharged.

16. He   further   relied   in   the   case   of   Dipakbhai  Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 and relied on paragraph no.23 of the said judgment which is quoted below:

“23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.”

17. Relying on the above judgment, Mr. Sinha, the learned counsel for the petitioner in respective case submitted that the case of the petitioners are covered and the petitioners are entitled to be discharged. On these grounds, he submitted that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed and the petitioners may kindly be discharged and the order framing charge may kindly be quashed.

18. Per contra, Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned A.S.G.I appearing on behalf of the respondent -Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) vehemently opposed the prayer and submitted that there are sufficient materials against the petitioners to make out the case and rightly the cognizance is taken and the discharge petition has been rejected and the charge has been framed. He drawn the attention of the Court towards the charge sheet and submitted that Sh. N.P. Garg in conspiracy with Sh. Darlando Thanmi Khathing and in absence of complete master plan invited Expression of Interest (EOI) on 22.10.2011 for empanelment and award of work of construction of different buildings at the permanent campus at Cheri-Manatu, Ranchi. Sh. N.P. Garg, dishonestly and fraudulently, divided the different civil works into four groups of different values. As per the NIT dated 22.10.2011 the civil/internal electrification / HAVA/ Services works were divided into four categories for empanelment of the contractors, i.e. Group A (works valued above Rs.25 crores), Group C (works valued between Rs.5 crores to Rs.10 crores) and Group D (works valued between Rs.3 crores to Rs.5 crores). In the NIT published, no specific criteria was spelt out for empanelment of the contractors. The only condition was that the party should be technically and financially sound and have completed the assigned projects in time bound manner without escalation. In the NIT, a condition was imposed by CUJ that only the empaneled firms will be eligible to participate in the tender for the particular group. By way of referring this, he submitted that others have been deprived in participating in the tender in view of empanelled firms. He further submitted that C.P.W.D, Ranchi by letter no.1530 dated 09.10.2011 had requested Sh. Darlando Thanmi Khathing, the then Vice Chancellor of Central University Jharkhand (CUJ) for giving complete construction work to it for execution in light of UGC/ Government Guidelines and GFR, 2005. However, its request was turned down and instead treated as its bid for empaneled contractor of work for Group-A, that is, above Rs.25 crores. He further submitted that as a part of the conspiracy the award of building construction was given to the favoured firms and a comparative chart was prepared by the concerned accused officers of Central University, Jharkhand, Ranchi (CUJ) for empanelment of Group-A, B, C and D contractors in which the CPWD was deliberately excluded. He submitted that the CPWD is Central Agency to execute all important works of the Government and purposely the CPWD was deliberately excluded which clearly suggest that conspiracy was made for misappropriation.

19. By way of further drawing the attention of the Court to the charge sheet, he submitted that it has been revealed that while preparing the list of empaneled firms/ Government Departments in the order dated 09.01.2012 all the empaneled contractors were requested to quote their rate over DSR 2007 of civil /electrical work along with rate for extra items as per list annexed and the rates were to be submitted in sealed envelope on 20.01.2012 by 3.00 p.m and the rates were to be opened at 3.30 p.m. on the same day. He further submitted that with the approval of Sh. Darlando Thanmi Khathing, Sh. Narendra Pal Garg asked the empaneled firms to submit their rates for construction of different buildings, Daily schedule of rates DSR-2007 for all civil and electrical works. No bill or quantities was specified for the said loss. It was found in investigation that all empaneled firms quoted the same rate that is 58 % above DSR 2007. All the empaneled contractors in different groups had quoted the same rates of 58% above DSR and retendering was not done to decide the L1 party. The rate was negotiated by Sh. Narendra Pal Garg and finally the lowest rate was obtained and as Group-A 56%, Group-B 56%, Group-C 54% and Group-D 49%. For Group-D. M/s Sintex Industry Ltd. (Plastic Division), Ranchi had quoted its rate of 56% above DSR-2007 and was L-1. However, Building Committee resolved that its status of the Plastic Division to represent M/s Sintex Industry may be clarified. It further resolved that OSD (Projects) Narendra Pal Garg may explore the possibilities of negotiating with L-2 i.e. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. under the premises of CVC guidelines. Investigation further disclosed that under Group-B, M/s Sadanand Gupta, M/s Park Sarvangda Projects Pvt Ltd and M/s Rock drill India were L-1 after post tender negotiation who quoted 56% above DSR-2007. He submitted that investigation further disclosed that under Group-C M/s Raj Construction M/s Mourya Heritage, M/s J.C. Enterprises and M/s Bharat Drilling and Foundation Treatment Pvt. Ltd. were L-1 after post tender negotiation who quoted 54% above DSR-2007. He further submitted that it has come in investigation that under Group-D, M/s B.P. Construction was L-1 who quoted 49% above DSR-2007. He then submitted that instead of retendering, the accused public servants awarded the same or several types of works i.e. Civil works/ electrical works at different rates, i.e. 56^above DSR 2007 in Group-B, 54% above DSR 2007 in Group-C and 49% above DSR-2007 in Group-D. These rates should have been same as the nature of the work was same or similar. He submitted that the Minutes of 11th meeting of Building Committee held on 27.01.2012 in which the award of the work to the contractors in different categories was shown approved by the Building Committee were issued under the signatures of Sh.D.T.Khating who was the Chairman of the Building Committee. He had also made corrections in the draft in his own handwriting. The said minutes were not confirmed by the other Members in the 12th meeting of the Building Committee held on 09.02.2012. It was observed by the Members that the Master Plan had not yet been finalized and it was resolved that retender be called for selection of builders. The investigation further disclosed that Sh. Narendra Pal Garg had called all the empaneled contractors for negotiations to get their rates reduced. The lowest rate offered by the contractors after negotiation was 49% above DSR-2007 quoted by M/s B.P. Construction of Group-D. The works was awarded to the contractors in Group-B and C at 7% and 5% above the L-1 rate which is a wrongful loss to the University and corresponding wrongful gain to the private parties. By way of referring the charge sheet, he submitted that the wrongful loss occurring to the University on this count is tabulated in the charge sheet as under:

20. He submitted that thus the total wrongful loss on account of the award of work at higher rates of 56% and 54% to the above firms is Rs.3,56,66,439/-. The investigation disclosed that the measurement books (MBs) have been prepared by Sh. Sanjay Kumar Singh and checked by Sh. Sitaram Swarnkar. Thereafter, the bills have also been countersigned by Sh Sanjay Kumar Singh and checked by Sh.Sitaram Swankar. The order for payment was issued by Sh. N.P.Garg after obtaining the approval of Sh D.T.Khating.

21. Relying on the above materials which are in the charge sheet, he submitted that the case has rightly been proceeded and the discharge petition was rejected and the charge has already been framed and there are parameters of exercising power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. He submitted that the case of the petitioners are prima facie proved and that can be subject matter of trial only and this Court may not interfere. He relied in the case of State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC Online SC 129 and relied on paragraph no. 7,8, 9 and 10:

7. It is trite law that application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on basis of charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge would suffice and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.

8. At the time of framing of the charge and taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only.

9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-sheet material at the stage of framing the charge which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court to determine whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing, to oral hearing and oral arguments only and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O.

10. It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:

“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”

22. Relying on the above judgment, he submitted that the materials are already there and prima facie case is made out and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record may not be gone into and nature of impression to be made by the Court at the stage of framing of the charge is to taste the existence of prima facie case. At the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of practical ingredients constitution the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. Relying on the above, he submitted that the materials are there and as such, these petitions are misconceived one and this Court may kindly dismiss these petitions.

23. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has minutely gone through the materials on record and finds that Narendra Pal Garg, OSD (Projects) and D.T. Khating, the then Vice Chancellor without preparation of details of the project report, without approval of Finance Committee of Central University of Jharkhand (CUJ) and University Grants Commission invited an Expression of Interest (EoI) of preparation of panel of contractors under 4 categories i.e. for civil and electrical works, valued up to Rs.35 crores, Rs.10 crores to Rs.25 crores, Rs.25 crores to Rs.10 crores and Rs.3 crores to 5 crores for construction of different buildings. No open tender was floated by accused public servants of CUJ for construction of the various buildings of permanent campus. The financial clearance and initial approval was not made. The public servants by abusing their official position awarded the work of construction of building at permanent campus to 12 firms at exorbitant rates. The builders must have constructed the buildings were awarded to above accused firms at different rates, that is, above 56%, above 54% and above 49% of daily schedule of rates (DSR) 2007 whereas the rate should have been different. All the empaneled contractors of three Groups, that is, B, C and D have quoted the same rates, that is, above 58 % of DSR 2007. However, no re-tendering was done by the accused persons. In this background, it transpires that the official of CUJ have entered into conspiracy with 12 firms and by abusing their official position on the basis of fake and bogus documents awarded the work of construction of different buildings to the said firms at an exorbitant rate and fraudulently made payment of Rs.93,94,77,420/-and it is alleged that the University was cheated to the tune of Rs.3,56,66,439/-. Thus, the allegations are there of procedural irregularities in issuing tender, the contract was given at a higher rate. The charge sheet was submitted against the four public persons and eight private firms exonerating one Abhay Nindkan Tigga and four private persons, however, it is well settled that exoneration of other accused persons cannot be a ground of quashing of entire criminal proceedings and discharge of accused persons and if in course of the trial any materials are coming against any other person the Court is competent to exercise the powers under section 319 Cr.P.C and that cannot be a ground of discharging and quashing of the entire criminal proceeding. The learned court has applied its mind in passing the order taking cognizance and further the entire case has rightly been appreciated and thereafter has been pleased to reject the discharge petition and pursuant to that the charge has already been framed. Thus, a prima facie case against the petitioners are made out. In all these cases, the petitioners have also been charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The said Act has a purpose to serve and it was made with an intention to eradicate corruption and provide deterrent punishment if criminal culpability is proven and the same is having an immense social relevance. An attitude to abuse of official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. A reference may be made to the case of Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal and Another v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 wherein at paragraph nos.16, 17 and 25 it has been held as under :

“16. In Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] a proponement was advanced that unless a time-limit is fixed for the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the right to speedy trial would be illusory. The Constitution Bench, after referring to the factual matrix and various submissions, opined that there is a constitutional guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21 which is also reflected in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows: (SCC p. 268, para 83)

“83. But then speedy trial or other expressions conveying the said concept—are necessarily relative in nature. One may ask—speedy means, how speedy? How long a delay is too long? We do not think it is possible to lay down any time schedules for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the workload in the particular court, means of communication and several other circumstances have to be kept in mind.”

After so stating, the Court gave certain examples relating to a murder trial where less number of witnesses are examined and certain trials which involve large number of witnesses. It also referred to certain offences which, by their very nature, e.g., conspiracy cases, cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, forgery, sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public servants, cases of corruption against high public officials, take longer time for investigation and trial. The Court also took note of the workload in each court, district, region and State-wise and the strikes by the members of the Bar which interfere with the work schedules. The Bench further proceeded to observe that in the very nature of things, it is difficult to draw a time-limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go, and if it is a minor offence, not an economic offence and the delay is too long, not caused by the accused, different considerations may arise but each case must be left to be decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does not become illusory when a time-limit is not fixed.

17. In the said case, in para 86, the Court culled out 11 propositions which are meant to subserve as guidelines. The Constitution Bench observed that the said propositions are not exhaustive as it is difficult to foresee all situations and further, it is not possible to lay down any hard-and-fast rules. The propositions which are relevant for the present purpose are reproduced below: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] , SCC pp. 271-72)

“86. … (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of right to speedy trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on—what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.

***

(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors—‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’—and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.

(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order—including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded—as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.”

It has been laid down therein that it is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences inasmuch as any such rule is bound to be qualified one.

25. In the case at hand, the appellant has been charge-sheeted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for disproportionate assets. The said Act has a purpose to serve. Parliament intended to eradicate corruption and provide deterrent punishment when criminal culpability is proven. The intendment of the legislature has an immense social relevance. In the present day scenario, corruption has been treated to have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the economy. There are cases where the amount is small and in certain cases, it is extremely high. The gravity of the offence in such a case, in our considered opinion, is not to be adjudged on the bedrock of the quantum of bribe. An attitude to abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of benefit is a crime against the collective and an anathema to the basic tenets of democracy, for it erodes the faith of the people in the system. It creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law. Be it noted, system of good governance is founded on collective faith in the institutions. If corrosions are allowed to continue by giving allowance to quash the proceedings in corruption cases solely because of delay without scrutinising other relevant factors, a time may come when the unscrupulous people would foster and garner the tendency to pave the path of anarchism.”

24. As it was argued by the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in respective case that mala fidely the case has been lodged against the petitioners, that cannot be a ground for preventing the court of competent jurisdiction from examining the evidence which may be led before it for coming to the conclusion whether an offence has been committed or not? A reference may be made to the case of State of Maharastra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 542, wherein at paragraph 22, it has been held as under:

“22. In fact, the question of mala fides in a case like the present is not at all relevant. If the complaint which is made is correct and an offence had been committed which will have to be established in a court of law, it is of no consequence that the complainant was a person who was inimical or that he was guilty of mala fides. If the ingredients which establish the commission of the offence or misconduct exist then, the prosecution cannot fail merely because there was an animus of the complainant or the prosecution against the accused. Allegations of mala fides may be relevant while judging the correctness of the allegations or while examining the evidence. But the mere fact that the complainant is guilty of mala fides, would be no ground for quashing the prosecution. In the instant case, specific averments of facts have been made whereby it was alleged that the respondent had disproportionately large assets. Mala fide intention of the appellant in launching prosecution against the respondent with a view to punish him cannot be a reason for preventing the court of competent jurisdiction from examining the evidence which may be led before it, for coming to the conclusion whether an offence had been committed or not. Allegations of mala fides were also made in P.P. Sharma case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] against the informer. It was held by this Court that when an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.”

25. In the case of Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2010) 9 SCC 368, in paragraph no.21 of the judgment, a guideline has been made on the point of framing of charge and discharge which is as under:

“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

26. In view of the above principle, the Court is required to decide the discharge petition or framing of the charge. In the aforesaid guidelines, the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the petitioners and for that they have placed reliance on several judgments have already been sum upped by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Thus, a discharge petition and order framing charge is required to be considered on these principles.

27. The  judgments  relied  by  the  learned  Senior  counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the case of A Shivaprakash v. State of Kerala (supra) the allegation is on the accused of committing criminal misconduct by abusing his position and obtaining pecuniary advantage and no evidences was led on record as what kind of pecuniary advantage was obtained by the accused persons that is why Hon’ble Apex Court has quashed the proceedings in that case but in the case in hand evidences are against the petitioners as such the case relied by the petitioners is not helping the petitioners.

Further the case relied by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner in the case Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr.(supra), no doubt the High Court has a power to quash the proceedings even after framing of the charges where the allegations do not disclose the prima facie case but it cannot be a ground for quashing of the legitimate prosecution. In the case in hand, there are direct allegation against the petitioners of issuing the tender without complying the basic provisions and the prosecution is legitimate or illegitimate it will appear in trial, but not before that. Thus, this case is also not helping the petitioners.

Further the case relied by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, in the case of C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State (through, CBI)(supra), in that case dishonest intention to obtain the pecuniary advantage was absent and that is why the Hon’ble Apex Court has quashed the proceedings, whereas in the case in hand, the materials on record suggest that the dishonest intention is there and as such, this case is also not helping the petitioners.

Further, the case of ‘R.Balakrishna Pillai’(supra), the allegation against the accused person that they illegally sold the Kerala Electricity without sanction of the Government to an Industry in the State of Karnataka by abusing their official position and intentionally made the pecuniary advantage to the company/industry, in this regard Hon’ble Apex Court has quashed the proceeding on the ground that element of mens rea and intention was not there, but in the case in hand, evidences on record suggest otherwise, and as such, this case is also not helping the case of the petitioners.

28. At this stage, evidences can only be weighed for the limited purpose of finding out whether the case is made out or not? Whether any grave suspicion is made out or not? The Court cannot act as a post –office. However, at this stage a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the matter are not expected. On the materials, the Court formed the opinion that the accused have committed offence and it can frame the charge, at that time the probative value of the materials on record cannot be roamed into.

29. In view of the above facts, it is crystal clear that a prima facie case is made out against the petitioners and as such, all these petitions being Cr. M.P. No. 759 of 2018, Cr. M.P. No. 385 of 2018, Cr. M.P. No. 702 of 2018 and Cr. M.P. No. 708 of 2018 are, hereby dismissed.

30. Interim orders are vacated.

31. Pending petition if any also stands disposed of accordingly.

32. The trial will proceed in accordance with law without prejudice to this order and as such, the trial will be expedited.