M.M. Punchhi, J.@mdashWe have here three petitions, being OWP Nos. 6452, 6453 and 6456 of 1989, which are identical. They are on behalf of three Executive Officers against whom similar action has been initiated. Illustratively to quota one of them, we have Vijay Kumar''s case in CWP No. 6456 of 1989. He was an Executive Officer-cum-Secre-tary, Market Committee, Raipur Rani in district Ambala in the year 1982-83. For an action while posted there, he had to face proceedings u/s 29 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) on a show cause notice Annexure P-l, issued to him by the Chief Administrator of the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, the pith and substance of which was that he was instrumental in purchasing substandard tarpaulins at inflated rates for the Market Committee for extraneous considerations, whereby loss was caused to the Committee to the tune of Rs. 60,160. On such notice, the Petitioner sent his reply and thereafter the Chief Administrator,--vide order dated May 27, 1988, Annexure P-3, held Vijay Kumar Petitioner responsible for making good the loss of Rs. 60,160 to the Committee. The matter is stated to be in appeal at the instance of the Petitioner.
2. Thereafter a charge-sheet under Rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952, (for short, Punishment Rules) was served on Vijay Kumar Petitioner by the Chief; Administrator proposing to initiate proceedings against him on the statement of allegations appended therewith. The crux of those allegations is that he neither worked out the requirements of tarpaulins on any realistic basis nor did he place before the Administrator necessary data for determining the requirements of tarpaulins, before obtaining his orders for purchase thereof, which amounted to negligence and deriliction of duty on his part. Further, he did not positively inform the Administrator of the Market Committee that budgetary sanction for the purchase of tarpaulins was necessary under Rule 6 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1962 (for short, the Rules) before incurring expenditure thereon, resulting in an unauthorized expenditure of Rs. 1,58,720. Still further, he failed to send a copy of the resolution whereby the Administrator approved the purchase of tarpaulins, to the Secretary of Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Botfrd as required under Rule 14(4) and thus acted in gross violation of the said Rules. Lastly, he malafide managed the whole process of purchase of tarpaulins in a great hurry and in utter disregard of norms of financial propriety, inasmuch as wide publicity in the newspaper was not given despite huge financial implications involved, sealed quotations were not invited, quotations were not opened by the competent authority etc. etc. and that he had caused a loss of Rs. 60,160 to the Market Committee, Raipur Rani.
3. The other two Petitioners were similarly ordered i.e. Dharam Vir in CWP No. 6452 of 1989 to pay Rs. 33615 for the loss caused to the Market Committee, Pipli, and Prithvi Singh, in CWP No. 6453 of 1989 to pay Rs. 78,528 and Rs. 96000 in two account years for causing loss to the Market Committee, Ambala Cantt.
4. Challenge in these petitions is two-fold. Firstly, it is urged that when the Petitioners have been ordered to make good the loss to the respective Committees u/s 29 of the Act, they cannot be made to face any enquiry under the Punishment Rules, Section 29(1) of the Act, being relevant, is quoted below:
29. Liability of member or employee of Committees or the Board.
(1) Every person shall be liable for the loss, waste or misapplication of any money or other property belonging to a Committee, if such loss, waste or misapplication is proved to the satisfaction of the Board to be the direct consequence of his neglect or misconduct in the performance of duties as a member or an employee of the Committee, or an official managing the affairs of the committee and he may, after being given an opportunity by a written notice to show cause why he should not be required to make good the loss, be surcharged with the value of such property or the amount of such loss by the Board, and if the amount is not paid within one month from the expiry of the period of appeal prescribed by Sub-section (3) it shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue:
Provided that no such person shall be called upon to show cause after the expiry of a period of four years from the occurrence of such loss, waste or misapplication or after the expiry of two years from the time of his ceasing to be a member of an employee or official whichever expires first.
5. It is plain from the language thereof that thereunder only the liability of member of employee of a Committee is determined even though such liability arises when loss, wastage or misapplication of any money or other property belonging to a Committee, is proved to the satisfaction of the Board to be the direct consequence of his neglect or misconduct in the performance of his duties as a member of an employee of the Committee, but in no case is such a determination that of a guilt so as to impose any punishment on a member or an employee. This enabling provision comes to the rescue of the Committee to have its loss recouped and the Board is the determining authority in that regard. It is difficult for us to subscribe to the view, as canvassed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the order u/s 29 is, in any way, penal in character or that in the wake thereof no proceedings under the punishment Rules can be initiated against the Petitioners. We are further of the view that the mere provision of one of the punishments thereunder being recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by negligence or breach of orders etc., as provided in Rule 4(iv) of the Rules, is by itself not an instance of double jeopardy. There are other punishments too from censure to dismissal. The supposition that if such a punishment of recovery from pay is imposed upon a delinquent and whether initiation of proceedings u/s 29 would be justified thereafter, is neither here nor there. This is an argument which has to be noted and rejected in the instant case. Reading the provisions together, it is crystal clear to us that one establishes the civil liability and the other the guilt of the delinquent and there is no overlapping by the coinciding of neglect and misconduct to be established in both.
6. Secondly, it has been contended that though under the Rules, it is provided that with regard to the Secretaries, Market Committee, the punishing authority is the Chief Administrator, this power has been conferred on it under the Act. Specific attention has been invited to Sub-section (5) of Section 20 of the Act, which says that the Board shall have the power to suspend, remove, dismiss or otherwise punish the officials in the Service. And, it is contended that the Chief Administrator is not the Board. The argument loses sight of the implication of Sub-section (7) of Section 20, which provides that the power conferred upon the Board and the Committee shall be exercised subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf by the State Government. So the power of the Board is subjected to the rules and those provide that it is the Chief Administrator of the Board who would be acting as the punishing authority as if the Board. Besides, Section 3(17)(2) of the Act, as applicable to the State of Haryana, provides that the Board may, under intimation to the Government, delegate any of1 its power to its Chairman, Chief Administrator, Secretary or any of its officers. The narration in the show cause notice, Annexure P-l, issued by the Chief Administrator to the effect that that power vested in him u/s 29 of the Act, by virtue of the delegation made to him by the Board, has not been questioned before us, for, as hinted earlier, the Board was empowered to delegate any of its powers to the Chief Administrator u/s 3(17)(2) of the Act. In this situation, we do not find any fault in the Chief Administrator exercising the powers of the Board.
7. No other point arises.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss these writ petitions in limine.
