J.V. Gupta, J.@mdashThis is landlady''s revision petition whose ejectment application was allowed by the Rent Controller, but dismissed in
appeal.
2. The demised premises are a residential building, i. e., house No. 1076, Sector 27-B, Chandigarh. They Were rented out to the tenant vide rent
note dated February 27, 1974, for a period of six month on a monthly rent of Rs 500/-. The ejectment of the tenant was sought on the ground that
the landlady bona file required the same for her own use and occupation, as she was not residing in her own right but on sufferance, in house No
1040, Sector 27-B, Chandigarh, because the said house belonged and was owned by her brother Gurdev, Singh Bhalla (who died during the
pendency of the appeal). According to her, her brother Gurdev Singh Bhalla had been pressing her for some time and wanted her to vaeate the
said house. The family of the landlady consisted, besides herself, of her daughter and her husband who was serving and posted somewhere in the
border area near Tibet. She could not live with her husband there. Under the circumstances, ,she had to live at Chandigarh to look after her
daughter who was an M. A. student. It was. further pleaded that she had no other place to live at Chandigarh except the demised premises. It was
alto averred that she had not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, (hereinafter called the Act), nor was she occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned. In the written statement, the
tenant admitted the factum of the tenancy According to him, before he occupied the demised premises as a tenant, they were in occuation of
another tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/-. '' According to him, the landlady got them vacated from him on the pretext that she needed the same
for her own use and occupations. It was further pleaded by him that the ejectment application bad been made by her with the motive of enhancing
the rent for which the had been pressing him on a number of occasions. In the replication filed on behalf of the landlady, the allegations made in the
written statement were contraverted and those made in the ejectment application were reiterated. Thus, the only controversy between the parties
was whether the landlady required the building, in question, for her own bona fide requirement or not. The learned Rent Controller came to the
Conclusion that the requirement of the landlady to occupy the premised, in question, was most bona fide since, then, she was putting up in the
house owned by her brother, with his permission. As a result, the eviction application was allowed and the ejectment order was passed against the
tenant. In appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the said finding of the Rent Controller and, consequently dismissed the ejectment application.
Dissatisfied with the same, the landlady has filed this revision petition In this Court.
3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Rent Controller after appreciation of the entire evidence rightly came to the
conclusion that the requirement of the landlady was bona fide as she was not occupying any other house in the urban area concerned in her own
right, but the said finding has been reversed arbitrarily and on surmises and conjectures by the Appellate Authority. According to the Learned
Counsel the finding arrived at by it is wrong, illegal and therefore vitiated. The Learned Counsel also argued that in February, 1982, the father-in-
law of the landlady died and, therefore, now, her mother-in-law also wanted to live with her at Chandigarh Apart from that, it was also averred in
the additional affidavit, filed in this Court, dated July 4, 1983, on behalf of the landlady that the Respondent tenant had recently constructed bis
own house at plot No. 604, Sector 16, Panchkula, on a one kanal plot and therefore, the accomodation for the requirement of the Respondent
was sufficient in the said house. Reply to the above said affidavit was filed on behalf of the tenant-Respondent by way of an affidavit dated March
15, 1984, wherein it was inter alia stated that if the father-in-law of the landlady bad died in February, 1982, then this fact could be brought on the
record when the proceedings were pending in the Court of the Rent Controller because the Rent Controller has passed the eviction order on May
31, 1982. According to the tenant, this ground was not now available to the landlady by way of a subsequent event. As regards the construction of
the house in Panchkula as averred in her affidavit by the landlady, it was stated that he owned plot No. 604, Sector 16, Panchkula, but no house
has been construnted except that preliminary construction has been raised thereon so far. However, the details of the so-celled preliminary
construction have not been given.
4. The Learned Counsel for the tenant-Respondent submitted that the landlady had failed to plead and prove the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a) (i)
(c) of the Act, i.e, she had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act. According to the Learned
Counsel, the Act was made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh in November, 1972 whereas the tenant had occupied the premises, in
dispute, in the year 1974. Under the circumstances, it will be deemed that the said premises were available to her in the year 1974 for her
occupation, but she failed to occupy the same without any sufficient cause which under the law would mean that she had vacated such a building
without sufficient cause.
5. After hearing the Learned Counsel for the parties and going through the relevant evidence on the record, I am of the considered opinion that the
whole approach of the Appellate Authority is wrong, illegal and misconceived.
6. It is the common case of the parties that the house in which the landlady at present is living belongs to her brother Gurdev Singh Bhalla. It is also
admitted that he has died during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the Appellate Authority. He was unmarried and has left behind
his mother and a brother. It is also not disputed that now after the death of Gurdev Singh Bhalla, the inheritance will go to his mother. Thus, the
residence in or the occupation of the said house by the landlady could not be said to be in her own right. It is true that she has been living there
since the year 1963, but at the same time, it could not be disputed that she was living there as a licensee and not in her own right. It is also not
disputed that the landlady or her husband does not own any other bouse in the urban area concerned except the building, in dispute. The reason
given by the landlady to occupy her own house, i e., the demised premises, was that her brother Gurdev Singh Bhalla was pressing her to vacate
the house where she was redding with him because he wanted to sell the same. Be that as it may, if Gurdev Singh Bhalla did not want her to live in
the said home with him for any reason or that she did not want to continue to remain in occupation thereof as a licensee, she was entitled to the
order of ejectment against the tenant because she wanted to occupy her own house bonafide when admittedly she did not own any other house in
the urban area concerned The main contention raised on behalf of the tenant is that since in the year 1974, she rented out the demised premises to
him when she was in a position to occupy the same herself, in law, it would be presumed that she had vacated the said building without sufficient
cause after the commencement of the Act and, therefore, Clause (c) of Section 13(3) (a) (i) of the Act, was not complied with. I do not find any
merit in this contention. The tenant was inducted on the demised premises in the year 1974 whereas the present eviction application was filed on
August 2, 1979, i e., after more than five years. If in the year 1974, she rented out the premises, as she did not require the same at that time, it did
not mean that the was debarred from claiming the ejectment of the tenant subsequently. Though there is some dispute as to whether the words,
such a building"", in Clause (c) of Section 13(3) (a) (i) of the Act means the building, in dispute, or some other building, but without going into that
controversy, from the facts and circumstances of this case, it is amply proved that the demised premises were not occupied by the landlady in the
year 1974 for sufficient cause and, therefore, Clause (c) of Section 13( ) (a) (i) does not stand in her way. The approach of the Appellate
Authority in this behalf, as observed earlier, is wholly misconceived. The previous two tenants who had occupied the premises in question, vacated
the same themselves. If after their vacation, it was again rented out subsequently on a higher rent by the landlady, it did not mean that she had got
the same vacated for the purposes of enhancing the rent thereof The matter might have been different if the ejectment was sought of those previous
tenants through Court, but if they themselves vacated the same, and the same were rented out subsequently by the landlady on a higher rent, it did
not mean that her intention was to enhance the rent thereof. According to the Appellate Authority since she has stated in her statement that the
present market rent of the house, in dispute, was about Rs. 1,500/-, it was clear that she only wanted to enhance the rent and that her requirement
of the demised premises was not bona fide This approach of the Appellate Authority, as observed earlier, is wholly wrong, illegal and
misconceived. It could not be disputed that the rents of the buildings go on increasing and if it is stated by a landlord or a landlady that the present
market rent of a building was about so and so, then, it did not mean that he or she will again rent out the same after getting vacated from the then
tenant In the present case, the requirement of the landlady is most bona fide when it is the common case of the parlies that she does not own any
other residential building in the urban area concerned, and was not in occupation of any other building in her own right. Simply because she has
been living earlier for a long time in the house owned by her brother who has died during the pendency of the appeal, it did not debar her from
claiming the ejectment of the tenant from the house, in dispute All the ingredients of Section 13(3) (a) (i) of the Act are fully proved in this case and
once the said ingredients are proved, then, it could not be successfully argued that the requirement of the lanolady was not bona fide and that it was
her mere wish to occupy the premises, in dispute. Similar situation came up for consideration before me in Rajesh Kumar v. Kulwant Rai 1982 (1)
Rent L. R. 256, wherein it was held that where the landlord was residing with his brother at his mercy and he had no other property in the urban
area concerned, his need to occupy his own house which was rented out earlier was bona fide Similar view was taken in Sadhu Ram v. Shakuntla
Devi (1979) 81 P. L. R. 52, wherein it was held that if a person is sharing an accommdation(sic) with a relation, he or she cannot be left at the
mercy of that relation for all times, to come. If such a person owns a bouse at a different place and puts forth a claim that he or she is going to
occupy the same, such a plea in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, should not be lightly ignored. If the landlord in such a situation puts
forth such a plea solely with the intention of getting that house vacated and does not occupy the same, the tenant has ample remedies for
reoccupying such a house in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
7. According to the Appellate Authority, the very basis of the application of the landlady was that she wanted to shift from the house of her brother
Gurdev Singh Bhalla who bad been pressing her hard for quite some time to vacate the house. Since he had already died, the very foundation of
the claim of the landlady for seeking the tenant''s eviction had ceased to exist. According to the Appellate Authority, though the house now will vest
in the mother of Gurdev Singh Bhalla, yet ordinarily, one would expect the mother to prefer her daughter (the landlady) to live with her because
both will have the assistance of each other in a situation like this. These observations are based on surmises and conjectures. Whether the mother
will prefer to live with her daughter or will take to live with her son at Delhi, is for her to decide and not for the authorities under the Act Once it is
found that the landlady does not occupy any other house in the urban area concerned in her own right, she is entitled to seek the ejectment of her
tenant as her need of the demised premises under the circumstances will be most bona fide The only circumstance brought on the record on behalf
of the tenant that she wanted to enhance the rent because the market rent at present of the house, in dispute, was Rs. 1,500/-, as admitted by the
landlady, has ho relevance. Simply because the present market rent thereof is Rs. 1,500/-, it did not mean that the ladlady wanted to enhance the
rent thereof. At least on that ground, it could not be held that the requirement of the landlady was not bona fide. Thus, keeping in view the facts
and circumstances of the case, the finding of the Appellate Authority being illegal & impower is vitiated and that of the Rent Controller is held to be
correct.
8. In this view of the matter, this revision petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned order of the Appellate Authority is set aside
and that of the Rent Controller, directing the ejectment of the tenant is restored. However, the tenant is allowed three months'' time to vacate the
premises; provided all the arrears of rent, it any, and the advance rent for three months are deposited with the Rent Controller within one month
and the tenant also gives an undertaking, in writing, before him that he will vacate the premises and hand over the possession thereof to the
landlady after the expiry of the above-said period of three months.