Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.@mdashBriefly the facts are that Subhash Chander Khurana was placed under suspension by the Chief Engineer (P. & M.M.), Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala,--vide order dated 29th December, 1981, on receipt of a confidential report from Assistant Executive Engineer (Flying Squad) that he had been tampering at site the spot Welding and M&T seals originally fixed in the M.E. Laboratory with the object of committing/aiding theft of electricity. The Respondent instituted a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Muktsar against the order of suspension. During the pendency of the suit the Respondent was reinstated on 15th July, 1982, subject to the result of the enquiry. His posting order was also issued. However, the suit was partly decreed on 29th October, 1983 for declaration to the effect that the Plaintiff stood reinstated with effect from 29th January, 1982, instead of 15th July, 1982 subject to the result of the enquiry pending against him. It was further directed that the Board should complete the enquiry with 90 days.
2. The Board could not complete the enquiry within the said period and, therefore, an application was moved on its behalf before the Subordinate Judge, Muktsar for extension of three months time to complete enquiry. The application has been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge,--vide impugned order on the ground that the same could not be allowed u/s 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Board has come up in revision against the order of the Subordinate Judge to this Court.
3. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the part of the decree that the Defendant should complete the enquiry within 90 days was not the essence of the decree and therefore, it could not be held that Section 148 of the Code was not applicable.
4. I have duly considered the argument and find force in it. The facts of the present case are not distorted. The Respondent had been suspended,--vide order dated 29th December, 1981. He instituted a suit on 3rd March, 1982. for declaration that the order of suspension was illegal, void and ineffective. He also prayed that the Board be directed to issue order of his posting. During the pendency of the suit he was reinstated by the Board on 15th July, 1982. The suit was decided by the Court on 29th October, 1983 in which it was ordered that he stood reinstated with effect from 29th January, 1982 instead of 15th July, 1982, but that would be subject to the result of the enquiry pending against him. It was further directed that the Board would complete the enquiry within 90 days. It is not disputed that the Respondent had not claimed in the suit that the enquiry should be completed within a particular period. It is also noteworthy that it was not provided in the decree or judgment as to what would be the effect if the enquiry was not completed within the said period. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the said direction was the essence of the decree. It is well-settled that if any time is fixed for performance of some act, which is not the essence of the decree, the Court has got the power u/s 148 to extend time for the performance thereof. Reference in this regard may be made to a Division Bench judgment of Pepsu High Court in Nanha v. Baroo and Ors. AIR 1952 Pepsu 88 and
This makes me think that time fixed for the deposit was not the essence of the matter, and even though the deposit was not made within time the Appellants'' right to obtain possession was not altogether lost. Different, however, would have been the condition if it had been laid down by the Judicial Committee that if deposit was not made within time the Appellants'' suit for possession of the land shall stand dismissed or that they would be debarred from taking the possession.
It was urged by the Respondents'' counsel that when time is once fixed for performance of a certain act in a decree it cannot be extended u/s 148. This is no doubt the general rule, but there are exceptions to it. In this connection I cannot do better than to refer to a Bench decision of the Patna High Court
The said case was followed in Sarat Chandra Patro''s case (supra). In that case a decree for possession in favour of the Plaintiff was passed by the trial Court on paying some compensation to the Defendant. The compensation was deposited in execution of the decree. The Defendant went up in appeal and the appellate Court increased the amount of compensation. The Plaintiff was directed to deposit the balance amount within two months which was deposited by him after the expiry of the said period. During the execution proceedings an objection was taken by the judgment-debtor that the decree could not be executed as the Plaintiff decree-holder had not deposited the enhanced amount within the stipulated period. It was observed by the learned Judge that the absence of an order that if the said amount was not deposited within the said time, the decree-holder would lose his right to obtain possession of the property indicated that the Court wanted that the amount should be paid within that time so that the matter pending in Court for a long time could be finally disposed of without unnecessary delay. In the context and perspective of the facts and circumstances of the case the specification of time in the order did not appear to be the essence of the said order. I am in respectful agreement with the above observations.
5. The learned Counsel for the Respondent made reference to Himmun v. Fauji AIR 1921 Lah 6 wherein it was observed that a decree could be altered by review on appeal or revision but either Section 148 or 151 could not be utilised for the purpose of altering the decree. The observations were made in the facts and circumstance of that case which are distinguishable. In my view, he cannot derive any benefit-from the said observations.
6. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts and circumstances I am of the opinion that the Court had the power to extend time u/s 148 of the Code.
7. Now the question that arises for determination is whether the time should be extended u/s 148 or not in the present case. I have been informed that one of the witnesses who is to be examined is at present employed outside the country and it will take some time to secure his presence. Mr. Goyal has, however, given an undertaking that the Department shall close its case by 30th April, 1985. Mr. Jain, counsel for the Respondent, states that he shall take at the most one month for producing his evidence. Thus the evidence of the parties should conclude by the end of May, 1985. Thereafter the enquiry officer will require some time to complete the report. Mr. Goyal has further given an undertaking that the report shall be completed by the enquiry officer within 15 days after the Respondent concludes his evidence. In case he concludes the evidence within a shorter period than one month. It is expected from the enquiry officer to give the report within 15 days after the conclusion of the evidence. Mr. Goyal has made an oral request that the period be further extended for completion of the enquiry up to 15th June, 1985. Section 148 provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing of any act prescribed, the Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. It is well settled that the power given to the Court u/s 148 is discretionary and is given for the purpose of securing the ends of justice in case of necessity (see Shri Joydhayan v. Babu Ram and Ors. CA 94/72 decided on 23-11-82, decided by the Supreme Court. After taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and in order to avoid further litigation between the parties I extend the time up to 15th June, 1985. However, I hope that the enquiry will be completed prior to that date and in any case no further extension will be sought by the Petitioner.
8. For the aforesaid reasons I accept the revision petition and grant extension to the Petitioner up to 15th June, 1985. I, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
