Alok Singh, J.@mdashOn 6.8.2010, adjournment was sought by the learned Counsel for the revisionist. Thereafter, none was present on behalf of the revisionist on 26.10.2010. Even today none is present for the revisionist to press the revision.
2. Present revision is filed by the complainant against the order of acquittal passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sangrur, vide judgment dated 2.3.2010 in FIR No. 100 dated 31.12.2008 under Sections 452/436/323/34 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Longowal.
3. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that the complainant Gurcharan Singh son of Rajinder Singh, caste Jat, resident of village Loha Khera had been residing in village Loha Khera since for the last five years along with his brothers. On 30.12.2008, at about 2.00 p.m., accused Jagtar Singh alias Bogha armed with takua and Gurlal Singh alias Lali armed with a soti came to the house of the complainant/Petitioner. Accused Gurlal Singh put the parali and the cotton sticks lying in the house of the complainant to fire. When the complainant prevented the accused Gurlal Singh from putting the parali and the cotton sticks to fire, accused Jagtar Singh gave the blow of the takua from its sharp side towards the person of the complainant/Petitioner and he put forth his right arm and the same hit from its blunt side on his right arm. The complainant/Petitioner ran for safety into his house. When accused Jagtar Singh gave another blow of the takua, the complainant/Petitioner had taken the shelter behind the pillar in the verandah of his house and raised hue and cry. In the meantime, Sukhwinder Singh brother of the complainant/Petitioner arrived there and the two accused fled away from the spot along with the weapons. Injured Petitioner was removed by his brother Sukhwinder Singh in a vehicle to Civil Hospital, Sangrur. On 30.12.2008, a medical ruqa Ex.PD having been received from the SHO, P.S. City Sangrur regarding the injured complainant/Petitioner having been admitted in the Civil Hospital, Sangrur, HC Harbans Singh of P.S. Longowal visited Civil Hospital, Sangrur and having moved the application Ex.PE obtained the opinion Ex.PE/1 from the doctor regarding the fitness of the injured to make a statement but the injured wanted his statement to be recorded after the consultation with the members of his family. Accordingly, on 31.12.2008, HC Harbans Singh again visited Civil Hospital, Sangrur, and recorded the statement Ex.PF of the injured Petitioner regarding the aforesaid version of the occurrence in which he also got it recorded that the motive behind the occurrence is that they (complainant) had purchased the land from Bhan Singh, uncle (chacha) of accused Jagtar Singh and Gurlal Singh and regarding which the accused had a doubt about the measurement of the same in that they were under a doubt that the complainant had been cultivating the land in excess. HC Harbans Singh marked his endorsement Ex.PF/1 on the statement of Ex.PF of the injured Petitioner/complainant and sent the same to the Police Station on the basis of which formal FIR Ex.PF/2 was registered.
4. On completion of the necessary investigation, the challan against the accused was presented before the Court of learned Illaqa Magistrate, which in due course of time and after performance of the necessary formalities in the matter of supplying the copies of the documents to the accused as required u/s 207 Code of Criminal Procedure was committed to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Sangrur.
5. At the trial, the prosecution examined PW-1 Dr. Rajiv Prashar, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sangrur, PW-2 Gurcharan Singh (complainant/Petitioner), PW-3 Sukhwinder Singh (eyewitness), PW-4 Nahar Singh, PW-5 Kulwinder Singh, PW-6 Harpreet Sharma Draftsman, PW-7 HC Harbans Singh (I.O.) and closed the evidence.
6. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the record, learned Trial Court has observed as under:
...the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges framed against the accused beyond a shadow of doubt. Firstly the prosecution has not established any motive which impelled the accused in having come to attack the complainant Gurcharan Singh and then to put the Parali and cotton sticks to fire. The land was purchased by the complainant Gurcharan Singh and his brothers from Bhan Singh, uncle of the accused and therefore, the grouse, if any would have been with Bhan Singh and not the accused. It appears that the complainant party had a suspicion upon the accused that they doubted the complainant party to be in possession of the land in excess that purchased by them from their uncle Bhan Singh and in that even the matter could be got settled by demarcation of the land but PW-1 Gurcharan Singh has denied the suggestion that they were in possession of the land more than their share and that Jagtar Singh had got the demarcation of the land from the Patwari. Therefore, the inkling of the doubt entertained by the accused that the complainant party was in possession of the land in excess than purchased by them from Bhan Singh, uncle of the accused goes to show the real motive behind the occurrence.
It appears that the complainant in order to pressurize the accused so as not to ask for the vacation of the land in their possession in excess than purchased by them thought of getting the accused implicated in this case. There is a reason to say so because firstly the complainant Gurcharan Singh caused a delay of four hours in his medical examination and secondly he avoided lodging the FIR on the day of the occurrence i.e. on 30.12.2008 under the pretext that he would suffer the statement after consultation made with the other members of his family. These two circumstances are enough for the Court to disbelieve the version of the prosecution as also the testimony of PW-2 Gurcharan Singh and PW-3 Sukhwinder Singh particularly when the injuries found sustained on the person of PW-2 Gurcharan Singh are found to be only complaint of pain on the right side of lower back and complaint of pain in the right arm.
The things have been tried to be magnified by proving the photigraphs Exs.P2 to P6 showing the burnt Parali scattered on the land away from the house and a part of small cut branches of the trees. Had the accused any intention to destroy the house of the complainant, they would not have put the scattered Parali lying away from the house to fire and rather they would have put the heap of the dungs stacked adjoining the wall of the house as is visible in the photograph Ex.P2 to fir.
7. Having perused the record, I am of the opinion that learned Trial Court has given cogent reasons for acquitting the accused.
8. Hon''ble Apex Court in the matter of Akalu Ahir reported in 1973(3) SCC 583 in para 8 has observed as under:
...the revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice.
...It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court in the court of trial, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of acquittal and direct the retrial of the acquittal accused persons. From the very nature of this power, it should be exercised in exceptional cases and with great care and caution. Trials are not to be lihtly set aside when such order expose the accused persons to a fresh trial with all its consequential harassment. This matter is not res integra and had indeed been dealt with by this Court at least in the four cases noticed by the High Court.
...It makes all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in the opinion of this Court no criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies for attracting the High Court''s power of ordering retrial can be laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision.
i. Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still qcquitted the accused;
ii. Where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wishes to produce;
iii. Where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the Trial Court to the inadmissible;
iv. Where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and.
v. Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.
These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.
9. Hon''ble Apex Court, in the matter of Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar 2002(6) SCC 560 in paras 13 and 14 has observed as under:
13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.
14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdictional against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction.
10. Hon''ble Apex Court, in the matter of
19. The approach of the High Court to the entire case cannot be appreciated. The High Court should have kept in mind that while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it exercises a limited power. Its jurisdiction to entertain a revision application, although is not barred, but severally (sic severely) restricted, particularly when it arises from a judgment of acquittal.
11. In view of the dictum of the Hon''ble Apex Court, in the humble opinion of this Court, in a revision filed by the complainant against the order of acquittal, revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence. However, revisional Court shall be within its jurisdiction to see as to whether trial Court has shut out or has overlooked the evidence which could clarify the issue. Revisional Court can further see manifest error of law or jurisdictional error or procedural error committed by the trial Court amounting to failure of justice.
12. In the present case from the perusal of the record, I am satisfied that learned trial Court has not shut out or overlooked any evidence, which could prove offence against the accused. I do not find any manifest error of law or jurisdictional error or procedural error on the part of the trial Court resulting in wrong judgment.
13. In the opinion of this Court, even if two views are possible on the appreciation of evidence available on record, the view taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused must prevail and this Court should not substitute its view over the view taken by the learned trial Court.
14. Petition is devoid of merit, hence is dismissed.
