G.S. Singhvi, J.@mdashThe preamble of the Constitution of India which was brought into force on January 26, 1950 declares;-
"WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens.;
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all;
FRATERNITY assuring the dignify of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty sixth day of November, 1949 do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION." Part-III contains various provisions relating to individual rights which are enforce able by the Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Part-IV enumerates the Directive Principles of State Policy which, though not enforceable by a Court of law, are fundamental to the governance of the country and are to be kept in view by the State while framing laws. Part IV-A de fines the fundamental duties of the citizens. In a way, that was implicit in the concept of right of one person and corresponding duty of the other has been made explicit in Part IV-A of the Constitution. Article 39(b) lays down that the State shall, in particular, direct its policies towards ensuring that ownership and the control of material resources of the community are so distributed to best subserve the common good. Article 46 imposes a duty on the State to promote with special care, the educational and economic interest of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitations.
2. Article 31-C, which was inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect of the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be vioded on the ground that it is in consistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy.
3. It is sad that even after 54 years of coming into force of the Constitution, dis-advantageous and down-trodden groups of people in general and members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes in particular are exploited with impunity by the haves of the society.
4. I have prefaced the disposal of these petitions by making reference to the provisions of the Constitution because after perusing the record and hearing learned counsel for the parties. I am convinced that these petitions filed for quashing orders dated 19.12,1978 and 15.5.1984 passed by Joint Sales Commissioner (respondent No. 2) and Commissioner, Jullundur Division, Jullundur (respondent No. 1) are wholly merit less and are liable to be dismissed.
5. A perusal of the record shows that after purchasing surplus rural evacuee agricultural land from the Central Government in Package Deal of 1961, the State Government in the Rehabilitation Department framed a policy for disposal of such land by transfer to the occupants on the basis of possession by auction. Subsequently, it was decided that the surplus evacuee land covered by the Package Deal should be sold by restricted auction confined only to landless members of Scheduled Castes. This was intended to help those who could never dream of having land to live and in order to achieve the objectives of social justice by distribution of land to the landless members of the Scheduled Castes, the State Government imposed rigorous restrictions against the transfer of land by the allottee by way of sale or otherwise.
6. In furtherance of the policy framed by the State Government, land measuring 100 kanals 3 marlas comprised in khasra Nos. 16//1(8-0), 2(8-0), 3(8-0), 4(3-14), 7(1-11), 16/21(7-2), 16/8(8-0), 9(8-0), 1(8-10), 12(8-0), 13(6-2), 18(2-4), 19(8-0) and 20(8-0) situated in village Thanda Bhagana, Tehsil Phagwara, Distt. Kapurthala was sold by restricted auction to one Banta Ram, who was a member of Scheduled Caste and other similarly situated persons in accordance with the provisions of Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Rules, 1962 (for short ''the 1962 Rules''). At the time of auction, it was made clear to the bidders that the allottee shall not be entitled to resale, transfer or mortgage the land till the final payment of the price with interest or till the expiry of 10 years from the date of purchase whichever is later. Banta Ram gave highest bid of Rs. 5200/-. His bid was provisionally accepted by the Auctioning Authority and the same was subsequently confirmed by the competent authority. An agreement in the shape of memorandum of offer was executed by the auction purchaser and signed by Tehsildar (Sales), Kapurthala on behalf of the State Government. One of the conditions contained in the memorandum of sale was that the auction purchaser shall not re-sell or mortgage the purchased land till the final repayment of the loan, with interest or till the expiry of a period of ten years, whichever is later. This condition was also incorporated in the Sale Certificate issued by the competent authority.
7. Notwithstanding the fact that the restriction imposed at the time of auction and the conditions contained in the memorandum of offer dated 12.2.1965 and the sale certificate. Banta Ram was persuaded by Harbans Lal son of Amir Chand, who was a member of general category and at the relevant time was residing in Singapore, to sell the land in dispute. According to the petitioners, Harbans Lal had purchased the property from Banta Ram on 18.4.1972. It is also their case that Shri Harbans Lal, who died on 17.3.1984 in Singapore, had willed the property purchased from Banta Ram in their favour on 25.12.1971.
8. It appears from the record that on having come to know about the transfer of the property by Banta Ram in favour of Harbans Lal, Tehsildar (Sales), Kapurthala made a reference to respondent No. 2 who, after issuing notice to Banta Ram, passed order dated 19.12.1978 (Annexure P-1) for setting aside the sale/transfer of land in his favour and ordered forfeiture of the amount already deposited. By that order, respondent No. 2 disposed of two other references made by Tehsildar (Sales), Kapurthala in the case of Parkash Chand son of Banta Ram and Jagat Ram s/o Chhaju Ram. Harbans Lal appealed against the order Annexure P-1, but failed to persuade respondent No. 1 to set aside the same, who dismissed the appeals vide order dated 15.5.1984 (Annexure P2).
9. Shri Sanjiv Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that order Annexure P-1 is liable to be declared as nullity because respondent No. 2 did not give notice or opportunity of hearing to the transferee, namely, Harbans Lal. He invited my attention to the averments contained in paragraph 3 of the writ petition to show that Harbans Lal had purchased property from Banta Ram after due verification of the revenue records and on being fully satisfied that the latter was its owner and was entitled to transfer the same. In support of his arguments, Shri Sanjiv Sharma relied on the judgments of this Court in Mohinder Singh v. The State of Punjab and Ors (1980)82 P.L.R. 132; Rattan Singh and Anr. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Haryana and Ors. (1978)80 P.L.R. 47 and Achhar Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. 1979 P.LJ. 278. Learned counsel emphasized that the predecessor-in-interest the petitioners had no reason to doubt about the right and entitlement of Banta Ram to transfer the property and therefore, he could not have been condemned unheard. Shri Sharma also assailed the conditions enshrined in the memorandum of offer dated 1.2.1965 and the sale certificate by arguing that in the absence of any provision under Rule 11 of the 1962 Rules, Banta Ram could not have been prevented from transferring the land allotted to him by way of restricted auction.
10. Shri S.S. Behl, learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab relied on the judgment of the Division Bench in Joga Singh v. Deputy Secretary (Rehabilitation)-cum-Settlement Commissioner, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur and Ors. (1980)82 P.L.R. 405 and argued that the restriction imposed on the transfer of the land sold by restricted auction does not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity. He also relied on the judgment of the Single Bench in Jagir Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Punjab Chandigarh 1975 P.L.J. 421 and argued that so called transfer made by Banta Ram in favour of late Harbans Lal was void ab initio and no right much less a legally enforceable right was acquired by the petitioners on the basis of the so called will dated 25.12.1971 executed in their favour by Harbans Lal.
11. I have thoughtfully considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the record. At the threshold, I deem it proper to observe that the petitioners have failed to establish their locus standi to seek intervention of the Court. A perusal of the averments contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the writ petition shows that Harbans Lal purchased the property from Banta Ram vide sale deed dated 18.4.1972 and executed a Will in favour of the petitioners on 25.12.1971 bequeathing the disputed property. Learned counsel for the petitioners was at loss to explain as to how Harbans Lal could execute will on 25.12.1971 in respect of the property which he had purchased on 18.4.1972. This also appears to be the reason why the petitioners have deliberately refrained from placing on record copies of sale deed dated 18.4.1972 and will dated 25.12.1971. If they had annexed these documents with the writ petitions, the Bench hearing the petitions for admission purposes, might have refused to entertain the same. However, by withholding these documents, the petitioners succeeded in persuading the Motion Bench not only to entertain the petitions but also stay their dispossession. In my view, the petitioners are guilty of highly contumacious conduct and have no right to be heard on the merits of the case
12. De hors the afore-mentioned conclusion, I am convinced that even on merits, the petitioner''s do not have any case because the impugned orders do not suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law apparent on the face of the record. In Jagir Singh''s case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court considered the, validity of conditions incorporated in the document vide which the land was transferred under the Package Deal to the members of Scheduled Castes and upheld the same by making the following observations:-
"The learned counsel has referred to Nathu v. Allah Ditto AIR 1922 Lah. 287 which again is of no help to him. In that case, the defendants were Government tenants under the Government Tenants (Punjab) Act, 1983. They induced their brothers to come to help them in reclaiming the land and promised to give them one half of whatever they might obtain from the Government. After reclamation, proprietary rights were conferred on the tenants by the Government. When their brothers sought to enforce the agreement to share the tenancy, it was resisted on the ground that u/s 8 of the said Act, the agreement was void and could not be enforced. It was held that though an agreement to share the tenancy might be invalid u/s 8 of the Act, an agreement to share whatever they might obtain is not invalid and on the principle of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, and Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, the agreement could be enforced when the proprietary rights were subsequently conferred on the tenants. The gift in the instant case was without consideration and there was no promise that after the conferment of proprietary rights the gift would become absolute. The gift made on August 31, 1953, was void and non-est and, therefore, donees could not base their proprietary title thereon. Similarly the petitioner cannot urge that he had divested himself of that land in 1953, and, therefore, it did not form part of his land holding on August 21, 1956, the material date for determining the surplus area with the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note that the proprietary rights sanad was issued to the petitioner and not to his sons and that was on August 17, 1964, according to paragraph 1(c) of the writ petition. Mutation in favour of his sons was made in 1963 after a decree from the Civil Court had been obtained. Therefore, on August 21, 1956, the petitioner was the sole owner of the entire land holding of which proprietary rights were conferred on him later on."
13. Learned counsel for the petitioners could not draw my attention to any decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court taking contrary view. This being the position, it must be held that the restriction imposed in memorandum of offer dated 1.2.1965 executed by Banta Ram and sale certificate issued by the competent authority was legally correct and binding on Banta Ram and he did not have the authority to transfer the land to Harbans Lal before expiry of ten years. As a logical corollary to this conclusion, it must be held that the so-called sale deed dated 18.4.1972 executed by Banta Ram in favour of Harbans Lal was nullity and no right can be said to have been acquired by Harbans Lal which he could transfer in favour of the petitioners.
14. I am further of the view that restriction contained in the memorandum of offer and the sale certificate was in consonance with the scheme of the constitutional provisions contained in the Preamble and Article 46 of ht Constitution. Therefore, the same was mandatory in character and alienation of the property in favour of late Sh. Harbans Lal was void ab initio.
15. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order dated 14.8.1984 is vacated.
