Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu, J.
1. Gurdarshan Singh petitioner was posted as Quality Control Inspector, Food Corporation of India at Amritsar. On 10.7.1985 a case was registered against him under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code for having accepted Rs. 11,000/ as illegal gratification from Ashok Kumar and Beant Rai for doing a favour to them by passing some bills submitted by them. After perusing the documents relied upon by the prosecution and hearing both the parties, Special Judge, Amritsar charged the petitioner for the above mentioned offences. The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed trial. Statement of Shri Bikramjit Singh, Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India at Chandigarh was recorded wherein he stated that the petitioner was promoted from Technical Assistant GradeIII to Assistant GradeII by the Zonal Manager, New Delhi on 30.12.1980 and the Zonal Manager had administrative control over all the regional offices. Thereafter, an application was moved by the petitioner that sanction accorded by the Senior Regional Manager for his prosecution was not valid. The learned Special Judge after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that Shri Bikramjit Singh, in the capacity of Senior Regional Manager, was not the proper person to grant sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner and the proceedings against him were, therefore, liable to fall through on this ground alone. Vide his order dated 17.8.1988, he discharged the petitioner.
2. A fresh challan was presented against the petitioner on 27.7.1990 in the Court of Special Judge, Amritsar and the petitioner was again chargesheeted for the offences under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. He has now filed this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the criminal proceedings pending against him in the Court of Special Judge, Amritsar in case F.I.R. No. 323 dated 10.7.1985.
3. The petitioner alleged that after the charge was framed and he pleaded not guilty, there was no procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code by which he could be discharged. Once the trial had started, it was to be concluded either with his acquittal or conviction and the order of discharge was wrong and erroneous in law. In fact, this order of discharge amounted to acquittal and he could not be tried again for the same offence. His second trial for the same offence was barred under Section 300(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also pleaded that there was delay of more than seven years in the conclusion of the proceedings.
4. I have heard Mr. D. S. Pheruman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. R. Sidhu, Deputy Advocate General, Punjab for the respondent and have perused the record.
5. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that once a charge was framed against the petitioner, the Court had no power under Section 227 or any other provision of the Code to discharge the petitioner. After the framing of the charge, the petitioner had pleaded not guilty and thus, the trial Court was required to proceed with the trial to a logical end. Since the petitioner was discharged for want of proper sanction before the whole of the evidence of the prosecution was recorded and the trial was concluded, this order of discharge amounted to an acquittal and the petitioner could not be prosecuted for the same offence as second trial for the same offence was barred under Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1979 SC 94, wherein it was observed :
"Once a charge is framed, the Magistrate has no power under Section 227 or any other provision of the Code to cancel the charge, and reverse the proceedings to the stage of Section 253 and discharge the accused. The trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry. After the framing of charge if the accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate is required to proceed with the trial in the manner provided in Sections 254 to 258 to a logical end. Once a charge is framed in a warrant case, instituted either on complaint or a police report, the Magistrate has no power under the Code to discharge the accused, and thereafter, he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Sections 349 and 562 of the Code of 1896."
6. The above mentioned authority, however, does not bar the trial of a petitioner for the same offence if earlier he was discharged on account of some fundamental defect in the case such as proper sanction. In para 26B of the judgment referred to above it has been further stated :
"Excepting where the prosecution must fail for want of a fundamental defect, such as want of sanction, an order of acquittal must be based upon a ''finding of not guilty'' turning on the merits of the case and the appreciation of evidence at the conclusion of the trial."
7. In the instant case, after framing charge the trial Court did not record the whole of the evidence of the prosecution and on an application filed by the petitioner, considered the question of a valid sanction and found that the case was likely to fail for want of sanction by a competent authority. So, discharge of the petitioner in such circumstances will not amount to an acquittal.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the case of the State of Punjab v. Mool Chand, 1992 (2) C.L.R. 224, but in that case also there were no findings to the effect that discharge of an accused after the framing of charge would amount to an acquittal on merits and fresh trial for the same offence was barred rather in that case, a revision petition was filed by the State of Punjab against an order of discharge passed by the Special Judge, Ludhiana in a case under Section 13(1)(d) II of the Provision of Corruption Act and under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The order of discharge was found to be erroneous and the revision petition was accepted. The impugned order was set aside and the case was remanded for prosecution of the accused in accordance with law.
9. In Mohammed Iqbal Ahmad v. State of A.P., 1979 Crl. Law Journal 633 it was held that any case instituted without proper sanction must fail because this being a manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. The learned Special Judge discharged the accused for the reason that there was no proper sanction and that he had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence and therefore, the entire proceedings were void ab initio. Even though there is no specific provision in the Cr.P.C., the discharge of the accused was permissible, since the entire proceedings were void ab initio and the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratilal Bhanji''s case fortifies this view. Similar findings were given in the case of E. K. Thankappan v. Union of India, 1989 Crl.L.J. 2374.
10. As the present petitioner was discharged on the ground of want of proper sanction for his prosecution, the trial did not conclude on merits and his discharge did not amount to acquittal. His fresh trial for the same offence was, therefore, not barred.
No other point was urged before me. The petition is bereft of any merit and the same is hereby dismissed.
