S.S. Dewan, J.
1. The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing the order whereby summons were issued to him by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sangrur on September 30, 1982 in the following circumstances.
2. Dr. Gurdial Singh, Food Inspector, visited the shop of Bishan Dass accused, situated at Sangrur, on 551982 and purchased as sample of `Paris Tomato Ketchup'' for analysis and after completing usual formalities, sent one of the samples for analysis. On examination, it was found that it was contaminated with coliform bacteria. It is alleged that at the time of purchase of sample, the Food Inspector was told by Bishan Dass that he had purchased the Tomato Ketchup from M/s. Paris Food and Chemical Industries, Dehradun. The Food Inspector filed a complaint against Bishan Dass and the petitioner Amarjit singh on 2291982 in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sangrur, alongwith the documents. On 3091982 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate after going through the complaint and other documents found a prima facie case under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short the Act) and accordingly summoned the petitioner alongwith Bishan Dass for 26101982.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued with little persistence that M/s. Paris Food and Chemical Industries were allegedly the manufacturers of the food product of which sample was taken and the petitioner could only be proceeded against under Section 20A of the Act, which gives powers to the trial Court to proceed against the manufacturer only on the basis of evidence adduced before it and this could only be done during the course of trial against the original vendor when the complainant had led some evidence (sic) that M/s. Paris Food and Chemical Industries were manufacturers of the Tomato Ketchup and the petitioner was responsible for the same. It was contended that nothing such having been done the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to summon the petitioner.
4. It is an admitted fact that the prosecution against the petitioner is not under Section 20 of the Act. It is only under Section 20A of the Act, under which, the Magistrate could exercise the power. In order to see how and when the power can be exercised under this Section, it would be proper to reproduced the Section itself and the same is as under :
"Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such Manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20."
5. A perusal of this Section would, therefore, show that the Court trying an offence under the Act, alleged to have been committed by any person (here Bishan Dass) can proceed against manufacturer, distributor or if the Court is satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is concerned with the offence. But this power has got to be exercised or invoked only during the trial of the person, who is alleged to have committed the offence under the Act. In the instant case, what has happened is that the trial Magistrate after going through the complaint and the other documents, summoned Bishan Dass accused and the petitioner without even recording the evidence of the complainant. Therefore the trial Magistrate has acted in contravention of the mandatory provisions of Section 20A of the Act which clearly says that the power can be exercised only during the trial.
6. In view which I have taken I must quash the order of the trial Magistrate, issuing the process against the petitioner. I, however, make it clear that this order will not prevent the Magistrate from exercising his powers under Section 20A of the Act, if he is satisfied on the basis of any material that might be placed on record that the petitioner should be joined as an accused in the proceedings. Rule is made absolute.
Rule made absolute.
