Prem Chand Pandit, J.@mdashThis is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the orders dated 27th February, 1959, 7th March, 1960, and 7th May, 1960, passed by the Managing Officer, the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, and the Chief Settlement Commissioner, respectively, cancelling the allotment of land in the names of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh and directing that penal rent be charged from the Petitioners who were held to be in unauthorised possession of this land.
2. Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh owned some agricultural land in the district of Sheikhupura, now part of West Pakistan. A part of this land was mortgaged with possession with the Petitioners. After the partition of the country, on the basis of jamabandi entries received from Pakistan, Sunder Singh was allotted 28 standard acres and 1 1/2 units and Sawan Singh was allotted 24 standard acres and 2 1/4 units in village Mattewal, district Ludhiana, on quasi-permanent basis in ''reserve categories'' because no claim in respect of these holdings had been filed. Out of Sunder Singh''s allotment, possession of 21 standard acres and 4 1/2 units and out of Sawan Singh''s allotment, possession of 9 standard acres and 5 1/2 units was delivered to the Petitioners in lieu of their mortgagee rights in the year 1953 and regular sanads were also issued by the Rehabilitation authorities in this respect. On receipt of a complaint filed by one Abnashi Lal that the Petitioners were in unauthorised possession of the land allotted to Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh the Managing Officer passed the impugned order on 27th February, 1959, without issuing any notice to the Petitioners. The Petitioners thereupon filed an appeal before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, who dismissed the same by his order, dated 7th March, 1960. A revision petition was then filed before the Chief Settlement Commissioner (Rural) who also dismissed it on 7th May, 1960. The Petitioners then filed a petition u/s 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (Act No. 44 of 1954), to the Central Government, which, I have been informed, has also been dismissed. The Petitioners have filed the present writ petition against the above orders.
3. This petition is not contested by the State but is opposed by only Respondent No. 1 in whose favour a part of the land in dispute has been allotted, after the cancellation of the allotment in favour of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh.
4. The allotment in favour of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh has been cancelled by the Rehabilitation authorities on the ground that the allottees had not reached India and had no reversioners or successors-in-interest, as would be apparent from their not filing any claims on behalf of the allottees and from not taking possession of the allotted land. As regards the Petitioners, who were the mortgagees, it was said that their rights would materialise only if proper allotment had been made in the names of their motrgagors. The mortgagees as such had no independent locus standi to obtain the allotment of land. Since the allotment in the names of the mortgagors was improper and was liable to be cancelled, the mortgagees, according to the Rehabilitation authorities could not have any right to retain the possession of the land to the extent of their mortgagee rights.
5. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the orders passed by the Rehabilitation authorities were invalid and must be quashed. It is common ground that the allotment in the names of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh was made on the basis of the jama-bandi entries received from Pakistan and it is not disputed that such an allotment could be made according to the rules. Even where a displaced landholder in whose name land stood in the records received from West Pakistan had died, the allotment could be made in the name of the deceased (vide para 17, page 180 of the Land Resettlement Manual). If Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh had remained in Pakistan and not migrated to India, their names, according to the rules, would have been shown in the remarks column in the jamdbandis received from Pakistan. It, therefore, follows that the allottees had died on their way to India during the partition of the country, since they did not reach India. Now the question arises whether they come within the definition of the word ''displaced person'' as given in the notification dated 8th July, 1949, issued by the Department of Rehabilitation (page 193 of the Land Resettlement Manual) which reads as under:
''Displaced person'' means a land-holder in the territories now comprised in the province of West Punjab or a person of Punjabi extraction who holds land in the Provinces of North-Western Frontier Province, Sind or Baluchistan or any State adjacent to any of the aforesaid Provinces and according to the Dominion of Pakistan, and who has since the 1st day of March, 1947, abandoned or been made to abandon his land in the said territories on account of civil disturbances, or the fear of such disturbances, or the partition of the country.
A bare reading of this definition would show that both these persons would be covered by this definition because they had abandoned or were made to abandon their land in Pakistan. It is not necessary that they should actually reach India. Even if they had been killed on their way to India after abandoning their land in Pakistan, they would still be covered by this definition. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the allotment made in favour of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh was quite valid and according to the rules. As regards the possession of the allotted land whether it was correctly given by the Rehabilitation authorities to the mortgagees, it has been laid down in para 17(i) page 73 of the Land Resettlement Manual, that the possession in such circumstances would be given to the mortgagees provided sufficient proof of the transaction existed. Since the revenue records received from Pakistan themselves mentioned the mortgages in favour of the Petitioners, in my opinion, the possession had been validly given to them by the authorities. Since the quasi-permanent allotment had been validly made in favour of Sunder Singh and Sawan Singh and the possession of the allotted land had been legally given to the Petitioner-mortgagees, it could not be cancelled by the Managing Officer. He seems to have taken action u/s 19 of Act No. 44 of 1954, read with Rule 102 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, which are reproduced below--
[His Lordship read Section 19 and Rule 102 and continued--].
Firstly, it will be clear from these provisions that a reasonable opportunity should have been given to the Petitioners by the Managing Officer before passing the impugned order, because they were adversely affected by that order and were liable to be evicted from the land which was in their possession since 1953. Secondly, I have already held above that the Petitioners were not in unauthorised possession of this land and, therefore, the provisions of Section 19(2)(b) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act could not apply in this case. Thirdly, Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 102 admittedly do not apply, and therefore, the question arises whether the reasons given by the Managing Officer fall within Clause (d) of this rule. The reasons given by the authorities for the cancellation of the allotment, in my opinion, are not valid in law. It cannot be said that the allottees had no successors-in-interest in India. The Petitioners, being their mortgagees, can legitimately be called their successors in interest. Successor in interest does not include only an heir but a transferee also. The meaning of this word cannot be limited to successors by right of inheritance only vide Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Purai 60 I.C. 641, and Kuar Nihal Singh v. Baldeo Parshad 10 I.C. 39.
6. I may menion that the learned Counsel for the Respondent had submitted that the rules contained in the Land Resettlement Manual were merely departmental and executive instructions and had not got the force of law. He was, however, not able to cite any authority in support of his submission. On the other hand, this book has evidently the stamp of authority as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in
7. It was also urged by the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioners had no statutory right of being heard by the Managing Officer. I am unable to agree with this contention because the Petitioners were in possession of the land and they should have been heard before their possession was declared to be unauthorised and they were made liable to ejectment. No adverse order could be passed against them without first affording them a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent also submitted that the Petitioners had no locus standi to file the present petition in this Court. I see no merit in this submission as well. They are the persons who are actually in possession of the land in dispute and, consequently, they are adversely affected by the order passed by the Managing Officer. Besides, I have also held that they are the successors-in-interest of the allottees and on that ground also they have a right to file this petition.
9. In view of what I have said above, I would accept this petition and quash the orders dated 27th February, 1959, 7th March, 1960, and 7th May, 1960, mentioned above. In the circumstances of this case, however, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
