M.S. Liberhan, J.@mdashThe petitioner was employed as a carpenter with the respondent-University. He was removed from service. He raised an industrial dispute and claimed a reference to the Labour Court challenging the termination of his services. Reference was made and the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, vide his award dated March 27, 1989, found that the termination of services of the petitioner-workman was illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, that is, the petitioner having completed 240 days will be deemed to be in regular service. It was conceded by the respondent-University before the Labour Court that no notice was given to the petitioner, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid to him. It was further accepted that someone or the other had been appointed as a carpenter in the University. Though the termination of services of the petitioner was found to be illegal, still the Presiding Officer declined to grant the relief to the petitioner, inter alia, holding that the Kurukshetra University was not an industry and, consequently, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the dispute, as it did not constitute a dispute of industrial nature. The reason recorded for coming to such a conclusion was that the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable to the University because it did not carry on its activities for profit motive and its primary job was to impart education.
2. In my considered view, the approach of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is erroneous and cannot be sustained in the eye of law in view of the principle well-settled by the apex court. It has been observed in
"''industrial dispute'' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person."
Section 2(ka) further defines "industrial establishment or undertaking", which is in the following terms:
"''industrial establishment or undertaking'' means an establishment or undertaking in which any industry is carried on:
Provided that where several activities are carried on in an establishment or undertaking and one or some of such activities is or are an industry or industries ... shall be deemed to be a separate industrial establishment or undertaking..."
Section 2(j) of the Act defines ''industry'' as follows:
"''industry'' means any systematic activity carried on by co-operation between an employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not, -
(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or
(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit..."
In Miss A. Sundarambal''s case, (supra) it was observed that an educational institution is an industry. It was possible that some of the employees in that industry might not be workmen. It was observed therein that the view of the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the University of Delhi was not an industry was expressly overruled in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board''s case, (supra).
In view of the dictum laid by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases cited above, I am of the considered view that the University is an ''industry'' and the petitioner was a ''workman'' as envisaged by the Industrial Disputes Act and the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Thus, the finding arrived at by the authority that it had no jurisdiction to try the dispute, is set aside.
3. In view of the conceded fact that neither any notice was given to the petitioner before his retrenchment, nor any retrenchment compensation was paid to him and no enquiry was held before his services were terminated, I confirm the findings arrived at by the Labour Court. Nothing has been pointed out to take any other view than the one taken by the authority below. Otherwise also, it is a finding of fact arrived at after appreciation of evidence which has come on record, which need not be gone into in writ jurisdiction unless the same is shown to be based : on no evidence or perverse, etc. No such, stand has been taken by the respondent in the course of arguments.
4. In view of my above observations, the writ petition is allowed, the award dated March 27, 1989, is modified to the extent that the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to try the dispute and the termination of services of the petitioner being illegal and in violation of the Industrial Disputes Act, as neither any retrenchment compensation has been paid, nor any enquiry was held before the termination of his services and he has completed 240 days, the petitioner is directed to be reinstated.
5. Keeping the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in view, it is evident that nothing has been brought on record by the petitioner that he remained unemployed during all this period.
6. It would meet the ends of justice, if the petitioner is reinstated with no break in service and he is awarded the full back wages from the date of the award. I order accordingly.
7. No order as to costs.
J.V. Gupta J.
8. I agree.
