Mahesh Grover, J.@mdashThe present petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the Petitioner with a prayer that order dated 06.12.1999 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalandhar and the order dated 03.02.2003 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar be quashed.
2. The Respondent-Bhupinder Kumar Aggarwal filed a complaint against the Petitioner under the provisions of Sections 467/471/120B of the Indian Penal Code with the allegations that the complainant and his father had executed a partnership deed dated 04.02.1974 and formed a concern under the name and style of M/s Hind Murti Engineering. Subsequently, the Petitioner-Ashok Kumar was inducted as a partner in the aforesaid concern to the tune of 50% of the share father of the complainant died on 27.01.1992 and under the new formulation, the Petitioner and the complainant became partners to the extent of 50% each. It was alleged that there was a clear stipulation under the partnership deed that in case of retirement or dissolution of the firm, the Petitioner would be entitled to receive only the balance amount standing in his -credit in the account books of the firm and shall have no right to claim any share in the goodwill and fixed assets of the firm. However, differences arose between the partners which made it impossible for them to pull along.
3. A suit for dissolution of the firm and rendition of account was filed on 19.09.1994. In the said proceedings, the Petitioner moved an application claiming that the firm already stood dissolved vide the dissolution deed dated 31.03.1995 and a photocopy of the said dissolution deed was produced on record.
4. The complainant alleged that there was no dissolution of the firm as stated by the Petitioner and that the document which had been tendered indicating the dissolution of the firm was in fact a forged and fabricated document, which was procured with the connivance of Sh. Alok Kumar, Sh. Gurcharan Singh and Dipin Kumar, who were arrayed as accused Nos. 2 to 4 in the complaint preferred by the complainant.
5. In support of the allegations, the complainant led his preliminary evidence, and the complaint was dismissed on 18.02.1998. Against this order, the complainant-Respondent (herein) filed the Revision Petition, which was accepted vide the orders of the Revisional Court dated 08.07.1998 and the matter was remitted back to the trial Court with a direction that the case be decided afresh after holding further enquiry.
6. The operative part of the order of the Court of Revision dated 08-07 -1998 is as follows:
It thus follows from the above discussion that the revision petition succeeds and the same is accepted. The impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded back to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for holding further enquiry. The complainant, through his counsel, is directed to appear in the trial Court on 28.7.1998. File be consigned to the record room.
7. On remand, the trial Court instead of proceeding; with the enquiry as directed by the Court of Revision chose to adjourn the matter sine die to await the outcome of the proceedings in the Civil Court. The relevant portion of the order dated 06.02.1999 by which the matter was adjourned sine die is as follows:
Admittedly, civil suit is also pending between the parties in the Civil Court at Jalandhar. There both the parties are to lead evidence. AS such, at this stage, in my opinion, it is apt and proper if this complaint is adjourned sine die till verdict of the Civil Court is available. Consequently, I order that this complaint be adjourned sine die and consigned to the record room and the proceedings shall be revived as and when verdict of the civil Court is available.
The Respondent-complainant thereafter moved an application urging the Court to decide the matter as was directed by the order of Court of Revision on 08.07.1998.
8. The said application was accepted and the Petitioner was ordered to be summoned vide the order dated 06.12.1999. Against this order, the Petitioner preferred a revision petition which was dismissed on 03.02.2003.
9. The present petition has been filed assailing the aforesaid orders.
10. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that once the magistrate, had adjourned the matters sine die, the Respondent had the option to challenge the same if it was in violation of the directions of the Revisional Court but under no circumstances could the order of the Magistrate be revived on making an application as this would amount to review of the order passed earlier by the same Court, which is impermissible under the law. It was further contended that the order of the trial Court dated 6.02.1993 adjourning the matter sine die was perfectly correct as the Civil Court was seized of the matter and it was just and appropriate that the Court of Criminal jurisdiction await the outcome of the Civil proceedings more so when the only allegation in the complaint is that the document which was produced before the Civil Court was forged and fabricated.
11. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court as Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal reported as 2004 (4) All Ind CLR (S.C.) 376 : 2004 (4) RCR(Crl.) 1.
12. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that the matter had been adjourned sine die by the Magistrate even though there was categoric directions given to the trial Court to proceed with the matter after fresh enquiry and subsequently when the application was moved, the trial Court merely proceeded to comply with the orders of the Court of Revision and, therefore, there was no infirmity in the impugned orders. Besides against the order of summoning, the Petitioner availed himself of remedy of revision and the same having been the Petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the second revision is not maintainable.
13. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the Respondent placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court titled as Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa and others reported as 1995 (2) AIC LR (S.C.) 211 : 1995(2) RCR (Cri.) 373 ;
14. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the entire record.
15. From the facts of the case, it transpires that the complaint which was dismissed initially had led to the filing of a revision petition upon which the matter had been remanded back for decision afresh after holding further enquiry. This order passed by the Court of Revision on 08.07.1998 was unambiguous but strangely enough the trial Court instead of proceeding to hold enquiry as a measureof compliance of the order of the superior Court, chose to adjourn the matter sine die to await the outcome of the civil proceedings in complete defiance of the order of the Court of Revision.
This to the mind of the Court was a case of judicial impropriety. Had the order been passed after holding enquiry and then coming to same conclusion it could still have been understandable but simply adjourning the matter sine die without making any attempt to hold enquiry as directed by the Revisional Court was grossly improper.
16. In any eventuality, the subsequent application moved by the Respondent to revive the matter to seek compliance of the orders of the Revisional Court dated 08.07.1998 cannot be termed to be a review of the order of 06.02.1999 by which the matter was adjourned sine die as even if the concession is to be given to the trial Court to say that the order stated 06.02.1999 was correct and passed in deference to the orders of the Court of Revision then also the subsequent application was merely revival of the proceedings which had been adjourned sine die.
Hence by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the subsequent order of summoning was a review of the order of 06.02.1999. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is entirely mis-placed and hence rejected.
17. Now, coming to the prayer Petitioner that the proceedings be quashed. The Court is constrained to notice that Revision Petition was preferred against the order of summoning, which has since been dismissed. In
... In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved parry. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise, of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 197(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction.....
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Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceedings in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceedings the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations to the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases it, which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction u/s 56-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not.
Similarly in Ganesh Narayan Hagde''s case (supra), it was observed by the Apex Court as follows:
While it is true that availing of the remedy of the revision to the Sessions Judge u/s 399 does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court u/s 482, it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the learned Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter. The High Court should interfere only where it is satisfied that if the complaint is allowed to be proceeded with, it would amount to abuse of process of Court or that the interests of justice otherwise call for quashing of the charges.
The aforesaid view has earlier been reiterated in a number of judgments which need not be elaborately discussed here.
18. Clearly, the Petitioner having availed himself of the remedy of revision cannot be permitted to take up the plea against the summoning order by way of second revision as nothing has been shown that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of law or that it is likely to prejudice the interest of justice.
In this view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to exercise its inheritance jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the petition deserves to be rejected only on this score.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the outcome of the civil proceedings are essential because if finding is returned regarding the genuineness of the document in question, the complaint would necessarily fail.
19. The contention is also mis-placed because there is no bar under the Civil and Criminal proceedings to continue simultaneously and that it is not necessary for the trial Court to await the outcome of the civil proceedings. The Apex Court in its judgment reported as
Having regard to the aforesaid, there is no merit in the present petition and it is dismissed.
