K. Kannan, J.@mdashCMs are allowed. Legal representatives'' impleadment ordered subject to all just exceptions. The petition is filed at the
instance of the tenant who has been ordered to be evicted by the concurrent judgments of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. The
grounds of eviction by the landlord were non-payment of rent from 01.04.1984 to 31.03.1986 and cessation to occupy the premises for more
than a period of 4 months prior to the filing of the petition. The landlord had a case that the tenant ceased to occupy the premises from the year
1982.
2. The tenant contested the claim on both the grounds and deposited also the rent payable during the period when the landlord was making a
complaint that the tenant had been in default. Since the tenant had made the payment at the first hearing, the said ground does not survive
consideration and the case would require to be examined only on the ground of the tenant''s alleged cessation to occupy the premises.
3. Admittedly, the tenant was having a fan repair shop and the landlord wanted to adduce proof that the shop was not being used by the tenant by
attempting to show that the electricity consumption card revealed that no charges had been paid by the tenant. The electricity card was with
reference to door No. 938/11-27. The tenant contended that the electricity card itself did not pertain to the shop and the shop in his occupation
was having door No. 932/111-17. The tenant sought to contend further that he had been having his business even from the year 1976 when there
was no electricity and he would have the work done at the shop and used the electricity from some other place to test the fans. The issue was,
therefore, not whether the electricity card pertained to the premises, for, the tenant was contending a position that his type of activity did not
require any consumption of electricity. As laudable as a conduct of tenant would be in these days of power crisis, it cannot still be seen as truthful,
for the nature of activity was such as it would be inconceivable that he could have the avocation of fans repair without consumption of electricity.
4. The landlord also sought to discredit the quality of evidence given by the tenant by pointing out that even if there were 3/4 persons who were
employed to carry on his business activity, there ought to have been some proof of payment of wages to them through registers and even no
documentary proof was produced before the Court. It was also the contention that since the premises were within the boundaries of Municipal
Corporation there ought to have been registration of a shop as a profession and the absence of any such subsisting licence also was a proof that
there was no activity which was carried on by the tenant. On a cumulative assessment of the evidence brought by both the parties, the Court had
come to the concurrent finding that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises.
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant makes an impressive display of exuberance by stating to me several decisions rendered by
this Court to contend that the landlord had not proved the ground of eviction. I would cite them for the fullness of consideration that the case might
deserve. In Karam Chand Joshi v. Shri Kartar Singh and Ors. (1977) RCR 327 a learned judge of this Court held that non-consumption of
electricity or disconnection of electricity meter did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the premises remained unoccupied. The Court was
considering a case where there was evidence that 2/3 meter readers were changed during that time and the meter reading was not done properly.
The Court found the lapse of a meter reader as not leading to a proof that the non-consumption of electricity could not lead to a cessation of the
premises. We are herein examining a situation of a tenant contending that he was actually not using electricity but not that meter reader never came
to record meter reading. In Sohan Lal and another Vs. Gurbachan Singh the same issue of the non-consumption of electricity as not proving the
closure of business was examined. I am not prepared to re-examine what was dealt with at length while dealing with earlier case. Faqir Chand Vs.
Faqir Singh and Another, was also a case where a failure to consume electricity would not lead to an inference of non-occupation of building.
6. In Pawn Singh Tailor Master v. Ram Murti (1981) 2 RLR 448 the cessation to occupy the building was examined in the context of landlord''s
obligation to specify in the pleadings the period during which the tenant ceased to occupy such building. Mere vague allegations were found to be
inadequate. Where the requirement of the Act is that the tenant should have ceased to occupy the premises for a period of not less than 4 months,
the expectation is that the commencement of such inactivity must be evident. If there was even a dispute by a matter of few months, the date when
the tenant ceased to occupy the premises would be significant. When we are examining a case of landlord contending that the tenant was not
occupying the premises for 4 years, the lack of reference to the actual month when he ceased to occupy the premises would become irrelevant. In
M/s. Babu Ram Gopal and others Vs. Mathra Dass, the Supreme Court was examining the non-occupation of premises by the tenant to be
required till the date of filing of the petition on such ground. It is nobody''s case that the tenant ceased to occupy originally and came back to
possession before the date when the petition was filed. I have already observed that the Courts below have considered the cumulative factors that
the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises. Its a meritless civil revision and a vexatious exercise. It deserves to be dismissed and is,
accordingly, dismissed.