Rajesh Bindal, J.@mdashThe prayer made in this petition filed u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") is for quashing of FIR No. 204 dated October 16, 2002 registered under sections 498-A/ 406 IPC at Police Station, Salawas, District Jhajjar and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.
2. Briefly the facts are that Petitioner No. 1 was married to Neelam d/o Om Parkash on June 2, 2001. Petitioner No. 2 is mother of petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 3 is father of petitioner No. 1. After the marriage, they resided at the residence of petitioner No. 1 at House No. 1298/31, Kamla Nagar, Rohtak. Due to certain difference between the parties, Neelam left the matrimonial home and shifted to her parents'' house in village Bambuliya, Tehsil and District Jhajjar. On October 16, 2002, the FIR in question was lodged by wife Neelam under Sections 498-A/406 IPC with the allegations that after her marriage when she was living with her husband and family members, once she was asked to bring Rs. 50,000/- from her house on the promise that same would be returned within one month, which according to the complainant were handed over to Petitioner No. 2. Thereafter, another demand of Rs. 20,000/- was made, which was also fulfilled. However, still being dissatisfied the complainant was regularly harassed with the result, she was shunted out of the house.
3. Petitioner No. 1, who appeared in person, submitted that FIR in question is liable to be quashed on the sole ground that same has been registered at Police Station, Salawas, District Jhajjar whereas none of the alleged offence was committed in the territorial jurisdiction of that Police Station as on plain reading of the FIR, it is clear that all the allegations regarding occurrence of various incidences took place at his residence at Rohtak. Accordingly, the FIR deserves to be quashed. In addition to this, he submitted that vide judgment dated July 26, 2006, the complainant has already got divorce from the petitioner No. 1 and the order was not appealed against by him. He has relied upon the judgments in Bhupinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, 1991 (2) RCR(Crl.) 225 (P&H), Gurmukh Singh and others v. Bhupinder Kaur, 1991 (2) RCR(Crl.) 185 (P&H), Anil Kumar v. Rita Kumari, 1999 (1) RCR(Criminal) 813 (P&H), Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, 2004 (3) RCR(Crl.) 988 : 2004 (3) Apex Criminal 455 (SC), Ramesh and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 (2) RCR (Criminal) 68 : 2005 (1) Apex Criminal 537 : 2005 (2) AICLR 565 and Manish Ratan and others v. State of M.P. and another, 2007 (1) RCR 513 (SC).
4. In response to the contentions raised by petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that marriage in question was solemnized at the place of complainant and even the amount was brought by her from parents. Accordingly, Police Station, Salawas and consequently Courts at Jhajjar have the jurisdiction to investigate and try the case. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that after the complainant was shunted out of her matrimonial home at Rohtak where she was harassed, she having shifted to her parents home in District Jhajjar and harassment being a continuing offence, even police Station, Salawas will have the jurisdiction to investigate the matter. He further submitted that charges have already been framed and case is at evidence stage.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant submitted that marriage of the parties took place within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Salawas and once the complainant was asked to bring the money from her parents, the Police Station, Salawas will certainly have jurisdiction to register a case and investigate the same. However, he did not dispute the fact that on a petition filed by the complainant, learned Additional District Judge, Jhajjar had already passed a decree of divorce in her favour on July 26, 2006 which has attained finality.
6. Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Y. Abraham Ajith''s case (supra) opined that once the wife left the matrimonial home on account of alleged demand of dowry and there was no subsequent incident of demand of dowry while the wife was residing at a different place, the offence will not be continuing one and further that the place where the alleged demand of dowry was made will have the jurisdiction to deal with the complaint and not any other place. It was further opined therein that as none of the alleged offence was committed at the place where the FIR was registered, the police and the Courts there will not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Finally the complaint was directed to be returned to the complainant with liberty to file the same before the Court of competent jurisdiction. Similar view was expressed by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Ramesh''s case (supra).
7. Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Manish Ratan''s case (supra) while dealing with an identical situation in a complaint u/s 498-A IPC with regard to territorial jurisdiction opined that offence u/s 498-A IPC cannot be held to be continuing one only because complainant was forced to leave her matrimonial home. Further it was opined that when the demand of dowry was made at particular place any other place will not have the jurisdiction to entertain, investigate and try the same. Paras l5 to 18 thereof can be referred for the purpose, which are extracted below:
"15. Yet again in
"In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrates Courts at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to Section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded.
Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy."
16. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.
17. Our attention was drawn to the fact that no criminal case was lodged at Jabalpur. Our attention was further drawn to the fact that the investigation of the case is complete.
18. We, therefore, are of the opinion that, interest of justice would be subserved, while setting aside the order of the High Court, if in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct transfer of the criminal case pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Datia to the Court of Chief Magistrate, Jabalpur. We accordingly do so."
8. In view of my above discussions, on the basis of allegations in the FIR, the only possible conclusion is that Court at Jhajjar will not have jurisdiction to try the dispute. In view of the fact that divorce granted to the petitioner No. 1 on a petition filed by the complainant was ex parte and nothing has come on record as to whether the dowry articles have been returned by petitioners to the complainant, in exercise of powers u/s 482 of the Code, in the interest of justice, in my opinion, instead of quashing the FIR, it would be appropriate to direct transfer of criminal case pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jhajjar to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, who may try the same himself or entrust it to other competent Judicial Officer.
9. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak on April 5, 2008.
10. By that time, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jhajjar transfer the record of the case titled State v. Rajesh Kumar etc. to the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak.
11. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
