Nirmal Yadav, J.@mdashVide this petition seeks quashing of FIR No. 95 dated 22.10.1997, under Sections 465, 468, 471, 420 IPC, Police Nawashahar and the proceedings emanating therefrom pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Nawashahar.
2. The question raised in the present petition is - Whether a person who has been acquitted for an offence by a Court of competent jurisdiction can be tried again for the same set of offences ?
3. The petitioner is a Lambardar of village Khatkar Kalan, Tehsil and District Nawashahar. He is also a Mahant of Dera and associated with religious institutions. On 22.1.1982, one Dharam Singh executed a Will bequeathing his property in favour of Sukhwinder Singh and Lakhwinder Singh, sons of Sohan Singh. The petitioner was an attesting witness to the said Will. He had no interest in the property nor he acquired any benefit thereof. Harminder Singh (Attorney of Parkash Singh and Gurmej Kaur) son of Chain Singh, resident of village Paddi Sura Singh filed a complaint, alleging that the Will executed in favour of Sukhwinder Singh and Lakhwinder Singh was a forged document. The allegation against the petitioner was that he had conspired with the accused in fabrication and registration of the aforesaid Will.
4. As per petitioner, he never met the accused persons before the date of execution of the Will. He had simply attested the Will as a witness. The petitioner along with co-accused was tried in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Nawashahar. He was acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class vide order dated 10.12.1994. Against the order of learned Magistrate, the complainant filed an appeal in the Court of Sessions Judge, Jalandhar. During the pendency of the appeal, complainant-Harminder Singh submitted an application to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar, alleging the same allegations as contained in the complaint filed earlier by him in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Nawashahar. On the application submitted by Harminder Singh, the Senior Superintendent of Police ordered investigation and FIR in question i.e. FIR No. 95 dated 22.10.1997, under Sections 465, 468, 471, 420 IPC, Police Nawashahar was registered against the petitioner and other accused persons. It is pleaded that the allegations as contained in the above FIR have already been adjudicated upon by the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Nawashahar, therefore, the petitioner cannot be tried again for the same offences.
5. In reply, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Nawashahar submitted that the Will in question was a forged and fabricated document. The petitioner was an attesting witness to the said Will. He denied for want of knowledge, if any complaint was decided by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Nawashahar. It is further stated that the accused persons never faced trial in the complaint case as they were discharged at the pre-charge state. In view of explanation to Section 300 Cr. P.C., the dismissal of a complaint or discharge of the accused is not an acquittal for the purpose of Section 300 Cr. P.C. It is admitted that the appeal filed against the order of the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class discharging the petitioner and other co-accused was withdrawn by the complainant as the FIR No. 95 dated 22.10.1997, under Sections 465/568 (sic)/471/420 IPC, P.S. Nawashahar had already been registered against the accused persons. It is further submitted in the reply that the petition is liable to be dismissed as disputed questions of facts are involved.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner argued that the petitioner has been discharged by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class after recording evidence of both the parties. Taking into consideration the evidence produced by the complainant and after giving him opportunity to cross-examine the accused, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence against the accused to frame charge and that complainant had failed to prove a prima facie case against the accused persons. Learned counsel argued that the police does not have any sweeping powers of investigation subjecting the citizens to fresh investigation in respect of the same incident in relation to which the petitioner along with other co-accused have already been acquitted in a criminal complaint. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the allegations in the earlier complaint and subsequent FIR, in substance and truth, are the same. The registration of second FIR as well as fresh investigation thereof is illegal and cognizance of the same cannot be taken. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in
8. It is well established that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and had been acquitted of such offence, shall not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him, might have been made. He may be afterwards tried with the consent of the State Government for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial. Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code enacts the rule of `autrefois acquit'' and `autrefois convict'' applicable to criminal trials. As per said rule, so long as an order of acquittal of conviction at a trial held by a Court of competent jurisdiction of a person charged with committing a offence stands, that person cannot again be tried be tried on the same facts for the offence for which he was tried. This would apply to a case of conviction as well as acquittal. At common law, a man who has once been tried and acquitted of a crime may not be tried again for the same offence. He would be in jeopardy if the Court was competent to try him for the offence and acquittal was on merits i.e. by verdict on the trial or by dismissal on the merits followed by a judgment or order of acquittal. No person shall be held criminally liable for an act of which he has been acquitted so that he may not, in any way, be placed in double jeopardy.
9. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India clearly lays down that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. The principle underlying Article 20(2) is the same as underlies Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code are nothing more than an elaboration of principle of double jeopardy. The provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution also contain the principle of autrefois acquit and such provisions have to be regulated by the general law of the land. The provisions of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly bar a subsequent trial where on the same set of facts a competent Court had, after conducting trial, acquitted or convicted the person concerned. The Criminal Procedure Code contemplates only a single inquiry followed by a trial in respect of the same offence. The essential pre- requisite for the application of Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that so long as an order of acquittal or conviction at a trial held by a competent Court of a person charged with an offence stands, that person cannot again be tried on the same facts for the offence for which he was tried in the previous trial. The acquittal in a previous case is binding on the subsequent case registered by the police on the same set of facts.
10. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner along with order co- accused had been tried by the competent Court in a complaint filed by Harminder Singh. The learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint and discharged the petitioner along with other co-accused vide order dated 10.12.1994. The complainant filed appeal against the order of discharge and later on, withdrew the same. Thereafter, complainant submitted an application for registration of the case on 25.4.1997 i.e. 3 years after the petitioner and other co-accused were discharged by the learned Magistrate. On the basis of the said application, the impugned FIR was registered on 22.10.1997.
11. In view of the above I am or the considered opinion that the petitioner cannot be tried twice for the same offence and in the same set of circumstances. Accordingly, the petition is accepted and the impugned FIR together with all subsequent proceedings taken thereon is quashed.
Petition allowed.
