A.K. Samantaray, J.@mdashThis revision petition has been preferred by the Petitioner, i.e., the Management of Prajatantra Prachar Samiti, Cuttack assailing the judgment and order dated 9.11.2004 passed by the District Judge-cum-Appellate Authority, Cuttack under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Annexure-2) passed in M.A. No. 138 of 2003 dismissing the appeal against the judgment and order dated 17.10.2003 of the learned S.D.J.M.(S), Cuttack-cum-Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Annexure-1) (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act'') passed in M.C. No. 159/2002.
2. Initially, 15 workmen of Prajatantra Prachar Samiti filed a complaint before the labour authorities in connection with their non-payment/delay in payment of their wages for the period from October, 2001 to June, 2002. After receipt of such complaint petition on the spot inquiry was conducted by the Inspector (Assistant Labour Officer), Cuttack, O.P. No. 3, at the premises of Prajatantra Prachar Samiti and after perusal of all the relevant records it was found that the workmen who had filed the complaint are entitled to get the wages for the aforesaid period. Accordingly, a claim petition was filed u/s 15(2) of the Act by the Assistant Labour Officer-cum-Inspector under the Act before the learned S.D.J.M.(S), Cuttack-cum-Authority under the Act.
3. The trial Court on 17th October, 2003 passed the order directing the Management to pay Rs. 1,17,900/ - to the workmen whose names were mentioned in the claim petition within two months from the date of pronouncement of the order. The direction for payment was made by the trial Court on the reasoning that the employees were willing to work but they were not provided with any employment by the employer and as such the employees are deemed to be working and are thus entitled to their regular wages.
4. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 17.10.2003 the management filed an appeal before the District Judge-cum-Appellate Authority, Cuttack. The ground taken in the appeal memo was that the workmen had not worked for the said period, so basing on the principle of "No work no pay" the workers were not entitled to get any wages for the period from October, 2001 to June, 2002. It was also stated in appeal memo that the dispute should be processed under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and not under the ''Act''.
5. The Appellate Court arrived at the conclusion that as per the evidence adduced before the S.D.J.M., though the workmen attended the office regularly, they were not provided with any specific job, and as such the principle of "No work no pay" cannot made applicable to a case where the absence of workmen is not wilful and deliberate, but when a workman is forced not to attend the work or his absence is based on other circumstances beyond his control he is entitled to get the wages. As in the instant case, the workmen attended the place of work but they were not assigned any work to perform, so they were entitled to get the wages for the said period. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by the Management was dismissed on contest and the judgment passed by learned S.D.J.M.(S), Cuttack-cum-Authority under the Act in M.C. No. 159/2002 confirmed.
6. The order of the Appellate Authority was initially challenged by the Petitioner by way of filing a writ petition bearing W.P. (C) No. 12708/2004 which was subsequently withdrawn as because no writ petition is maintainable against the order of the Appellate Authority and the same can only be challenged by filing a revision petition and accordingly this revision petition has been preferred.
7. The main contentions of the Petitioner in this revision petition are three fold:
(i) That since the employees had not put in any service during the relevant period, as per the principle of "No work no pay", they were not entitled to any wages for the said period.
(ii) That as per the provisions of Section 2(vi) the entitlement of wages only arise if the employees had actually rendered physical work and merely making of attendance or attending place of work without performing any job does not entitle them any wages.
(iii) That the dispute involved is to be adjudicated under the Industrial Disputes Act and the authorities under the Act are not empowered to decide the question of entitlement of wages.
8. During the hearing, in reply to the above contentions of the Petitioner, it was submitted by learned Counsel for the opposite parties-employees that the principle of "No work no pay" will only have its application if the employer was willing to provide work to the employees and they failed to perform such work. It was further contended that the opposite party-employees were attending the office regularly but they were not provided with any work and as such the abstinence from work cannot be said to be wilful or deliberate, on the contrary it was because of the non-providing of work by the Management, that the employees were forced to sit idle. In such situation, the employees are entitled to their wages and the reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner on the provision of the Act, rather, supports such a conclusion.
9. From the records of the Courts below and the evidence led by the parties and the inquiry made by the Inspector-cum-Assistant Labour Officer, it is evident that the employees were not provided with any work to perform during the relevant period and as such the question of their non-performance of any work does not arise. This view, as I find, is well supported by the factual finding of the trial Court, which has been correctly upheld by the appellate authority in the impugned order.
10. As regards the applicability of the Payment of Wages Act, it was contended by the counsel for the opposite parties that this Act being a beneficial legislation whose objects and purpose are similar to that of Industrial Disputes Act and both the Acts are designed to produce the same result particularly since some of the provisions under both the Acts prescribe the same thing to be done. Therefore, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 are "corresponding laws" qua each other particularly as both are part of the same social legislative canopy made by the Parliament for immediate amelioration of workmen''s plight resulting in non-payment, delayed payment or for the matter of short payment of wages, it was contended. It was argued that accordingly it becomes the choice of suitor to process and prefer his claim under any of the Acts and the para materia provisions of the corresponding Act do not create any bar in initiating such proceeding before the available authority.
11. In response to the complaint of the workmen, the O.P. No. 3 conducted an inquiry and issued direction u/s 15(3) of the Act to the Petitioner-Management to pay the wages to the workers for the period from October, 2001 to June, 2002 which was computed at Rs. 1, 17,900/ -, but the Petitioner-Management failed to pay the wages. Accordingly, necessary proceeding was initiated by the Labour Authorities against the Management before the S.D.J.M.(S), Cuttack.
12. From the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties the moot legal questions that arise for consideration are as follows:
(i) When the Management denies workmen allotment of work even though they are ready and willing to perform duties can they be denied wages on the principle of "No work no pay"?
(ii) Whether the authority of the Court under the provisions of Section 15 of Payment of Wages Act has the same power as the Industrial Court has for the purpose of deciding the entitlement of the wages of the workmen?
(iii) The jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the finding of the fact and the conclusion arrived at based on such finding of the trial Court as well as the appellate authority in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
As regards point No. (i) the learned Counsel for the opposite parties relied on the decision reported in
As to the (ii) point for consideration, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties placed reliance on the observation of the apex Court in the decision reported in 1996 SCC (L & S) 264 Krishna Prasad Gupta v. Controller, Printing and Stationary in which the apex Court has defined the concurrent jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act to that of the Courts and Tribunals as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in 1988 Lab. I.C. 734 Rajasthan State Warehousing Corporation v. The Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, Jaipur and Anr. where it has been held that the authority under the Act can exercise jurisdiction as per the provisions of Section 15 of the Act to decide the case of deduction of wages and the entitlement thereof. In view of the aforesaid settled principle of law I come to a finding that the authority of the Court under the provisions of Section 15 of the Act has the same power as the Industrial Court has for the purpose of deciding the entitlement of the wages of the workmen.
Now, coming to point No. (iii), it was contended by learned Counsel for the opposite parties referring to a decision of the apex Court in the case of
7. There can be no controversy about the position that the power of the High Court u/s 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is wider than the power u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power, which in its very nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the revisional Court cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate Court. In examining the legality and the propriety of the order under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. It is only in such situations that interference by the high Court in revision in a finding of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power.
13. On the face of the aforesaid legal position and the consistent finding of the subordinate Courts and the authorities as to the factual position that the workmen were not allotted with any work during the relevant period for which the claim has been made even though they were willing to perform their duties, which factual findings cannot interfered with by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the question raised in the present civil revision petition is bound to be answered in favour of the opposite parties-workmen concurring with the views of the trial Court as well as the appellate authority.
14. In the result, the Civil Revision petition preferred by the management is bereft of any merit and as such is dismissed. However, I would make no order as to costs.
15. The interim order passed on 30.11.2004 in Misc. Case No. 112 of 2004 withholding disbursement of the deposited amount in favour of opposite parties 4 to 18 stands vacated.
