@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
A.B. Chaudhari, J.@mdashRule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Learned Adv. Mr. V.R. Mundra waives service on behalf of respondent sole. By consent, this Civil Revision Application is taken up for final hearing. Present applicant, the wife of original judgment debtor, raised the first objection, namely that the decree holder, brought on record in place of original decree-holder Kalubai who had filed the execution, was not her legal heir. In my opinion, this objection was rightly overruled in view of the fact that in Regular Darkhast No. 8 of 2003, the present respondent had brought on record a Will executed in his favour. As a result, he was brought on record in place of Original Decree-holder Kalubai in the execution proceedings and as such he continued to pursue the execution proceedings. That order brining the respondent on record has attained finality.
2. The contention raised by learned Adv. Mr. Kalwaghe for the applicant that the present decree-holder, who is the wife of original judgment debtor, was not aware about it and, therefore, the objection should have been entertained by the Executing Court, does not appeal to me, since he stepped into the shoes of her husband.
3. The second objection is that the execution was barred by limitation. Mr. Kalwaghe, Adv., argued that the decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree for partition in respect of house property as well as agricultural land. According to him, the decree being a compromise decree and being well defined in between the parties, it must be held that it was, in fact, a final decree, as nothing further remained to be done due to the compromise arrived at between the parties. To substantiate his contention, Mr. Kalwaghe relied on the decision of Supreme Court in case of
4. I have perused the said Judgment of the Supreme Court, and I find that even in the said Judgment, it has been clearly stated that a final decree is required to be made upon the preliminary decree embossed with stamp papers, in order to validate the preliminary decree and the status of the preliminary decree gets converted into a final decree only upon completion of those formalities, that too under the order and seal of the Court. I am also of the opinion that in the instant case, though the compromise decree was arrived at and passed by the Court under its seal, still it remained a preliminary decree until the partition stands effected in respect of house property by appointment of a Commissioner and delivery of possession and then embossing the stamps. In respect of agricultural property, which is assessed to land revenue as provided u/s 54 of CPC upon receipt of precept after effecting partition under the Partition Rules of 1967 by Tahsildar putting the parties in possession, it becomes a final decree. Therefore, though Adv. Mr. Kalwaghe''s submission that after passing of a compromise decree, nothing remained to be done in law is attractive, still a final decree was required to be passed with the requirements as above-stated. The cause of action would obviously start thereafter. The contention raised by Mr. Kalwaghe about computing the limitation from the date of preliminary decree, therefore, must fail. In the result, I do not find fault with the Trial Court in overruling both the objections. I, therefore, find no merit in the present Civil Revision Application. Hence the following order:--
ORDER
Civil Revision Application No. 105 of 2013 is rejected with no order as to costs.
