R.A. Jahagirdar, J.@mdashThis is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 24th of July, 1981 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane Bench, in Complaint (ULP) No. 162 of 1980, which had been preferred by the petitioner-union before the Industrial Court. That complaint was filed on 24th of September, 1980, alleging certain acts of unfair labour practices on the part of respondent No. 1, hereinafter referred to as "the company". Those unfair labour practices consisted of, among other things, the dismissal of the employees of the company, who were members of the petitioner-union, on the ground, among others, that they were members of the petitioner-union. The complaint which was filed on 24th of September, 1980 was found to have been filed tow days beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing such complaints under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as "the PULP Act". The period of limitation is ninety days as per section 28 of the PULP Act. Subsequently, on being informed that there was a delay in the filing of the complaint, the petitioner-union filed an application on 8th of December, 1980 for condonation of delay. In this application, it has been mentioned that the individual employees had approached the company through individual letters and had also approached the Government Labour Officer. It was only when those efforts were unsuccessful that they approached the petitioner-union to file the complaint before the Industrial Court.
2. On the facts mentioned in the complaint, the petitioner-union alleged unfair labour practices under Items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II and Items Nos. 1(a), (b), (f) and 2 and 5 of Schedule IV of the PULP Act. Under the provisions of the PULP Act, the items covered by Schedule IV of the Act are to be investigated into by the Labour Court, whereas the matters falling under items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II of the PULP Act are to be investigated into and decided by the Industrial Court.
3. The Industrial Court rejected the application on tow grounds. In the first place, it held that the complaint related to the items in Schedule IV of PULP Act and it was the Labour Court alone which would have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes in respect of the items in Schedule IV of the PULP Act. Secondly, the Industrial Court held that an application for condonation of delay ought to have been made along with the main application alleging unfair labour practices. Since this was not done, the main application was itself liable to be dismissed. On this ground, it held that the application was barred by limitation. It is on these two grounds that the Industrial Court rejected the application, by the aforesaid order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. Mr. Puri, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, had no difficulty in showing that the view of the Industrial Court that an application for condonation of delay in the filing of the main application ought to be made along with the main application is erroneous. Fortunately for Mr. Puri, the point is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in
5. While interpreting an analogous provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court in M. Das Gupta v. Prakash K. Shah 1984 MLJ 694 , has held that despite the fact that Rule 3-A of Order XLI of the CPC mentions that the appeal must be accompanied by an application making out the case for condonation of delay if the appeal is beyond the period of limitation, it does not preclude the appellant from presenting an application for condonation of delay when it is brought to his notice that the appeal has been filed beyond time. In particular, this Court held that despite the apparently peremptory language of Rule 3-A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal preferred after the period of expiry of limitation cannot be dismissed summarily on the ground that the application for condonation of delay does not accompany the memo of appeal. This is for the simple reason that at the time when the appeal is preferred, the appellant may not be aware that the appeal is beyond time or may be insisting that the appeal was within time. This view is also supportable by the observations of the Supreme Court in
6. I have already mentioned above the reasons given by the petitioner-union for condonation of delay. The delay is of only two days. I do not see any reason why the matter should be remanded to the Industrial Court to consider the question of condonation of delay. The delay is of a very short duration. Valid and acceptable reasons have been given by the petitioner-union. I, therefore, condone the delay in the filing of the main application, which shall be proceeded with in accordance with law in the light of what is being mentioned hereinafter on the other question.
7. It has already been mentioned above that the complaint disclosed unfair labour practices of two types, some falling under Schedule II and some falling under Schedule IV. Mr. Puri does not dispute the fact that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the unfair labour practices falling in Schedule IV. However, he insists that if the complaint relates to unfair labour practices falling in two Schedules and if the Industrial Court can deal with the unfair labour practices falling in Schedule II, it can incidentally also deal with the unfair labour practices falling in Schedule IV, which have been included in the main complaint. The argument is not acceptable.
8. Reliance placed by Mr. Puri on section 32 of the PULP Act in this regard is misplaced. Section 32 is to be found in Chapter VII of the PULP Act, which is headed "Powers of Courts". Section 32 may be reproduced :-
"32. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Court shall have the power to decide all matters arising out of any application or complaint referred to it for the decision under any of the provisions of this Act."
9. From the language of section 32, it is clear to me that this does not enlarge the scope or the extent of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court beyond what is conferred upon it by the other provisions of the PULP Act. If under the other provisions of the PULP Act the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the unfair labour practices mentioned in Schedule IV of the Act, section 32 does not give such power to the Industrial Court. What is contemplated in section 32 is that the Industrial Court or, for that matter, even the Labour Court has power to decide all matters arising out of an application or a complaint referred to it for decision under the provisions of the PULP Act. The complaint or the application which is referred to the concerned Court must be made to the proper Court. While deciding such a complaint or an application if certain matters or issues or questions arise, the concerned Court has been invested with the power to decide all those matters, issues or questions so arising. The Court is not debarred from dealing with such matters, issues or questions arising merely on the ground that no specific provision has been made elsewhere conferring power upon the concerned Court to deal with such incidental questions. This is the meaning of section 32 of the PULP Act. It does not enlarge the jurisdiction of either the Industrial Court or of the Labour Court which is otherwise not being conferred upon but by the other provisions of the PULP Act.
10. Mr. Puri, however, is demonstrably on sound ground when he says that the Industrial Court was in error in dismissing the application of the petitioner on the ground that the complaint related to only items in Schedule IV. The heading of the application itself and the averments made in the application go to show that the petitioner-union also wanted to complain of the unfair labour practices in items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II of the PULP Act. The Industrial Court had undoubtedly jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the complaints in respect of these items. The dismissal of the entire complaint, therefore, is wholly unjustified. The petition, therefore, must succeed to that extent.
11. In the result, the petition is partly allowed. The order dated 24th of July 1981 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane, in Complaint (ULP) No. 162 of 1980 is hereby set aside. The said complaint is restored to the file of the Industrial Court, which will dispose of the said complaint in so far as it relates to unfair labour practices mentioned in Items Nos. 3 and 4(a) of Schedule II of the PULP Act. No order as to costs.
