Renupada Mukherjee, J.@mdashThese two rules were issued at the instance of the Petitioner firm challenging the propriety and correctness of two
judgments delivered by the Full Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta.
2. In order to understand the point in controversy which has arisen in these two rules it is necessary to state the following facts in brief:
Suit No. 2045 of 1953 of the Second Bench of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, out of which Rule No. 1605 of 1955 has arisen, was
instituted by the Petitioner firm against the opposite party which is an incorporated Steamship Company styled Messrs. Asiatic Steam Navigation
Company Limited for recovery of a sum of Rs. 921-7-6 p. as compensation for short delivery in respect of a consignment of mug pulses sent from
Muslipatam to Calcutta by ship.
3. In Suit No. 2427 of 1953, out of which Rule No. 3824 of 1955 has arisen, the same Petitioner claimed a sum of Rs. 1,635-3-6 p. against the
same Shipping Company for alleged short delivery of a quantity of mug pulses sent from Muslipatam for carriage to Calcutta by ship.
4. In both the above suits, a question of limitation arose. The claim of the Petitioner firm was contested by the Shipping Company also on the
merits. It will not, however, be necessary for me to enter into that aspect of the case in view of my decision on the other question raised in the
courts below, viz., the question of limitation.
5. In both the suits, the learned Trial Judge held that the claim of the Plaintiff firm was barred by limitation. The learned Judges of the Full Bench,
who disposed of the application u/s 38 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act filed in connection with Suit No. 2045 of 1953, took a different
view from the trial Judge on the question of limitation and held that the Plaintiff''s claim was not time-barred. They, however, agreed with the finding
of the trial Judge in that case that the Plaintiff firm was not entitled to get any compensation. In that view of the matter, they dismissed the
application.
6. In the other Full Bench case arising out of Suit No. 2427 of 1953, which was heard by different Judges, it was held that the claim of the
Plaintiff-Petitioner was not only untenable on the merits but it was also barred by limitation.
7. These two Rules were obtained by the Plaintiff-Petitioner against the said two decisions of the learned Judges presiding over the Full Bench of
the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta.
8. The substantial question of law which arises in both these cases is from which particular date limitation would run. It is an admitted fact that, in
the case out of which Rule No. 1605 of 1955 has arisen, the Shipping Company delivered the consignment in question to the Port authorities in
Calcutta on April 5, 1952. It is also an admitted fact that, in the other case out of which Rule No. 3824 of 1955 has arisen, the Shipping Company
delivered the goods to the authorities of Calcutta Port-on May 11, 1952. Admittedly, both the suits with which we are concerned were instituted
after the expiry of more than one year from the respective dates of delivery of the goods by the Shipping Company to the authorities of Calcutta
Port. At the same time, it is an undisputed fact that, in respect of both the consignments, some bags were missing and the services of Surveyor
were requisitioned for ascertaining the loss. In Case No. 2045 of 1953 the Surveyor''s report was submitted on April 30, 1952 and in the other
case this report was submitted on May 17, 1952. It is also an undisputed fact that both the suits were instituted in the trial court within a year of the
submission of the Surveyor''s reports. The period of limitation in this case would admittedly be one year. If that period of one year be computed
from the date when the Shipping Company delivered the goods to the case of the Port authorities, then the suits would be barred by limitation. If,
however, this period of one year be computed from the dates when the Surveyor submitted his reports in the two cases, then the suits will be
within time. I shall have to determine which date should be taken for ascertaining the point of limitation in these two cases.
9. It was not disputed before me that the limitation in these two cases would be governed by the special rule of limitation laid down in the Indian
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925. Sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 6 of Article III of the Schedule to that Act lays down what the period of
limitation in such a case would be. That Sub-paragraph runs as follows:
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after
delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.
10. It would appear from the above quoted passage that the period of limitation of one year would run, in case of the present description, from the
date of delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. In the present case, the goods were delivered to the
authorities of the Port of Calcutta on April 5, 1952, in Case No. 2045 of 1953 and on May 11, 1952, in the other case. The question is whether
delivery of goods to the Port authorities is equivalent to delivery to the consignee. In this connection, my attention was drawn to some terms and
provisions appearing on the back of the bill of lading. Term No. 8 is important. It runs in the following manner:
At all ports in which by law or the custom of the port there shall exist Port or Harbour Authority empowered or authorised to receive import
cargo, delivery of the goods into the custody of such Port or Harbour Authority shall be a good and effectual discharge and delivery of the goods
and shall be treated as a removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to the delivery thereof under the contract of carriage for all
purposes of the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925.
11. It lays down distinctly that delivery of the goods into the custody of the Port Authority shall be effectual delivery and shall be treated as a
removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof. There does not remain any room for doubt that the consignor
entered into an agreement with the Shipping Company that delivery of the goods to the Port Authority will be regarded as effectual delivery to the
consignee. Sub-paragraph 3 of Paragraph 6 of Article III of the Schedule to the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925, read with the above
term appearing on the bill of lading leaves no room for doubt that limitation would run from the dates when the consignments in question were
delivered to the Port Authority. The suits under consideration were brought more than one year after the expiry of the dates of delivery. That being
the case, it was held correctly by the trial Judges in the two cases that they are barred by limitation and the learned Judges of the Full Bench of the
Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, who took a contrary view in one of the cases, were wrong.
12. The view which I have taken above finds support in a case of the court of Sind Judicial Commissioner. Haji Shakoor Firm v. Volkart Brothers
Firm and Anr. (1936) 168 I.C. 330.
13. The view which I have taken also finds some support from Section 91 of the Calcutta Port Act of 1890. In Sub-Section 2 of that section, it
has been laid down that after a Shipping Company has delivered the goods from its vessel to the Commissioners of the Port of Calcutta and
obtained a receipt, its liability for any loss or damage to such goods will cease. That means that the Shipping Company is not responsible for giving
actual delivery to the consignee.
14. For reasons given above I hold that the present Rules must be discharged.
15. They are accordingly discharged.
16. In the circumstances of the cases I do not make any order as to costs.
