@JUDGMENTTAG-ORDER
R. J. Kochar, J.@mdashSix individual employees had filed a complaint of unfair labour practices u/s 28 read with Items 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule 4 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act. They had prayed for permanency in employment of the respondent Corporation as they were in employment from 27th November 1980 (three employees) 16th December 1980 (one employee) and 3rd January 1981 (two employees) respectively as averred in para 2 of the petition. This fact has not been disputed. It appears that the petitioner union being a recognised union had stepped in the shoes of the individual employees and had finally contested the matter on their behalf. The respondent Corporation had filed its reply and contested the case of the complainant and vehemently refuted the charge of unfair labour practice levelled against them. The main case of the employees was that they were in employment from the first date of appointment though on daily wages and continued in employment since then without any break. The Corporation, however, has faintly contested this fact by saying that they were on daily wages and that they were appointed as and when work was available. Apart from this bare statement, there is no material to substantiate this crucial fact averred by the employees. The main part of the reply of the Corporation was that there were no permanent vacancies and that there was a back log to be filled in for the reserve class candidates. The Corporation, however, has very vaguely referred to the back log to be filled in by the category of only S.T. candidates and has not given any specific figures per category of the reserve class candidates. It has very conveniently taken shelter under the roster and back log to be filled in. This is the only reason put forward by the Corporation to deny the benefits of permanency to these employees. Had there been any truth in such contention, the Corporation would have straight away put on record the exact number of posts and the percentage of such posts which were reserved for the reserve class candidates. Except by making a bald and vague statement in respect of the posts to be filled in by S.T. candidates, there was absolutely no material before the Industrial Court to substantiate the said contention of the Corporation. Even before me, the Corporation has not tried to place on record the figures in respect of the alleged back log to be filled in by the reserve class candidates, including those belonging to scheduled tribe. According to me, the plea taken by the Corporation is not a bona fide one and the same was resorted to deny the benefits of permanency to the employees who were in continuous employment from 1980 onwards.
2. It is very significant to note that by a resolution dated 23-2-1987 and 27-2-1987 it was resolved to absorb all the aforesaid six employees in employment as permanent employees of the Corporation. However, a condition appears to have been put in their orders that the appointment was subject to the availability of the S.T. candidates and until the availability of the S.T. candidate or for a period of 3 months whichever is earlier. It is further significant to note that the said resolution was not revoked or annulled by the Corporation in its subsequent meetings. Pursuant to the said resolution, the employees were deemed to have been permanent after the expiry of the period of 3 months as, according to the Corporation itself, no S.T. candidates were available. It is further surprising that the Corporation had tried to convert the complainants into again daily wages workers on or from 20th November 1987. The complainants thereafter appeared to have sought reliefs by filing the present complaint before the Industrial Court. In the meanwhile, during the pendency of the complaint, the concerned employees were "again" made permanent with effect from 21-2-1991 and 25-7-1991 respectively. In view of this development, the Industrial Court disposed of the complaint on the ground that the employees had got the main relief of permanency and, therefore, nothing survived in the complaint. By his order dated 20th December 1991, the learned Member of the Industrial Court was pleased to dispose of the complaint on the aforesaid basis. It is not disputed that the concerned employees are getting the benefits of permanency from 21-2-1991 and 25-7-1991 respectively. They are, however, aggrieved by the fact that they are denied the benefits of permanency with effect from the first resolution of 1987 though Shri Bukhari has tried to urge before me that in fact they were entitled to get the benefits of permanency soon after they completed 240 days from the first date of their employment. Shri Bukhari was however, fair enough not to insist that relief from the first date of employment. He however, vehemently asserted that the employees should get all the benefits of permanency atleast from the date of the resolution.
3. According to me, the concerned six employees are entitled to be made permanent with all the benefits of permanency from the date of the resolution passed by the Corporation on 23-2-1987 and 27-2-1987. From these resolutions it is clear and it is an admitted fact, that they were appointed in clear vacancies of conductors. When the order prescribes one year''s probation period, it is an illegal order as under the model standing orders the probation period cannot be more that 3 months. It is an admitted position that the Corporation is governed by the model standing orders. In fact, the employees would have been justified in asking permanency no sooner they completed 240 days continuous employment from the date of the first day of employment. In the present case, the Corporation has passed resolution to appoint the concerned employees as permanent conductors on probation for one year. Thereafter the employees have been continued for years together and they continued till 1991 and the Corporation absorbed them "again" as permanent employees. I fail to understand how the resolution passed by the Corporation to make them permanent once in 1987 can again be repeated in respect of the same employees granting them the same relief. I am, therefore, of the view that the concerned employees are entitled to be treated as permanent employees from the date of the resolution and not either form the first day of appointment or from the date of appointment made in the year 1991. The Corporation has surely indulged into an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Items 6 and 9 of the Schedule IV of the Act as the concerned employees have been continued either as Badli or temporary for years together and they have been denied the benefits of permanency. They are entitled to get all the benefits including the difference in the wages and all other benefits pertaining to the permanent posts from 5-3-1987 and 6-3-1987 respectively. The Industrial Court has erroneously disposed of the complaint merely because the Corporation had passed second time a resolution making the concerned workmen permanent from 21-2-1991 and 25-7-1991 respectively. The Industrial Court has not applied its mind to the fact that whether the employees are entitled to be treated as permanent from the date of the resolution passed by the Corporation making them permanent. The Industrial Court ought to have granted these employees the benefits of the permanency from that date till the aforesaid dates in 1991. The industrial Court was wrong in treating the complaint of the employees being satisfied merely because they were absorbed in the permanent post in the year 1991. The Industrial Court has committed an illegality in taking the said view. The Industrial Court ought to have either held that these employees were entitled to the benefits of permanency from the year 1987 or not. In my opinion, the employees were and are entitled to all the benefits of permanency within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act from the year 1987 in accordance with their dates of appointment as permanent conductors in terms of the resolution.
4. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a) and (b) with a modification that the concerned employees would be entitled to get benefits of permanency from 23-2-1987 and 27-2-1987 respectively. The Corporation shall compute the benefits of the aforesaid employees accordingly and grant them the same within a period of 8 weeks from today. The Corporation shall act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of the Court.
5. Writ petition allowed.
