Pratap, J.@mdashThe appeals come before us on a reference to a larger Bench. Abbreviated to the minimum , the relevant facts and circumstances are as follows:
2. After terminating the respective defendants'' tenancy, the respective plaintiffs filed suits for possession . The defendants claimed protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947 - hereinafter ''the Rent Act''). The trial Court held that the Rent Act did not apply to the suit area i.e. the area where the suit premises were situate. There being no other valid defence to the claim for possession, the suits were decreed. Appeals therefrom failed. Hence these second appeals by the respective defendants.
3. A learned single Judge of this Court referred these appeals to a Division Bench . The Division Bench referred the same, in turn, to the learned Chief Justice for placing them before a larger Bench. Hence this Full Bench.
4. Though in the referring judgment, the question for consideration and determination of the Full Bench has not been formulated, a perusal of the said judgment indicated the question involved. And we formulate the same as under:-
If a notification is once issued by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Rent Act extending Part II or Part III or both, as the case may be, to the area constitution a municipal district or a municipal corporation, is it then necessary to issue another or fresh notification under the said sub-section (3) of Section 2 for the application of the said Part II or Part III or both, as the case be, to the area or areas subsequently included in the limits of the said local authority?
5. Turning now to the context in which this question arises. The Rent Act was enacted in 1947. Section 2 thereof - the key section qua the above question - deals with its extent and is as under:
Section 2.
(1) Parts I and IV of this Act shall extend to the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra.
(2) Parts II and III shall extend respectively to the area specified in Schedules I and II to this Act and shall continue to extend to any such area notwithstanding that the area ceases to be of the description therein specified.
(3) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend to any other area, any or all of the provisions of Part II or Part III or of both.
(4) The State Government may, at any time by like notification, direct that any or all the provisions of Part II or Part III or of both, as the case may be, shall cease to extend to such area and on such date as may be specified in the notification; and on that date the said provisions shall cease to be in force in such area.
Scheme of this section shows that -
(a) the legislature has itself extended Parts I and IV of the Act to the entire Bombay area of Maharashtra (sub-section 1);
(b) out of this entire Bombay area of Maharashtra, the legislature has selected certain areas viz., those specified in Schedules I and II to the Act itself applied thereto Parts II and III of the Act (sub-section 2);
(c) as regards the remaining Bombay area of Maharashtra, the legislature has delegated to the State Government the power to apply to any other area thereof, any or all of the provisions of Part II or Part III or both, as the case may be, by notification to that effect (sub-section 3).
6. Before moving on, it would be useful to note the relevant provisions of an allied enactment viz., The Bombay District Municipal Act 1901 (hereinafter the Municipal Act). Section 4 deals with declaration of municipal districts.
Section 4(1):
Subject to the provisions of Sections 6,7 and 8, the State Government may, from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any local area to be a municipal district, and may from time to time, by a like notification, extend, contract or otherwise alter the limits of any local area shall, from a date to be specified in the notification, cease to be a municipal district.
Section 4(2):
Every such notification constituting a new municipal district, or altering the limits of an existing municipal district, shall clearly set forth the local limits of the area to be included in or excluded from such municipal district, as the case may be.
Section 4(3):
It shall be the duty of the Municipality in every municipal district already existing and of every Municipality newly constituted under this Act, and of every Municipality whose local limits are altered as aforesaid, to cause, at their own cost to be erected or set up, if and when so required by the Collector, and thereafter to maintain, at their own cost, substantial boundary marks of such description and in such positions as shall be approved by the Collector, defining the limits or the altered limits of the Municipal district subject to its authority, as set forth in the notification.
Section 4(4) not relevant and hence not reproduced.
Section 8 provides for permanent municipal districts.
Section 8(1):
Not less than two months before the publication of any notification declaring any local area a permanent municipal district, or altering the limits of any such district or declaring that any local area shall cease to be a municipal district, the State Government shall cause to be published in the official Gazette, in English, and in at least one of the local newspapers, if any, in the language of the district in which such local area is situated, and to be posted up in conspicuous spots in the said local area in the language of the said district, a proclamation announcing that it is proposed to constitute such local area a municipal district, or to alter the limits of the municipal district in a certain manner, or to declare that such local area shall cease to be a municipal district, as the case may be, and requiring all persons who entertain any objection to the said proposal to submit the same, with the reasons therefor, in writing to the Collector within two months from the date of the said proclamation, and whenever it is proposed to add to or exclude from a municipal district any inhabited area, it shall be the duty of the Municipality also to cause a copy of such proclamation to be posted up in conspicuous places in such area.
Section 8(2):
The Collector shall, with all reasonable despatch, forward every objection so submitted to the State Government.
Section 8(3):
No such notification as aforesaid shall be issued by the State Government unless the objections, if any, so submitted are, in its opinion insufficient or invalid.
Section 3(5) defines " municipal district" as under:
Section 3(5):
"municipal district" shall mean any local area which is at present a municipal district, and any local area which may hereafter be constituted a municipal district u/s 4, if such municipal district has not ceased to exist under the provisions of the said section.
7. Now, soon after the merger effective from 1st August 1949 of the erstwhile Miraj State - a native Indian State - with the then Province of Bombay, the State Government, in the exercise of its powers u/s 4 of the Municipal Act, initially constituted the Miraj Municipal District. Thereafter, on 4th October 1949, the State Government by notification u/s 2(3) and Section 6(2) of the Rent Act applied Part II thereof inter alia to the area of the said Miraj Municipal District. This notification, to the extent here relevant, is as under:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 2 and sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (Bom. LVII of 1947) as applied by the Indian States (Application of Laws) Order, 1949, the Government of Bombay is pleased -
(I) to direct that all of the provisions of Part II of the said Act shall extend, with effect on and from the date of this notification, to the areas specified in Column 1 of the Schedule appended hereto (hereinafter called the ''said areas''); and
(ii) to specify that in the said areas, Part II of the said Act shall apply to the premises specified respectively, against them in Column 2 of the said Schedule.
S C H E D U L E
Area Premises
1 2
(1) ..........................................................................................................
(2) ...........................................................................................................
(3) Miraj Municipal District All premises let for residence, education, business,
trade or storage or let to Government or a local
authority for the purpose of setting up an office or a
public hospital or a dispensary."
(Herein after referred to as ''the 1949 notification'').
8. Subsequently, on 8th September 1961, the State Government by notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act enlarged the limits of the Miraj Municipal District. This resulted in the area of the suit premises falling within these enlarged limits. It may be noted that there is no challenge to the validity of this 1961 notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act nor any challenge to the validity of the 1949 notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act. It may also be noted that notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act is subject inter alia to Section 8 thereof which envisages prior publication of proposal to enlarge the limits of a municipal district; opportunity to object thereto; forwarding of every objection to the State Government; and consideration thereof by the State Government. These provisions in Section 8 are mandatory in nature. It was, therefore, open to the plaintiffs to object to any such proposal inter alia on the ground that if an additional area is inclined in the Miraj Municipal District, the provisions of Part II of the Rent Act would become applicable thereto and that, in turn, would severely restrict, prejudice or adversely affect their rights qua their property situate within that area.
9. The emerging position so far, thus is:
(a) there is a validity constituted Miraj Municipal District;
(b) there is the 1949 notification applying Part II of the Rent Act to the area of the Miraj Municipal District; and
(c) there is also the 1961 notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act enlarging the limits of the Miraj Municipal District resulting in the area of the suit premises falling within these enlarged limits.
The inquiry or the point at issue now is:
Does Part II of the Rent Act, which under the 1949 notification applied to the area of the Miraj Municipal District, also apply to the area or areas subsequently included from time to time within its enlarged limits? Or is it, for such application, incumbent to issue a fresh notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act every time an additional area is included in the limits of the said municipal district?
Put differently:
Does the 1949 notification apply to the Miraj Municipal District only as in existence at the date of the said notification or does it apply to the area of the Miraj Municipal District as is existence at any given point of time?
10. This question arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Revn. Appln. No.598 of 1963 decided on 24th December 1963. It was held therein that though the 1949 notification applies to the area of the Miraj Municipal District and though by the 1961 notification u/s 4(1) if the Municipal Act this area was enlarged or extended, it was nonetheless necessary, if Part II of the Rent Act had to apply to the extended area, that there should be a fresh notification accordingly u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act so applying Part II thereof to the extended area. Closely analysing and carefully considering the reasoning of this judgment, we are unable to agree therewith because of its following crucial infirmities.
(a) It wrongly declines to accept the "municipal district" definition in Section 3(5) of the Municipal Act even though neither the Rent Act nor any other applicable enactment separately defines the said term and even though a "municipal district" is constituted under the said Municipal Act itself;
(b) It wrongly relies upon the Supreme Court ruling in
(c) It refers to Section 4 of the Municipal Act and yet overlooks the important Section 8 thereof laying down the statutory scheme and procedure both for initially constituting a permanent municipal district as also for subsequently altering the limits thereof;
(d) It fails to note the distinction between a notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act and a notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act and the vital difference between the two;
(e) It wrongly assumes the question for consideration to be whether the Rent Act is applicable "........... by a reason of the notification of 8th September 1961" u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act when the question in effect and reality was not that but whether the Rent Act is applicable by reason of the notification of 4th October 1949 u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act;
(f) It has misconstrued the notification of 4th October 1949 u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act by holding that the said notification "extended the provisions of Part II of the Act to the Miraj Municipal District as it then stood" though the notification plainly read nowhere restricts its application or operation only to the state of circumstances subsisting or prevailing at the date thereof and though the said notification in effect applies to and operates upon the "area" of the "Miraj Municipal District" without restriction of time or area of the said district.
Besides, after the above ruliing, much water has flowed beneath the bridge or down the Ganges, as the phrase goes. The law here as elsewhere has not remained immobile or statis. The evolving legal position culminating as of now in the Supreme Court ruling in
11. We may first refer to the judgment in Second Appeal No. 224 of 1969 decided on 6th March 1972 by a learned single Judge of this Court (Nagpur Bench ). That was a case under the Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses Rent Control) issued in July 1949 by the State Government in exercise of its powers u/s 2 of the Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accomodation Act, 1946. Said Section 2 provided that such Order shall extend to such areas a s the State Government may, by notification, direct. In July 1949 the State Government issued a notification inter alia directing that Chapter I of the Rent Control Order shall extend to the whole of the Central Provinces and Berar and Chapters II and IV thereof shall extend to the areas of all the municipalities in the Central Provinces and Berar. When the above notification was issued, the area of the Municipality of Telhara, nay, the municipality itself, was not even in existence. It was established much later in April 1952. The plaintiff in that case sued the defendant for possession of premises situate within the area or the limits of this newly established Municipality of Telhara without permission of the Rent Controler. The defendant contested and contended that since the Rent Control Order was applicable to the areas of all the municipalities, it would apply not only to the area of those municipalities actually in existence in July 1949 when the Rent Control Order and the notification in question were issued but also to the area/areas of municipality/municipalities thereafter established and coming into existence; and , therefore, also to the area of the Municipality of Telhara (wherein were situate the suit premises) established subsequently in 1952. In the circumstances, so contended the defendant, as the plaintiff had not obtained the Rent Controler''s permission under Clause 13 of the Rent Controler Order, his suit was not maintainable. This contention was, however, rejected. It was held that though the Rent Control Order was applicable to all the municipalities actually in existence at the time when the notification aforesaid was issued and not also municipalities established thereafter. Therefore, as the Municipality of Telhara was not in existence when the said notification was issued in July 1949 and as, after it was established in April 1952, there was no fresh notification applying the Rent Control Order to the area of the said new municipality, it was held that, unless a fresh notification was issued, the Rent Control Order cannot apply to the area of the said new municipality. There was consequently no question of the Rent Controler''s permission as a condition for filing the suit and the one filed without such permission was maintainable.
12. In a similar subsequent case viz., Second Appeal No. 195 of 1965 Motilal v. Nandlal, decided on 16th December 1974 by the same learned single Judge deciding the above Second Appeal No. 224 of 1969 but qua another municipality viz., Municipal Committee of Tiroda, it was similarly held that the Rent Control Order did not ipso facto apply to the suit premises situate within the limits of the Municipal Committee of Tiroda because the said Municipal Committee was not in existence when the notification under the said Rent Control Order was issued in July 1949 and because after it was established in June 1965 there was no fresh notification applying the Rent Control Order to the area thereof. This decision in substance followed the learned Judge''s own earlier judgment supra in Second Appeal No. 224 of 1969. To the same effect in substance is the ruling in Gangadin v. Addl. Dy.Commr., Nagpur, ILR (1954) Nag 87, in passing referred to by leaned Counsel for the plaintiffs.
13. Nandlal, the defendant in the above Second Appeal No. 195 of 1965, carried the matter to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court judgment and dismissed the plaintiff''s suit. It is here best to reproduce the relevant portion from the Supreme Court judgment:
''The validity of the notification which was issued on July 26, 1949, u/s 2 of the Act, has not been challenged before us, so that there can be no doubt that while Chapter I became applicable to the whole of the Central Provinces and Berar and the integrated States, Chapters II and IV became applicable to all Municipalities in that State with effect from that date. Tiroda was not a Municipality at that time and did not come within the purview of the notification. But it became a Municipality on June 12, 1956 and the notification became applicable to it from that date. We, therefore, see no justification for the argument that the notification was confined to those Municipalities which were in existence on July 26, 1949, and that a fresh notification was necessary to extend the benefit of the Rent Control Order to a subsequently constituted Municipality. There is nothing in the wordings of the notification to justify any such argument. On the other hand, the wordings of the notification are quite unambiguous and there is no reason why they should not be given their simple and natural meaning. They clearly provide that Chapters II and IV of the Rent Control Order extend to "all the Municipalities'' in the State. As Tiroda was constituted as a Municipality on June 12, 1956, the provisions of those chapters became applicable to it from that date. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court that the protections of Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order was not available to the appellants. As they raised a defence against the maintainability of the suit on the ground that previous permission of the Controler was not taken by the respondent, the High Court clearly erred in rejecting that defence and in setting aside the judgment of the Court of first appeal by which the plaintiff''s suit was dismissed."
(Vide
14. Now, Clause I(2) of the Rent Control Order, 1949, is pari materia with sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Rent Act. Whereas under Clause I(2):
"The order or any specified chapter thereof shall extend to such areas as the State Government may, from time to time, by notification, direct."
Under Section 2(3) of the Rent Act:
"The State Government may, by notification, in the Official Gazette, extend to any other area, any or all of the provisions of Part II or Part III or of both."
The power of the State Government under Clause I(2) of the Rent Control Order and u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act to issue notification extending the provisions of the Rent Control Order or the Rent Act, as the case be,is , in substance, the same. Notification under Clause I(2) of the Rent Control Order and notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act are of the same nature and character and issued in the exercise of substantially the same powers of the State Government under provisions pari materia and also having the same purpose and object. There is absolutely no difference in principle. In the circumstances,therefore, the interpretation and construction put by the Supreme Court in Nandlal''s case (supra) would eeequally apply here. The two provisions being ad idem and pari materia, construction of one provision by the Supreme Court would and should eeequally apply here. The two provisions being ad idem and pari materia, construction of one provision by the Supreme Court would and should be a sound rule of construction for the other and similar provision here concerned.
15. Therefore, if as per Nandlal''s ruling, there was no need for a fresh notification for applying the Rent Control Order to the area of even an altogether newly established Municipality of Tiroda, there was a fortiori much less any need for a fresh notification for applying the Rent Act to an area included in the already existing Miraj Municipal District and to which the Rent Act already applied. If the notification in Nandlal''s case has been held by the Supreme Court to apply to the areas of even altogether new municipalities taking birth and coming into existence even after the date of the said notification (i.e.even to post-notification municipalities), then the notification here concerned surely stands on a stronger footing and would, for certain, apply to the areas subsequently included in the limits of the already existing municipalities. If the Supreme Court ruled out the need for any fresh notification qua even post-notification municipalities, the need for such fresh notification eequal merely the enlarged limits of the already existing municipalities stands likewise ruled out. Nandlal''s ruling squarely terminates the grey area of judicial uncertainty. It s ratio decidendi affords a complete answer against the plaintiffs to the purported need or requirement of a fresh notification every time an area is included in a municipal district. So initially applied to the Miraj Municipal District, the present area was not within its limits and, therefore, did not then come within the purview of the 1949 notification. But on 8th September 1961 it was included in the Miraj Municipal District. The above notification - and consequently Part II of the Rent Act - became, therefore, applicable to this area from that date. Applying the reasoning in Nandlal''s case, there is no justification for the contention that the said 1949 notification was confined to Miraj Municipal District as it existed only on the date of this notification and that a fresh notification was necessary to extend the benefit of Part II of the Rent Act to the additional area included in the said Miraj Municipal District. There is nothing in the wording of the notification is quite plain and unambiguous and there is no reason why the same should not be given its simple and natural meaning. As the additional area came in the limits of the Miraj Municipal District with effect from 6th September 1961, the notification became applicable to this area from that date. To hold otherwise would for certain render the notification non est qua this additional area.
16. In the context, itis relevant to note that there is no provision in the Rent Act excluding the application of an existing notification to a subsequently included area within the limits of a pre-existing municipal district. Nor is there any provision necessitating a fresh notification each and every time a new area is included in an existing municipal district. It is also not the plaintiff''s case that upon the limits of a municipal district being altered, a new municipal district comes into existence. Indeed, a municipal district, such as the Miraj Municipal District here, once so constituted, is a permanent municipal district vide Section 5 read with Section 7 of the Municipal Act. The permanent municipal district is a permanent nucleus around which the live notification u/s 2(3) of the Act revolves. It is all along the self-same municipal district as before albeit with altered limits. The extension of the limits of a municipal district implies that the extended limits also become subject to such laws as are already in force in the municipal district . The legislature also while delegating,under Section 2(3) of the Rent Act, its legislative function to the State Government, could not have intended otherwise.
17. Reference is, however, made to certain other rulings in which, so it is submitted, a different view has been taken. We proceed then to these cases.
The first in point of time is a ruling in Biraj Mohini Dassi v. Gopeswar Mullick, ILR (1899) Cal 202. That case, however, turned on the interpretation of certain provisions of two statutes viz., the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888) and the Bengal Tenancy Act (Act VIII of 1885) and also the true meaning to be given to the terms "Town of Calcutta", "Calcutta" and the "suburbs" of the Town. It is difficult to appreciate the relevance of this ruling to the question here. A case is an authority for what it actually decides and it is the rule or principle deducible therefrom which constitutes its ration. Construction based on specific and particular provisions of a different kind and nature and of altogether different statutes - and not in the least pari materia with the statute (Rent Act) here - can be to no avail in the present case.
18. The next is a ruling of the Supreme Court in
It was, in the light of this provision, held that a byelaw made without previous publication of its draft to those likely to be affected thereby and without providing them with opportunity to object thereto or make suggestions in that regard, would be an invalid bye-law . This ruling has been referred to in the next authority to which our attention was invited viz.,
(a) prior publication; and
(b) prior opportunity to raise objections thereto or make suggestions in that regard.
None of these pre-conditions apply to a notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act. Besides, in the present case, there is, as earlier noticed, no challenge either to the validity of the 1961 notification u/s 4(1) of the Municipal Act enlarging the limits of the Miraj Municipal District or to the validity of the 1949 notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act applying Part II thereof to the area of the Miraj Municipal District. The questions arising in the said rulings are not in the least germane to the point here under our consideration. Though it is permissible to extend the ratio of one decision to another case, the requisite condition for doing so is that the two cases must involve identical or at least a similar situation, factual and legal. That is not so here. These rulings are thus of no avail to the plaintiffs. Put shortly, these are no authority on the question before us.
19. A decision more to the point albeit under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (but akin to the Rent Act here) is that of the Karnataka High Court in
"........... it is improper to overlook the opposing point of view, whether it is expressed in a minority judgment or elsewhere."
With every respect to the learned Judges who delivered the majority judgment, we find ourselves unable to agree therewith. In our view, the said judgment erroneously distinguishes the Supreme Court ruling in
20. It was, however, contended for the plaintiffs that every time Part II of Part III or both, as the case may be, of the Rent Act is intended to be applied to an additional area of an existing municipal district, the executive must perforce apply its mind to the needs and requirement of the additional area for such law. And hence, therefore, the need for issuing, on each and every such occasion, a fresh notification u/s 2(3) indicating this application of mind. In support, it is submitted, by way of an instance, that when an additional area was included in the limits of the Dombivli Village Panchayat (to the original limits whereof the Rent Act was already applicable), the State Government had issued a fresh notification applying the Act to this additional area, thus indicating application of mind and the need for a fresh notification whenever an additional area is included in the limits of a municipal authority and if to this area, the Rent Act is intended to apply. A telling point indeed. However, and though the fact of such notification is not disputed, an instance just the contrary to or reverse of the above and, what is more, qua the same Dombivli Village Panchayat, the State Government decided that, for the application of the Rent Act to the said additional area, a fresh notification was not necessary. The State Government has thus - and significantly in respect of the same local authority - spoken in two voices: earlier and initially, in favour of a fresh notification but later and subsequently against any need for the same. The result, therefore, is equivocal and fails to help, one way or the other, in construing the statutory provision under consideration. The question has, therefore, to be determined independently and on its own merits.
21. It is also pertinent to note that save and except the above singularly solitary instance of its kind, Counsel for the plaintiffs were unable to cite any other similar instance during the course of the last over thirty years during which the Rent Act has been in force. The learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State (to whom notice was issued by the Court and who later were made party to these proceedings and who support the defendants) informed us that the above first instance of Dombivli Village Panchayat was based upon an erroneous view then taken but which solitary lapse was, as seen above, rectified when a similar occasion later arose in respect of the same Panchayat. He further informed us that though in the course of these thirty years and more, several additional areas have been included in the limits of several municipal authorities, there was (save and except the aforesaid solitary instance qua Dombivli Village Panchayat) never any fresh notification by the State Government specifically applying the Rent Act to any of these additional areas. In this context, we were also informed by the Assistant Government Pleader as also by Counsel for the defendants that, notwithstanding absence of any such fresh notification, all such additional areas have, consistently and all along, been governed by the Rent Act from the date of their inclusion in the limits of a municipal district or a municipal corporation, as the case may be, and relationship between land lords and tenants qua premises in these areas have stood governed by the Rent Act and proceedings qua such premises have been, without demur, heard, tried and adjudicated upon by Courts having exclusive jurisdiction under the Rent Act.
22. It was further contended, and rightly so, by the defendants'' learned Counsel that if all through, right from the inception of the Rent Act in 1947, there has been - ruling supra in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 598 of 1963 notwithstanding - on all sides and by all concerned a uniform and uninterrupted understanding and acceptance of a position perpetually recurring throughout the State, the same should not be lightly departed from. We may add that this should all the more be so where any disregard thereof or departure therefrom would inevitably, and for certain, result in nothing short of utter chaos, disruption of titles, unsettling of rights and extinguishment of protection under the Rent Act as also rendering countless decided and disposed of judicial proceedings and decrees and orders therein all over the years and all over the Bombay area of Maharashtra, null and void.
23. Be all that as it may, one also cannot overlook the fundamental position viz.,application of law is a legislative function. Issuance of a notification u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act applying the said law viz., the Rent Act, to a particular area and extent is, therefore, essentially a legislative function. It was in law open to the legislature to delegate this legislative function. There is before us no challenge to this delegation in favour of the State Government not is there any grievance that the State Government by issuing the 1949 notification has exceeded the authority delegated to it. Besides, challenge to the validity or constitutionality of delegated legislative function can only be, and obviously so, on limited grounds such as excessive delegation or delegation of power to determine legislative policy or fraud or legal mala fides per se none of which is even alleged to exist here. All the greater need, therefore, for judicial deference to legislative judgment.
24. Finally, a word before we conclude. Rent legislation throughout the country taken along with the landmark rulings thereon has been reflecting a shifting spectrum - ever alert to the challenge of change. In this field - and under the realities of the times - both legislative as also judicial activity together manifest and strike an apt amalgam resulting in progressively better and better security to tenants. The protective shield is ever widening . The law here, as in may another fields, along with judicial interpretation thereof, has not stood inert or passive but has kept evolving and modulating as per society''s changing axis, norms and values. The welter of judicial dicta manifests, by and large, an endeavour to further the self-evident objectives constituting the raison d''etre of this socially beneficent piece of legislation. On a question of importance with which we are here concerned, construction or interpretation dehors these objectives may, therefore, well lead to judicial frustration of this legislative intent and object - in the process defeating the wide amplitude, focus and sweep of thelaw. It is axiomatic that if two interpretations are possible - one likely to withhold or weaken the basic policy of the Act and the other actively advancing the fulfilment thereof - the Court then would and should prefer to adopt the latter construction. While construing a benevolent piece of legislation, liberal interpretation with an in - built capacity for growth and adaptation should generally be the rule. That way lies a direct link and nexus between law and justice bringing about, as best as possible, a close approximation between the two.
25. In all the circumstances and for reasons aforesaid, our answer to the question formulated at the outset of this judgment is:
A notification once issued by the State Government u/s 2(3) of the Rent Act, extending Part II or Part III or both, as the case be, to the area of a municipal district or a municipal corporation, would also apply to the area or areas subsequently included in the limits of such local authority. It is hence not necessary to issue another or fresh notification for the application of the said Parts to such additional area or areas as are included in the area of the said local authority.
We consequently hold thus:
(a) This Court''s ruling dated 24th December 1963 in Civil Revision Application No. 598 of 1963 does not decide the question correctly. The same is overruled.
(b) Ex abundanti cautela - by way of abundant caution - we further hold that , in any event of the matter, after the Supreme Court judgment in
(c) In view of the Supreme Court ruling in Nandlal''s case, the decision of the learned single Judge in Second Appeal No.224 of 1969 decided on 6th March 1972 stands overruled.
(d) For the same reason the ruling inGangadin v/s Addl. Dy. Commr, Nagpur, ILR (1954) Nag 87, relied upon by the plaintiffs, also stands overruled.
26. Reverting in the end to the present appeals, it follows from what is stated and held above that by virtue of the 1949 notification the Rent Act applied to the area then constituting the Miraj Municipal District as also to the additional areas later included therein. It is obvious, therefore, that to the suit premises situate within the said area, the Rent Act applies and thus, qua these premises, governs the relationship between the parties. The instant suits dehors this Act are, therefore, not maintainable. Defence accordingly claiming protection of the said Act was thus well taken and deserves to be upheld. The inevitable end-result can thus be but only one viz., dismissal of the suits leading to these appeals. In the circumstances, returning the appeals to a single Judge becomes a futile formality. Therefore, rather than elect such circuitous detour leading to the same terminus, better course would be to dispose of these appeals by this judgment itself.
27. Hence Order
a) Second Appeal No. 69 of 1979 is allowed. Decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs'' suit is dismissed but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs throughout.
b) Second Appeal No. 310 of 1982 is allowed. Decrees passed by the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiffs'' suit is dismissed but, in the circumstances, with no order as to costs throughout. Ordered accordingly.
