Swatanter Kumar, C.J.@mdashRule in both the Writ Petitions. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of the parties, Rule called out and heard finally at the admission stage itself.
Facts
2. The State of Maharashtra vide its order dated 29th February 2008 appointed Shri A N Roy, Petitioner in Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2528 of 2008 and Respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2552 of 2008, as the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Maharashtra State. This order of the State was challenged by Shri Suprakash Chakravarthy, Director General of Police, Commandant, General Home Guards & Director, Civil Defence, Maharashtra State, Mumbai by filing Original Application No. 389 of 2008 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench, Mumbai stating that he is an Officer from 1972 Batch of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and till date he has served in distinguished capacity in various ranks of the police force and other Departments including CID, Railways, Commissioner of Police, etc. He was promoted to the rank of Director General of Police in February 2005 and had earned two confidential reports in that rank. He claimed that he was the seniormost Director General of Police and had even held important postings in that rank. The post of Director General and Inspector General of Police occupied by Shri A N Roy and Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau occupied by Shri J D Virkar are the only two cadre posts, whereas Director General of Police and Managing Director Police Housing & Welfare Corporation Limited, Mumbai i.e. the post presently held by Shri Virk and the post of Director General of Police, Commandant, General Home Guards and Director, Civil Defence, Maharashtra State, Mumbai occupied by the Applicant i.e. Shri S. Chakravarthy are the two noncadre posts. The post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra fell vacant on 29th February 2008 when the incumbent of the post Shri S.P. Pasricha was superannuated even after expiry of his extension period. Shri S.S. Virk, according to the Applicant, had joined the Maharashtra State cadre after repatriation from Punjab, where he was on deputation and was taken on the strength of the State cadre on 27th April 2007. While raising a challenge to the order, the grounds taken by the Applicant before the Tribunal was that only the three seniormost officers in the rank of Director General of Police could be considered for the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police and Shri A N Roy was not in the zone of consideration in terms of directions prescribed in the case of
3. This Application was contested by the Union of India, Government of Maharashtra as well as by Shri Roy, the private Respondent. The other private Respondent, Shri J D Virkar, it appears from the order of the Tribunal had not really contested the Application either way.
4. In its reply before the Tribunal, the State took up the stand that Shri Virk is the seniormost Officer as per seniority while the Applicant is the second senior Director General and seniority as stated in the application was not disputed. It was stated that there are two excadre posts of Director General level and two noncadre posts which are in consonance with the instructions of the Government that the excadre posts would not exceed the equal number of cadre posts. It was averred that Shri Virk was prematurely repatriated to the State of Maharashtra vide order dated 10th April 2007, but vide order dated 4th April 2007 he was placed under suspension by the State of Punjab and after joining the State of Maharashtra on 27th April 2007 he was on compulsory waiting thereafter. It is also stated that Shri Virk was arrested by the Mohali Police Station, Chandigarh on 9th September 2007 and remained in police custody till 24th September 2007. Therefore the Government of Punjab issued an order dated 25th February 2008 stating that Shri Virk was deemed to be under suspension with effect from 9th September 2007 and as he was facing prosecution and being under suspension at the relevant time, issue of appointment in the rank of Director General of Police, when the issue was considered, did not arise. In view of the above position, three seniormost Officers i.e. Shri Chakravarthy, Shri Virkar and Shri Roy were considered and Shri Roy was appointed to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police. It is also averred that Shri Roy was the only Officer who has been empanelled by the Government of India to hold Director General level post at the Centre as was communicated vide order dated 5th April 2006. Shri Virk was to superannuate on 30th June 2009 and Shri Virkar on 31st July 2009, whereas Shri Roy was due to retire on 30th May 2010. Taking these various factors into consideration, Shri Roy was appointed to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, Maharashtra State.
5. The stand of Shri Roy, as noticed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, was that his appointment was in accordance with the Rules. The appointment of Director General and Inspector General of Police is not a promotion, as all the four posts of Director General of Police are in the same pay scale, rank and status and it is in the discretion of the State to decide as to who should be appointed to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, Maharashtra State. He was having a period of more than two years before superannuation and in terms of the Prakash Singh''s case (supra), he was validly appointed to the said post.
6. From the record, it appears that the Union of India hardly took any interest in contesting the said application before the Tribunal and even before this Court. No reply was filed by the Union of India before the Tribunal as well as this Court except submitting a short note at the end of the hearing.
7. The Central Administrative Tribunal vide its Judgment dated 8th October 2008 set aside the appointment of Shri Roy to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra and the Respondents were further directed to comply with the directions contained in paragraphs 8A, 8B and 8C of the prayer clauses within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment. Time was granted to the Respondents to continue with the incumbent Shri Roy in the said post till compliance to the directions. The State of Maharashtra as well as Shri Roy felt aggrieved from the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal and filed Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2552 of 2008 and Writ Petition (Lodging) No. 2528 of 2008 respectively. During the pendency of these Writ Petitions before this Court, the Division Bench of this Court passed the following Order on 23rd October 2008:
1. Matters taken on board upon mentioning. With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, we direct that both these petitions be listed for admission/ hearing on 11.11.2008.
2. Further, the first direction in the order at page 52 of Writ Petition (L) No. 2528 of 2008 may be implemented by the State. However, the period in relation to holding of selection to the post of Director General of Police, Maharashtra State, is extended to 11.11.2008, till which date, obviously, the incumbent will hold the office. We make it clear that this order has been passed upon the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and without prejudice to their rights and contentions.
8. During the pendency of the Writ Petitions before this Court, Notices of Motion No. 519 of 2008 and 520 of 2008 were taken out by Shri S.S. Virk in both these Writ Petitions praying for impleadment and to be heard in these Writ Petitions. As agreed between the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and as we also considered it appropriate to permit intervention by Shri Virk in both these Writ Petitions, all parties were heard on merits of the case. In other words, both these Notices of Motion were heard along with the Writ Petitions and intervention was permitted by the Court.
9. The Central Administrative Tribunal while quashing the appointment of Shri Roy to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, noticed in some detail the contents of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) and noticed that scope for the Government concerned in the matter of selection of an Officer in preference to another is essentially an administrative decision and has to be taken within the framework of the said judgment. Noticing directions stated in Clause 2 of paragraph 31, it observed that the State was obliged to consider three seniormost Officers of the Department for the purpose of their selection and appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police. Noticing the contention that Shri Virk was one of the three seniormost Officers available and he was excluded from the consideration on the ground of his suspension by the State of Punjab on 4th April 2007 and on 25th February 2008. While noticing that Shri Virk was permitted to join the cadre of State of Maharashtra on 27th April 2007 and the Orders passed by the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal at Chandigarh against the suspension of 4th April 2007 and the Order of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 3649 of 2008, the Tribunal took the view that there was no compliance to the judgment of the Supreme Court and that Shri Virk had been incorrectly excluded and exclusion of one of the eligible and seniormost Officers violates the selection process and it could only consider three seniormost Officers. Referring to the case of
10. The legality and correctness of the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal was questioned before us primarily on the ground that the Tribunal has incorrectly applied the law and as it is a result of misapplication of the principles of law the judgment is liable to be set aside. According to the State, it had complied, as far as possible, with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) and has even filed an application seeking clarification before the Supreme Court and appointment of Justice Thomas Committee was made to answer the query raised. Further, it is argued that the appointment cannot be made purely on seniority as it is a selection post and it is in the discretion of the State, particularly when all the four posts of Director General of Police were in the same rank, pay and status at the relevant time. As there was no empanelment of eligible officers made by the Union Public Service Commission, there was no occasion for the State to pick up three seniormost Officers in the manner as stated in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) but still the State had considered three seniormost Officers, Shri Virk being under suspension. It is stated that though interims orders had been passed in favour of Shri Virk, still he was facing investigation in furtherance to the First Information Report registered at Mohali Police Station and his order of suspension was to be adjudicated upon by the Central Administrative Tribunal or the High Court where the cases are still pending for final disposal. Thus, the correctness of the judgment of the Tribunal is challenged on facts and law, both.
11. It is necessary for us to notice at this stage itself that Shri Virk was never impleaded as a private Respondent though Shri Roy and Shri Virkar both had been impleaded by the Applicant as Respondents in the case before the Central Administrative Tribunal. Furthermore, Shri Virk never challenged the appointment of Shri Roy overlooking his seniority. In other words, Shri Virk at no point of time raised a grievance with regard to appointment of Shri Roy though the entire judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal is founded on the reasoning that Shri Virk was excluded incorrectly and that the order of suspension, departmental inquiries had an impact one way or the other on the selection of Shri Roy. We hardly find these findings to be in consonance with the principles of law particularly in absence of Shri Virk being joined as party to the proceedings. This was one of the reasons why this Court had permitted intervention by Shri Virk in the Writ Petitions filed before this Court. We may also record here that the Central Administrative Tribunal had not considered the contention raised by the parties in its entirety and furthermore as intervention of Shri Virk was permitted in the Writ Petitions, we heard the parties on all the points which were raised in the Writ Petitions as well as on the points which were raised before the Tribunal but not considered and we heard the parties at great length on all the issues. We may also notice that original record was produced during the course of hearing and as the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the State was not in conformity with the original records, we had even granted liberty only to the learned Counsel appearing for the parties to examine the original file and for this reason, we passed following order on 30th January 2009:
After the arguments were concluded by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the original record which was produced during the course of hearing was examined by the court and it was found that name of Mr. Virk was actually considered with other officers for the appointment to the post of DGIGP State of Maharashtra. Even the circular issued by the Ministry of Home dated 15th January, 1999 along with certain other factors had not been adverted to by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. Thus, we directed the matter to be listed for direction today. We grant liberty only to the counsel appearing for the parties to examine the original record, if they so desire, and other documents indicated and placed on record. List this matter for further orders, if any, concluding the arguments limited to this issue on Monday, 2nd February 2009.
The matter was also heard again on 2nd February 2009 at some length, then we reserved the matters for Orders.
12. In this backdrop of findings, now we proceed to discuss the merits of various contentions raised by the learned Counsel appearing before us. Law relating to and method of appointment to the post of Director General of Police, Maharashtra State.
13. The Director General of Police, Maharashtra is the highest rank post in the State Police administration and every eligible officer has legitimate aspiration to rise to that stature and status. Thus, it is necessary first and foremost to examine as to under what Rules the eligible Officers are to be considered and how are they to be appointed to that post including the application of the principles or directions stated in judicial pronouncements. The learned Counsel appearing for various parties primarily relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
31. With the assistance of learned Counsel for the parties, we have perused the various reports. In discharge of our constitutional duties and obligations having regard to the aforenoted position, we issue the following directions to the Central Government, State Governments and Union Territories for compliance till framing of the appropriate legislations:
State Security Commission
(1) The State Governments are directed to constitute a State Security Commission in every State to ensure that the State Government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State Police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State Police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country. This watchdog body shall be headed by the Chief Minister or Home Minister as Chairman and have the DGP of the State as its ex officio Secretary. The other members of the Commission shall be chosen in such a manner that it is able function independent of Government control. For this purpose, the State may choose any of the models recommended by the National Human Rights Commission, the Ribeiro Committee or the Sorabjee committee, which are as under:
The recommendations of this Commission shall be binding on the State Government. The functions of the State Security Commission would include laying down the broad policies and giving directions for the performance of the preventive tasks and service oriented functions of the police, evaluation of the performance of the State Police and preparing a report thereon for being placed before the State Legislature.
Selection and minimum tenure of DGP
(2) The Director General of Police of the State shall be selected by the State Government from amongst the three seniormost officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission on the basis of their length of service very good record and range of experience for heading the police force. And, once he has been selected for the job, he should have a minimum tenure of at least two years irrespective of his date of superannuation. The DGP may, however, be relieved of his responsibilities by the State Government acting in consultation with the State Security Commission consequent upon any action taken against him under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules or following his conviction in a court of law in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption, or if he is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his duties.
Minimum tenure of IG of police and other officers
(3) Police officers on operational duties in the field like the Inspector General of Police in charge Zone, Deputy Inspector General of Police incharge Range, Superintendent of Police incharge District and Station House Officer incharge of a Police Station shall also have a prescribed minimum tenure of two years unless it is found necessary to remove them prematurely following disciplinary proceedings against them or their conviction in a criminal offence or in a case of corruption or if the incumbent is otherwise incapacitated from discharging his responsibilities. This would be subject to promotion and retirement of the officer.
Separation of investigation
(4) The investigating police shall be separated from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people. It must, however, be ensured that there is full coordination between the two wings. The separation, to start with, may be effected in towns/urban areas which have a population of ten lakhs or more, and gradually extended to smaller towns/urban areas also.
Police Establishment Board
(5) There shall be a Police Establishment Board in each State which shall decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Establishment Board shall be a departmental body comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department. The State Government may interfere with the decision of the Board in exceptional cases only after recording its reasons for doing so. The Board shall also be authorised to make appropriate recommendations to the State Government regarding the postings and transfers of officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police, and the Government is expected to give due weight to these recommendations and shall normally accept it. It shall also function as a forum of appeal for disposing of representations from officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above regarding their promotions/transfers/disciplinary proceedings or their being subjected to illegal or irregular orders and generally reviewing the functioning of the police in the State.
Police Complaints Authority
(6) There shall be a Police Complaints Authority at the district level to look into complaints against police officers of and up to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Similarly, there should be another Police Complaints Authority at the State level to look into complaints against officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above. The district level Authority may be headed by a retired District Judge while the State level Authority may be headed by a retired Judge of the High Court/ Supreme Court. The head of the State level Complaints Authority shall be chosen by the State Government out of a panel of names proposed by the Chief Justice; the head of the district level Complaints Authority may be assisted by three to five members depending upon the volume of complaints in different States/districts, and they shall be selected by the State Government from a panel prepared by the State Human Rights Commission/Lok Ayukta/State Public Service Commission. The panel may include members from amongst retired civil servants, police officers or officers from any other department, or from the civil society. They would work whole time for the Authority and would have to be suitably remunerated for the services rendered by them. The Authority may also need the services of regular staff to conduct field inquiries. For this purpose, they may utilise the services of retired investigators from the CID, Intelligence, Vigilance or any other organisation. The State level Complaints Authority would take cognizance of only allegations of serious misconduct by the police personnel, which would include incidents involving death, grievous hurt or rape in police custody. The district level Complaints Authority would, apart from the above cases, may also inquire into allegations of extortion/land/house grabbing or any incident involving serious abuse of authority. The recommendations of the Complaints Authority, both at the district and State levels ,for any action, departmental or criminal, against a delinquent police officer shall be binding on the authority concerned.
National Security Commission
(7) The Central Government shall also set up a National Security Commission at the Union level to prepare a panel for being placed before the appropriate appointing authority, for selection and placement of Chiefs of the Central Police Organisations (CPOs), who should also be given a minimum tenure of two years. The Commission would also review from time to time measures to upgrade the effectiveness of these forces, improve the service conditions of its personnel, ensure that there is proper coordination between them and that the forces are generally utilised for the purposes they were raised and make recommendations in that behalf. The National Security Commission could be headed by the Union Home Minister and comprise heads of CPOs and a couple of security experts as members with the Union Home Secretary as its Secretary.
The aforesaid directions shall be complied with by the Central Government, State Governments or Union Territories, as the case may be, on or before 31/12/2006 so that the bodies aforenoted become operational on the onset of the new year. The Cabinet Secretary, Government of India and the Chief Secretaries of State Governments/Union Territories are directed to file affidavits of compliance by 3/1/2007.
14. Let us analyse the above directions of the Supreme Court. The reason for issuing such directions were widespread. It intended to attain a public purpose, namely, urgent need for preservation and strengthening of rule of law and to introduce reforms in the police setup in the country. Taking into consideration the gravity of the problem, the Court felt the need for appointment of (i) State Security Commission; (ii) transparent procedure for appointment of Police Chief; (iii) desirability of giving him a minimum fixed tenure and (iv) separation of investigation work from law and order. In the backdrop of the directions in relation to appointment to the post in question, the State was expected to select from amongst three seniormost Officers of the Department who have been empaneled for promotion to that rank by the Union Public Service Commission. This empanelment is expected to be made on the basis of his length of service, very good record, range of experience for heading the Police force and to ensure that once selected for this job, he should have minimum tenure of atleast two years irrespective of his date of superannuation. The directions also refer as to when he could be relieved of the responsibility of the post by the State Government in consultation with the State Security Commission. These directions had been issued by the Supreme Court in discharge of its Constitutional duties and the Court made it clear in paragraph 29 of the judgment that "It is essential to lay down guidelines to be operative till the new legislation is enacted by the State Governments".
15. In other words, these are the guidelines in the form of directions issued by the Supreme Court and it is expected of the State Governments and the Central Government to amend the laws and frame appropriate policies and legislations to comply with the directions.
16. As far as this Court is concerned, the State of Maharashtra was expected to take appropriate steps, legislatively and otherwise, to amend the laws in force, to constitute the State Security Commission and to follow the prescribed method of appointment to the post of Director General of Police in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). It was not in dispute before us that so far neither the laws have been amended nor any policy has been framed by the State of Maharashtra to precisely implement the directions of the Supreme Court. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India as well as the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Maharashtra took a common stand that to a great extent it is not possible or practicable for the State to implement the directions in their entirety and realizing the impediments in compliance to the directions of the Supreme Court, applications have been moved before the Supreme Court. It is stated that unworkability of directions at State and Central level has resulted in noncompliance of the directions and thus further directions were prayed for. These applications were dealt with by the Supreme Court vide its Order dated 16th May 2008 and the Supreme Court appointed Mr Justice K.T. Thomas, Former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as Chairman of the Committee and made reference to the Committee in the following directions:
1) To examine the affidavits filed by the different States and the Union Territories in compliance to the Court''s directions with reference to the ground realities.
2) Advise the Respondents wherever the implementation is falling short of the Court''s orders, after considering the Respondents'' stated difficulties in implementation.
3) Bring to the notice of the Court any genuine problems the Respondents may be having in view of the specific conditions prevailing in a State or Union Territory.
4) Examine the new legislations enacted by different States regarding the police to see whether these are in compliance with the letter and spirit of this Hon''ble Court''s directions.
5) Apprise the Court about unnecessary objections or delays on the part of any Respondent so that appropriate follow up action could be taken against that Respondent.
6) Submit a Status report on compliance to this Hon''ble Court every six months.
17. It is thus argued that strict compliance to the directions of the Supreme Court may not be necessary at this stage and the procedure adopted by the State Government for promotion/ appointment to the post of Director General of Police is just, fair and in consonance with the principles stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) as well as the relevant Rules.
18. It is not for us to deal with this aspect of the case relating to workability or otherwise of the directions issued by the Supreme Court. Suffice it to note that the judgment being that of highest Court of the land and in consonance with the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution of India this being the law of the land, it is expected of the Central Government as well as the State Government to carry out the directions of the Supreme Court appropriately. With this observation, we leave the matter at that.
19. Reverting back to the method of appointment to the post of Director General of Police in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court, it is clear and there cannot be a dispute to the fact that the directions of the Supreme Court in relation to the appointment of the Director General of Police have not been carried out in its entirety and even appropriately. Compliance of the directions would be that the Union Public Service Commission is expected to empanel the Officers for providing Officers in the zone of consideration for promotion to the post of Director General of Police in the State. This empanelment is to be done by the Union Public Service Commission and nobody else, based upon length of service, their service record being very good and the range of experience for heading the Police force. This is an introduction of a specialised agency in the method of appointment to the post of Director General of Police or the Police Chief. Once the empanelment is made, the names of three seniormost Officers would be considered by the State Government and thereafter the Government is expected to select the most meritorious person to the post of Director General of Police and, if so selected, he is expected to have tenure of two years. The directions of the Supreme Court issued under Articles 32 or 142 in light of Article 141 of the Constitution of India cannot vary their basic character to the extent of being mandatory or directory.
20. The legal character and substance of the direction would not normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The language used by the Supreme Court while issuing such directions is in no way indicative of they being optional at the discretion of the authorities concerned but are of substantive character of being mandatory. In our view, these directions need to be complied with in their entirety and not with reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case. Thus, it was expected of the State Government, Union of India as well as Union Public Service commission to comply with the directions in their true spirit and proper perspective without applying the rule of convenience.
21. The Supreme Court in the case of
22. The directions issued by the Supreme Court have the binding force of law and it is hardly permissible to the authorities to mould the directions to suit a given situation. Reference in this regard can also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of GM, Indian Bank v. R. Rani and Anr. (2007)12 SCC 796.
23. In
24. Needless to reiterate that in the case of
25. The above being the position of law, we have no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the State Government, the Union Government and all other concerned authorities were expected to make appointment to the post of Director General of Police, Maharashtra, strictly in accordance with the directions contained in Prakash Singh case (supra). All the directions contained in Clause (2) of Paragraph 31 of the said decision are mandatory in nature and it was neither expected nor was it permissible to State Government or any other authority to mould these directions or make appointments in violation to these directions.
26. It was practically unanimous argument by learned Senior Advocates appearing for different parties before us that these directions could be treated partly mandatory and partly directory with reference to the given facts of the case. We are unable to accept the said contention. Neither of the directions in their entirety are directory and consequently optional for the authorities to be followed and they are mandatory in character and the State Government and all concerned Authorities were expected to comply with those directions in stricto sensu. It is an admitted case of all the parties before us that the Union Public Service Commission did not empanel any officer for appointment to the post of Director General of Police, Maharashtra. Once the officers were not empaneled by Union Public Service Commission, the question of State Government picking up three senior most persons for its consideration and appoint them to the said post does not arise. The Supreme Court considered it appropriate to introduce participation of Union Public Service Commission in empanelling the officers on the basis of length of service, good record and suitability. Once this panel was not prepared by a Commission like Union Public Service Commission, rest of directions would hardly be complied with. The State Government is not vested with any discretion to prepare its own panel or consider the candidates which the State feels are proper to be considered for appointment to that post. The sine qua non for consideration by the State for appointment to the post of Director General of Police is empanelment of candidates by the Union Public Service Commission which admittedly and certainly was not in existence before the officers of Maharashtra Cadre of Indian Police Services were considered for promotion to that post. It can hardly be argued on behalf of any of the Respondents and for that matter even on behalf of the Petitioner and private Respondents that the appointment to the post of Director General of Police, Maharashtra, has been made strictly in accordance with the directions contained in Clause (2) of paragraph 31 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). In fact, the entire process of selection and appointment to the post, as revealed from the pleadings of the parties and records produced before us during the hearing of the petition, show that there has been no compliance to the directions contained in the said judgment of the Supreme Court.
27. The tenure of Director General of Police is another aspect on which arguments were addressed by learned Counsel appearing for the parties. According to one set of arguments, the period of two years being mandatory, the selected candidate will have to hold that post for a fixed period of two years, irrespective of the date of superannuation. However, according to the State, it was not necessary as the date of superannuation is provided under the statutory rules, and therefore, the directions are contrary to the legislatively framed rules and there cannot be a fixed period of two years of tenure irrespective of the age of superannuation. Another argument advanced in this behalf is that the relevant rules governing the terms and conditions of the services of the Indian Police Service Officers should be read in conjunction with the directions of the Supreme Court and the selecting authority could appoint a person who has minimum service of two or more years left. Superannuation being a provision controlled by Statute, it should be construed appropriately with the directives of the Supreme Court. This aspect of the matter, we shall shortly proceed to discuss as an alternative approach but suffice it note at this juncture that the directions which are mandatory for appointment to the post of Director General of Police have not been complied with by any of the officials/Respondents.
28. An ancillary, but a question of some importance that has to be considered by the Court now is whether the directions contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) are the guidelines or directions and what will be the effect of such directions vis-�-vis existing Legislation. In Paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has noticed that it is essential to lay down guidelines to be operative till the new legislation is enacted by the State Government. However, in the subsequent paragraph, the Supreme Court has noticed that the directions are being issued in exercise of its power under Article 32 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India and all the Authorities are mandated by Article 144 to act in aid of the orders passed by the Supreme Court. In view of these categorical findings recorded by the Court, any fine distinction between `guidelines'' and `directions'' and its consequences in law loses its significance as the orders of the Supreme Court with the aid of Article 141 of the Constitution are binding precedents for all the Courts in India and furthermore, all the State Governments and all the Authorities are expected to respect the law of the land declared by the Supreme Court and work in aid to proper implementation of such directions or guidelines.
29. The Supreme Court issued the guidelines/directions which were to be in force till the laws were amended or legislated by the Competent Legislative Authority in the form of subordinate Legislation. The judgment does not unambiguously state nor in fact it can be construed on the implied principle that the existing laws stand annulled by the judgment of the Supreme Court. In the case of Prakash Singh (supra), there was no challenge to any of the laws in force in relation to the police force either at the State or Union level. In fact, the gravity of problem and preservation of rule of law were primarily the reasons for the Supreme Court to issue these interim directions.
30. The laws which may have direct or otherwise bearing on the matter in issue are the Indian Police Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1954, The Indian Police Services (Cadre) Rules, 1954, The Bombay Police Act, 1951, The Bombay Police Manual, 1959 and the allied Statutes which have a bearing on various aspects of the other statutes being All India Services Act, 1951 and the Rules and Maharashtra Civil Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1981. These are the statutes which are in existence and which deal with appointment to the post of Inspector General of Police later on termed as "Director General of Police" (Inspector General of Police), other posts of Director General of Police and conditions of service of that post.
31. In terms of Section 3 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, there is one Police Force for the whole of the State of Maharashtra and such police force shall include every Police Officer referred to in Clause (6) of Section 2. Section 5 thereof deals with the Constitution of Police Force, which lays down that the Police Force shall consist of such number in the several ranks and have such organization and such powers, functions and duties as the State Government may by general or special order determine. Section 6 of the Bombay Police Act deals with the posts of Inspector General, Additional and Deputy Inspector General and states that subject to the provisions of Section 4 for the direction and supervision of the Police Force, the State Government shall appoint a Director General and Inspector General of Police who shall exercise such powers and perform such functions and duties and have such responsibilities and such authority as may be provided under the Act or orders made by the State Government. The State Government is also empowered to appoint one or more Additional Director General and Inspector General or a Special Inspector General or a Deputy Inspector General to aid and assist the Director General and Inspector General. Appointments to these posts are to be made by the State Government.
32. In the various Acts and Rules referred by us above, it appears that there is no provision as to how and on what basis appointment is to be made to the post of Director General of Police of State of Maharashtra. There are provisions, like Section 6 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 and Section 3 of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, which provide for the procedure and method which need to be adopted by the Competent Authority for appointment to various higher posts in the police cadre. There is no provision brought to our notice which demonstrates as to the procedure and criteria for appointment to the post of Director General of Police. These provisions of law empowers the State to appoint the Director General and Inspector General of Police, but there is no provision under the Act which clearly spells out the criteria, procedure and methodology to be adopted by the State Government while making such an appointment. Section 4 states that the superintendence of the police force is to vest in the State Government through the Home Department unlike the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 which in turn provides for appointment of the Director and also spells out u/s 4A that there shall be a Committee for appointment to the post of Director. In other words, there is no specific statutory provision controlling this aspect. This gives rise to a question whether the State can follow any procedure for appointment to the post of Director General of Police in absence of specific Rules. Firstly, once there is no specific provision in the Rules, it was obligatory in law upon the State Government to entirely follow the procedure prescribed and mandated by the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) which admittedly has not been followed. The State having not followed the mandatory directions in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) and Rules being silent in regard to the appointment for the post of Director General, the procedure adopted by the State for such appointment has to be just, fair and should not be arbitrary.
33. In the present case, from the original records which were produced before the Court, it is seen that a detailed note was prepared by the Under Secretary on 12th February 2008 stating the names of five (5) seniormost Officers and also stating that the Director General of Police and the Director General, ACB, are two posts in the State being cadre post and other two posts i.e. Commandant, General Home Guards & Director, Civil Defence and Managing Director, Maharashtra State Police Housing & Welfare Corporation Limited were excadre posts and each post has an independent jurisdiction and not a single post is subordinate to the other. After giving the profile of various persons, it was stated that the Punjab Police had registered an offence against Shri Virk for possessing disproportionate assets and he had moved an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Chandigarh and the matter was subjudice. It was indicated that Shri Virk has received in all six different medals. Details of other Officers were also given. The note further states that while making appointment to the four posts available in the State, any Officer can be appointed to any post irrespective of the mutual seniority of these Officers by taking into consideration the importance of the said post, integrity and efficiency of the said four Officers. The said note was submitted by the Under Secretary to the higher authorities seeking orders from the Competent Authorities.
34. This file was thereafter put up before the hierarchy in the Home Department and the Joint Secretary (S J Mahajan) recorded a note that the post of Director General of Police would fall vacant and the four Officers of Director General were in that rank. The note also refers to the registration of some case against Shri Virk and pendency of proceedings before various Courts as well as the arrest of Shri Virk on 9th September 2007 and the fact that he was under deemed suspension. The note further refers to the Order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court wherein the investigation was quashed and a new team was appointed to look into the First Information Report and to initiate inquiry afresh in respect of criminal investigation. After referring to the other candidates commonly, the file was submitted for orders for appointment to the post of Director General of Police and Additional Director General of Police. The note recorded by the Joint Secretary (S J Mahajan) on 15th February 2008 was put up before the Joint Secretary (Law), who thereupon recorded a note, referring to deemed suspension of Shri Virk and stated that it will be appropriate to seek explanatory advise from the Central Government. Additional Chief Secretary (Home) put forward the file for issuance of appropriate orders with bio data on record. The list of the Officers in the rank of Director General of Police was also submitted by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home). Thereafter this file was put up to the Chief Secretary, Deputy Chief Minister with Home portfolio and the Chief Minister. The Deputy Chief Minister decided in the following words:
In order to maintain law and order properly in the State, appointment of Shri Roy to the post of Director General of Police and of Shri Gafoor to the post of Commissioner of Police, Mumbai should be made. Rest should be resubmitted.
The said decision was then approved by the Chief Minister.
35. The noting on the file also suggests that Shri Virk had been arrested and was in custody for more than 48 hours, and therefore, the order of suspension of Shri Virk would be required to be issued and three other officers could be considered for the post. This noting was recorded by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) on 16th February, 2008 whereafter a decision was taken. It may be noticed that Shri Virk was subsequently given posting as Director General of Police/Chairman and Managing Director, Maharashtra State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation Limited. What is the effect in the note on such consideration and whether this consideration of the officers concerned can stand the scrutiny of law under judicial review or not, are the questions which we shall soon revert back to. At this stage, we would proceed to complete the discussion on the law relating to impact of directions/guidelines issued by the Supreme Court in exercise of its power under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution of India vis-�-vis the law in question. This aspect of the matter has attained certain relevancy to the matter in issue inasmuch as great emphasize was placed by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties on the mandatory directions that the person who was selected would have tenure of two years irrespective of his date of superannuation. Rule 16 of the All India Services (Deathcum Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 provides for superannuation gratuity of pension to a member of the Service. Rule 16(1A) thereof also provides that the Government could, in a given set of circumstances, grant extension but the same could not exceed six months and it could be only for the limited purpose that is stated under the rules. Proviso to the said rule states that a member of the Service could retire on attaining the age of 60 years unless extension is granted for a limited purpose that he was a fulltime member of a committee which is to be wound up within a short period or extension of service is necessary for a period of three months in public interest to complete a particular job. This also could be done only after taking approval of the Central Government. In other words, the rules which are applicable to the members of the Police Services clearly postulate that an employee was to superannuate upon attaining the age of 60 years. We have already noticed that no statutory Rules or provisions of an Act have been quashed or set aside by the Supreme Court specifically or even impliedly and the directives/guidelines were intended to be creative in nature and of course are binding but it will always be proper to interpret statutory provisions in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court and such purpose easily could be achieved simply by selecting a candidate who has a tenure of more than two years at the time of his selection. The States were expected to amend the laws which they have not done so far and have moved the Supreme Court praying that the directions issued by the Supreme Court are not workable or practicable and that aspect of the matter is subjudice before that Court. The argument raised on behalf of the State and even on behalf of other Respondents that some of the directions contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) are directory and other are mandatory, i.e. nonempanelment by Union Public Service Commission is inconsequential but directions of two years'' tenure is mandatory is self destructive .Qui approbat non reprobat, parties cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate in relation to interpretation of the same directions. In our considered view, the most appropriate manner of interpreting the directions of the Supreme Court is to read them harmoniously with the statutory laws in existence as statutory provisions cannot be written off the Statute book by mere implication. The law could either be set aside by the Supreme Court in exercise of its power of judicial review or Legislature could amend or repeal the law. Applying the principle of harmonious construction in such a situation would be the most permissible legal methodology relating to interpretation. The doctrine of purposive construction as well as creative construction can be applied to such a situation where the Court could discover a principle which would squarely meet the public purpose intended to be achieved by interpretative process. We really do not see that by issuing the directions contained in Clause (2) of Paragraph 31 of Prakash Singh''s case (supra), the Supreme Court intended to quash and/or judicially repeal the provisions of the statutory rules in relation to superannuation of the members of the Police Force.
36. We would clarify it without leaving a room for doubt that our discussion should not be understood, even remotely to have suggested that the directions of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) are directory and it was optional for the State to comply or not with those directions. The State was expected to do everything in its power and authority to comply with the directions. We have referred to the concept of harmonious construction and doctrine of creative interpretation only for harmonizing the conflicting interpretations of the directions of the Supreme Court and the Rules submitted before us. For instance, by way of harmonizing the Rule that an Officer should retire at a certain age and direction that he should have a tenure of two years if appointed as a Director General and Inspector General of Police, it was suggested that compliance to the direction regarding the tenure of two years indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court could be ensured even till the laws were accordingly amended, by selecting a candidate who was otherwise meritorious to be appointed to that post and preferably for a tenure of two years.
37. In the case of
38. Furthermore, in the case of
39. In the case of
40. One of the most important judgments on the subject, which in our view would have considerable bearing on the issue under discussion, is in the case of
47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent "clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice". It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of court case by suspending his licence to practice, a power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to be litigating parties.
48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice "between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by "ironing out the creases" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling .It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a lawmaker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling .It is a" problem solver in the nebulous areas" (See
49. In
23. The amplitude of powers available to this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is normally speaking not conditioned by any statutory provision but it cannot be lost sight of that this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution with a view to do justice between the parties but not in disregard of the relevant statutory provisions.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
55. Thus, a careful reading of the judgments in
56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case, A.R. Antulay case and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. Case go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case. It is one thing to say that "prohibitions or limitations in a statute" cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending "cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This Court did not say so in Union Carbide case either expressly or by implication and on the contrary it has been held that the Apex Court will take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishra case that the law laid down by the majority in Prem Chand Garg case is "no longer a good law".
57. In a given case, an advocate found guilty of committing contempt of court may also be guilty of committing "professional misconduct", depending upon the gravity or nature of his contumacious conduct, but the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different forums by following separate and distinct procedures. The power to punish an advocate by suspending his licence or by removal of his name from the roll of the State Bar Council for proven professional misconduct vests exclusively in the statutory authorities created under the Advocates Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of court vests exclusively in the courts.
58. After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, exclusive power for punishing an advocate for "professional misconduct" has been conferred on the State Bar Council concerned and the Bar Council of India. That Act contains a detailed and complete mechanism for suspending or revoking the licence of an advocate for his "professional misconduct". Since the suspension or revocation of licence of an advocate has not only civil consequences but also penal consequences, the punishment being in the nature of penalty, the provisions have to be strictly construed. Punishment by way of suspending the licence of an advocate can only be imposed by the competent statutory body after the charge is established against the advocate in a manner prescribed by the Act and the rules framed thereunder.
41. The above law enunciated by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court thus leaves no room for doubt that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution and its inherent jurisdiction cannot be encroached upon even by legislative process and the directions issued by the Supreme Court are binding and every authority of the State is expected to carry out those directions mandatorily. The directions in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) are mandatory and the State is expected to comply with them in their entirety and should and ought to have done everything in its power and authority to comply with all the directions or at least substantially. The State Government as well as the Union moved the Supreme Court after a considerable delay and the Review Application filed by the State of Maharashtra was dismissed on 23rd May, 2007, whereafter a compliance report was also filed. But as stated earlier the Supreme Court vide its order dated 16th May, 2008 had appointed Committee headed by Justice Thomas. We may also notice here that it was also pointed out on behalf of the parties that in terms of the order of the Supreme Court dated 16th May, 2008, the directions contained in Prakash Singh''s case stood diluted to implement the directions in their entirety. This argument is without any merit inasmuch as the Supreme Court, of course, has appointed Committee headed by Justice Thomas to look into certain difficulties but so far the directions of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh have not been modified and altered neither any State or the Union Government has been granted leave to ignore the said directions.
42. Unless there was specific order of the Court directing that the law in existence should be ignored or the Court has directly set aside such law, it may not be appropriate to read the directions of the Supreme Court in violation of the statutory law. Of course, such a situation may be permissible if there is explicit directives of the Supreme Court to that extent. We, in no way, find it difficult to harmonize and read the directions of the Supreme Court in conjunction with the statutory provisions while ensuring that no absurd or unjust or repugnant result is followed from such interpretation. The concept of` value based interpretation'' would also aid such an approach inasmuch as apparently there is some uncertainty over the application of the directions and statutory provisions. This doctrine is helpful in a situation where it is difficult to clearly determine the legislative intent and purposive approach is not of a great help. Legal thinkers have also opined that the` value based interpretation'' shifts the power to create laws away from Parliament and onto the judiciary and this principle of interpretation has been equated to the golden rule of avoiding absurd, unjust or repugnant result. ( Professor John Burrows "The changing Approach to the Interpretation of Statutes" Roles & Perspective in the law, referred in `Trends in Statutory Interpretation and The Judicial Process. Ref: Victoria University of Wellington Law Review.) It is always possible and permissible to read the judge made law in consonance with the statutory law while avoiding patent conflict.
43. To reiterate, we could state the position that the directions of the Supreme Court are mandatory. They have to be read and construed in harmony with the statutory law except where there is explicit direction of the Court setting aside such law or directing to ignore statutory provisions. In the present case, undoubtedly, the State Government and the concerned authorities have not acted in accordance with the directions contained in Clause (2) of paragraph 31 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case (supra). In fact, they have acted in flagrant violation to the said dictum. The State or the Union have not amended their laws and the State Government has not even constituted the State Security Commission in furtherance to the directions of the Supreme Court. Thus, the entire process contemplated under the directions has been utterly ignored by the State and its Authority.
44. As far as appointment in accordance with various provisions of the Statutes and particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 read with Section 30 of the Bombay Police Manual, 1959, the State Government is empowered to make appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police as well as to the Additional Director Generals. It is not even the case of the State in its reply affidavit that the State made the appointment as per any specific law or even established practice and norms in consonance with law. It appears that the State has made appointment of Respondent No. 3 as Director General of Police, Maharashtra, as contained in its file. None of the parties have brought to our notice any provision of law or manual under which it is provided as to how the appointments are to be made to the post of Director General of Police. As there was no specific law in force in that behalf, it would have been more appropriate for the State to completely follow the directions of the Supreme Court they being mandatory. One aspect which needs to be examined is for appointment of the Superintendent, Additional, Assistant and Deputy Superintendents of Police and Director of Police Wireless and of Superintendent, Assistant and Deputy Superintendents for Wireless System in that Department. Sections 8 and 8A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 provide methodology for appointment to these posts. Regulation 3 of The Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations 1955 provides for constitution of a committee to make selection to State Cadre. Chief Secretary, Secretary, Director General and Inspector General of Police and other officers stated in that Regulations are to be members of the committee which is to prepare a list of suitable officers who will be appointed to the State Police Services and even to the Indian Police Services by the Central Government in terms of Regulations 5 to 9 of the said Regulations in consultation with the State Commission Thus, a clear procedure is provided for appointment to these posts. The petitioners have contended that the appointment has been made by the Home Department in the normal course. However, no committee was constituted and after the file was initiated by the Home Department finally the appointment was made. This entire process per se may not be illegal as seen from the point of view of the statutory provisions still the process was arbitrary and it suffers from such other infirmities in the decision making process which would vitiate the decision making process and the decision as well. Whether the process of selection appointing Shri A.N. Roy as Director General and Inspector General of Police is arbitrary and discriminatory violating Constitutional Protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India ?
45. In order to examine whether the decision of the Government in appointing Shri A.N. Roy is arbitrary or discriminatory, the Court would have to necessarily examine various facets of this case. What is contained in the Government file has already been noticed by us in some details. It was well known fact that Shri Pasricha, the incumbent of post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, was to superannuate on 29th February, 2008. In fact, he was an officer who had been granted extension by the State Government which came to be challenged before this Court in a Writ Petition in the case of
3. Taking into account the aforesaid circumstances, the Government has to take decision in respect of the following things :1) To obtain information from the Government of Punjab in respect of detention of Shri Virk in the custody for more than 48 hours and to take further action accordingly in respect of him. 2) If Shri Virk has been detained in custody for more than 48 hours, he will be placed under suspension and one post of the rank of the Director General shall remain vacant. In such event, to hold meeting of the Selection Committee to give promotion to the post of the rank of the Director General. 3) To issue an order as to which officers should be given posting on the 4 posts of the rank of the Directors General, are 1) Director General of Police, 2) Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, 3) Commandant General, Home Guards and 4) Managing Director, Police Housing Corporation.
46. On this note, without appointing any Selection Committee and without calling for the explanatory advise of the Central Government, the Deputy Chief Minister with Home portfolio passed the following order:
In order to maintain law and order properly in the State, appointment of Shri Roy to the post of Director General of Police and of Shri Gafoor to the post of Commissioner of Police of Mumbai should be made. Rest should be resubmitted.
47. This order was approved by the Chief Minister on that very date i.e. 29th February, 2008 resultant to which, Shri A.N. Roy was appointed as Director General and Inspector General of Police of the State of Maharashtra. The post of Director General and Inspector General of Police of State of Maharashtra is the highest post in the hierarchy of the State Police. It is expected that while making appointment to such a coveted position, the State Administration would act fairly and transparently. Fairness is a settled canon, not only of law but of administrative functioning as well. In the modern times, the concept of good governance and transparency in State action are the essential features of Constitutional scheme. It sufficiently indicates that" value based "approach can legitimately be applied to the process of interpretation in such a situation.
48. These accepted Constitutional commands are required to be followed by all Executives as well as other Authorities which are exercising the powers under the State Administration. Admittedly neither Selection Committee meeting was held for taking decision on three points as requested by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) nor the advice of the Central Government was called for. In the entire file produced before us, there is no reference to any provision of law, manual, judgment of the Supreme Court or the methodology which is expected to be adopted in making the appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police in a most fair and transparent manner. What compelled the Authorities to take such a hasty decision and why the file itself was initiated just at the nick of the time are the questions which remain unanswered by the State. The order passed by the Deputy Chief Minister that `in order to maintain law and order properly, Shri A.N. Roy should be appointed to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police would hardly be a reason which can justify exclusion of other officers who are admittedly senior to Shri A.N. Roy. It is a selection post and we are quite aware of the situation that in selection post, discretion is left with the Competent Authority to make a choice on merits. Even in the case of Prakash Singh (supra), the Supreme Court had clearly stated that a person with meritorious records should be selected for being appointed to the post of Chief Police Officer of the State and the procedure should be transparent. Even in the case of
49. Comparative merit is one of the recognized precepts of making appointment on the basis of meritcumseniority. As early as in the case of
50. Arbitrariness in a State action can be demonstrated by existence of different circumstances. Whenever the decision making process and the decision taken both are on consideration of irrelevant facts while ignoring relevant considerations, such an action can normally be termed as arbitrary. Where the note is valid but proper reasoning is not recorded for arriving at a conclusion, the action may still fall in that category. Of course, such reasoning is not to be examined by the High Court as an appellate authority but existence of proper reasoning for taking such an important decision would be a condition precedent for rejecting the contention of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A Division Bench of this Court in
6.5 .... However, with the passage of time, the law developed so as to make the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution applicable to the matters of contract. Referring to the contractual policy of the State, the Supreme Court in the case of
51. The reasons recorded during the decision making process should not only show the application of mind but the reasons so recorded should have appropriate nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The averment that `in order to maintain law and order properly, the appointment should be made'' does not directly or indirectly suggest that Shri A.N. Roy was a more meritorious person than the other eligible aspirants. In fact, the order is so cryptic that it does not even say as to how the appointing authority in the State Government came to the conclusion that Shri A.N. Roy is the most appropriate and befitting person to hold the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police of the State.
52. Rationality, reasonableness, objectivity and application of mind are some of the prerequisites of proper decision by the State. It will be more so when the decision is in relation to a very vital facets of the State administration and is likely to affect morale of the police force and public confidence. The concept of transparency in such a decision making process, which is now an accepted judicial norm, is indicative of the fact that the decision making process and the decision of the Government should be free of favouritism, arbitrariness and the decision should not have been taken for irrelevant considerations. Maintenance of law and order is a primary duty of the police force and it could hardly be said that with reference to comparative merit and outstanding qualities of a candidate with due consideration of his length of service, good record, range of experience, a decision, which will be unquestionable, could be taken. According to the State and as stated in their reply affidavit ,there are four posts of Director General in the State administration and all the incumbents were holding one or the other of such posts except Shri Virk, who at the relevant time was awaiting the post and, as already noticed, was subsequently appointed as Director General of Police and Vice Chairman and Managing Director, Maharashtra Police Housing Corporation. In other words, all the aspirants were holding the post of Director General and one of them had to be nominated as Director General Inspector General of Police of State of Maharashtra. Thus, it was a matter of concern and proper examination by the concerned authorities.
53. A Circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India dated 15th January 1999 has also been brought to our notice. In this Circular, the Ministry has spelt out various principles regarding promotion of members of Indian Police Force in the State cadre. We may notice that Clauses (B) and (C) of Principle IV of the said Circular provides for zone of consideration and method of selection. In terms of Clause IV(A), a Screening Committee is to be constituted for promotion of an officer to the grade of Director General as well as Additional Director General of Police and it should consist of (i) Chief Secretary, (ii) one non IPS officer of the rank of Chief Secretary and working in the State Government, (iii) Director General of Police and (iv) an additional member in case there is a senior officer available who is holding independent charge of Home Secretary. This Committee is expected to screen the candidates and prepare a panel which then is to be placed before the Competent Authority. The empanelment is to be prepared batch wise. Even this procedure has not been followed in the present case and the candidates who were holding very responsible posts were not objectively considered at any stage by the Screening Committee and then by the appointment Authority at any relevant point of time. Absence of proper compliance to the established guidelines, norms and the law in force, would result in terming the decision as arbitrary more particularly when irrelevant matters have been taken into consideration and relevant matters did not receive proper consideration at the hands of the concerned authorities.
54. It will also be useful to make a reference to Clause IV (C) where method of selection to the post of Director General of Police is stated to be based on merit with due regard to seniority as provided in Sub-rule (2A) of Rule 3 of the Indian Police Service (Pay) Rules, 1954. In terms thereof, appointment to the Selection Grade and to posts carrying pay above the Time Scale of pay in the Indian Police Service is to be made by selection on merit with due regard to seniority. In other words, seniority being relevant consideration, the determinative factor has to be merit. Thus, the record essentially must state that the Screening Committee and/or the Competent Authority making appointment has applied its mind for picking up the most meritorious candidate keeping in view the settled parameters of selection by `meritcumseniority'' as known to service jurisprudence and the relevant rules.
55. The consideration of eligible candidates falling within the zone of consideration does not bring an end to the responsibility of the authorities as there action has to be fair in contradistinction to arbitrary. The concept of fairness would take in its ambit the matter of consideration for promotion or selection as every eligible and suitable person has a right of consideration. Consideration for promotion is a matter of considerable importance in service jurisprudence as it deals with fairness in the matter of consideration for promotion under Article 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, inter alia, stated this principle in the case of
(1) Under Article 16 of the Constitution, right to be "considered" for promotion is a fundamental right. It is not the mere "consideration" for promotion that is important but the "consideration" must be "fair" according to established principles governing service jurisprudence.
(2) Courts will not interfere with assessment made by DPCs unless the aggrieved officer establishes that the nonpromotion was bad according to Wednesbury principles or was mala fide.
56. In the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra), this Court while commenting upon the nature and consequences of arbitrary action in such appointment and vital decision of the Government held as under:
38. .... In the decision making process by the respondents, no nexus is made out between the decision and the object of the relevant Rules. Exercise of general discretion under a residuary power vests the Government with wide discretion but equally places a higher responsibility upon the concerned authorities to exercise such discretion cautiously for valid reasons and its decision making process should be free from element of arbitrariness and discrimination. It essentially must be in the larger public interest...
39. It is obligatory upon the State to show that the decision is in larger public interest and it cannot take up the plea that it is not prejudicial to the public interest. The decision making process should ex facie reflect the application of unbiased mind for some good reasons which are intended to achieve the larger public interest in contradistinction to providing for limited interest....
(Emphasis supplied.)
57. In a very recent judgment of Goa Bench of this Court in the case of Adv. Aires Rodrigues v. The State of Goa and Ors. PIL Writ Petition No. 05 of 2007 delivered on 22nd January 2009, a Division Bench while discussing the impact of arbitrary State action relating to appointment of Parliament Secretaries in the rank and status of a Cabinet Minister in violation to the scope of Article 164(1A) of the Constitution held as under:
54. We have already discussed the scope of judicial review above. The Judicial review of Executive and Administrative action is permissible. This power of judicial review of course, has to be exercised within the framework of law and settled principles. Every State action may not fall within the ambit of judicial review but wherever the action of the State is arbitrary or unconstitutional, the power of judicial review of the court can be invoked. The expression "arbitrarily" means "in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, nonrational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.
55. Wherever the validity of the State action is questioned on the ground of constitutionality, the Court normally would not decline to interfere in the case on the ground that such case would fall beyond the circumscribed limit of judicial review. Policy decisions of the State are outside the scope of judicial review except when such policy decisions again are arbitrary, irrational, opposed to Constitutional provisions or are contrary to law.
56. In the case of
57. In the present case, the challenge to the State action in appointing the respondent Nos. 2,4 and 5 to 7 is founded on the plea that the same is violative of Constitutional provisions and is so arbitrary that it opposes the public policy. The act is a colourable exercise of power. It is also challenged on the ground that the decision even if treated as policy decision is motivated to frustrate the constitutional mandate and as such is an action void ab initio.
58. The learned Counsel appearing for the parties including the learned Advocate General attempted to argue that the guidelines stated in the Circular dated 15th January 1999 have no application to the present case as they primarily deal with selection to Time Scale. This argument is without any substance. Firstly, the letter issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home, New Delhi clearly states, "In order to ensure uniformity of procedure in the matter of appointment and promotion to various grades in the Indian Police in all State Cadres in the country, it would be desirable to adhere to the revised guidelines and follow and impose stricter standards of selection as envisages in the revised guidelines." Furthermore, besides the fact that Guideline IV (A) (ii) provides for constitution of Screening Committee for promotion of an Officer to the grade of Director General as well as Additional Director General, it refers to method of selection, zone of consideration and the period of validity of the panel. It is true that this Circular primarily refers to grant of Selection Grade and Time Scale, but at the end the letter clearly says that general principles for promotion would be as stated in the Annexure. Annexure to this Circular dated 15th January 1999 spells out the mode of selection and promotion as well as the functions of the Screening Committee. It specifically says that it should be ensured while making promotions that suitability of the candidates for promotion is considered in an objective and impartial manner. It not only refers to promotion but even confirmation and assessment of work, refers to consideration of Officers on deputation, functions of the Committee, preparation of year wise panel, procedure to be followed in relation to the Officers under cloud and following sealed cover procedure. Thus, in our view, these guidelines are a clear indicator as to how the promotions should be made to the post of Director General. Even if we were to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties that the Instructions have no application to the present case and they are only restricted to grant of Time Scale and Selection Grade, etc., even then it is a significant pointer that if for the grant of Selection or Time Scale such stringent procedure is to be followed and objective and impartial selection is required, then what should be the expected standards and method of selection for appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, the highest post in the State. Either way, it is necessary to follow the prescribed procedure and in absence thereof, just, fair, impartial and objective procedure must be followed
59. The above analysis of factual matrix and legal principles aforestated, lead us primarily to one conclusion that the cases of all the eligible officers already holding the rank of Director General were not considered by the Competent Authority in proper perspective and in consonance with settled norms and guidelines. The entire process of consideration and ultimate result thereof is in complete contradiction to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). In fact, the entire process of selection can hardly be supported by law in force and suffers from basic infirmities like arbitrariness, lack of objectivity and decision being founded on irrelevant considerations. Zone of consideration and relevancy of suspension of Shri Virk on the decision making process and decision to appoint Shri Roy to the post of Director General of Police.
60. As far as zone of consideration for appointment to the post of Director General of Police is concerned, there is no specific Rule that has been brought to the notice of the Court clearly stating as to how many candidates can be considered by the Competent Authority while making appointment to the post of Director General of Police. With reference to Prakash Singh''s case (supra), it was argued that three seniormost Officers have to be considered and as the State Government has considered four seniormost Officers, the appointment of Shri Roy, who was junior most ,is liable to be set aside being beyond the zone of consideration. The inter se seniority in the Maharashtra cadre of the persons who were already holding the rank of Director General of Police is as under:
61. We have already noticed that the judgment of Prakash Singh (supra) specifically contemplates empanelment by Union Public Service Commission and out of that panel, three seniormost Officers are to be considered by the State administration for appointment to the post of Director General of Police. It is not in the discretion of the State to pick up all three senior Officers in the State cadre of IPS who have not been empaneled by the Union Public Service Commission. The plausible reasoning behind such empanelment could be that the seniormost Officers in the State cadre of IPS may not necessarily be the best thus not empaneled by the Union Public Service Commission as fit for appointment to the post of Director General of Police. The Union Public Service Commission may pick up any of the three Officers from the seniority list of the State depending on the three factors indicated in the judgment of Prakash Singh (supra). According to the learned Advocate General, State had picked up three seniormost Officers for consideration and then had appointed Shri Roy to the said post. According to him, it neither violates the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) nor any other law as it is in the discretion of the State to consider the candidates and make appointment on merit. The learned Advocate General also sought to buttress the submission that the four senior most Officers were holding the post of Director General and Shri Roy being one of them has been appointed to the post of Director General of Police Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra.
62. Once there is no specific rule specifying Zone of Consideration, in that event, the Appointment Authority can exercise its discretion only by acting reasonably. The noting in the file does indicate that four persons were sought to be considered for the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police including Shri Virk, which means that the State has considered four senior most officers, three of whom were already holding the post of Director General. Even the instructions issued by the Government of India dated 15th January 1999 refer to the zone of Consideration and the same does not specify any number of Officers. On the contrary, it says that Zone of Consideration for promotion to various grades would be depending upon the availability of posts and fixes the years of service for promotion or appointment to a particular post. For the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, the officers who have put in 30 years of service were to be considered for promotion to the said post. All the four officers who were sought to be considered by the State thus would fall within the Zone of Consideration inasmuch as they all had put in 30 years of service in February 2008 when the appointment of Shri A.N. Roy was made. The purpose of specifying Zone of Consideration is to pick up the best person available on the basis of seniority cum merit and to avoid consideration of all eligible persons, which may be a large number of persons, for appointment to such a senior post.
63. In the case of
64. In the case of
We proceed to consider the next contention of Mr N C Chatterjee that in the absence of any statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts the government cannot issue administrative instructions and such administrative instructions cannot impose any restrictions not found in the Rules already framed. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. It is true that there is no specific provision in the Rules laying down, the principle of promotion of junior or senior grade officers to selection grade posts. But that does not mean that till statutory rules are framed in this behalf the government cannot issue administrative instructions regarding the principle to be followed in promotions of the officers concerned to the selection grade posts. It is true that government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point government can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed.
(Emphasis supplied)
65. In the case of
20. In the case before us, zone has been restricted by prescribing that out of the total number of candidates who satisfy the eligibility requirement, the zone of consideration will be limited to a multiple of 3 to 5 times of the number of vacancies and the persons to be considered will be determined on the basis of their seniority in the combined seniority list. It appears to us that there is nothing unreasonable in this restriction. It was open to the Delhi High Court to restrict the zone of consideration in any reasonable manner and limiting the zone of consideration to a multiple of the number of vacancies and basing it on seniority according to the combined seniority list, in our view, cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious or mala fide.
(Emphasis supplied)
66. In the case of
67. If we analyse the above principles stated in different judicial pronouncements, it can safely be stated that unless and until the field is controlled by a statutory provisions specifying the zone of consideration, the Competent Authority can adopt a reasonable, just and fair approach even in the field of formation of zone of consideration. We have already noticed that, in the present case, no rule or law has been brought to our notice which specifies the zone of consideration except in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) where out of the eligible officers, empanelment for the post of Director General has to be effected by the Union Public Service Commission and out of the officers so empaneled, the State was to consider three seniormost Officers. This process never commenced in the present case. According to the State, the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Maharashtra State, Director General of Police, Home Guards, Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau and Director General of Police, Maharashtra State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation Limited, are the post of same rank, status and pay. Shri Virk was given posting of Director General of Police, Maharashtra State Police Housing and Welfare Corporation at a subsequent stage which he accepted without protest and they had considered first three seniormost officers excluding Shri Virk. This stand of the State is factually incorrect. In face of its file, we find that actually Shri Virk''s name was also considered, but ultimately Shri Roy was appointed to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, Maharashtra State as noticed above. Thus, in fact, the State has considered four seniormost Officers. We are really not able to understand why the State has taken the stand of considering first three seniormost Officers as no rigid statutory zone of consideration has been provided and it certainly lie in the discretion of the competent authority to consider such number of officers which was otherwise reasonable, just and fair as held in the case of C Dinkar (supra). Such decision, if is not arbitrary and not in colourable exercise of powers would hardly invite judicial chastisement. Keeping in view the fact that the zone of consideration spelt out in the Notification does not specify number of seniormost officers to be included in the zone of consideration, we are not able to understand where the State or even other parties to the Petitions got the magic figure of three seniormost officers. This expression only appears in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) in the direction contained in Clause 31(2). It is undisputed case before us that empanelment of eligible Officers by the Union Public Service Commission was never done, the State even did not request the Commission for the same and, therefore, the question of picking up three seniormost officers out of the empaneled officers never arose. It is a legitimate right of an eligible officer to be considered for higher post, whether it be by promotion or selection. The principal of legitimate expectancy would apply to the candidate''s right for being considered for promotion. In the case of
68. We have already referred amongst others to the case of Sangram Keshari Nayak (supra) where the Supreme Court stated that right to be considered even for promotion is a fundamental right. An employee does not lose the right of being considered merely because he is under suspension or that departmental proceeding has commenced against him in accordance with law. In the case of
69. Now we will refer to the aspect of suspension of Shri Virk and its effect on the merits of the case. From the record it appears that the departmental proceedings were contemplated against Shri Virk while he was holding the post of Director General of Police, Punjab at Chandiragh. The authorities concerned issued an order placing Shri Virk under suspension on 4th April 2007. Thereafter, he was repatriated to his parent cadre in the State of Maharashtra on 10th April 2007 and was permitted to join on 27th April 2007. However, he was compulsorily awaiting his posting. An FIR was registered against Shri Virk on 8th September 2007 at Police Station, Mohali in regard to disproportionate assets and it is claimed that he was arrested on 9th September 2007 and remained in the police custody till 12th September 2007 and was granted bail on 15th September 2007. On 20th April 2007, the Article of Charges were served by the State of Punjab upon Shri Virk.
70. While relying upon Rule 3(2) of All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, it is stated that Shri Virk would be deemed to have been suspended as he was in police custody for a period in excess of 48 hours. This deemed suspension was spelt out by the State of Punjab vide its order dated 25th February 2008 wherein it was stated that Shri S.S. Virk, IPS, Former Director General of Police of Punjab is deemed to be under suspension with effect from his date of arrest, viz. 9th September 2007 till the termination of all proceedings in terms of Rule 3(3) of All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969. In other words, according to the learned Advocate General appearing for the State of Maharashtra, right from 4th April 2007 Shri Virk remained under suspension at all relevant points of time and the order dated 25th February, 2008 has not been revoked and in any case, was in force on 29th February, 2008.
71. It is the contention on behalf of Shri Virk and even of other Respondents, except the State and Shri Roy, that the suspension order dated 4th April, 2007 was quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal at Chandigarh in O.A. No. 692/2007. The correctness of the said order was questioned before the High Court which stayed the operation of the order of the Administrative Tribunal, vide its order dated 25th April 2008, the correctness or otherwise of which was assailed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, finally, vide its order dated 16th May 2008, took notice of the fact that the Union Government, vide its letter dated 10th April 2007 had repatriated him to the State of Maharashtra and order dated 4th April 2007 was quashed by the Tribunal and finally, the Supreme Court directed that the interim order passed by the High Court dated 25th April 2008 in Civil Writ Petition No. 6821 of 2008 required modification to the extent that it will be open to the State Government to give posting to Shri Virk on his repatriation to the State of Maharashtra from the State of Punjab. With this modification, the interim order passed by the High Court was modified. It is also stated that as far as arrest of Shri Virk on 9th September, 2007 is concerned, Shri Virk had filed criminal writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Vide order dated 17.1.2008 in Misc. Application No. 54610M/ 07, the court held that the arrest was illegal and also doubted the manner in which the investigation was conducted. Thus, while setting aside the investigation, the court had declined to quash the FIR and held that it was the duty of the court to ensure that the Government agencies do their duty without any bias, malafides and strictly in conformity with law and further observed that the First Information Report registered against the petitioner clearly spelt out that it was registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act and such routine matters should not be investigated through the Central Bureau of Investigation and finally directed that the investigation of the FIR shall be conducted afresh by a special team to be appointed by the Chief Secretary of the State of Punjab which had to conclude the investigation expeditiously. It is also pointed out that in terms of Rule 3 aforereferred, the suspension orders automatically came to an end and they cannot remain in force indefinitely as such the suspension orders had come to an end on the date of consideration for the post of Director General of Police as the arrest of Shri Virk was held to be illegal and as such he ought to have been considered and not ignored by the respondents on the basis of these facts.
72. It must be noticed that the matter is still pending final determination before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh in relation to the suspension and other ancillary departmental proceeding/matters while the matter in relation to registration of FIR is pending investigation before the investigating agency as well as before the competent Court. As the matters in relation to suspension as well as registration of FIR are pending before the competent court/forum, it is not for this Court to enter upon any of the findings recorded in those proceedings directly or indirectly. Firstly, this Court has no jurisdiction to enter upon the merit or demerit of the contentions being raised in relation to suspension and registration of case against Shri Virk. Secondly, it will hardly be advisable for this Court to heavily rely upon any of the orders passed by those forums/courts particularly when they have not attained finality and are presently pending at the stage of investigation before the authorities or hearing before the courts. Thus, we decline to comment upon any of these circumstances except to the extent they have relevancy to the matter in issue before us.
73. The post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, strictly may not be treated as a promotional post. Various judgments of the Supreme Court aforereferred indicate that the post of Chief Police Officer of the State (Director General and Inspector General of Police) is a post to which selection should be made on merit and upon proper consideration of all the relevant factors. Even in the case of Manas Chakraborty (supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 framed a question whether the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police was or was not a promotional post. This question was answered by holding that it was a post to be filled on merit by selection on merit cum seniority of the most suitable candidate and not merely on the basis of seniority. Even in the case of Prakash Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the most meritorious officer out of the three senior most officers empaneled by the Union Public Service Commission should be appointed by the State. In other words, it is a post which has to be filled by selection on the basis of meritcumseniority. As far as the present case is concerned, we may also notice that the Central Government vide its letter dated 10th April, 2007 had directed repatriation of Shri Virk in Maharashtra Cadre. This decision was again reiterated vide its letter dated 11th March 2008 where it was stated that the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet had clarified the status of Shri Virk that his suspension would not be altered nor would have any effect on the proceedings taken against the order and his premature repatriation to Maharashtra cadre was reaffirmed. Lastly, vide letter dated 8th June 2008, which was produced by the learned Additional Solicitor General during the course of hearing, the controversy as regards to who is the Competent Authority to take disciplinary proceedings for alleged misconduct against the said officer had been put to rest by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi and the said letter reads as under:
Subject : Departmental action against Shri S.S. Virk, IPS (MH.70).
Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter No. 2/60/20073H(1)/13810, dated 7th June, 2008 on the subject mentioned above and to state that Rule 7(1)(b)(1) of AIS (D&A) Rules, 1969 states that the authority to institute proceedings and to impose penalty 0 where a member of the Service has committed any act or omission which renders him liable to any penalty specified in Rule 6 of rules ibid - while he was serving in connection with the affairs of a State - will be the Government of that State.
2. Since the acts of misconduct were committed by Shri S.S. Virk, IPS (MH:70) while he was working on connection with affairs of the Government of Punjab, it is for the State Government to probe further into these misconducts and on finding cogent evidence, initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. Yours faithfully,
Sd/- (K. Natarajan )Under Secretary to the Government of India
74. Another contention which has been raised as an ancillary issue before us is as regards to following of sealed cover procedure. At the cost of repetition, we must notice that even if the departmental proceedings against Shri Virk were pending, Shri Virk at no point of time has challenged the appointment of Shri Roy in his own proceedings. He is a mere intervenor in the present Writ Petitions and thus, his entire case has to be examined only from that point of view. Since he was actually considered by the authorities concerned, this issue hardly survives but we may notice that in terms of the circular of the Ministry of Home, Government of India dated 15th January 1999 under Clause 21 even the procedure of sealed cover could have been adopted by the authorities. The general principle of law is that the departmental proceedings commences against an officer when charge sheet is served upon him unless the Rule specifically provide to the contrary and the Competent Authority can adopt recourse to sealed cover procedure for consideration of the delinquent Officer whether the promotion is by seniority or meritcumseniority. It may equally be true where promotions are made by selection. Reference in this regard can be made to the case of
75. We have already noticed that we have neither jurisdiction nor are called upon to decide any of the controversies in relation to the departmental proceedings and criminal investigation which are stated to be pending against Shri Virk. The only question that is of some relevancy in the present Writ Petitions which was argued with some vehemence by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, is whether the order of suspension had come to an end or whether despite the order of suspension name of Shri Virk ought to have been considered for appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra. The learned Counsel appearing for the other respondents further laid emphasis that since Shri Virk was entitled to be considered, being the seniormost officer and the zone of consideration being the three seniormost officers, Shri Roy could not have been considered. As far as the matter in relation to zone of consideration is concerned, we have already discussed it at some length and have declined to accept this contention. Furthermore, the entire arguments relating to suspension order, its extension and the automatic termination of the order of suspension by virtue of the provisions referred above, loses all its significance as we have already seen from the original records that the name of Shri Virk was actually considered by the competent authority while appointing Shri Roy to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra. The entire noting sheet specifically and in great detail refers to Shri Virk. Whether the entire consideration is proper or improper and consideration of all the candidates, including Shri Virk, is a matter which we have dealt with in great detail above and have found that the consideration is improper, unfair and suffers from the vice of arbitrariness.
Conclusions
76. The judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal has been impugned by the parties before us on different grounds but there are certain salient and significant errors which we find apparent on the face of the judgment and record. Therefore it will be useful to notice them concisely at this stage itself.
(a) The entire judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal is based on the grievance which could appropriately be raised by Shri Virk. The Tribunal has laid emphasis on various orders passed in the cases of Shri Virk by different Tribunals and/or Courts, though Shri Virk had neither challenged the appointment of Shri Roy to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police in any of the proceedings in his own right nor was be impleaded as a party to the original Application decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears and we are of the considered view that Shri Virk was, if not a necessary party, but certainly was a proper party before the Tribunal as his presence before the Court would have helped to completely and effectively decide the issues in question.
(b) The learned Tribunal placed undue emphasis on the setting aside of the order of suspension and holding that the arrest of Shri Virk was illegal on 9th September 2007 in face of the fact that the departmental proceedings as well as the investigation were still pending before the appropriate forum, Tribunals and the Courts. The Tribunal, in our view, erred in holding that the zone of consideration was three without reference to any Rule, Notification or Guideline. The judgment of the Tribunal solely founded on the finding that the zone of consideration was three and Shri Roy being at No. 4, could not have been at all considered for appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, therefore is erroneous.
(c) The Tribunal also failed to take note of the fact that it was admitted case between the parties that the Union Public Service Commission had not empanelled any Maharashtra cadre Officer for appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra. In fact, the process in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra) had not been even initiated either by the State or by the Union Public Service Commission. The State could consider three senior officers in accordance with paragraph 31(2) of the directions of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) by picking up three seniormost Officers out of the list of Officers empanelled by the Union Public Service Commission. Once Union Public Service Commission has not empanelled any officer, the remaining process could hardly be concluded in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh (supra).
(d) It has been recorded in the judgment of the Tribunal that the original records pertaining to the selection made in the month of February 2008 were produced before it where it noticed that name of Shri Virk appeared in various notes in the proceedings preceding the date of selection but the Tribunal still proceeded to hold that Shri Virk was not considered for appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police. This finding at the face of it is erroneous inasmuch as all the officers were considered by the same note including Shri Virk, however, Shri A.N. Roy was appointed. As such, nowhere in the file it was recorded that the name of Shri Virk should be deleted. There is no doubt that Shri Virk was permitted to join Maharashtra Cadre subsequently even though departmental proceedings as well as criminal proceedings against him had not attained finality at the relevant date and even as of today. The file reflects that the names of all the four candidates were considered.
77. The learned Advocate General during the course of hearing on 2nd February, 2009 has fairly stated that correct stand of the State Government had been stated in its rejoinder in paragraph 26 and averments in the affidavit in the writ petition as well as reply before the Central Administrative Tribunal that Shri Virk was not considered at all, was factually incorrect. This itself has caused a factual error in the judgment of the Tribunal.
78. The stand of the Government that they have complied with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Singh (supra) is certainly without any merit. There being four posts in the rank of Director General of Police, obviously highest post is that of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra. It may be noted that the Gazette Notification issued by Ministry of Finance regarding implementation of Sixth Pay Commission specifies Apex Scale of Rs. 80,000/( Fixed) to one post of Director General of Police as head of the police force in each State. The Rules aforereferred by us also show that he is the person incharge of the entire police force in the State of Maharashtra. Even if the rank and status of the Director General of Police, Home Guards, Director General of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau and Director General of Police, Maharashtra State Police Housing & Welfare Corporation Limited and Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra were equal at the relevant time, still the status, rank and superiority of the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra as the Chief Police Officer of the State cannot be undermined. This appointment need to be made on merit and upon due and fair consideration of the eligible persons in accordance with law.
79. It is thus difficult for us to accept the reasoning recorded by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the impugned judgment, though we have arrived at the same conclusion but for different reasons.
80. Undoubtedly, the State is the competent authority and has the power to appoint an officer to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra. This power of wide magnitude and significance has to be exercised in consonance with law whether statutory and/or emerging from judicial pronouncement in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. The power of competent legislature under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India leads to enactment of statutory law. The decisions of the court could not be read as statutory enactments. In the present times, jurisprudential question whether the function of the court and Judges are only to interprete law and make declaration to that effect and not to make laws has often been the subject matter of discussion. In
81. Where the Supreme Court issues directions in exercise of its powers under Articles 32 and 141 of the Constitution of India, besides it being a law binding on courts, the State and all its authorities and instrumentalities are expected to abide by and obey the same as law of the land. Having examined the gravity of the problem prevalent in functioning of the police in various States and with the object of providing an aid for preserving and strengthening the rule of law, introducing reforms in police set up in the country and to ensure transparency and fairness in appointment to the high ranks in the police hierarchy, the Supreme Court issued mandatory directions in the case of Prakash Singh (supra). It is unfortunate that neither the State of Maharashtra nor Union of India has amended its laws to bring them in conformity with the directions of the Supreme Court. No steps have been taken to implement guidelines which was the basic requirement in terms of the dictum of the Supreme Court. With reference to the present case, the State of Maharashtra, in fact, not even initiated the action to request the Union Public Service Commission to empanel the Officers of the Maharashtra cadre so as to exercise its authority to consider three senior most officers out of that panel and make appointment upon due consideration to the post of Director General and Inspector of General of Police, State of Maharashtra. The State has utterly failed in complying with the directions of the court which it ought not to have done. The power and obligation of the State to make appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police (Chief Police Officer of the State), thus provides a legitimate right to the eligible officers for being considered for appointment of that post. It would not be permissible for the State to disenfranchise any person eligible and entitled for consideration. The consideration by the State has to be just and fair. The power ought not to be exercised arbitrarily or in a colourable manner. The precepts of service jurisprudence sufficiently guide the administrative authorities to act fairly and make appointment to such high posts without violating the law and the rules. The Courts would ensure emphasize not on the content of the legal precept and the available remedy, but would concentrate on the effect of the precept when invoked and the efficiency of the available remedy to attain the ends for which the precept was devised. [Reference : Dean Pound, "Administrative Application of Legal Standards", e.f. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, (New Delhi: Universal Pub., (1921) 1995 at 73.]
82. The proponents of the theory of `practical reason'' persist that it is correct approach to be adopted in interpreting statute. `Practical reason'' as an approach to process of interpretation has been traced as more real and in line to the institutional relationship, rule of law virtues, social norms, efficiency and justice. Statutory construction is a nonmechanical exercise of practical reason involving text, history, purpose and background values. The applicability of practical reason to the present case as well as that of doctrine of creativity provides complete guide to the situation of the kind in the present case. The directions of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case would have to be read in conjunction and harmony with the statutory rules as they are not annulled or set aside expressly or impliedly.
83. The State Government had to adopt a fair process and finalise appointment to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra in consonance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case in accordance with the relevant rules and the process which was in conformity with the rule of fair play and transparency. The consideration contemplated in law is just and fair consideration and not a consideration which is a mere eyewash. The State Government has apparently and admittedly not followed the directions contained in Prakash Singh''s case for appointment to the post in question. It has also not adhered to the various rules aforeindicated as well as the circular issued by the Central Government dated 15th January 1999. As already discussed, the Instructions specifically apply to the promotion as well. The State Government has failed to act in accordance with law. The entire decision making process and decision has been taken with undue haste and not in conformity with the accepted administrative norms. The records produced before us clearly demonstrate that action of the State Government is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Decision of the then Deputy Chief Minister, incharge of Home portfolio reflects non-application of mind and the only reason stated in the note have no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The process adopted and even the final decision arrived at are not in conformity with law. The administration has taken note of irrelevant considerations while it has ignored the relevant parameters for appointment to coveted post. In fact, the process adopted by the State in the selection is opposed to the basic doctrine of equality and there has been no appropriate and effective consideration of the eligible Officers by the Competent Authority. No comparative merit is discussed; no plausible reason has been stated for preferring the selected candidate over the candidates ignored. Reasoning is the soul of the decision even in an administrative order of this nature.
84. The laws in force show that even for the post of the Superintendent of Police and/or Director (Wireless), the recommendatory Committee with the Chief Secretary and other higher Officers as its members is constituted to screen and recommend a panel of Officers to be appointed to that post. After such a Committee has prepared the panel, the Competent Authority in the State makes the appointment to the post. Higher the post greater is the responsibility on the State administration to make appointments with greater caution, fairness and transparency. Adopting a convenient and casual procedure for making appointment to such a high post or acting entirely on the premise of absolute discretion, unfounded on appropriate reasons and unconnected with any rationality would obviously render the action of the State as arbitrary. Though we have not accepted the contentions of the State that it was impracticable for the State to act in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court, still even if it is presumed for the sake of arguments that compliance with the directions of the Supreme Court in Prakash Singh''s case (supra) was not workable presently, in that event the State should have acted in accordance with the relevant provisions of Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, Bombay Police Manual, 1959 and the Bombay Police Act, 1951. Furthermore, even if the statutory provisions in regard to the method of appointment to the post in question were silent and not explicit on all aspects, still the State was expected and ought to have adopted a procedure of selection, which will be, if not identical, at least akin to the process of selection contemplated either in Prakash Singh'' s case (supra) or under the Rules. It was expected of the State to have constituted a High Power Committee at least to examine the contemporaneous service record of the eligible Officers and submit a report to the appointing authority in accordance with the Rules. Then the Competent Authority could consider same and take final decision with reference to the service record, length of service, meritorious performance, contribution and utility of the Officers to the Department and remaining tenure of service of the Officers along with other important aspects. It would have ensured lawful, fair and transparent process of consideration to all the eligible candidates. A comparative study of merit of the eligible Officers is an expected norm of administrative and service jurisprudence which would put the record straight in regard to the selection of best candidate to the post. The Courts in that event may not really examine the decision of selection as an appellate authority primarily for the reason that the decision making process would be in conformity with the statutory provisions, law of the land and in any case, basic rule of law. Proper application of mind in contrast to "no application of mind" is a sine qua non for taking proper and acceptable administrative or executive decision. Even if the State bona fide believed that there was no specific law in force to make appointments to the post of Director General of Police and that there was no prescribed procedure for such appointment, still it was obligatory on the State authorities to adopt mechanism which is just, fair, transparent and free from evil of arbitrariness.
85. As we have already noticed that the only reason stated in the note of the Deputy Chief Minister incharge of Home portfolio is "In order to maintain law and order properly in the State ...". This reason ex facie has no nexus to the concept of selection on merit. By this observation, we are not commenting upon the merit or otherwise of any candidate but are only concerned with the decision making process which is contrary to law and rudiments applicable to appointment by selection on merit. This process of selection has to be impartial and conducted with high sense of responsibility. There has to be objectivity in the decision making process and decision should be taken dispassionately.
86. Any new resolution or method adopted by the State should be such that at the end of it, it should neither result in prejudicial inconveniences nor violation of basic rule of law. The innovation of procedure should not result in patent arbitrariness. About law, it is said that reason is the soul of law and when reason of any particular law ceases so does the law itself. This maxim, to some extent, does extend to administrative and executive orders as well. However, for lack of reasoning or patent unsound reasoning, the orders per se do not cease to exist but they are open to challenge on that count alone. In the facts of the case, the State cannot take advantage of De Non Apparentibus ET Non Existent bus Eadem Est Ratio. The laws existed and it was for the State to show that they have acted in accordance with the statutory and/or Judge made law particularly when the fact that the State has acted contrary to law is hardly disputable.
87. Though we are unable to concur or endorse to the reasoning given by the Central Administrative Tribunal in the impugned judgment, however, for different reasons afore recorded, we arrive at the same conclusion. Though we discharge the Rule in both the Writ Petitions, we dispose of the Writ Petitions with the following order and directions:
(a) The order dated 29th February, 2008 appointing Shri A.N. Roy as Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, is hereby quashed.
(b) The State Government is directed to make appointment to the said post within a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this order in accordance with law and after taking into consideration the content of this judgment.
(c) We further mandate the State Government to take all steps within its competence and power to ensure compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court in the case of
(d) We further make it clear that in this judgment, we have not decided any issue directly or indirectly relating to merit or otherwise of a candidate who is eligible and entitled to be considered for the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, State of Maharashtra, in accordance with law. The State Government is free to make fresh appointment in its discretion but certainly, within the time and as per directions afore indicated.
88. Notices of Motion Nos. 519 of 2008 and 520 of 2008 are allowed and disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
