Nripendra Nath Basu Vs Kisen Bahadur

Guha, J.@mdashThis is an application for revision of an order convicting the Petitioner u/s 341 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to pay a fine of u/s 25, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two weeks. The facts are briefly as follows: From 2 to 6 p.m. one day the Petitioner resisted the complainant when the latter tried to take a lorry full of manure into his master''s garden where he used to work. It appears that the Petitioner along with others had trespassed into the garden about a month before the occurrence and had constructed huts there without the permission of the complainant''s master and there was criminal litigation going on over the matter. It has been found further that in spite of the occupation of the garden by the Petitioner and others the complainant''s master was still in possession of the garden.

2. It is contended by Mrs. Nag on behalf of the Petitioner that the conviction is bad on two grounds. Relying upon the case of In re Suba Row (1908) 8 Cri. 212, she contends that as no physical force was used there cannot be any wrongful restraint. Obstruction to be within the meaning of Section 339 must no doubt be physical obstruction although it may be caused as much by physical force as by the use of menaces and threats. So far as the offence u/s 339 or 341 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is determined more by the nature of the effect caused and not by the nature of the act which brought it about. In one case it was held that where the accused removed a ladder and thereby deterred a person on the roof of a house, the act amounted to obstruction within the meaning of Section 341. In re Telapolu Subbadu (1884) 1 Weir. 340. As in Sections 184, 224 and 225, Indian Penal Code, the word "obstruction" in Section 339 is used in a somewhat metaphorical sense. In the present case, on the facts found by the trial court, I am of opinion that there was obstruction within the meaning of Section 339, Indian Penal Code. The first objection is, therefore, overruled.

3. It is next contended by Mrs. Nag that the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 341 was bad in the present case, inasmuch as whatever obstruction there might be was not to a person but to a lorry and as Section 341 requires that there would be wrongful restraint to a person the Petitioner cannot be deemed in the circumstances of the present case to have committed an offence u/s 341. So far as this objection is concerned, it may be observed that there are two lines of cases. According to one view, there will be no offence u/s 341 in circumstances like these and in this connection reference may be made to the cases of Emperor v. Rama Lata (1912) 19 Ind. Cas. 177; In re Venkataramiah (1908) 4 Ind. Cas. 1117; Durgapada Chatterjee v. Nihmony Ghosh (1934) 39 C.W.N. 143; Maharani of Nabha v. Province of Madras ILR (1942) Mad. 696; Juggeshwar Dass v. Koylash Chunder Chatterjee I.L.R.(1885) 12 Cal. 55. According to the second line of cases, however, there will be an offence u/s 341 in circumstances like those of the present one and in this connection reference may be made to the cases of In re Abraham ILR (1950) Mad. 858; Gopala Reddi v. Lakshmi Reddi ILR (1947) Mad. 555; In Re: Peria Ponnuswami Goundan and Another, 506; In re Muhammad Yusuf Sahib (1938) II M.L.J. 583; Muthu Padayachi v. Emperor (1934) M.W.N. 620; Emperor Vs. Lahanu Manaji, 118. According to the first view in order to amount to an obstruction there must be the unconditional prevention of another person''s movement. According to this view, as has been said, all that the section protects is the obstruction of any person which cannot be said of a person who is free to go anywhere but not with his impediments. According to the second view, however, the slightest unlawful obstruction to the liberty of the subject to go when and where he likes to go provided he does so in a lawful manner is punishable u/s 341, Indian Penal Code. In my opinion, the first line of cases takes too narrow a view of the scope of Section 339 or 341 and in many cases it is obvious that too rigid an application of this view will lead to absurd and undesirable results. Many illustrations will readily come to one''s mind as in the case of a person riding a horse (cf. In re Peria Ponnuswami Goundan (supra)) or a person carrying a corpse to a funeral pyre (cf. In re Abraham (supra)). Unless there be any compelling reason I do not see why the more rational view as contained in the second line of cases mentioned above should not be followed. If a person has the right to go in a certain direction in, say, a vehicle in which he is travelling, any voluntary obstruction to the vehicle which prevents him from going along a particular direction in that vehicle will, in my opinion, amount to wrongful obstruction within the meaning of Section 341. As has been pointed out, the fact that the person in question may get down and then be left at liberty to proceed on this way unmolested seems immaterial. In the present case, it is clear that obstruction was offered to the complainant when he tried to exercise his undeniable right of taking the lorry into the garden. Such obstruction, in my opinion, comes within the mischief of Section 341. The complainant might, no doubt, have walked unmolested into the garden if he left the lorry behind but as the accused Petitioner could have no possible excuse for offering resistance to the taking of the lorry by the complainant into the garden, I do not see why in the circumstances of the present case it cannot be held that in the eye of law there was an obstruction within the meaning of Section 341 when the accused prevented the complainant from going into the garden with the lorry. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that the second objection raised by Mrs. Nag must also be overruled.

4. In the result, the conviction and sentence must stand and the rule is discharged.