(1) A suit was filed by one Soma Parma, who was a minor, through his next friend. This suit was dismissed on 23-12-1950. By that time Soma had attained majority and he instructed his pleader on 21-1-1951, to prefer an appeal and he signed a vakalatnama in favour of the pleader on January 22. The pleader preferred the appeal on 29-1-1951. Prior to that date Soma died on 23-1-1951. On 16-3-1951, the present petitioner, who is the heir and legal representative of Soma applied to the District Court to substitute her name in place of Soma. That application was dismissed by the learned District Judge, and it is from that order that this revision application is preferred.
(2) Now, apart from authorities, I should have said that the appeal that was preferred, on 29-1-1951, was clearly a nullity. The appellant being dead, the pleader who preferred the appeal had no authority to prefer any appeal and the vakalatnama signed in his favour had come to an end. If the appeal was a nullity, no order could be made in that appeal which Would be an effective order, and therefore the learned District Judge was right in refusing to direct that the petitioner should be substituted in place of the deceased appellant. An effective order under Order 1, Rule 10, can only be made provided there is a suit or an appeal before the Court, but if the suit or the appeal is a nullity, then any order made in that suit or appeal is equally a nullity, and the learned Judge rightly relied on the decision of Mr. Justice Mulla in --
(3) Mr. Sethna has relied on a judgment of the Madras High Court in --''Gopala Kristnayya v. Lakshmana Rao'', AIR 1935 Mad 1210 (B). That is a judgment of a Full Bench, but before we turn to that judgment it is necessary to draw attention to an earlier judgment of that Court in --''Veerappan Chetty v. Tincial Ponnen'', 31 Mad 8 (C). In that case Wallis and Miller JJ. took the view that there was nothing in the CPC to authorise the institution of a suit against a deceased person and the Courts have no jurisdiction to allow the plaint in such a case to be amended by substituting the names of the representatives of the deceased, even when the suit is instituted bona fide and in ignorance of the death of the defendant. With respect, I entirely agree with this view. What is said here about a plaint also applies to an appeal. Turning to --''Gopala Kristnayya''s case (B)'', the Full Bench took the view that when there is an appeal presented against a person who is dead at the date of presentation, the Court has jurisdiction u/s 153 to permit the title to be amended. When we turn to the judgment with great respect, no reason is given why a view different from the view expressed in --''Veerappa Chetty''s case (C)'', has been taken and the decision in --''Veerappa Chetty''s case (C)'', is not even expressly overruled. What is overruled is another case reported in --
(4) The other case relied on by Mr. Sethna is a judgment of the Nagpur Court in --
(5) Mr. Sethna has strongly relied on a judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in
-- ''Alabhai Vajsurbhai v. Bhura Bhaya'', AIR 1937 Born 401 (H). It seems that there an appeal was presented against several respondents. Some respondents seem to have died before the appeal was presented and others died pending the appeal, and the main question that arose was whether the appeal had abated. In this connection Wassoodew J, in his judgment relied on -- ''Gopala Kristnayya''s case (B)'' and expressed the opinion that the view expressed by that decision was the correct view. Wadia J, in his concurring judgment has not referred to this point at all.
(6) Now, the Bombay case is clearly distinguishable because that was not a case of an appeal being preferred against a sole respondent who was dead at the date when the appeal was preferred. That was a case where the appeal was preferred against several respondents and the appeal was properly instituted against some of the respondents who were alive at the date when the appeal was instituted. Therefore, it could not be said that the appeal was a nullity. There was a proper and effective appeal before the Court and really the question of bringing the legal representatives of the respondents who had died before the appeal was preferred was not so much a question of substitution as a question of adding to the respondents who were, already before the Court, and there can be no doubt that if a suit or an appeal is effectively before the Court, the question of addition of parties is regulated by Order 1, Rule 10. Further, it appears from the judgment of Wassoodew J, that the reason why the appeal was not preferred with regard to some of the respondents against the legal representatives was that certain orders passed by the Court had not been duly carried cut and what particularly weighed with Wassoodew J, was that the record should be amended and should be brought in conformity with the orders of the Court passed on various applications. Therefore, in my opinion, the
judgment of the Division Bench on which Mr. Sethna relies is not directly in point and it does not in any way impair the authority in
(7) In my opinion, the view expressed in --''Veerappa Chetty''s case (C)'' and in -- ''Sudhir Kumar De''s case (G)'' and also in -- ''Rampratab''s case (A)'' is the better view and I prefer it to the view expressed in -- ''Gopala Kristnayya''s case (B)''; -- ''Karimullah v. Bhanu Pratap Singh (E)'' and in -- ''Meher Singh v. Labh Singh (F)'' and also to the observations of Wassoodew J, in -- ''Alabhai Vajsurbhai v. Bhura Bhaya (H)'' to which I have made reference. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned District Judge was right in dismissing the application made by the petitioner.
(8) The result is that the revision application fails. Rule discharged with costs. Rule discharged.