Ranjana Desai, J.@mdashThis petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ("the Code" for short) seeks quashing of investigation in respect of the complaint bearing C.R. No. 40 of 2001 filed by Respondent No. 3 ("the Complaint" for short) Ms. Chetana Yashwant Vyas at Worli Police Station, Mumbat. It also seeks an order restraining the investigating agency from taking any further steps in respect of the said complaint.
2. Petitioner No. 1 is the Director-Personnel of Siemens Ltd. ("the Company" for short). Petitioner No. 2 is its Senior Manager Personnel and Petitioner No. 3 holds the post of General Manager-Legal in the Company.
3. Respondent No. 1 is the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-3, Mumbai. Respondent No. 2 is the Inspector of Police attached to Worli Police Station. Mumbai.
4. The facts which give rise to the present petition as set out in the petition are as under :
The complainant joined the Company on 19th September, 1994 as Assistant Manager-Legal in the Company''s internal officer''s Grade of MG1 Officer. She held different posts in the Company. On 21st January, 2000, the complainant was promoted as MG3 Officer. On and from 1st February 2000, the designation of the complainant was changed to Chief Manager-Legal.
5. According to the petitioners in or about September, 2000 when the audit department of the Company was conducting a periodic routine audit, they came across certain peculiar expense reports pertaining to the complainant. The audit department of the Company vide confidential note dated 15th September, 2000 inter alia pointed out that the complainant was indulging in malpractice of self-sanctioning of the vouchers by compelling her subordinate to raise the vouchers pertaining to her expenses and pass on the said amounts to her on encashment of vouchers.
6. In response to the confidential note Mr. W. Kroll, the then Executive Director of the Company instructed Mr. Prakash Khemani, General Manager to carry out further investigation and furnish a report to him. On 28th September, 2000 Mr. Prakash Khemani submitted a report to Mr. W. Kroll wherein he pointed out certain irregularities such as (a) self sanctioning of vouchers; (b) claiming heavy personal expenses on telephones as official; (c) undertaking outstation tours for personal reasons; (d) claiming inflated conveyance expenses; (e) claiming of arbitrary expenses; (f) improper accounting of attendance in office; (g) deliberate attempts to hide irregularities from her immediate supervisor.
7. It is the case of the petitioners that pursuant to the report, on 10th October, 2000, the complainant was called to Mr. Kroll''s cabin, where apart from Mr. Kroll petitioner No. 1 and Mrs. Sujata Deshpande, Senior Personnel Officer were already present. As per the instructions of the management Mr. Prakash Khemani brought to the notice of the complainant the prima facie Irregularities noticed by the audit department. Mr. Prakash Khemani left Mr. Kroll''s cabin. Mr. Kroll instructed petitioner No. 1 to initiate provisional action of transfer of the complainant. The complainant agreed to accompany petitioner No. 1 to his cabin where the necessary procedure was to be carried out. Accordingly the complainant and Ms. Deshpande accompanied petitioner No. 1 to his cabin. As petitioner No. 1 had some other pressing matters to attend to, he left his cabin. The complainant requested petitioner No. 1 to allow her to continue to remain in his cabin since she was embarrassed to go back to her department. Since the complaint was emotionally disturbed, petitioner No. 1 asked Ms. Sujata Deshpande to remain with her and give her moral support. In the absence of petitioner No. 1, the complainant made two phone called from his cabin, one to her advocate and another to her relative. After about 2 hours petitioner No. 1 returned along with Mr. Kroll and it was decided to change the reporting of the complainant from Mr. Kroll to petitioner No. 3 and to stop her increment for at least one year till investigation was completed.
8. In the meanwhile Investigation was continued and on 2nd January, 2001 Mr. Prakash Khemani, furnished a detailed report to petitioner No. 3 covering a period of about one year. Several acts of omission and commission of the complainant were mentioned in the said report.
9. The petition further goes on to say that on 10th January, 2001, the complainant was called to the cabin of petitioner No. 3 where petitioner No. 2 was also present. The complainant was told that the Company would be constrained to carry out highly Intensive investigation/audit to cover the entire period of her employment and would take necessary action, if required. The complainant with a view to avoiding tarnishing of her reputation requested that further investigation be called off and that she would voluntarily resign from the Company with immediate effect. She requested that the Company should waive the requirement of one month''s notice period. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 decided to concede to her request as a special case and the complainant wrote out a resignation in her own handwriting. Letter of acceptance of her resignation was Immediately handed over to her. She acknowledged the receipt of the same.
10. In order to protect the interest of the Company, an agreement was also entered into by and between the Company and the complainant whereby the complainant agreed to covenant with the Company not to take up assignment as an employee or in an advisory capacity or as an advocate or otherwise with any of the companies which may initiate action against the Company and of companies against whom litigation instituted by the Company. Is pending, in consideration of the Company paying to her an amount of Rs. 1,20,000/- on the terms and conditions mentioned therein. The agreement was signed by petitioner nos. 2 and 3 for and on behalf of the Company and by the complainant herself.
11. On 11th January, 2001 the complainant telephoned petitioner No. 3 at his office and requested him to ensure early payment of her salary, leave encashment, leave travel assistance etc. On 18th January. 2001, the Company by its letter informed the complainant that a cheque of Rs. 1,67,826/- being the salary, leave travel allowance, leave encashment etc, due to her had already been delivered to her bankers. On the copy of the said letter the complainant acknowledged its receipt. The complainant was given an option to retain the Company''s car or to make payment to the leasing Company or to return the same to the Company. The complainant did not retain the car but requested that Rs. 30,000/,- spent by her on installation of a music system in the car be reimbursed to her. By letter dated 24th January, 2001, the Company informed her that two cheques aggregating to Rs. 1,50,000/- out of which Rs. 1,20,000/- was the amount payable under the agreement dated 10th January, 2001 and Rs. 30,000/- was the amount spent by her on the music system installed in the car hat} been sent to her bankers for crediting in her account.
12. On 2nd February, 2001 the petitioners were summoned to Worli Police Station in connection with a First Information Report which they came to know, was lodged by the complainant. The petitioner''s statements came to be recorded. The petitioner''s further statements and statements of Mr. Prakash Khemani and Ms. Sujata Deshpande were recorded as the investigation progressed further.
13. The complainant vide her facsimile message dated 5th February, 2001 informed petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 that an amount of Rs. 1,20,000/ - had been accepted by her without prejudice to her rights and contentions.
14. Having come to know that the complainant has alleged commission of offences under Sections 504, 342. 509 r/w 34 of the I.P.C. against them, the petitioners have approached this Court for quashing the investigation. The affidavit of Shri B. V. Worlikar. Inspector of Police. Worli Police Station, Mumbai states that as the investigation indicated that two ex-employees of the Company had been forced to resign in the past and as letter of resignation is alleged to have been obtained by giving threats of injuries to the reputation of the complainant, Section 384 of the I.P.C. has also been applied by the police. Since the gravamen of the petitioner''s case is that even, if the averments made in the complaint are taken at their face value, they do not disclose any offence and hence this is preeminently a fit case where this Court should exercise its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code to quash true investigation, it is necessary to have a look at the contents of the complaint.
15. In the complaint the complainant states that on 8.10.2000, when she resumed her work, at about 10 a.m. petitioner No. 1 called her in his cabin and told her to give resignation of her post. He. threatened her and started abusing her. When she asked for an explanation he became aggressive and would not listen to her. At that time he asked Smt. Sujata (Personal Department) who was present in his cabin to be with her and ordered her not to go anywhere. He then went out. For about 3 hours the complainant was sitting in petitioner No. 1''s cabin under mental stress. Thereafter petitioner No.. 1 came to his cabin with Mr. Kroll, Executive Director. Mr. Kroll told the complainant that she should work under Mr. Katgare i.e. petitioner No. 3 and that her increment for one year has been stopped. He told her that she could continue to work only if she was agreeable to this condition. The complainant accepted this condition. On the next day Mr. Kroll declared this in writing. However, the petitioner did not complain about the same.
16. Thereafter when the complainant started working with petitioner No. 3 in the absence of others, petitioner No. 3 used to make vulgar gestures at her and used to wink at her. The complainant ignored all this and never complained about fit. for fear of loosing her job and also because he was her senior.
17. On 10th January, 2001, as usual the complainant resumed her work. At about 10. a.m. she went to the cabin of petitioner No: 3 where petitioner No. 2 was present. They told her that the management had lost confidence in her and she should forthwith give her resignation. When she asked for the reasons they refused to give them. They were talking in somewhat threatening terms. The complainant repeatedly requested them to allow her to make a telephone call to her relatives but they did not allow her to do so nor did they allow her to go out of the cabin. They threatened her that, if she did not give resignation they would tarnish her character and she would not get job anywhere. The complainant cried and requested for time. However, they mentally tortured her and forced her into writing a resignation letter. Similarly they forcibly took her signature on a stamp paper on which it was stated that the complainant shall not do any independent legal practice and shall not work with the companies which were connected with Siemens Ltd.
18. The complaint further notices that due to the said incident, the complainant and her mother were under lot of mental stress. For the mental stress the complainant is still under the treatment of private doctors and therefore, till date the complainant was unable to register the complaint with the police.
19. In the last paragraph the Complainant has summed up by saying that the petitioners had without any reason unlawfully confined her in their cabin and petitioner No. 3 had behaved in an indecent manner with her. By keeping her in illegal confinement the petitioners have forcibly obtained her resignation and, therefore, legal action be Initiated against them. The question is whether this complaint and the investigation pursuant thereto is liable to be quashed.
20. We have heard at some length Mr, Manohar, Senior Counsel who appears for the petitioners and Mr. Janardhan, the learned Additional Advocate General who appears for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4; Since Mr. Manohar and Mr. Janardhan had no objection, we have also heard Mr. Shirish Gupte, Sr. Counsel who appears for the complainant.
21. We shall now deal with the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel. Mr. Manohar urged on behalf of the petitioners that even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted as true they do not disclose any offence whatsoever. The complainant had committed gross irregularities when she was in service. The General Manager had submitted a detailed report about her conduct. The complainant was Informed that after intensive investigation necessary action may have to be taken against her. In order to avoid all this the complainant voluntarily tendered her resignation, accepted her dues and later on as a counterblast filed the complaint. Therefore, her action is vindictive and malafide.
22. This is confirmed from the fact that on 18.1.2001 the Company by its letter of the same date informed the complainant that the Company had sent a cheque to her bank covering her dues. This letter was received by heron 19.1.2001 and she acknowledged its receipt. By another letter dated 24.1.2001 the Company informed the complainant that it had sent two cheques to her. one in respect of the amount due to her in terms of agreement dated 10.1.2001 and another in respect of the music system. The receipt of this letter was also acknowledged by her on its copy on 25th January, 2001. It is only as an afterthought and as a vindictive measure that she lodged the complaint in question on 1.2.2001 and on 5.2.2001 she wrote a letter to the Company that she had acknowledged the cheque payments without prejudice to her rights and contentions. Mr. Manohar submitted that this is sufficient Indication of the fact that the complaint is malafide.
23. Mr. Manohar further submitted that by no stretch of imagination can an offence u/s 383 of the Indian Penal Code be made out from the facts alleged in the complaint. Section 383 reads thus :
"383. Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion".
He submitted that in order to make out a case of extortion a person must dishonestly Induce another person by putting him in fear of injury to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed by which may be converted into a valuable security., Therefore, there must be delivery of property. In this case, argues Mr. Manohar, there is no delivery of property.
24. He then invited our attention to section 30 of the Indian Penal Code which defines valuable security. Section 30 reads thus :
"30. Valuable security" - The words "valuable security" denote a document which Is, or purports to be. a document whereby any legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or whereby any person, acknowledges that he lies under legal liability, or has not a certain legal right."
Therefore, for a document to be a valuable security it must create, extend, transfer, restrict, extinguish or release any legal right or by the said document a person must acknowledge that he lies under legal liability or has not a certain legal right. In the instant case it is the case of the complainant that she was forced to write a letter of resignation and thereby give up a legal right to service.
25. Mr. Manohar submitted that the complainant had no legal right. Her services could be terminated by giving simple one month''s notice as contemplated in the agreement of service. Drawing our attention to Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Manohar urged that such a grievance could be made only in cases covered by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Since the complainant had no legal right, there was no question of her alleged right being extinguished or released. There was no question of her acknowledging that she has no such right by letter of resignation dated 10.1.2001 or even under agreement dated 10.1.2001. Neither the letter of resignation, nor the agreement can, therefore, be described as a valuable security. Section 383 of the Indian Penal Code can, therefore, never be attracted to the facts of the case.
26. On the applicability of Section 383 Mr. Manohar also relied on Indrasena Kuer v. Sia Ram Pandey and Ors. In that case Patna High Court was considering whether forcibly taking any property from any person comes under the definition of Section 386 of the I.P.C. The Patna High Court observed that the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that a victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security etc. The delivery of the property must be with consent which is obtained by putting a person in fear of any injury and by overpowering him. Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition. On the facts of that case Patna High Court held that the statement of the victim indicated that the accused forcibly took the thumb impression and not that she had delivered the papers containing her thumb impression to them. According to the Patna High Court, therefore, no offence of extortion as committed.
27. Mr. Manohar, relying on this judgment, urged that in the facts of the case on hand, there is no averment in the complaint nor is there any legal evidence that the will of the complainant was overpowered by putting her in fear of injury. Assuming that the allegations in the complaint are correct, alleged action of the petitioners in forcing the complainant to write a letter of resignation will not be sufficient to attract Section 383 of the Indian Penal Code.
28. Mr. Manohar also urged that the complaint indicates that the complainant was not prevented from leaving the office. It is her case that petitioner No. 1 had ordered her not to go anywhere and Smt. Sujata was present in his cabin. There was no wrongful restraint on her movement. To prove wrongful restraint there should be obstruction to any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed. The complainant does not disclose that the complainant was forbidden from going to any direction where she had desire to go. According to the complainant she was only told not to go anywhere. No force was applied. Hence there was no wrongful restraint or wrongful confinement. Section 342 of the I.P.C. Is also not attracted to the present case.
29. In support of his submission that the complaint even, if accepted at its face value does not disclose any offence at all. Mr. Manohar relied on R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr; K. Ramakrishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., Mr. Manohar urged that, if the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases is applied to the facts of the present case, the complaint has to be quashed. Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration and Anr, was relied upon in support of the submission that, if it is clear that the trial would be an exercise in futility, the proceedings should be quashed to avoid flooding of the Courts with frivolous litigation. Mr. Manohar also urged that the complainant''s story is inherently improbable.
30. Mr. Manohar then urged that this case, at the most is of a breach of contract. The dispute is entirely of a civil nature and, therefore, the complainant could not have initiated criminal action against the petitioners. In this behalf he relied on Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan and Anr., He, therefore, submitted that the complaint deserves to be quashed.
31. As against this Shri Janardhan, learned Addl. Advocate General contended that the complaint does disclose a cognizable offence. It is still at the stage of investigation. The complaint indicates that the complainant was restrained from leaving the office. She was forced to sign letter of resignation. She was given threats. A prima facie case under Sections 383 and 342 of the I.P.C. is made out. Besides this petitioner No. 2 is also guilty of offence u/s 509 of the Indian Penal Code i.e. uttering words or making gestures, intended to insult the modesty of a woman. Whether or not offence is made out can be ascertained only after the evidence is laid. This is not one of those rarest of rare cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence at all. He, therefore, submitted that this Court should not quash the complaint.
32. Mr. Gupte, appearing for the complainant submitted that the petition involves disputed facts, a final determination of which can only be done at the stage of trial. He submitted that this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and u/s 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in this case where disputed questions of facts are involved. Mr. Gupte also submitted that the averments in the F.I.R. need not disclose every characteristic or ingredient of the offence but it should broadly spell out the offence. It is for the Court to frame appropriate charge. He also submitted that annexures to the complaint cannot be looked into to quash the complaint and what is material are the averments made in the complaint. If the complaint prima facie discloses an offence, it cannot be quashed. The High Court, argued Mr. Gupte. cannot appreciate the evidence at the stage of trial and examine whether a conviction would be forthcoming. That is the job of the Trial Court.
33. He submitted that the offence u/s 383 is squarely made out. By putting the complainant in fear of Injury to her reputation, the complainant was forced to sign a letter of resignation. Thereby she was forced to give up her legal right to ajob. Mr. Gupte submitted that the word "delivery" should not be interpreted in the strict sense of the term. It does not mean physical delivery of a thing but a broad view will have to be taken. If the complainant was forced to give up a right emanating from a contract by a letter of resignation, the letter would amount to a valuable security within the meaning of Section 30 of the I.P.C.. Mr. Gupte urged that the defence of the petitioners cannot be examined at this stage. Mr. Gupte also submitted that the argument that the prosecution is mala fide could be examined only from the pleadings and not from the defence of the accused, and in the facts of the case no mala fides are discernible.
34. Mr. Gupte relied on Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Ors., where the Supreme Court has stated that, if averments in the complaint prima facie make out a case for Investigation the High Court cannot quash the complaint merely because one or two ingredients of the offence have not been stated in detail.
35. Mr. Gupte heavily relied on Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr., in support of his submission that in case of offence u/s 354 I.P.C., i.e., outraging the modesty of a woman culpable intention is an ingredient and which has to be proved like any other ingredient. In the absence of direct evidence it can be inferred from attending circumstances. He submitted that it is necessary for the complainant to prove the offences under sections 354 and 509 by leading evidence and the opportunity to prove the offence cannot be denied to the complainant by quashing the complaint. Mr. Gupte therefore, submitted that this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the complaint in question.
36. By a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has crystallized the principles underlying the exercise of High Court''s extraordinary and inherent powers to quash a complaint. Suffice it to refer to the decisions cited before us by the learned Counsel. In R. P. Kopur v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily, criminal proceedings instituted tuted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the "High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. No inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. The Supreme Court noted following three categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised.
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of offences alleged;
(ii) Where the allegations in the F.I.R., or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises: it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the F.I.R. to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not.
(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
37. In respect of the third category, the Supreme Court voiced a note of caution. It observed that a distinction will have to be drawn between a case where there is either no legal evidence: adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly falls to prove the charge and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. The Supreme Court observed that in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction the High Court would not. embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not because that is the function of the Trial Magistrate.
38. In State of Haryanav. Bhajanlal, the Supreme Court observed that the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power u/s 482 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The Supreme Court noted the following categories of cases wherein such power should be utilized making it clear however, that it was not possible to give an exhaustive list.
"(102). (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2). Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompany the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations, made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of Magistrate as contemplated u/s 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a Just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an .express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted )to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for .the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal Grade
Mr. Manohar wants us to hold that the present case falls in category 1, 3, 5 and 7.
39. In Rupan Deol''s (supra) the appellant Mrs. Rupan Bajaj, an officer of the Indian Administrative Service lodged a complaint with the Inspector General of Police. Chandigarh, alleging commission of offences under Sections 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509 of the I.P.C. by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of Police, Punjab. On a petition being filed by Mr. Gill, u/s 482 of the Code, for quashing the F.I.R., the High Court quashed it inter alia on the ground that the allegations made therein do not disclose any cognizable offence, and that the allegations were unnatural and Improbable. On appeal the Supreme Court reiterated that at the stage of quashing an F.I.R. the High Court is hot justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegations made therein. The complaint could be quashed if the allegations made therein are inherently improbable. The Supreme Court found that on the basis of the allegations in the F.I.R. such a conclusion could not have been drawn and hence the High Court''s judgment was set aside.
40. In Rajesh Bajaj''s case (supra) the appellant had lodged ah F.I.R. with the police for the offence u/s 420 of I.P.C. The Delhi High Court held that the F.I.R. as recorded did not disclose offence of cheating; there was nothing in the complaint to suggest that the appellant had a dishonest or fraudulent intention and that the complaint recites a purely commercial transaction. The Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary that the complaint should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence alleged. It is also not '' necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this Stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premises that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an F.I.R. (a step which his permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. The Supreme Court was of opinion that F.I.R. ought not to have been quashed. The following observations of the Supreme Court ought to be quoted :
"12. The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through a Cull ender of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients u/s 415 of the I.P.C. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved."
41. In Hridaya Rajan Prasad''s case (supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with a complaint where it was alleged by the complainant, who was a secretary of the society engaged in purchase and sale of lands, that the appellants/accused had agreed to sell some land to respondent No. 2 but the appellants defrauded the society by suppressing the fact that two cases were pending against them in respect of the properties Which were agreed to be sold. This suppression was deliberate and Intentional. The High Court rejected the appellant''s petition and declined to quash the complaint. Oh appeal, the Supreme Court held that the ingredients of the offence of cheating punishable u/s 420 of the I.P.C. and its allied offences under Sections 418 and 423 had not been made out. Basic allegations making out a case under Sections 469, 504 and 120B are not contained in the complaint. The Supreme Court therefore, observed that, reading the averments in the complaint in entirety and accepting the allegations to be true, the ingredients of intentional deception on the part of the accused, has neither been expressly stated, nor Indirectly suggested in the complaint. In such a situation, continuing the criminal proceedings against the accused will be, observed the Supreme Court, an abuse of the process of Court. The Supreme Court, therefore, quashed the proceedings.
42. In K. Ramkrishna''s case (supra) the Supreme Court had again an occasion to deal with the same issue. The appellants, who were senior officers of United Bank of India, were arraigned as accused persons in the charge-sheet by C.B.I, for the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468. 420 and 120B of the I.P.C. Their petition for discharge was rejected. The appellants moved the High Court u/s 482 of the Cod with the prayer for quashing the order of the Magistrate. Their prayer was rejected and hence they approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that ordinarily the criminal proceedings which are instituted against the accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the proceedings at an Interlocutory stage. The Supreme Court observed that, if without appreciating the evidence but only merely by looking at the complaint or the accompany documents, the offence alleged is not disclosed, the person proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be saved. The High Court u/s 482 is not called upon to embark upon an enquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceeding further or not. However, If, upon the admitted facts and documents relied upon by the complainant and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings Instituted against the accused are required, to be quashed., The case before the Supreme Court presented exceptional circumstances which compelled the Supreme Court to sift the evidence. The Supreme Court noted the Trial Magistrate had recorded facts wrongly with respect to the case diary. It observed that it had no option but to direct the State to produce the documents. But the Supreme Court seems to have made an exceptional deviation. It observed :
"We are conscious of the fact that in the normal circumstances, this Court or the High Court while deciding the sufficiency of the evidence would not resort to the perusal of the case diary, or , sit in appeal over the judgment or .the investigating officer but as the Trial Magistrate has apparently made wrong observations with respect to the facts noticed in the, case diary, the Court had no option but to direct the counsel of the State to produce the documents."
43. Apart from the fact that the Supreme Court in Ramkrishna''s case (supra) was dealing with a discharge application, in our opinion, the facts before it were exceptional and the observations of the Supreme Court will have to be viewed against the said exceptional facts and cannot be made applicable to all cases.
44. In Alpic Finance''s case (supra) the respondent had entered Into an agreement with the appellant Company for hire purchase of dental chairs. It was held that the respondent was hot regular in making payments and he committed defaults in making, payment of the installments Certain chairs were allegedly missing. The High Court quashed the proceedings u/s 482 of the Code by holding the entire transaction was of civil nature and there was no element of misappropriation or cheating. In appeal the Supreme Court observed in the facts before it, that there was no allegation that the respondents had made any willful misrepresentation. Even according to the appellant, parties entered into a valid lease agreement and the grievance "of the appellant is that the respondents failed to discharge their contractual obligations, in the complaint, there is no allegation that there was fraud 01" dishonest inducement on the part of the respondents. Therefore it'' was difficult to discern an element of deception in the whole transaction. It was evident that the appellant had an oblique motive of causing harassment to the respondents. The Supreme Court therefore declined to interfere with the High Court''s judgment.
45. The principles that emerge out of these decisions are now clear. We will test the present complaint in the light of the said principle''s Waving regard to the submissions advanced before us. We will undertake this exercise keeping in mind the words of caution sounded by the Supreme Court that the power to quash a complaint has to be used with circumspection and in rarest of rare cases.
46. Firstly, oh the basis of R.P. Kapur''s case (supra) it has to be ascertained whether the allegations made in the complaint even if they are taken at their face value constitute an offence "alleged or not and if they do constitute an offence, whether there is any legal evidence in support of the case or whether the evidence adduced manifestly falls to prove the charge. It is not, however, open to this Court to; appreciate legal evidence if any, to find out whether it is reliable or not,
47. In our opinion, in the facts of the present case, it is difficult to come to a conclusion that the allegations in the complaint which give minute details about the fact that the complainant was ordered hot to leave the room, was not allowed to contact anybody on phone and was forced to sign a letter of resignation do not prima facie constitute an offence. Similarly ,the allegation pertaining to the attempt to insult the modesty of the complainant also prima facie constitute an offence. The evidence in the form of the complainant''s statement, the letter of resignation and the agreement of the same date with the Company would constitute legal evidence. As held by the Supreme Court in R P. Kapur''s case (supra) it is not necessary for this Court to decide at this stage as to whether the said evidence is reliable or not. This, therefore, is not one of those rarest of rare cases where the complaint needs to be quashed by a mere look at it or where there is no legal evidence to substantiate it, or it manifestly fails to prove the charge: Even the judgment of Supreme Court in Ramkrishna''s case (supra) where the Supreme Court made similar observations, will not be applicable to the facts of the present case.
48. The present case will have to be looked at from one more angle. There is an element of intention in Sections 383, 504 and 509 of the I.P.C. Intention will have to be proved at the trial b''y direct evidence or could be inferred from the attending circumstances. In this connection, we may usefully refer to the observation''s of the Supreme Court in Rupan Deal''s case (supra) where while observing that at this stage the Court has to only consider whether prima facie offence has been made out or not, the Supreme Court has said "It is undoubtedly true that, if intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved like any other ingredients for convicting a person. But it is equally true that those ingredients being states of mind may not be proved by direct evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of the case". These observations of the Supreme Court will be applicable to the facts of the present case also. We are of the opinion that the complaint does disclose the offences alleged by the complainant. The intention will have to be proved like any other ingredient at the trial and may also have to be inferred from the attending circumstances. The Trial Court alone can decide whether the evidence is reliable or not. Therefore, the trial cannot be scuttled by quashing the complaint.
49. In Bhajanlal''s case (supra), as also in Rupan Deal''s case (supra), the Supreme Court has held that, if the allegations in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent man can reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, the complaint will have to be quahsed. We are unable to come to a conclusion that the allegations in the complaint are absurd or inherently improbable. The narrative of the incident prima facie, appears to us to be not improbable. There is no warrant to quash the complaint on this ground.
50. Besides, it is also difficult to come to a conclusion at this stage that the complaint is mala fide or that the proceeding is Initiated with an ulterior motive to spite the accused due to personal grudge. The accused has come out with a case that the complainant is guilty of various illegalities and in order to avoid an enquiry, she had submitted her resignation. It is the case of the accused that after the decision to drop the enquiry was taken, as a vindictive measure she has filed the present complaint. Reports submitted by the Company against the complainant are pressed into service for this. The complainant has, on the other hand, alleged that there was wrongful confinement, administration of threats, extortion and indecent behaviour. These, in our opinion, are disputed facts which this Court is unable to appreciate at this stage. It is not a case of such stark mala fides or visible personal vendetta falling in category 7 of Bhajanlal''s case (supra) which would pursuade us to quash the complaint at this stage. Similarly whether the letter of resignation is a valuable security or not, whether ingredients of wrongful confinement are present or not and whether ingredients found essential by the Patna High Court in Indrasena Kuer''s case (supra) to make out a case of extortion are present or not cannot be decided at this stage. We are unable to draw any such inferences and Indulge in surmises and thus scuttle the legal process.
51. We are also unable to come to a conclusion that the complaint should contain all the ingredients of the offences alleged. In the nature of things, it may not be possible for a lay person to narrate all the ingredients meticulously. As observed by the Supreme Court in Rajesh Bajaj''s case (supra), if factual foundation is laid, absence of one or two ingredients will not make a complaint vulnerable. A hyper technical approach is what this Court must avoid.
52. We find the reliance placed by Shri Manohar on Hriday ranjan Verma''s case (supra) to be misplaced. In the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found that basic allegations of the offence alleged were absent in the complaint. The ingredients were neither expressly stated nor indirectly suggested in the complaint. It is in this fact situation, that the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings. Such is not the case here. A proper factual foundation is laid here suggesting the commission of the offences alleged. Basic allegations making out offences of wrongful confinement, extortion, insulting the modesty of a woman are very much present. Ratio of Hriday ranjan. Verma''s case (supra) is, therefore, not applicable to the facts of the present case.
53. We are also not impressed by the submission of Shri Manohar that the complaint merely discloses a civil dispute. We have already expressed that the factual details of extortion, wrongful confinement, insult to the modesty of a woman have been set out in the complaint. That the complaint has definite criminal overtones cannot be gainsaid. In Alpic Finance''s case (supra), the complainant had put in forefront the allegation that there was a failure to discharge contractual obligations. The Supreme Court in the facts before it was of the opinion that, there was no element of deception in the transaction and in the complaint there was no allegation of fraud. In the case on hand, there is no grievance of breach of contract. The grievance is of wrongful confinement, extortion, administration of threats and indecent behaviour. We are, therefore, unable to view it as a dispute of civil nature. The ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Alpic Flariance''s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
54. Some arguments were also advanced on the question as to which documents the Court can peruse at this stage. In Satish Mehra''s case (supra) the Supreme Court observed that at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code (Discharge), the Court can consider materials which the accused may produce if that material would clinch the issue. In such a situation, the Court''s time should not be wasted in the name of trial. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni. However we need not go into this question because Mr. Manohar has submitted that all the documents to which our attention has been drawn are in the case-diary and no extraneous documents are relied upon. We may also observe that we are unable to conclude at this stage that the present case would end in an acquittal and further Investigation of the case would be a waste of time and abuse of the process of law.
55. In the view that we have taken, we will have to dismiss the present petition. We would however like to make it clear that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the case either way. Our observations are but prima facie observations made only for the purpose of disposal of this Petition before us. Anything said by us in this Judgment should not be taken as a final adjudication by us, of any point involved.
56. In the result the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
