Union of India (UOI) Vs Okorake Emmanuel Chukwunonyere and The State of Maharashtra

Bombay High Court 25 Jul 2011 Criminal Writ Petition No. 3372 of 2010 (2011) 07 BOM CK 0132
Bench: Division Bench
Acts Referenced

Judgement Snapshot

Case Number

Criminal Writ Petition No. 3372 of 2010

Hon'ble Bench

A.R. Joshi, J; A.M. Khanwilkar, J

Advocates

D.J. Khambatta, Additional Solicitor General and Mandar Goswami, P.P, for the Appellant; H.E. Mooman, instructed by K.V. Anuradha, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3372 of 2010 and Ayaz Khan, in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2990 of 2010, for the Respondent

Acts Referred

Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 — Section 8, 8(1), 8(3)#Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 2, 225, 24, 24(1), 24(2)#Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS) — Section 24(8), 36A, 36C, 4(1), 4(2)

Judgement Text

Translate:

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.@mdashRule. Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 in the respective petitions waive notice. The matters were taken up for

final hearing forthwith, by consent.

2. Both these petitions involve common questions, and are, therefore, being disposed of together.

3. The principal question that arises for consideration in these petitions is: Whether by efflux of time specified in the subject Notification issued by

the Government of India inter alia in exercise of powers conferred u/s 24(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as

the Code"", for the sake of brevity), the appointment of the concerned Special Public Prosecutors to conduct the trial, in respective special cases,

wherein they had already entered appearance when the tenure specified in the notification was subsisting, being offences punishable under the

provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ""the NDPS Act"", for the sake of brevity),

would come to an end, as a result of which, their continuation as Special Public Prosecutors even in those criminal cases is without authority of

law?

4. At the outset, we place on record that, in view of the subsequent development, the above question does not survive for consideration at least in

the subject criminal cases, in view of issuance of fresh Notification by the Government on 26th October, 2010, continuing the appointment of the

concerned Special Pubic Prosecutors to conduct the trial of the stated cases. However, since the question is a recurring one, and is likely to be

agitated in other cases tried by the Special Court under the provisions of the NDPS Act, we accede to the request of the Union of India to answer

the said question.

5. Briefly stated, Respondent No. 1 in the respective petitions came to be arrested in connection with offence punishable under the provisions of

the NDPS Act, as they were found to be in possession of narcotic drugs. The Petitioner is an investigating and prosecuting agency in the

concerned cases. The said cases are being tried before the Special Judge appointed under the NDPS Act for Greater Mumbai. In both these

criminal cases, Shri A.R. Gupte, Advocate, (hereinafter referred to as the said Advocate), entered appearance to conduct the trial for and on

behalf of the Petitioner, the prosecuting agency. It is common ground that the said Advocate, and two other Advocates, were appointed by the

Government of India as Special Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting cases instituted under specified enactments, including the NDPS

Act, vide Notification dated 27th April, 2005. The said Notification reads thus:

TO BE PUBLISHED IN PART II SECTION 3 Sub-section II

GAZETTE OF INDIA, EXORDINARY (SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH HINDI VERSION)

Government of India

Ministry of Law and Justice

Department of Legal Affairs

New Delhi, the 27th April, 2005

Notification

S.O................. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (8) of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) the

Central Government hereby appoints:

(i) Shri A.R. Gupte, Advocate, Mumbai High Court

(ii) Shri C.T. George, Advocate, Mumbai High Court and

(iii) Smt. Usha Sisodia, Advocate, High Court.

As Special Public Prosecutor for the purpose of conducting cases instituted under (a) the Central Excises Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), (b) The

Employees `Provident Funds'' and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), (c) The Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), (d) The Wealth-

tax Act, 1957 (27 of 1957), (e) The Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958), (e) The Gift-Tax Act, 1958 (19 of 1958), (f) The income tax Act, 1961 (43

of 1961), (g) The Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), (h) The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

(52 of 1974), (i) The Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980) and (j) The

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) before the Special Courts, Sessions Courts and Additional Sessions Court in

the Greater Mumbai for a period of three years or until further orders, whichever is earlier, subject to the3 condition that the above mentioned

advocates shall not appear in any criminal cases in any Special Court, Sessions Court or Additional Sessions Courts against the Central

Government or any officer of the Central Government or against any Department of the Central Government.

(D.K. Meena)

Joint Secretary and Legal Adviser to the Government of India

F. No. 23(2A)/2005-Judl.

The Manager

Government of India Press

Mayapuri, Ring Road

New Delhi.

6. From the plain language of this Notification, it is obvious that the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 24(8) of

the Code, appointed the named advocates as Special Public Prosecutors to conduct cases pertaining to specified enactments before the Special

Courts, Sessions Courts and Additional Sessions Court in Greater Mumbai. This appointment, however, was a tenure appointment for a period of

three years or until further orders, whichever is earlier. Thus, the period of three years was to expire on 26th April, 2008. It is common ground that

no Notification was issued by the Central Government to continue the appointment of the named advocates as Special Public Prosecutors after

27th April, 2008. In that view of the matter, the Respondents in the respective petitions moved application before the Special Court for direction

to the prosecution to produce the Notification showing that the appointment of the said Advocate was still subsisting. While resisting the said

application, it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the accused or their advocates cannot be allowed to challenge the appointment of

Special Pubic Prosecutor, nor can they ask for production of Notification to establish that the appointment of the concerned advocate as Special

Public Prosecutor was still subsisting. At the same time, it was fairly accepted before the Special Court that no fresh Notification has been issued

by the Central Government after 27th April, 2008 indicative of continuation of appointment of the concerned advocate(s) as Special Public

Prosecutor to conduct the cases on behalf of the Central Government in the Special Court. According to the Petitioner, however, that would make

no difference, as the concerned advocates could legitimately continue to conduct the cases under the NDPS Act, in view of the expansive

provisions of Section 36-C of the NDPS Act. In other words, the Petitioner asserted that it was not necessary to issue any further notification u/s

24(8) of the Code, so as to enable the concerned advocates to appear and conduct cases under the NDPS Act as Special Public Prosecutors in

which they have already entered appearance in that capacity during the period specified in the stated Notification. The Special Court, after

considering the stand taken by the rival parties, vide its judgment and order dated 6th September, 2010, proceeded to answer the controversy,

and held that the appointment of the concerned advocates as Special Public Prosecutors, in terms of Notification dated 27th April, 2005, was a

tenure appointment, and, in absence of fresh notification for continuation of their appointment, the said advocates were ineligible to act as Special

Public Prosecutors in the concerned cases. This conclusion has been reached essentially on the basis of the order passed by this Court in Criminal

Writ Petition No. 1003 of 2005 dated 7th June, 2005. It is this decision which is subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petitions.

7. Besides challenging the decision of the Special Judge dated 6th September, 2010, the Petitioner has asked for a declaration that Section 36-C

of the NDPS Act overrides the provisions of Sections 225 and 24(8) of the Code, to the extent that there is a conflict, and that a person duly

authorised to conduct prosecution under the special provisions such as Section 36-C of the Act may continue to conduct such prosecution as a

Public Prosecutor, even in the absence of a further Notification issued u/s 24(8) of the Code.

8. We have heard the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the Union of India and the counsel for Respondent No. 1 in the respective

petitions. The arguments canvassed before the Special Judge have, more or less, been reiterated by the rival parties before us.

9. To answer the controversy, we may usefully refer to the relevant provisions of the Code, which have bearing on the controversy on hand.

Section 2(u) of the Code defines ""Public Prosecutor"" to mean any person appointed u/s 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of

the Public Prosecutor. Thus, the regime for appointing a Public Prosecutor is spelt out in Section 24 of the Code.

10. Before referring to Section 24 of the Code, it would be apposite to refer to Sections 4 and 5 of the Code, as the trial in the present cases is

under the provisions of the NDPS Act, which is a special law. The said provisions read thus:

4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated,

inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but

subject to any enactment for the lime being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with

such offences.

5. Saving.-Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time

being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in

force.

Section 4(1) is not applicable to the cases pertaining to offence under the NDPS Act. However, Section 4(2) would come into play, as it provides

for procedure to be followed in respect of offences ""under any other law"", for investigation, enquiry into, trial of, and otherwise dealt with. This

expansive provision would encompass cases under the NDPS Act. However, the latter part of Section 4(2) predicates that the procedure

provided in the Code for such cases shall be subject to the provision in the special law for the time being in force. Section 5 of the Code makes it

explicit that, if there is a specific provision to the contrary in the special law, amongst others, pertaining to special form of procedure prescribed,

that shall prevail. We shall advert to this aspect a little later.

11. Reverting back to the procedure for appointment of a Public Prosecutor or a Special Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, we will have to

refer to Section 24 of the Code ""as applicable to the State of Maharashtra"", which reads thus:

24. Public Prosecutors.-(1) For every High Court, the Central Government or the State Government shall, appoint a Public Prosecutor and may

also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutor, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the

Central Government or State Government, as the case may be.

(2) The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting any case or class of cases in any district,

or local area.

(3) For every district, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for

the district:

Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed for one district may be appointed also to be a Public Prosecutor or

an Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for another district.

(4) The District Magistrate shall, with the approval of the State Government, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion fit to be

appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.

(5) No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his

name appears in the panel of names prepared by me District Magistrate under Sub-section (4).

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (5), where in a State there exists a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers, the State

Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor only from among the persons constituting such Cadre:

Provided that where, in the opinion of the State Government, no suitable person is available in such Cadre for such appointment that Government

may appoint a person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, from the panel of names prepared by the District

Magistrate under Sub-section(4).

[Explanation.--For the purposes of this Sub-section,

(a) ""regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers"" means a Cadre of Prosecuting Officers which includes therein the post of a Public Prosecutor, by

whatever name called, and which provides for promotion of Assistant Public Prosecutors, by whatever name called, to that post;

(b) ""Prosecuting Officer"" means a person, by whatever name called, appointed to perform the functions of a Public Prosecutor, an Additional

Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor under this Code.]

(7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under Sub-section (I) or Sub-section (2)

or Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (6), only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years.

(8) The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in

practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor.

[Provided that the Court may permit the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution under this Sub-section.]

(9) For the purposes of Sub-section (7) and Sub-section (8), the period during which a person has been in practice as a pleader, or has rendered

(whether before or after the commencement of this Code) service as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public

Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer, by whatever name called, shall be deemed to be the period during which such person has been in practice

as an advocate.]

12. On conjoint reading of the above-said provisions, it does appear that the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, is

obliged to appoint a Public Prosecutor and Additional Public Prosecutors to conduct criminal cases on its behalf before the concerned Courts. In

addition, it is open to the concerned Government to appoint any person as a Special Public Prosecutor for the purpose of any case or class of

cases. Sub-section (1) requires the concerned Government to appoint ""a Public Prosecutor"" and one or more Additional Public Prosecutors for

conducting any prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on its behalf before the High Court.

13. In the present cases, Sub-section (1) will have no application, as the appointment in question is in relation to cases instituted by the Central

Government and tried by the Special Judge under the provisions of the NDPS Act. Sub-section (2) is attracted in such cases. It provides that the

Central Government"" may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors, for the purpose of conducting ""any case"" or ""class of cases"" in any district or

local area. Notably, this provision does not specify any tenure for such appointment. That is a matter obviously left to the discretion of the Central

Government, whether the appointment is for ""a case"" or ""class of cases"" in the district or local area. Even this provision is of no avail to the facts of

the present case - as the appointment is of ""Special Public Prosecutor"" u/s 24(8) of the Code.

14. Sub-sections (3) to (6) are essentially applicable to the appointment of a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district by

the ""State Government"", with which we are not concerned in the present cases.

15. Sub-section (7), however, deals with the eligibility of a person to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor for

the High Court or the district or local area, as the case may be. In the present cases, there is no dispute regarding the eligibility of the advocate(s),

who were appointed as Special Public Prosecutors by the Central Government. The limited question is: whether they could continue to conduct the

trial for and on behalf of the Central Government, even though their term specified in the Notification dated 27th April, 2005 had expired and in

absence of a notification to extend their tenure as ""Special Public Prosecutor"" to conduct the concerned cases.

16. Sub-section (8) is of some significance to answer the point in issue. It postulates that the Central Government or the State Government may

appoint, for the purposes of ""any case"" or ""class of cases"", a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a

Special Public Prosecutor. This is an enabling provision empowering the Central or the State Government, as the case may be, to appoint any

Advocate possessing requisite qualification as a Special Public Prosecutor. It is open to the concerned Government to appoint any Advocate

possessing requisite qualification including whose name does not appear in the panel of persons appointed as Public Prosecutors or Additional

Public Prosecutors for the High Court or the district or local area, as a Special Public Prosecutor. Further, the appointment of ""Special Public

Prosecutor"" can either be in respect of ""a case"" or ""class of cases"". It need not necessarily be a tenure appointment, but could operate until further

orders. In the present cases, the appointment of the three advocates as Special Public Prosecutors was to conduct cases under the specified

enactments, including the NDPS Act, before the Special Courts, Sessions Courts and Additional Sessions Court in Greater Mumbai. They were

appointed by the Central Government, vide Notification dated 27th April, 2005, in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 24(8) of the Code. The

problem, however, arises, as the Notification dated 27th April, 2005 specified the term for which the three advocates were appointed as Special

Public Prosecutors by the Central Government, viz., for a period of three years or until further orders, ""whichever is earlier"". We will deal with this

aspect a little later.

17. There is yet another provision in the Code, to which our attention was invited. Section 225 of the Code mandates that, in every trial before a

Court of Sessions, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. The Pubic Prosecutor referred to therein, obviously, means a Public

Prosecutor appointed by the Central or State Government, as the case may be, u/s 24 of the Code. That includes the Special Public Prosecutor

appointed u/s 24(8) of the Code.

18. Be that as it may, as aforesaid, the problem posed before us arises on account of the tenure appointment of the three Advocates as Special

Public Prosecutors by the Central Government under Notification dated 27th April, 2005. The term of their appointment was for a period of three

years or until further orders, whichever is earlier. That means, they could be removed even before the expiry of three years'' period. In absence

thereof, their term was to last for a period of three years only from the date of their appointment vide notification dated 27th April, 2005. Thus,

going by the language of this Notification, it may appear that the term of office of the three advocates as Special Public Prosecutors, by efflux of

time, expired on 26th April, 2008.

19. To get over this position, it was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that, since the cases in which the advocates were appointed as Special

Public Prosecutors, are under a special law, the express provision contained in Section 36-C of the said enactment ought to prevail. According to

the Petitioner, any person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court on behalf of the prosecuting agency ought to be considered as a Public

Prosecutor, in view of the legal fiction and the deeming provision contained therein. Section 36-C of the NDPS Act reads thus:

36-C. Application of Code to proceedings before a Special Court.-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the

purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before a

Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.

20. The question is: Whether the above said provision in the NDPS Act is in conflict with the provisions of the Code? There can be no doubt that

the NDPS Act is a special law, and has been enacted with a view to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating

to the narcotic drug and psychotropic substance [see State of Rajasthan Vs. Udai Lal, ]. It is also well established that, if the provisions of the

special law are in conflict with the provisions of the general law, then, the provisions of the special law must prevail, and, if the special law is a

subsequent enactment, then, the provisions contained therein must prevail both on the ground that the Act, being a special Act, overrides the

provisions in the Code, which is a general law and also because the subsequent enactment must prevail over the earlier one. (See Jasbir Singh Vs.

Vipin Kumar Jaggi and Others, ).

21. Reverting back to Section 36-C of the NDPS Act, it opens with the expression ""Save as otherwise provided in this Act"". The procedure

pertaining to trial of cases prescribed by the Code, which includes the appointment of a person as Public Prosecutor or Special Public Prosecutor,

to conduct the trial, ought to apply even to NDPS cases. Section 36-C, however, contemplates that a person conducting a prosecution of NDPS

Act case before a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. According to the Petitioner, this deeming provision is intended to

override the provision in Section 225 of the Code, which mandates that every trial before a Court of Sessions, the prosecution shall be conducted

by a Public Prosecutor. The term ""Public Prosecutor"" in Section 225 of the Code is ascribable to the Public Prosecutor or Special Public

Prosecutor appointed u/s 24 of the Code by the Central Government. It is trite to note that a Special Public Prosecutor appointed u/s 24(8), acts

as a Public Prosecutor in a given case or class of cases. He need not be a Public Prosecutor appointed u/s 24(1), 24(2) or 24(3) by the Central or

State Government, as the case may be. The Special Public Prosecutor so appointed is not required to act under the directions of a Public

Prosecutor. That, however, does not dispense with the procedure to appoint a person, other than a Public Prosecutor, as a Special Public

Prosecutor, in exercise of power u/s 24(8) of the Code. The word ''person'' appearing in Section 36-C of the NDPS Act will have to be

juxtaposed with the provisions of Section 24(8) of the Code, which postulates that a person, who has been in practice as an advocate for not less

than ten years, may be appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor for the purposes of any case or class of cases. Thus, a restricted meaning will

have to be given to the term person, who is qualified to be appointed as a Special public Prosecutor having been in practice as an advocate for not

less than ten years. Indeed, by virtue of Section 36-A, the Special Court can take cognizance of a case covered by the NDPS Act not only on the

basis of police report, but also on the basis of complaint made by an officer of the Central or State Government authorised in that behalf. Even

though the complaint can be filed by the authorised officer of the Central Government or State Government, as the case may be, that person

himself cannot conduct the trial as a Prosecutor, being the complainant. It necessarily follows that an independent person other than the

complainant will have to act as Prosecutor to conduct the trial of the case; and that person must possess the necessary qualification of having been

in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years to be appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor.

22. Indisputably, the Notification in question dated 27th April, 2005 has been issued in exercise of powers u/s 24(8) of the Code; but, as

aforesaid, it was to appoint the named advocates as Special Public Prosecutors for a specified period of three years or until further orders,

whichever is earlier.

23. The core question in the present cases is: With efflux of time, whether the appointment of the advocate(s) made in terms of Notification dated

27th April, 2005 had expired, and resultantly they would automatically cease to be Special Public Prosecutors on and from 26th April 2008 even

in cases where they have already entered appearance as a Special Public Prosecutor during the period specified in the stated Notification? Suffice

it to observe that the validity of initial appointment of the said Advocate as Public Prosecutor vide Notification dated 27th April, 2005 is

immutable. As a mater of fact, that challenge has been negatived by the Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1003 of 2005

vide order dated 7th June, 2005. The said order reads thus:

1. By this petition the Petitioners seek to challenge the appointment of certain special prosecutors to prosecute cases under the NDPS Act of

1985. Such application was therefore moved before the learned Special Court and the learned Judge has with reference to Section 24 of Code of

Criminal Procedure

and Section 36(C) of NDPS Act of 1985 held that the appointment and continuance of the special prosecutor in his court was proper.

2. We have considered the submission made at the bar and we have perused the provisions of secs.24 of Code of Criminal Procedure and 36(C)

of NDPS Act of 1985. A cohesive reading of both the sections very clearly establishes that the appointment made in the year 2000 and thereafter

in the year 2005 were in accordance with the law. Hence there is no substance in this petition. Petition is therefore rejected.

Concededly, by the said Notification, the named advocates were appointed by the Central Government as Special Public Prosecutors for the

purpose of conducting specified class of cases, and not for the purpose of any particular case. It is a general Notification appointing the three

advocates as Special Public Prosecutors in class of cases, and not with reference to any particular case. If the appointment were to be for a

specific case, the question of limiting it for duration of three years would not arise (considering the fact that the time frame for conclusion of trial is

uncertain). In the matter of appointment of Special Public Prosecutor in class of cases, consequent to his entering appearance in a given case in that

capacity, that arrangement ought to enure till the disposal of that particular case or till the appointment is expressly recalled, whichever is earlier.

Taking any other view would result in a piquant situation. In that, on expiry of the term specified in the notification appointing the Advocate as a

Special Public Prosecutor in respect of class of cases, the cases in which that Advocate has already entered appearance, in cases sent for trial, as

a Special Public Prosecutor, during the subsistence of his term of Special Public Prosecutor under the notification, the prosecuting agency would

go unrepresented in those cases. That would create an impasse or hiatus qua the trial of those cases.

24. In the present cases, the said Advocate entered his appearance as a Special Public Prosecutor on the basis of the said notification. At the

relevant time, he was authorised to appear and conduct cases for and on behalf of Central Government under the specified enactments in that

capacity. Indeed, the said two cases remained pending even beyond three years period specified in the notification, yet the said Advocate

continued to appear in those cases as a Special Public Prosecutor even though no fresh notification was issued by the Central Government for

continuing his appointment as a Special Public Prosecutor in those class of cases after 27th April, 2008. As aforesaid, since the said Advocate had

legitimately entered his appearance in the two cases pending against respective Respondent No. 1 in his capacity as Special Public Prosecutor

pursuant to Notification dated 27th April, 2005, it would necessarily follow that he had the implied authority of the Central Government to conduct

the said two cases for and on behalf of the Central Government, until the disposal thereof by the trial Court, so long as he was not replaced by

another Special Public Prosecutor or the Public Prosecutor to conduct the concerned case(s) in due course.

25. A priori, the expiry of time specified in the Notification dated 27th April, 2005, which was a general appointment of the said Advocate and

two others as Special Public Prosecutors for class of cases specified therein, that would not militate against the implied authority enjoyed by the

said Advocate to continue to appear in the said two cases until its disposal, wherein, he had entered appearance for the purposes of conducting the

said cases as Special Public Prosecutor for and on behalf of the Central Government, until an express order to recall him and to appoint another

Advocate as a Special Public Prosecutor to replace him is issued by the Central Government. In other words although, he would automatically

cease to be a Special Public Prosecutor for the ""class of cases"" referred to in the said Notification dated 27th April, 2005 on expiry of the tenure

specified therein; but he would continue to have an implied authority of the Central Government to conduct these two cases, wherein, he has

already entered appearance, till its disposal, as Public Prosecutor. That he could continue until the Central Government were to formally appoint

another Special Public Prosecutor or the Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, to conduct the concerned case(s) to replace him. In our opinion,

so long as a formal order is not issued by the Competent Authority of the Central Government to remove or replace the said Special Public

Prosecutor, who had entered appearance in two cases, at a time when the term specified in the Notification was subsisting, hr can and ought to

continue to appear as Public Prosecutor in those cases, by virtue of the deeming fiction in Section 36-C. To this extent, the provisions of Section

36-C would prevail over the provisions of Section 225 read with 24 of the Code.

26. Reliance has been placed on the provisions in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act of 1952""). The

purport of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act of 1952 is similar to Section 36-C of the NDPS Act. The same reads thus:

8(3) Save as provided in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), shall, so far as

they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of

the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a

prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor.

27. While considering the said provisions, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, ,

held that the deeming fiction enacted in Section 8 (3) above is confined to the limits of its requirement. In that, the person conducting a prosecution

before a Special Judge is to be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. It went on to observe that the Legislature wanted to clothe the person in charge

of the prosecution before a Special Judge with a status of a Public Prosecutor for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

28. This exposition has been reiterated by the Constitution Bench in its subsequent decision in the case of R.S. Nayak and P.S. Samant Vs. A.R.

Antulay, . In paragraph 4, the Court observed thus:

4. The clarification in respect of the first point read with the judgment rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 1983 in which Section 8(3) of the

Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 had come in for interpretation, it follows as a corollary that if the cognizance of an offence is taken u/s 8(1)

of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and the trial has to be held according to the procedure prescribed therein, u/s 8(3) the learned

advocate engaged by the complainant to conduct the prosecution will be deemed to be a public prosecutor. In such a situation, there is no question

of the State-appointed public prosecutor to conduct the prosecution. It is, therefore, clarified which to some extent may appear tautologous in view

of the aforementioned judgment, that it would be for the complainant to decide who would be the learned advocate in charge of the prosecution

and the advocate so appointed would be deemed to be a public prosecutor.

29. In paragraph 8 of the same decision, with reference to the purport of Section 8 of the Act of 1952, the Court has further opined that it is for

the complainant to decide who should be his advocate in charge of the prosecution; and there is no question of entrusting the trial of the two cases

to a State-appointed public prosecutor.

30. Applying the principle underlying the dictum of the Apex Court in the above said decision, we have no hesitation in taking the view that Section

36-C of the NDPS Act is a provision, which, by legal fiction, declares that the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court to be

deemed to be a public prosecutor. In the present cases, the Central Government has not only asserted that the said Advocate was authorised to

conduct the two cases on hand; and, had thus entered his appearance in those cases as Special Public Prosecutor, pursuant to the Notification

dated 27th April, 2005, when the same was in force, but has also asserted that the said Advocate should be allowed to appear and conduct those

two cases in which he has already entered appearance until the same are decided, and no fresh notification was necessary. It would necessarily

follow that the appointment as well as continuation of the said Advocate, to be in charge of the prosecution and conduct the two cases on hand, is

on instructions and under a proper authority of the Central Government. By virtue of legal fiction contained in Section 36-C of the NDPS Act, he

is deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of Section 24 read with Section 2(u) of the Code.

31. We shall now consider the argument advanced by the counsel for Respondent No. 1 that the order of the Division Bench of this Court in

Criminal Writ Petition No. 1003 of 2005 dated 7th June, 2005 would come to their aid. In our opinion, the said order, in the first place, cannot be

treated as a binding precedent. Secondly, the opinion recorded by the Division Bench in the said order does not militate against the view that we

have taken. Thirdly, the said order has been misconstrued by the Special Judge to mean that the regime provided in Section 24 of the Code was

indispensable in the fact situation of the case. For the view that we have already taken, Section 36-C departs from the regime of Section 24 of the

Code only to the extent of declaring that any person, who is, under proper authority, conducting a prosecution before the Special Court for and on

behalf of the concerned Government, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.

32. The respective counsel for Respondent No. 1 would then contend that the subsequent continuation after 27th April, 2008 has been validated in

terms of order dated 26th October, 2010 issued under the signature of Director (Legal), Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of

Revenue, Central Board of Excise and Customs, and not by the Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, which had issued the

Notification dated 27th April, 2005. This argument does not take the matter any further. So long as there is valid authorisation during the relevant

period, express or implied, as in these cases, by the prosecuting agency to permit the person to appear before the Special Court for the purpose of

conducting specified cases, that person, by virtue of Section 36-C of the NDPS Act, would be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor. It is

indisputable that the prosecuting Department in these cases is the Customs Department, as the Central Government had instituted prosecution

through the Air Intelligence Unit, Customs. Thus, understood, the order dated 26th October, 2010 meets the requirement of a valid authority in

favour of the said Advocate to conduct prosecution of subject cases before the Special Court in his capacity as a Public Prosecutor, by virtue of

Section 36-C of the NDPS Act.

33. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Shri A.R. Gupte, Advocate, was duly authorised to appear and conduct the two cases until its

disposal, in which he had entered appearance pursuant to the Notification dated 27th April, 2005 even after expiry of (three years) period

specified therein. In that view of the matter, he was competent to appear in the subject cases until the conclusion of trial thereof, in his capacity as

Public Prosecutor, by virtue of deeming provision contained in Section 36-C of the NDPS Act, even after expiry of period specified in the

Notification dated 27th April, 2005, so long as he was not formally removed or replaced by the Prosecuting Agency.

34. Accordingly, both these petitions succeed, and the impugned decision of the Special Judge dated 6th September, 2010 in the respective cases

is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute on the above terms.

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