Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.@mdashIn this revisional application, the petitioner Kamal Singh Badalia, prays for quashing the proceeding of Case
no. C/4803 of 1976 which is now pending against him before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Calcutta under S. 500 of the
Indian Penal Code, on the ground that the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta has no territorial jurisdiction to try the case. The
opposite party No. 2 Dilip Singh Nahata, instituted the case before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta alleging, inter alia, that on
September 18, 1976 he received at his office at 12, India Exchange Place, Calcutta a letter written to him by Sri Bejoy Singh Nahar, President,
Bihar State Board of Swetambar Jain Religious Trusts, enclosing therewith an alleged true copy of a letter dated March 20, 1976 addressed to the
Law Secretary, Government of Bihar by the petitioner. It has been alleged by the complainant that from the said communication, he learned that
the petitioner wrote a letter to the Law Secretary, Government of Bihar, wherein he has intentionally made certain allegations against the petitioner
which are false and highly defamatory. Along with the complaint the copy of the said letter dated March 20, 1976 has been annexed. The learned
Chief Mttropolitan Magistrate took cognizance upon the complaint, examined the complainant and his witness Govinda Chandra Dhar, perused the
different paragraphs of the said letter dated March 20, 1976 and being satisfied therefrom that the letter contained defamatory statements against
the complainant, summoned the petitioner under S. 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Pursuant to the process issued the petitioner appeared before
the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who transferred the case to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Calcutta for disposal. The
petitioner, thereafter, moved this Court and obtained the present Rule.
2. Mr. Sekhar Kumar Bose the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contended that the petition of complaint will itself disclose that the
offence of alleged defamation was committed within the jurisdiction of Bihar Court and as such the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta
had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Mr. Talukdar, the learned Advocate appearing for the complainant on the other hand contended, that
the copy of the letter addressed to the Law Secretary, Government of Bihar was received by the complainant in Calcutta where he was defamed
and in view of the provisions of S. 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873, the Courts at Calcutta had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint and try the case.
3. To appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it has therefore to be determined what are the ingredients of an offence punishable under
S. 500 of the Indian Penal Code and whether S. 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is attracted in the instant case.
4. The three essential requirements to constitute an offence punishable under S. 500 of the Indian Penal Code are :(i) making or publishing any
imputation concerning any person, (ii) such imputation must have been made by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by
visible representations and (iii) such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with knowledge or having reason to believe
that it will harm the reputation of the person concerning whom it is made. It is not a necessary ingredient of the offence of defamation that the
reputation of the person, concerning whom such imputation has been made, should have been actually harmed. Once the defamatory imputation is
made or published in the manner indicated in S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code with the requisite intention or knowledge the offence is complete. If
as a consequence thereof the person concerned is defamed, a cause of action arises in his favour to institute a prosecution for such offence against
the person making the imputation but such a consequence does not form part of the offence. Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that where an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be
enquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. It would thus appear
from a plain reading of the section that ""consequence"" referred to therein must be a part of the offence. In other words, the section can apply only
to a case where a person is charged with an offence which constitutes not only act committed by him but also the consequence which has ensued
from the act. If the consequence is no part of the offence then in my view, S. 179 of the Code has no application.
5. Keeping in view the above principles let me now therefore ascertain whether the Meropolitan Magistrate''s Court at Calcutta has jurisdiction to
try the instant case. The letter in question was written by the petitioner in his capacity as Mukhya Karyavahak Bihar Shaka of Shree Akhil Bharat
Varsiya Jain Sanskirt Rakshak Sabha of Parshanath Mandir Path, Patna City and was sent to the Law Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna
through Sri Rabindra Prosad Sinha. Under Secretary, in-charge Religious Trust, Patna. It appears from the petition of complaint and the initial
depositions of the complainant and his witness that the Law Secretary went through the letter and thereafter forwarded a copy of the said letter to
Sri Bejoy Singh Nahar, President of Bihar State Board of Shetambar Jain Religious Trusts and the said letter was opened by Sri Gobinda Chandra
Dhar, Office Assistant of Sri Nahar at 48, Indian Mirror Street, Caleutta-13. Sri Bejoy Singh Nahar in his turn, with the letter dated September
18, 1976 forwarded a copy of the said letter to the complainant asking for his comments. The materials on record disclose that the letter was
written by the accused at Patna and was also published in the Secretariat at Patna when the contents of them were made known to the Law
Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Government of Bihar. The offence of defamation, as defined under S. 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
Therefore, if any, was complete with its publication at Patna. It is no doubt true that the consequence of alleged commission of such offence ensued
in Calcutta as according to the complainant he was defamed in Calcutta. But as I have already indicated the consequence that ensued in Calcutta
was no part of the offence of defamation. In this connection, it has to be borne in mind that it is not the case of the complainant that while
addressing the letter to the Law Secretary dated March 20, 1976 the petitioner sent a copy thereof to any one in Calcutta so as to entitle the
Metropolitan Magistrate to entertain the complaint on the ground that the accused published the defamatory statement in Calcutta.
6. In view of the foregoing discussions, it must therefore be held that the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to
entertain or proceed with the complaint. On this ground alone the proceeding of the case must be quashed. In the result, this application succeeds
and the Rule is made absolute. The proceeding of Case No. C/4803 of 1976 pending against the petitioner in the 14th Court of the Metropolitan
Magistrate, Calcutta is hereby quashed. I however make it clear that nothing will prevent the complainant to file a fresh complaint in the
appropriate forum, if the same is otherwise maintainable in law.