,"Name of
the
Petitioner","Property in
question","Date of the
notice","Period for
which
assessments
were to be
effective","Date when
assessments
orderswere
made","Date of the
demand",
,"Ved
Marwah","Flat No.A-
2, 44,
Amrita
Shergill
Marg, New
Delhi","11.02.2002
31.03.2011
08.03.2017","2001-02
2010-11
2016-17",31.10.2017,01.11.2017,
,S.P.,Delson,10.02.2003,2002-03,13.12.2016,06.01.2017,
,"Malhotra
A.L.
Malhotra
Satyawati
Malhotra
Vivek
Malhotra","Motor
Workshop
BF FF SF
3F
Windsor
Mansion
Janpath","24.03.2011
28.03.2015/
30.03.2015","2010-11
2014-15",,,
Mehra
Jewel
Palace Pvt.
Ltd.","C-11 (incl.
Mezz),
Connaught
Place","28.02.2003
24.03.2006
28.03.2007","2002-03
2005-06
2006-07",27.02.2017,17.03.2017,,
appellant on 20.3.2001. Indisputably, in terms of Section 11 of the 1948 Act, a period of three years has been prescribed as a period of limitation as",,,,,,,
contained under sub-section (3) of Section 11 for completing assessment from the last date for filing of return. Sub-section (6) of Section 11 reads as,,,,,,,
under :,,,,,,,
If upon information which has come into his possession, the Assessing Authority is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay tax under this Act in",,,,,,,
respect of any period but has failed to apply for registration, the Assessing Authority shall, within five years after the expiry of such period, after",,,,,,,
giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard, proceed to assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax, if any, due from the dealer",,,,,,,
in respect of such period and all subsequent periods and in case where such dealer has willfully failed to apply for registration, the Assessing Authority",,,,,,,
may direct that the dealer shall pay by way of penalty, in addition to the amount so assessed, a sum not exceeding one and a half times that amount.",,,,,,,
Section 21 of the said Act provides for revision. Section 21 of the Act with which we are concerned herein reads as under: _,,,,,,,
21.Revision-(1) The Commissioner may of his own motion call for the record of any proceedings which are pending before, or have been disposed of",,,,,,,
by any authority subordinate to him, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order made therein and",,,,,,,
may pass such order in relation thereto as he may think fit.,,,,,,,
(2)The State Government may by notification confer on any Officer the powers of the Commissioner under sub-section (1) to be exercised subject to,,,,,,,
such conditions and in respect of such areas as may be specified in the notification.,,,,,,,
(3)A Tribunal, on application made to it against an order of the Commissioner under sub-section (1) within ninety days from the date of communication",,,,,,,
of the order, may call for and examine the record of any such case and pass such orders thereon as it thinks just and proper.",,,,,,,
(4)No order shall be passed under this section which adversely affects any person unless such person has been given a reasonable opportunity of,,,,,,,
being heard.,,,,,,,
15.Sub-section (1) of Section 11 empowers the Commissioner to extend the period of three years for passing the order of assessment wherefor,,,,,,,
reasons are required to be recorded in writing subject, however, to the maximum period of five years. Ordinarily, therefore, a period of three years has",,,,,,,
been prescribed for completion of the assessment in terms of the provisions of the Act. We may also notice that in cases where an assessment order,,,,,,,
is to be reviewed, the same should be done within a period of one year.",,,,,,,
16.A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean",,,,,,,
that the suo moto power can be exercised at any time.,,,,,,,
17.It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What,",,,,,,,
however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.",,,,,,,
18.Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said",,,,,,,
Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable.",,,,,,,
Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore,",,,,,,,
maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years.""",,,,,,,
14.Bhatinda (supra) was noticed and followed subsequently in Ram Prakash (supra). In a more recent decision Ram Karan (D),,,,,,,
by LRs v. State of Rajasthan 2014 (8) SCC 282, it was held that:",,,,,,,
“38.State of Punjab & Ors v Bhatinda District Co-op Milk P. Union Ltd (supra) this Court held that if no period of limitation has been prescribed,",,,,,,,
statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. However, what shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the",,,,,,,
nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. In the present case, neither any objection was raised nor was any",,,,,,,
application filed by vendors for restoration of land in their favour. The suit was filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after more than 31 years. No ground",,,,,,,
is shown to file such petition after long delay nor it was mentioned as to whether the vendors i.e. original landholders made any application for,,,,,,,
restoration of land in their favour.,,,,,,,
39.In view of the matter, we hold that the suit being filed beyond the reasonable period was fit to be dismissed. The Additional Collector rightly",,,,,,,
dismissed the suit being barred by limitation.â€,,,,,,,
14.In the present case, the finalization of assessment list or its revision, after over 12 years in all the cases, cannot be countenanced. It is clearly",,,,,,,
unreasonable and arbitrary and calls for interference.,,,,,,,
15.As regards the second issue whether an appeal is an efficacious remedy, the Court is of opinion that there is merit in the",,,,,,,
argument. In Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India 2004 (4) SCC 311, it was held as follows:",,,,,,,
“60.The requirement of pre-deposit of any amount at the first instance of proceedings is not to be found in any of the decisions cited on behalf of,,,,,,,
the respondent. All these cases relate to appeals. The amount of deposit of 75% of the demand, at the initial proceeding itself sounds unreasonable",,,,,,,
and oppressive more particularly when the secured assets/the management thereof along with the right to transfer such interest has been taken over,,,,,,,
by the secured creditor or in some cases property is also sold. Requirement of deposit of such a heavy amount on basis of one sided claim alone,",,,,,,,
cannot be said to be a reasonable condition at the first instance itself before start of adjudication of the dispute. Merely giving power to the Tribunal to,,,,,,,
waive or reduce the amount, does not cure the inherent infirmity leaning one-sidedly in favour of the party, who, so far has alone been the party to",,,,,,,
decide the amount and the fact of default and classifying the dues as NPAs without participation/association of the borrower in the process. Such an,,,,,,,
onerous and oppressive condition should not be left operative in expectation of reasonable exercise of discretion by the concerned authority. Placed in,,,,,,,
a situation as indicated above, where it may not be possible for the borrower to raise any amount to make the deposit, his secured assets having",,,,,,,
already been taken possession of or sold, such a rider to approach the Tribunal at the first instance of proceedings, captioned as appeal, renders the",,,,,,,
remedy illusory and nugatory.,,,,,,,
61.In the case of Seth Nandlal (supra), while considering the question of validity of pre-deposit before availing the right of appeal the Court held",,,,,,,
....right of appeal is a creature of the statute and while granting the right the legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right so long as",,,,,,,
the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory. ...."" (emphasis supplied). While making",,,,,,,
said observation this Court referred to the decision in the case of Anant Mills Co. Ltd. (supra). In both the above noted decisions this Court had,,,,,,,
negated the plea raised against pre-deposit but in the case of Seth Nandlal (supra) it was found that the condition was not so onerous since the amount,,,,,,,
sought to be deposited was meager and that too was confined to the landholding tax payable in respect of the disputed area i.e. the area or part,,,,,,,
thereof which is declared surplus by the Prescribed Authority (emphasis supplied) after leaving the permissible area to the appellant. In the above,,,,,,,
circumstances it was found that even in the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate authority to waive or reduce the amount of,,,,,,,
pre-deposit, it was considered to be valid, for the two reasons indicated above. The facts of the case in hand are just otherwise.",,,,,,,
62.As indicated earlier, the position of the appeal under Section 17 of the Act is like that of a suit in the court of the first instance under the Code of",,,,,,,
Civil Procedure. No doubt in suits also it is permissible, in given facts and circumstances and under the provisions of the law to attach the property",,,,,,,
before a decree is passed or to appoint a receiver and to make a provision by way of interim measure in respect of the property in suit. But for,,,,,,,
obtaining such orders a case for the same is to be made out in accordance with the relevant provisions under the law. There is no such provision under,,,,,,,
the Act.,,,,,,,
63.Yet another justification which has been sought to be given for the requirement of deposit is that the secured assets which may be taken possession,,,,,,,
of or sold may fall short of the dues therefore such a deposit may be necessary. We find no merit in this submission too. In such an eventuality the,,,,,,,
recourse may have to be taken to sub-section 10 of Section 13 where a petition may have to be filed before the Tribunal for the purpose of making up,,,,,,,
of the short-fall.,,,,,,,
64.The condition of pre-deposit in the present case is bad rendering the remedy illusory on the grounds that (i) it is imposed while approaching the,,,,,,,
adjudicating authority of the first instance, not in appeal, (ii)there is no determination of the amount due as yet (iii) the secured assets or its",,,,,,,
management with transferable interest is already taken over and under control of the secured creditor (iv) no special reason for double security in,,,,,,,
respect of an amount yet to be determined and settled (v) 75% of the amount claimed by no means would be a meager amount (vi) it will leave the,,,,,,,
borrower in a position where it would not be possible for him to raise any funds to make deposit of 75% of the undetermined demand. Such conditions,,,,,,,
are not alone onerous and oppressive but also unreasonable and arbitrary. Therefore, in our view, sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act is",,,,,,,
unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.â€",,,,,,,
16.In Sunil Rai v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors 48 (1992) DLT 621 (DB) after the judgment in Shyam Kishore (supra) a Division Bench,,,,,,,
of this Court had interpreted a provision identical to Section 116 (b) and held that the proper exercise of discretion by the appellate forum in cases,,,,,,,
where assessment orders are framed for a number of years, is to direct the assesse to deposit the disputed tax in respect of the base year and then",,,,,,,
to proceed to hear and decide the appeal in respect to the base year assessment and after deciding the said appeal the decision of the appeal in,,,,,,,
respect of the base year would   automatically  govern  the  assessment  for  the  subsequent years. Adoption of such,,,,,,,
an approach, in the opinion of this Court, saves the provision of Section 116 of the Act.",,,,,,,
17.In view of the above reasoning, it is held the impugned final orders of assessment and the demands issued are clearly unreasonable and void. They",,,,,,,
are hereby quashed. Consequently, it is held that the NDMC is at liberty to rework the assessments in respect of the properties that are the subject",,,,,,,
matter of these proceedings, by issuing fresh notices for the periods commencing from 3 years prior to the date on which the final notices were issued,",,,,,,,
and finalize the assessments within reasonable time. In the event of grievance on the part of the assessee to such fresh assessment orders, it is open",,,,,,,
to them to approach the appellate tribunal; provided they deposit the amount towards the tax liability for the base year.,,,,,,,
18.For the above reasons, the writ petitions are allowed; there shall be no order on costs.",,,,,,,
